THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Tet Declassified
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06786609
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: April 27, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 30, 2019
• Publication Date: February 12, 1968

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
The Situation in South Vietnam
(Weekly)
12 February 1968
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
THE SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
(5 February - 11 February 1968)
CON TEN TS
Section
POLITICAL SITUATION
Difficulties of civilian task force;
National Assembly developments; Reaction
from influential nongovernment figures.
REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT II
Impact of the Communist offensive on
pacification; Binh Dinh Province;
Ninh Thuan Province; Quang Tri Province;
Situation in Saigon; the IV Corps senior
officials.
ECONOMIC SITUATION III
Economic effects of Tet offensive.
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I. POLITICAL SITUATION
The task force established to cope
with civilian aspects of the current
crisis is apparently beset with serious
difficulties because of internal bickering
and the insistence of many members on
tying up operations in bureaucratic red
tape. There appears to be an increasing
groundswell in favor of amending the
constitution to allow Vice President Ky
to serve concurrently as prime minister,
but Ky is turning aside for the moment
any consideration of consolidating his
power. The National Assembly is showing
a willingness to cooperate with the
government in clearing up the ckisis,
after an initial round of severe
criticism from the Upper house. An
increasing number of influential per-
sonalities outside the government seem
to be coming to the view that the
Communist offensive has hurt the Viet
Cong image and that it provides a good
opportunity for the government to
mobilize popular support by calling on
the assistance of prestigious political
leaders.
Difficulties of Civilian Task Force
1. The South Vietnamese task force established
to cope with the massive problems arising from the
Viet Cong Tet offensive is apparently running into
serious difficulties because of internal bickering
and bureaucratic red tape,
/ On 9 February,
General Nguyen Duc Thang, Vice President Ky's
deputy on the task force, declared that he was
resigning in frustration, and he has failed to
appear for subsequent meetings.
2.
of the cabinet members on the task force, most
notably the ministers of health and refugees, have
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been unable or unwilling to work together co-
operatively and insist on-following normal '
ministerial procedures, with the result that
much needed services are not being provided the
people in a timely and efficient manner.
3. There is also a growing move afoot,
to urge Ky to have the constitution amended to
allow his own appointment as prime minister.
Several Lower House deputies, some senators,
Ky's own advisers, and Generals Thang and Khang
have all reportedly approached Ky with the
proposition, and all claim that he would get
fairly widespread support for such a move.
Ky's image has improved markedly during the
current crisis, to the detriment of both
President Thieu and Prime Minister Loc.
Thieu has taken
a quiet, behind-t e-scenes approach to the
situation and has remained inaccessible for personal
meetings with almost everyone except his closest
advisers. As a result, people have taken their
problems and ideas to Ky and are reportedly coming
away with the impression that he is the government's
man of action.
4. Ky, however, has reportedly put aside at
least for the time being, all urgings that he
consolidate his power. Although he has himself
been mildly critical of Thieu's conduct, he has
indicated to his advisers that he intends to
cooperate with Thieu and will not consider a
move to put himself in the prime ministership.
he is
doing his best to improve Loc's image and to
include him in the task force's plans and activities.
Although Ky is probably fully aware of the need
for governmental cooperation during the crisis,
he may well find the groundswell in favor of his
assuming greater executive power hard to resist
if it continues to gain momentum.
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5. Prime Minister Loc, for his part, apparently
fears that the criticism directed at him for his
lack of initiative in the crisis may spell his
doom.
National AsseMbly Developments
6. The Lower House has thus far proved
highly cooperative with the government in its
attempts to restore order and the Upper House has
begun to come around after voicing some vitriolic
criticism of the government's lack of preparedness
for the attacks. The two houses agreed on 10
February to establish a joint aid committee and the
Upper House appointed several senators to act as
liaison between the house and various segments of
the executive. The Lower House has made an effort
to keep in touch with the executive throughout
the crisis.
