CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Tet Declassified
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03192657
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: April 27, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 30, 2019
• Publication Date: March 29, 1968

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
ret
3.5(c)
Central Intelligence Bulletin
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29 March 1968
Jo 22_775V/
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lop-SecilT
The CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN is produced by the
Director of Central Intelligence to meet his responsibilities for providing
current intelligence bearing on issues of national security to the President,
the National Security Council, and other senior government officials. It
is produced in consultation with the Departments of State and Defense.
When, because of the time factor, adequate consultation with the depart-
ment of primary concern is not feasible, items or portions thereof are pro-
duced by CIA and marked with an asterisk.
Interpretations of intelligence information in this publication represent
immediate and preliminary views which are subject to modification in the
light of further information and more complete analysis.
Certain intelligence items in this publication may be designated specifically
for no further dissemination. Other intelligence items may be disseminated
further, but only on a need-to-know basis.
WARNING
This document contains classified information affecting the national security
of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, US Code
Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798.
Jop-Serrer
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29 March 1968
Central Intelligence Bulletin
CONTENTS
Vietnam: Situation report. (Page 1)
Communist China: Forces pressing for order and
stability strengthen their position. (Page 2)
Czechoslovakia: Dubcek virtually declares the in-
dependence of the Czechoslovak party. (Page 4)
Poland: Threats forestall another demonstration,
but students remain defiant. (Page 6)
Persian Gulf: New federation further complicates
situation. (Page 9)
Guatemala: Army reprisals may follow removal of
defense minister. (Page 10)
Panama: Opposition women's march provokes re-
newed violence. (Page 11)
Hungary-Rumania: Relations (Page 12)
TO-P-8-EettET
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Savannakhel
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29 Mar 68 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map
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*Vietnam,
South Vietnam Evidence is accumulating that a
new wave of coordinated Communist attacks may be in
the offing.
Many references
to "N-Day," the Vietnamese D-Day, have been
widely noted during the past few days. The frequency
of the references parallels that which preceded the Tet
offensive.
The positioning of enemy forces strongly suggests
that the central highlands is a likely focus for the enemy
actions. Stepped-up Communist operations also appear
possible throughout the coastal sectors of I and II Corps.
It appears probable that the feature of a new offen-
sive at this time would be heavy mortar, rocket, and
possibly artillery attacks against allied installations
both in and around urban areas, The Communists do
have strong infantry forces poised within striking dis-
tance of a number of towns, however, so that a new wave
of ground assaults on the cities cannot be discounted.
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TOP-StrirET
CommunistChina� Forces pressing for restora-
tion of order and stability appear to be further strengthen-
ing and consolidating their position.
This is suggested by the apparent purge of Acting
Chief of Staff Yang Cheng-wu, a Lin Piao protege, and
Yang's replacement by Huang Yung- sheng, long a tar-
get of militant Red Guard criticism.
A Peking radio report of a reception attended by
Mao Tse-tung, Lin Piao, and ten other leaders on 25
March listed Huang, commander of the Canton Military
Region, in the place normally reserved for Yang, who
has just come under heavy verbal attack by demonstra-
tors in the capital. Such name lists of elite personages
follow a strict order of precedence. At earlier turnouts
in Peking to display the active leadership, Huang was
invariably listed among regional military leaders, much
farther down the list.
Throughout the spring and summer of 1967, Huang
was under very severe attack by militant Red Guards in
Canton, backed by now-discredited radical leaders in
Peking, From August through November he appeared
frequently in Peking and may have been representing
other regional military leaders who had come under at-
tack by militants in July and August. Huang was named
head of the Kwangtung Revolutionary Committee in late
February, which suggests that he was not at that time
under consideration for a post of national significance.
Huang's apparent appointment to such a post seems
to be part of a broader offensive by moderate elements
who were themselves under attack at the height of the
Cultural Revolution, The radical Cultural Revolution
Group, partly dismembered in September, has recently
been further whittled away. Propaganda attacks on mili-
tant "factionalists" have grown more severe. Recent
appointments in the provinces have tended to confirm in
place or restore to good grace personalities who had been
attacked or sidelined by Red Guard attacks last spring and
summer.
29 Mar 68 2
(continued)
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T-OPE-scEekr17
The purge of Yang and of the Peking garrison com-
mander and the air force political commissar represents
the most significant setback for forces associated with
the Maoist onslaught against the political and military
establishment to date. Huang's appointment strongly sug-
gests that elements in the provinces and in Peking press-
ing for a return to law and order have improved their
position significantly. TCUTSTFIDEltri*b}�
The Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of
State, and the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, Depart-
ment of Defense, consider that there is not yet sufficient
evidence of the reasons for the possible removal of Acting
Chief of Staff Yang Cheng-wu or his possible replacement by
Huang Yung-sheng and has the following series of specific ob-
jections to the analysis in this article:
a) Evidence so far available does not support the con-
clusion that Yang's removal and Huang's promotion would
strengthen "forces pressing for the restoration of order
and stability." It is not established that Yang is a mili-
tant or that Huang is a moderate. b) In practice, Mao Tse-
tung, Chiang Ch'ing and the armed forces have apparently
pressed for moderation during the past six months. There is
no evidence that Yang opposed these efforts. c) It is not
necessarily true that Yang's apparent ouster is part of "a
broader offensive by moderate elements." It might be at-
tributable to differences with the army not necessarily re-
lated to the over-all direction of the Cultural Revolution.
d) The only military leaders listed as present at the Pe-
king reception were Lin Piao, Huang and air force commander
Wu Fa-hsien. Wu is considered a militant by many observers,
and none of the alleged moderate army leaders were listed.
e) Available evidence does not show that Huang has acted
as a spokesman for other regional commanders. f) It is true
that Huang was under attack by Red Guard groups in contact
with leaders in Peking, some of whom have been purged, but
some of these leaders remain in power, and at least one is
allegedly a moderate. In recent months, Huang has seemed
to get along better with the Peking-associated Red Guard
groups in Canton than with their opponents. g) Only a rel-
atively few provincial officials previously under heavy
Red Guard attack have apparently been rehabilitated. In
general the new provincial revolutionary committees appear
to be dominated by the armed forces.
