QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Tet Declassified
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03398256
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: April 27, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 30, 2019
• Publication Date: March 1, 1968

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MEMORANDUM FOR:
DDI
These MIMS were prepared for
Nr. Warnke at the request of the Director.
4
a.,/frk-74Y4,9,�?
ABBOT SMITH
Director
National Estimates
I March 1968
(DATE)
FO � .
0 I REPLACES FORM 10-101
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.
(47)
MEMORANDUM FOR:
These are from Bill Hyland.
(DATE)
FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101
1 AUG 54 WH ICH MAY BE USED.
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MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director
Bare is the memo you requested yesterday, for
Mr. Warnke tomorrow morning. We need to do a
corrected copy after you have seen it.
NeanWhile I have talked with Marmke. He agrees
that there need not be an SNIE. We shall send him
tomorrow a (second) memorandum on the questions
posed for the SIM plus the questions passed to
George Carver. I will get this to you tomorrow
before we send it.
ABBOT SMITE
Director
National Estimates
29 Nebruary 1968
(DATE)
FORM NO. lO REPLACES FORM 10-101
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
I March 1968
MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM
I. THE COMMUNIST POSITION
How does Hanoi view the present phase of the war; for
example, has Hanoi concluded that a protracted conflict
is impossible and that it must gain victory this year or
collapse?
1. Hanoi's strategy of revolutionary warfare in South
Vietnam has always embraced two propositions: to prepare for a
protracted struggle and to seek victory in the shortest possible
time. From the introduction of large US forces in 19650 through
the summer of 1967 the emphasis was on the probability of a pro-
longed war of attrition. Some backing away from the protracted
war theme became evident in captured documents and Hanoi's propa-
ganda later in 1967. In our view the intensity of the Tet offen-
sive and the exertions being made to sustain pressures confirms
that Hanoi is now engaged in a major effort to achieve early and
decisive results. Yet the Communists probably have no rigid time-
table. They apparently have high hopes of achieving their objectives
this year, but they will preserve considerable tactical flexibility.
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grading and declassification
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2. It is still not altogether clear why the Vietnamese
Communists chose this course of action at this time. They
certainly were not desperate or fearful of early collapse. A
reconsideration of their capabilities to succeed in a long war
may have been a contributing factor. And they probably regarded
the balance of forces as sufficiently favorable to warrant a major
and widespread offensive. The fact of Presidential elections in
the US may have influenced their decision, and, of course, the
tactical advantage of the Tet truce played a role in the immediate
timing. In any case, it does not appear that they undertook the pre-
sent offensive because they had concluded that protracted conflict
was no longer feasible for them.
What are the capabilities of the NVA/VC forces to sustain
their present offensive, and, if they choose to, continue
a prolonged war thereafter?
3. There is no doubt that the Communists have already paid
a high price in the present offensive phase. They have not only
lost manpower, but also vality resources such as the special
units employed in the Tet attacks. Nevertheless, prior to Tet
there was apparently a strenuous drive to bring units up to
strength with new recruits and upgraded guerrillas. Complete
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guerrilla units also were merged with Local forces to form larger
elements. Infiltration of replacements and units from the North
has probably been heavier than previously believed. A part of the
Main Forces have been withheld from major combat. Finally, an
intensive effort to raise new levies is underway in the rural
areas, where the Communists now enjoy fuller access. Thus,it is con-
ceivable that the enemy's gross strength is not significantly lower
now than it was in the latter part of 1967.
4. The Communist supply position might be a factor limiting
combat capabilities in the next few months. Many forces are now
deployed away from their bases at the end of longer lines of supply.
Expenditures of ammunition and losses of equipment have been re-
latively high. These factors will be offset in some degree by the
extraordinary stockpiling that evidently toot place before Tet and
by the increased availability of manpower in the countryside which
will permit the continued portering of military supplies and food
to VC/NVA forces.
5. While not strictly a matter of physical capability, the
Communist position is much enhanced, for the time being at least,
by their possession of the strategic initiative. Within limits
this permits them to choose the time and place of combat and to
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keep US/ARVN forces pinned down and dispersed in static defense
of many potential targets.
6. Accordingly, we believe that the EVA/VC forces have
the capability to sustain a relatively high level of combat
and occasionally to intensify it over the next several months,
including rocket and mortar attacks on urban areas and military
installations, major battles with US forces and assaults on
selected cities. At the same time, the Communists will have
resources to consolidate their hold on formerly pacified and
contested areas.
7. It is conceivable that the Communists regard the
present campaign as so critical to the ultimate outcome of
the war that they will commit their full resources to a
maximum effort in the near term, even at risk of very high
losses. But it is far more likely that they probably will
not use their resources in such a reckless manner as to deny
themselves the possibility of continuing the struggle well
beyond the next several months.
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What is the Communist attitude toward negotiations: in
particular how would Hanoi deal with an unconditional
cessation of US bombing of min and what would be its
terms for a settlement?
8. The Communists probably still expect the war to end
eventually in some form of negotiations. Since they hope the
present military effort will be decisive in destroying the TiN
and ABVN, they are not likely to give any serious consideration
to negotiations until this campaign has progressed far enough
for its results to be fairly clear.
9. If, however, the US ceased the bombing of North Vietnam
in the near future, Hanoi mould probably respond more or less as
indicated in its most recent statements. It would begin talks
fairly soon, would accept a fairly wide ranging exploration of
issues, but would not moderate its terms for a final settlement
or stop fighting in the South.