7. President Thieu addressed a joint session
of the assembly on 9 February and appealed for
the assembly's close cooperation. He asked that
he be allowed to promulgate decrees in the area
of economy and finance for a one-year period, and
urged quick passage of the: 1968 budget. He also
emphasized the government's determination to adhere
to the constitution and, although admitting that
some of the emergency measures instituted during
the crisis "do violate freedom and democracy to
some extent," pointed out that the steps were
necessary and that the government intends to
limit them as much as possible. Also outlined
were certain steps to increase mobilization. These
include earlier call-up of 18- and 19-year-olds,
recall of veterans with five-years' service or
less, postponement of some discharges, and military
training "in place" for civil servants under 45 and
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students of 17 and over. Although some of these
steps may meet with disapproval from certain of
the assemblymen, reaction to Thieu's speech has
thus far been generally favorable.
Reaction from Influential Nongovernment Figures
8. An increasing number of influential personali-
ties seem to be coming to the view that the Com-
munist offensive has not only hurt the Viet Cong
image in the eyes of the people but will also
serve to increase support for the government. They
say, however, that the decree of popular backing
which the government can expect will depend on the
government's ability to provide for the people and
mobilize them for the anti-Communist fight.
9. Tran Quoc Buu, president of the Vietnamese
Confederation of Labor
early in the,criSiS,
believes many people previously
"neutral" have now swung to support of the govern-
ment. This opinion was concurred in by Vo Van Tai,
secretary general of the confederation's Saigon
council. Tai, who is still scheduled to be tried
for his part in the recent labor disputes, had
previously issued a statement on behalf of his
council voicing full support for the government
in the crisis.
who took a pessimistic view
10. the
regime now has a perfect opportunity to capitalize
on anti-Communist sentiment, but should not use
its own resources exclusively to mobilize the
population. The government would do better, he
believes, to encourage the direct participation of
leading nongovernment personalities. According
Buu's own effort to
organize his confederation affiliates to assist
the government are being encouraged by several
cabinet members.
11. Oppositionist Lower House deputy Lv Ouv
Chung expressed similar views
Chung voiced optimism
at the lack of popular response to the Viet Cong
and, like Buu, views the present situation as a
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good opportunity for the government to broaden its
base of popular support by calling on the assistance
of various prestigious figures. Chung said that
the Lower House will continue to support the
government's efforts in the current crisis, as long
as no unconstitutional steps are taken.
12. Phan Khac Suu, an oppositionist and de-
feated presidential candidate who was taken into
protective police custody on 5 February because of
a Viet Cong prisoner's allegation that Suu would
be kidnapped, has also expressed his eagerness to
help the government.
13. These indications of a willingness to
join forces with the government from persons
who, like Suu and Chung, are known oppositionists
or, like Tai, have a grudge against the govern-
ment, are encouraging signs. All of these indi-
viduals can probably command a considerable follow-
ing, and their influence should be useful in com-
mitting more of the public to the anti-Communist
effort. Despite the optimism shown by' these men
about the people's willingness to rally to the
government, however, it is still too early to tell
whether the population in the more heavily affected
areas of the capital and in the provinces will
feel sufficiently free of Viet Cong pressure and
intimidation to cooperate more actively with the
government.
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II. REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT
Reports from throughout South Vietnam
indicate that the hamlet development program
in a large number of provinces has been
significantly upset. Allied military
units supporting pacification have been
largely withdrawn to defend the towns,
many Revolutionary Development teams
have been unable to stay in their hamlets,
and others have been withdrawn to guard
installations in the towns or to assist
in rooting out Communist remnants. In
Quang Tri, Binh Dinh, and Ninh Thuan
provinces, the enemy seems to have di-
rected his efforts toward upsetting
already completed hamlet pacification
efforts, rather than directly attacking
the teams and what remains of their defense
forces. The situation in Saigon is
examined from the standpoint of the
reaction of the Vietnamese Government to
the problems facing it there. In the
months-prior to and during the enemy
offensive, the performances of the IV
Corps province cheifs have varied widely.
