Ts)
----- Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 005974317
The President's Daily Brief
Top Secat 8 March 1968
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 005974317
23
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C05974317
NORTH VIETNAM
GULF OF TONKIN
NAUTICAL MILES
698473-68 CIA
r��,......10�2111PAIIIIIIMS111.61.110MINDAN
4.
Chinese Hydrofoil PT Boat
3.3(h)(2)
3.3(h)(2)
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 C05974317
TOP SECRET
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 005974317
DAILY BRIEF
8 MARCH 1968
1, North, Vietnam
2. South Vietnam
3. Panama
4. Warsaw Pact
Tor SECRET
Chinese-built hydrofoil torpedo boat--
the most modern craft of its kind. Be-
cause of greater speed and stability,
the North Vietnamese will find it is
considerably superior to the Soviet tor-
pedo boats which they already have. It
is excellent for hit-and-run tactics,
and could be used against US naval forces
in the Tonkin Gulf.
A motion of no confidence in the
government of Premier Loc has been
placed before the lower house, but it
is not expected to be acted upon for
some weeks. Action on the government
budget has priority on the agenda, and
any formal recommendation of no confi-
dence must have the approval of both
houses of the assembly.
Robles, in a nationwide radio-TV
speech yesterday, virtually slammed the
door on a negotiated settlement. He
announced that he had not appeared be-
fore the assembly commission investi-
gating the charges against him because
he views the entire procedure as "il-
legal and immoral." The impeachment
process, he said, is "completely null."
The two-day pact meeting ended in
Sofia yesterday without any sign of a
new Soviet-Rumanian confrontation.
There are no reports yet on what was
discussed, and a final communiqu�as
not been released.
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 005974317
3.5(c)
3.3(h)(2)
3.3(h)(2)
3.5(c)
_Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 005974317
Tor SECRET
5. Berlin
6. Western Europe
The informal arrangements by which
the US and the West Europeans have tra-
ditionally organized themselves to sell
gold to world buyers may be breaking
down.
Most members of the so-called
London Gold Pool are losing their en-
thusiasm for the system managed by the
Bank of England. Under the system each
member is expected to share the burdens
of any other who is hit hard by loss of
reserves to speculators and hoarders.
But Italy, for instance, now finds it-
self already purchasing directly from
the US all of the gold that it is re-
quired to provide to the pool. Other
members are also wavering.
If this trend continues, �the pool
would lose its purpose. The US would
in effect assume a 100 percent share of
the gold losses in the official Euro-
pean gold market. The other members
would retain their gold reserves, while
US reserves would continue to decline.
The immediate problem is that be-
tween 29 February and 5 March losses
of the pool reached $224 million; the
US in turn has had to ask members for
an additional contribution of $200
million.
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 005974317
3.5(c)
3.3(h)(2)
3.5(c)
Tor s ECRET
_Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 005974317
7. Czechoslovakia
8. Philippines
Tor sECRET -
The defection of the Czech general
has caused a major stir in Prague. The
main party daily is suggesting that the
general got away because of protection
given him by Novotny and his backers.
Other voices are calling on the defense
minister, the secret police chief, and
the prosecutor general to resign.
All of this comes at the best pos-
sible time for the new party secretary,
Dubcek. As a result, the attacks on
Novotny should pick up markedly; his
resignation as president is probably
not far off,
US-Philippine relations took a
strange turn yesterday. The Philip-
pine Embassy in Saigon told our embassy
there that, effective immediately,
Clark Air Base and other US bases in
the Philippines will be prohibited to
US servicemen and civilian personnel
visiting on leave. Clarification from
Manila is expected shortly.
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 005974317
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 005974317
�Th-p�Serref�
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 005974317
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 005974317
FOR THE THE PRESIDENT'S EYES ONLY
Special Daily Report on North Vietnam
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 005974317
�Top-Seeret-
16
8 March 1968
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 005974317
Special Daily Report on North Vietnam
for the President's Eyes Only
8 March 1968
I. NOTES ON THE SITUATION
More Comments from French Correspondent: In
further debriefing by US Embassy officers in Paris,
Cabanes, the former French Press Agency correspond-
ent in Hanoi, reports that the North Vietnamese
were not completely satisfied with the results of
the Tet offensive. He claims that in private conver-
sations, North Vietnamese officials have displayed
disappointment over the relatively good showing
made by the South Vietnamese and the fact that so
few South Vietnamese members defected to the Viet
Cong.
In other aspects of the war, Cabanes provided
little beyond the standard optimistic North Viet-
namese line. He characterizes the party'.s control
of the population as "strong and effective." He
says the North Vietnamese leadership's political de-
pendence on Moscow and Peking is minimal, and he
tries especially hard to discount Chinese influence
in Hanoi. He recounts a story about North Vietnam-
ese officials being extremely disturbed over bomb
damage to Chinese vessels in Haiphong because these
officials feared "it might trigger a Chicom response
or the sending of Chinese volunteers into North Viet-
nam."