10. In any talks, Communist terms would involve the establish-
ment of a new "coalition" government, which would in fact if not in
appearance be under the domination of the Communists. Secondly,
they would insist on a guaranteed withdrawal of US forces within
some precisely defined period. Their attitude toward other issues
would be dictated by the degree of progress in achieving these two
primary objectives, and the military-political situation then
obtaining in South Vietnam.
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11. Cessation of bombing and opening of negotiations
without significant Communist concessions would be deeply
disturbing to the Saigon government. There would be a real
risk that the Thieu-Ky regime would collapse, and this would
in fact be part of Hanoi's calculation in accepting negotiations.
THE OUTLOOK
What is the likely course of events in South Vietnam over
the next 10 months, assming no change in US policy or
force levels?
12. In the assumed circumstances a total military victory by
the Allies or the Communists is highly unlikely in the next 10
months. It is manifestly impossible for the Communists to drive
US forces out of the country. It is equally out of the question
for US/GVN forces to clear South Vietnam of Communist forces. It
is possible, however, that the overall situation in this period
will take a decisive turn.
13. We think it unlikely that this turn could be in the US/GVN
favor. To be sure, Communist forces are now exposed to aggressive
counteraction, their supply lines are extended, and some base
areas may be vulnerable. Morale may be poor in some of the
units which have suffered heavy losses. But we see no
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evidence yet that the GVN/ARVN will be inspired to seize the
initiative, go over to the attack, exploit the Communist
vulnerabilities, and quickly regain the rural areas. We doubt
they have the will and capability to make the effort.
14. Far more likely is an erosion of the ARVNis morale
and effectiveness. We do not believe that the GVN will
collapse, or that the ARVN will totally disintegrate. But
there is a fairly good chance that Communist pressures will
result in a serious weakening of the GVN/ARVN apparatus and
an end to its effective functioning in parts of the country.
In these circumstances, virtually the entire burden of the
war would fall on US forces.
15. The Communists too will be weakened by further
offensive efforts. Losses will be heavy, combat effectiveness
will be lowered, and morale will be damaged by the failure to
achieve a complete victory. Even though their situation vis-a-
vis the ARVN will be strong, their forces will probably not be
in a position to register decisive advances unless they radically
escalate the war by an all-out invasion.
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16. In sum) there is a high risk that both the ARVN and
GVN will be seriously weakened in the next months, and perhaps
decisively so. Our best estimate is that in the assumed cir-
cumstances the overall situation 10 months hence will be no
better than a standoff.
REACTIONS TO US COURSES OF ACTION
What is the likely VNA/VC strategy over the next 10
months if US forces are increased by 5000000 by 100,000,
or by 2000000?
17. We would expect the Communists to continue the war.
They still have resources available in Borth Vietnam and within
South Vietnam to increase their troop strength. Their strong
logistical effort and their ability to organize and exploit the
people under their control in the South enable them to counter
US increases by smaller increases of their own. Over a ten-month
period the Communists would probably be able to introduce suffi-
cient new units into the South to offset the US maneuver battalion
increments of the various force levels given above.
18. We cannot foresee the outcome of future combat resulting
from the increase in US forces. The Communists would probably
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have to modify their current tactics, especially if the US
increments were large enough to permit the formation of a
strategic reserve as well as providing for the partial re-
lief of the ARVN. In some places, they would retreat from
the urban areas, trying to hold as much as possible of the
countryside.
19. The prospect of heavy US reinforcements might persuade
Hanoi to gamble on an all-out invasion from the North to seize
Northern I Corps before reinforcements could be committed. It
is also possible that the Communists would greatly expand their
military pressures in Laos. The purpose of such a move would be
to draw off US forces from South Vietnam, and to indicate that,
unless the war was ended, the US faced a continued expansion of
its commitment.
20. We would not expect the addition of any given number
of US troops to change the policy or attitude of the USSR or
China. Both would be willing to increase assistance in weaponry
and Peking would offer more manpower for North Vietnam. Both
would be concerned that the US would still be frustrated and
would eventually be led to invade North Vietnam. But neither
China nor the USSR would be likely to enter the war in response
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to a US buildup, and neither would be likely to take drastic
diversionary moves outside of Vietnam.
21. The general international climate would certainly
worsen for the US. There would be greater apprehension that
the war in Vietnam would inevitably expand to the point of a
US conflict with China, and perhaps even with the USSR. Many
countries would blame the US for not trying to negotiate with
Hanoi. International pressures for an end to the fighting
would increase. At the same time, some US allies in Asia would
be relieved that the US chose to reinforce rather than accept an
unfavorable political settlement.
What is the likely Communist reaction to a change in US
strategy toward greater control over population centers,
with or without increased forces?
22. In general the Communists would view this move as a
success for their strategy. Their tactical response in such
circumstances would depend mainly on the nature of US enclaves.
If these were fairly large and embraced much of the outlying
countryside, the Communists would believe them to be porous
enough to infiltrate and harass, much as they are doing now.
If the defensive perimeters were fairly solid, however, the
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Communists would not try to overrun them in frontal assaults.
Instead, they would concentrate for a time on consolidating
the countryside and isolating the various defended enclaves,
in particular interdicting supply lines and forcing the US to
undertake expensive supply movements from out of country.
A Communist-controlled regime with a "coalition" facade would
be set up in "liberated" areas and attempts at terrorist activity
inside the enclaves would be undertaken. Hanoi would hope that
a combination of military and political pressure, together with
the dim prospect for achievement of the original US aims in the
Vietnam struggle, would eventmilly persuade the US to extricate
itself through negotiations.
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