The threat to IV Corps is by no means
over; several provincial capitals appear
to be under a state of useigen and others
have been extensively damaged.
Impact of the Communist Offensive on Pacification
1. Additional information has become available
that tends to reinforce the assumption made in the
Situation in South Vietnam (Weekly) of 5 February
that one objective of the recent enemy campaign
may have been to assert or reassert control over
large segments of the rural population. This
effort appears to have involved the use of
guerrilla and district units taking advantage of
the diversion of allied forces to protect the
urban areas.
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2. Reports indicate that hamlet development
in a large number of provinces has been set back
considerably. Since government military forces
supporting pacification were by and large withdrawn
to defend towns, many Revolutionary Development
teams have been pulled in to guard installations
in towns or to assist in rooting out Communist
remnants. Moreover, the enemy in some provinces
seems to have directed his efforts toward upsetting
already completed hamlet pacification efforts
rather than initiating military action directly
against the teams and what remains of their
defense forces, primarily Regional and Popular
Force soldiers.
Binh Dinh Province
3. In Binh Dinh Province, 20 Revolutionary
Development teams have been removed, at least
temporarily, from their hamlets because of the
withdrawal of supporting government troops. About
eight additional teams are in Qui Nhon city on
temporary security duty. Vietnamese officials in
-Binh Dinh believe the teams should be able to
return to their hamlets around the middle of
February if the security situation remains at its
present level. Many of the new refugees in Qui
Nhon are from hamlets that have been overrun, and
it may be difficult to persuade these people to
return.
4. US officials in Binh Dinh Province believe
it will take at least 18 months to reach the same
stage of hamlet development that existed six months
ago, when provincial security began to decline.
Advisory personnel believe that the province's
1968 pacification plan may have to be set aside
and resources directed toward areas previously
- developed during 1966 and 1967. This is a serious
setback, since Binh Dinh was one of the showplaces
for the pacification program.
Ninh Thuan Province
5. Although no enemy attacks have been reported
against the provincial capital or district towns
of coastal Ninh Thuan Province in II Corps, Viet
Cong forces have reportedly entered, unopposed, a
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number of Revolutionary Development hamlets in the
province. Between 31 January and 5 February,
Communist units entered 12 hamlets that had either
been worked by Revolutionary Development teams
during 1967 or were scheduled for development
under the 1968 program. None of the 12 hamlets had
a team present. One other hamlet, which was
protected by a team, was harassed during this period.
6. The primary objectives of the Viet Cong
in the 12 hamlets was reportedly to obtain food-
stuffs and to propagandize against the South Viet-
namese Government, the US, and the Revolutionary
Development (RD) program. By a show of strength
in these hamlets, the enemy is almost certainly
attempting to detract from pacification efforts
previously considered completed. In the hamlets
scheduled for development during 1968, the Com-
munists reportedly attempted to recruit youth for
their own forces and to discourage hamlet residents
from cooperating.
7. US officials in Ninh Thuan have for some
time noted a Viet Cong propensity to wait until
teams move out of a hamlet before trying to reassert
control. Over the past few months, the Viet Cong
have launched numerous company-and platoon-size
attacks against hamlets already pacified through
the RD program, those scheduled for pacification,
and those that might offer resistance to rice
collection operations. During December, when enemy
activity in Ninh Thuan increased by more than 100
percent over any month since July 1967, enemy forces
conducted 12 platoon-size hamlet entries and nine
company-size entries. The Viet Cong forces heavily
damaged one secured hamlet, forced the withdrawal
of a Truong Son (montagnard) RD team from another,
and caused the subsequent evacuation of the people
from a third hamlet located on the fringes of an
enemy base area.
8. A change in Viet Cong tactics in Ninh Thuan
from limited harassing attacks, or sapper and
propaganda activities, was first evident in late
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November 1967, when at least four enemy company-
size attacks were directed at Vietnamese military
forces providing hamlet security. The sudden
sharp rise in the intensity of enemy actions, the
reported capture of Chinese-made AK-47 weapons,
and the discovery of dead enemy soldiers allegedly
dressed in North Vietnamese Army (NVA) uniforms
have led MACV to conclude that NVA units are
probably operating in the province.