* * *
North Vietnamese Combat Officer's View of the
War: A recently captured 76-page notebook, formerly
the property of a North Vietnamese signals officer,
is concerned with combat strength ratios. The
writer states that if the ratio is 15 allied to one
Communist, "the enemy will win," but "the enemy will
lose if the ratio is five to one." He believes that
the ratio in April 1967, after the 1966-67 dry sea-
son, wAs two and one-half to one. North Vietnamese
reinforcements "continue to increase day after day
in order to prevent the enemy from increasing the
ratio. We presently have 400,000 troops."
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 005974317
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 005974317
The writer asserts that the Communists have
the initiative in the current winter-spring cam-
paign. He says that in 1966-67 "we succeeded in de-
ploying the enemy to the strategic positions se-
lected by us." He feels this year's campaign may
be a good opportunity to achieve ultimate victory
because opposing forces will be stretched thin.
The writer's views may not be an entirely ac-
curate reflection of North Vietnamese strategic
thinking, but they are illustrative of an apparently
widespread Communist conviction that the balance of
forces favors them. In earlier phases of the war,
Communists were instructed to believe in ultimate
victory primarily because of the righteousness of
their cause. Now the emphasis is on the superiority
of Communist forces and strategy.
TOP SECRET
-2-
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 005974317
3.5(c)
3.3(h)(2)
3.5(c)
_Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 005974317
Internal Security Measures:
in late
e regime au down strict measures to fur-
ther tighten controls over the populace.
The new measures in-
cluded increased patrols by local security forces,
more emphasis on detection of espionage, tighter
controls over �the rice ration, closer surveillance
of individuals deemed "bad elements," and deten-
tion of "dangerous elements" in special camps to do
forced labor.
None of these measures is new to life in North
Vietnam, and it seems likely that increased vigi-
lance last fall was prompted largely by the disrup-
tion caused by stepped-up US air attacks. There
were at least two propaganda pieces last autumn em-
phasizing a similar theme. Our best guess is that
the regime was simply taking further precautions to
maintain its already tight control apparatus, es-
pecially because of the growing number of evacuees
from urban areas. Evacuation was accelerated last
autumn and it doubtless has created problems and
confusion of which we are only dimly aware. Secu-
rity almost certainly is a major ronsidpration
rural authorities were exhorted to be more
responsible in caring for the needs of those evacu-
ated from the cities. They also were reminded to
be on guard for spies, rumormongers, and gossips
"who maligned the regime" in the ranks of these
refugees.
* * *
French Medical Aid for the Viet Cong: The
Franco-Vietnamese medical association in Paris has
assembled medical supplies valued at about $20,000
for air shipment to Cambodia and onward to the
Viet Cong. Funds for this particular shipment
have come from the medical association and the
Mouvement Du Milliard, which has previously sent
medical aid to North Vietnam. The shipment re-
portedly will be received in Cambodia by the Na-
tional Liberation Front representative there,
Nguyen Van Hieu.
TOP SECRET
-3-
3.5(c)
3.3(h)(2)
3.3(h)(2)
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 005974317
3.5(c)
TOP 'SECRET
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 005974317
Front Spokesman Discusses Tet Offensive: The
deputy chief of the Liberation Front office in Mos-
cow told recently that the Tet
offensive had proven that Viet Cong military forces
are still powerful and not "tired" as he claimed
the Pentagon and President Johnson had alleged. He
also said the objective of Viet Cong efforts is to
get the Americans out of Vietnam. In tough and
cocky language, he warned that the Communists are
prepared to outlast the Americans despite "their
stubborn nature," and that only after the US has
evacuated South Vietnam "will there be negotiations.
* * *
11
Hanoi Overcomes POL Problems: A detailed re-
view of the POL situation in North Vietnam over
the last year indicates that Hanoi has overcome
the effects of the 1966 bombings of petroleum
storage facilities. Specifically:
--POL imports were significantly larger in
1967 than in 1966. Most of the oil came by sea
from the USSR. The system of lighters at Haiphong
is working well.
--Consumption in 1967 was also higher than in
1966, partly because the North Vietnamese had to
depend more heavily on truck transport and POL-
driven electric power plants. But POL losses from
bombing were drastically lower, and the net out-
come was a modest increase in reserves.
--The North Vietnamese have dispersed most of
their storage facilities. This dispersal has been
so successful that they are not even bothering to
repair the central facilities damaged in the 1966
bombings.
-4-
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 005974317
3.5(c)
3.3(h)(2)
3.3(h)(2)
3.5(c)
:TOP SECRET
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 005974317
II, NORTH VIETNAMESE REFLECTIONS OF US POLITICAL
ATTITUDES ON THE WAR
There is nothing of significance to report.
TOP SECRET -
-5-
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 005974317
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 005974317
7up�Sevar-gt_
Approved for Release: 2019/04/17 005974317