Quang Tri Province
9. Since the Tet offensive, about 3,000
persons in Quang Tri Province have left the RD
areas, concentrated in Trieu Phong District, for
the relative security of Quang Tri city. The
refugees have reported that youths in their
hamlets are being formed into Viet Cong "civil
defense militia" in order to free the enemy's
main force battalions for another attack on
Quang Tri city. The formation of "self-defense
militia" by the Communists has been reported in
some other provinces, including Binh Long in
III Corps and in the delta.
10. In the Trieu Phong RD areas, at least
three New Life Hamlets have been completely
destroyed. Refugees from these hamlets have
reported Viet Cong terrorism, including the
assassination and kidnapping of GVN officials and/
or their families. Many of the refugees blame
the Vietnamese Army for not reclaiming the RD
areas, which the enemy forces have held for eight
days. The Communists cite the lack of ARVN
operations as indicative of Viet Cong success in
the province.
11. Nine RD teams have already been withdrawn
into Quang Tri city, but seven teams are remaining
in place in hamlets immediately adjacent to the
city. In Quang Tri, as elsewhere in the country,
enemy forces are apparently concentrating on the
destruction of completed RD projects and are leav-
ing the RD teams almost unscathed.
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Situation in in Saigon
12. A joint Vietnamese-US task force--the
National Recovery Committee (NRC)--has been
established to coordinate allied rehabilitation
efforts in the Saigon area. In addition, the
Vietnamese Government has instructed subordinate
echelons to set up similar coordinating bodies
at corps and province levels. Vice President Ky,
the chairman of the joint task force, established
an around-the-clock coordinating center at Indep-
endence Palace and assigned General Nguyen Duc
Thang as chief coordinator. Ambassador Komer's
deputy, General Forsythe, has been named Thang's
full-time US counterpart. The task force includes
representatives from the Vietnamese Army and civil
ministries,
13. Thang has established four coordinating
staffs: requirements and allocations, resource
availability, information and psychological
operations, and popular participation. The NRC
will direct its resources toward assuring the
fulfillment of three priority projects in Saigon:
clearing Viet Cong remnants from the city,
caring for the large number of refugees, and
assuring adequate food supplies for the people.
14. The heavy fighting in and around Saigon
since 31 January has generated an estimated 200,000
refugees in the city and in surrounding Gia Dinh
Province. A number of these people--perhaps half--
can be expected to return to their homes when the
fighting abates. In Gia Dinh Province, the districts
that were the most severly affected by the fighting
were those in the northern half of the province--
Tan Binh, Hoc Mon, Go Vap, and Thu Duc.
15. CORDS advisers report that the Vietnamese
Army units in Gia Dinh have lacked aggressiveness
in rooting out Viet Cong remnants, and that only
the quick deployment of US troops saved the province
from chaos. On the other hand, they report that
the often-faulted province chief, Major Cau, has
worked non-stop through the crises and turned in
a creditable performance.
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16. The refugees and homeless in Saigon -
Gia Dinh are being cared for in approximately
75 refugee centers, most of which the government
has stocked with foodstuffs and bedding. The
centers, under the jurisdiction of the Ministry
of Social Welfare, are being administered by
various civic organizations, including the
Catholic welfare agencies and youth groups.
Some 1,500 Revolutionary Development cadres
have reportedly been brought in from the train-
ing school at 'Jung Tau to assist in caring for
the refugees.
17. Refugees in Saigon, as elsewhere in
the country, will receive all normal assistance
payments--about 1,000 piasters per person-7-and
those who have lost their homes will receive
resettlement allowances. Security officials in
Saigon are concerned that the refugee centers may
become a haven for Viet Cong stragglers and, to
prevent this, have instituted periodic inspections
18. At last report, fighting continues in
precincts 5,6, 7, and 8 in Saigon. The enemy
appears to be trying to isolate the predominatly
Chinese section of the city, Cholon, from the main
part of Saigon. Since 31 January, civilian
casualties have been heavy in the city fighting.
The press speculates that anywhere from 200 to 350
persons have been killed and at least 3,800 injured
in Saigon alone.
19. Food supplies in the city are considered
adequate, largely because most households had
stocked up heavily for the Lunar New Year celebration.
The Saigon government, however, has distributed a
large amount of foodstuffs to the refugee centers
and is selling additional amounts of rice at distri-
bution points in the city. Revolutionary Development
cadres are reported to be assisting in rice distri-
bution, also.
20. Within Saigon, water and electricity is
available in varying degrees to residents in areas
serviced. The most pressing problem, however, has
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been the the collection of refuse. As an interim
measure, garbage is being burned on the streets.
Press reports indicate that an additional 1,000
RD cadre trainees have been brought into Saigon
from Vung Tau to assist in trash collection.
21. Following a press conference on 5 February
in which Ky stated that a civilian militia or
"Army of the People" would be organized to protect
the urban areas,
that the Ministry
with plans to arm
of the Interior is proceeding
the civilian population of
Saigon. the secure areas
of Saigon will be divided into neighborhoods,"
each with an appointed chief to supervise the
distribution and control of firearms within the
area. The ministry anticipates that each
"neighborhood" will have a minimum of ten and
a maximum of 30 weapons for self defense. The
Defense Ministry has reportedly delivered 1,000r:car-
bines to theinterior Ministry and will deliver
more, if needed.
22. The organizing and arming of the civil
population of Saigon will be done slowly and may
take several months, according to several Vietnamese
officials. Screening of participants in the
militia program will be done by Vietnamese security
officials, and those selected will probably be
either civil servants or veterans.
23. The South Vietnamese Government has
allotted over 600 million piasters to the National
Recovery Committee to aid in the rebuilding of
Saigon and some of the other urban areas. Accord-
ing to press reports, Vietnamese officials have
claimed that all the affected cities have been
photographed from the air to give planners informa-
tion with which to work, and urban renewal will
include the elimination of slum areas that have
mushroomed in and around the cities over the past
few years. Much of the money for urban rehabilitation
will probably be derived from funds earmarked for
the pacification effort, which may result in
drastically reduced pacification programs. The
destruction to Vietnamese cities and towns will
probably result in a reduced tax base for the
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government, and this will place a further strain
on, and perhaps necessitate reductions in, some
additional government programs.
The IV Corps Senior Officials
24. At present, only five of the 15 delta
province chiefs appointed by the previous IV Corps
commander, General Quang, are still in office.
These officers are the province chiefs in Vinh
Long, Bac Lieu, Ba Xuyen, Dinh Tuong, and Go Cong.
Of these, the province chief of Dinh Tuong is
considered by US officials as the most capable
and honest, and the others, with the exception of
the Go Cong Province chief, appear to have been
turning in satisfactory performances.
25. US officials in the delta believe that
it is too early to assess whether IV Corps commander
General Manh has been a positive or negative
element. Generally speaking, the province chiefs
he has appointed seem to have been somewhat less
corrupt and more efficient than those appointed
by his predecessor. On at least two occasions,
however, Manh has told US officials that he was
reluctant to press charges of corruption against
GVN officials because this "causes trouble."
26. There have been some rumors of personal
corruption by Manh, and strong allegations of
extensive illicit activities by his wife.
the rumors concerning Manh
have not been substantiated.
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27. In the Communists' recent Tet offensive,
the performance of the province chiefs has varied
widely. In Ba Xuyen, the chief reportedly became
hysterical, while in Dinh Tuong the province
chief has continuously acted in a creditable
manner. The provincial government in Chau Doc
seems to have collapsed, while in Kien Giang it
has been resolute. The threat to IV Corps is
by no means over; several provincial towns appear
to be under a state of "seigen and others have
been extensively damaged. Not much information
has yet become available on General Manh's
performance during the crisis, but one report
suggests that he has been more concerned for his
personal safety than with the activities of his
command.
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III. ECONOMIC SITUATION
It is clear that the Tet offensive
�has widely disrupted economic activity,
but the full, effects are not yet clear.
Food supplies are generally adequate,
although prices are high. Damage to
power and water facilities generally was
slight.
Economic Effects of Tet Offensive
1. The Tet offensive has interrupted economic
life in the major cities in Vietnam, but has not
brought activity to a halt. There are the expected
reports of food shortages, rising prices, destruc-
tion of housing, public utilities and production
facilities, and interdiction of highways and commu-
nication lines. The full extent of the damage,
and its consequences, may not be apparent for some
time.
2. The government's newly established task
force, under Vice President Ky, is working closely
with US officials in Saigon and he promises to co-
ordinate all relief and reconstruction activities.
The Foreign Ministry has also asked all South Viet-
namese missions abroad to seek food, clothing,
medicine, and other essentials from their host coun-
tries. Favorable responses are beginning to come
in. Government and private efforts to care for
the refugees reportedly have been satisfactory,
but government effectiveness will continue to be
tested even after the crisis period has passed.
3. There have been scattered reports of food
shortages in some provinces, especially in Quang
Tri, the northernmost province in I Corps, and in
the delta city of Vinh Long, which reportedly was
half destroyed during the fighting. Fortunately,
most people had stocked up on food supplies in
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preparation for the Tet holiday. In Saigon, US
officials report that there is sufficient food
available; the difficulty is getting it distri-
buted. On 6 February, rice stocks in Saigon-
Cholon warehouses, none of which has been reported
damaged, totaled 114,000 metric tons with another
17,000 tons on ships in the port. This rice is
sufficient to meet the needs of Saigon and the
rice deficit areas in the north for more than a
month. If this rice cannot be transported, how-
ever, shortages could develop, particularly in I
and II Corps. There is no indication of the cur-
rent level of stocks in central Vietnam, but at
the beginning of January this area reportedly had
on hand about 37,000 tons, or almost one month's
supply. Moreover, additional supplies presumably
arrived during January.
4. Normal detailed economic reporting has
been interrupted since the beginning of the offen-
sive, but general developments through 9 February
are discussed in the following paragraphs.
5. Food prices soared during the early days
of the offensive, but as more shops and market-
places open, prices reportedly are beginning to
decline. In Bien Hoa city, for example, prices
of most foods on 4 February were said to be three
to five times higher than those just before Tet. No
chicken, meat, or vegetables were available. By
7 February, however, the availability of food in
Bien Hoa was said to be near normal, although
prices were still up 50 to 75 percent. USAID of-
ficials in Saigon did not take their regular weekly
survey of prices, but have reported that prices
for rice, pork, and fish in Saigon are running
about double the pre-offensive level. On 9 Febr-
uary, however, prices of bread, sugar, and con-
densed milk were not significantly higher than
pre-Tet levels. Free rice is being distributed
at 59 refugee centers, and rice is being sold to
other civilians from trucks in various parts of
the city. The present plan calls for normal
commercial distribution by 11 February.
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6. The fighting has interrupted power and
water supplies in many cities, but in general,
damage to utilities seems to have been light.
There are some indications that the enemy did not
target these installations because they hoped to
hold the cities and wanted the utilities in opera-
tion. Scenes of heavy fighting, such as Hue, Ban
Me Thuot, and Vinh Long, reported both power and
water off. In Saigon, US officials stated on 9
February that power facilities were operating at
70-percent capacity, which was ample because of
reduced industrial demand. The Saigon water sup-
ply was cut on 4 February but only for a few hours.
7. The worst damage reported was that done
to production facilities of the two largest textile
firms in South Vietnam. About 60 percent of the
buildings and 80 percent of their equipment were
destroyed in fighting near Saigon. The general
manager of the two sister companies estimated that
repairs would take many months, and claimed that
finished products worth about $377,000 were looted
from the plants by both military personnel and ci-
vilians.
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