29 Mar 68 3
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1-1,
Czechoslovakia: Party leader Alexander Dubcek's
remarks before the central committee yesterday were
the strongest affirmation yet of Czechoslovak sover-
eignty.
In effect he said that the Czechoslovak Communist
Party alone will make decisions affecting the country's
course and will resist attempts by other countries to
interfere.
Dubcek asserted that Prague "does not overlook
related affairs" in the international Communist move-
ment but that "responsibility for our internal develop-
ments.., rests primarily with... this Communist Party."
Dubcek's comments undoubtedly were meant in part
to reject flagrant attempts by the East Germans to in-
tervene in Czechoslovak politics as well as criticism by
various other Soviet bloc parties.
Prague has begun to seek economic assistance from
the West. On 19 March, a representative of a group
claiming to be anxious to encourage foreign investment
in Czechoslovakia visited a privately owned US firm in
Geneva to solicit an invitation for talks. A Czech cor-
respondent in Moscow has stated that the Czechoslovak
purpose in attending the Dresden meeting was to seek
economic assistance, presumably expecting a refusal,
as a preliminary to making an overture to the West.
The liberal's grip on the Czechoslovak party, mean-
while, was further strengthened on 28 March with the
election to high party posts of Josef Smrkovsky and
Cestmir Cisar and the resignation from the presidium
and secretariat of Antonin Novotny.
The central committee also nominated General
Ludvik Svoboda Li) be president. Svoboda's election by
the National Assembly on 30 March appears assured
because Smrkovsky and Cisar, also nominees, declared
in his favor. Svoboda's selection is a gesture to the
29 Mar 68 4
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Soviet Union because he is a well-known advocate of a
strong alliance with Moscow. He will probably, how-
ever, be little more than a figurehead.
Adoption of the party's "action program" appar-
ently has been postponed until the central committee re-
convenes on 1 April.
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Poland: *According to press reports, students
at Warsaw University met yesterday to demand a redress
of grievances, including the reinstatement of faculty mem-
bers recently dismissed by the regime.
*The threat of forceful counteraction by the govern-
ment apparently forestalled any open demonstration, but
the students remain defiant.
The situation could deteriorate rapidly. The re-
gime press on 28 March threatened a mass expulsion
of students and warned that forebearance will no longer
be given to firebrands who try to sustain "a permanent
psychosis of tension." The rector of Warsaw University
warned that the school would be closed if students failed
to resume studies. Student militants, however, con-
tinue to press for consideration of their demands, and
there are rumors a student rally is being planned for
next week.
Provincial universities appear quiet and their stu-
dents reportedly believe that further protests now are
useless.
The regime has clearly drawn the line against fur-
ther disturbances, which are being equated with antistate
activity affecting national security. At the same time,
it may be exploring new moves to mollify the students.
According to one unconfirmed report, liberal Premier
Cyrankiewicz is working behind the scenes to resolve
the student problem.
An increase of party factional infighting is probably
behind the imminent closing of the party's prestigious
weekly, Polityka. All but two members of its editorial
board are said to have resigned in protest against tenden-
tious antistudent propaganda. Veiled press attacks against
chief editor Rakowski suggest that party hard-liners are
attempting to silence one of the few liberals close to
Gomulka.
29 Mar 68 6
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ST7' 1 k-,-1-1 -L J-J
The expected purge of liberal elements, both
Jewish and non-Jewish, from the party and state ap-
paratus will probably reach into the upper levels of
the Foreign Ministry, where Jews are still firmly
entrenched. Top ministry officials, including both
deputy ministers Naszkowski and Winiewicz, reportedly
came under attack at a recent meeting of the ministry's
party organization.
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A New Federation in the Persian Guff
IRAQ IRAN
Basra Abadan.
; KUWAIT
*Kawart
NEUTRAL
ZONE
Dammam-.
AI Hufuf.
*Riyadh
.Bushire
1. DUBAI
2. SHARJAH
3. AJMAN
4. UMM AL QAIWAIN
5. RAS AL KFIAIMAH
6. FUJAIRAH
Ras al Khaimah
MUSCAT
AND OMA
Umm al-Qaiwain
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A�
Dubai,*
0 25
MILES
*Aib"u Dhabi
ABU DHABI
771
jairah
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AND
OMAN
*Al Buraymi
BAHRAIN
*Manama CTunb
�
FEDERATION OF Abu Musa
ARAB AMIRATES
*Ad Dawhah
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SAUDI ARABIA
COMPARATIVE ARE
New
York
TRUCIAL 5T P.:(
ABU DHABI
e�"da'Y undefi,777
Iran claims the islands of Bahrain,
Abu Musa, and Tunb.
Matra h t Muscat
MUSCAT
AND
OMAN
100
MILES
AL MASIRAH
90093 3-68
29 Mar 68 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map
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X-e-P-SSCRET
Persian Gulf: The emergence of the Federation
of Arab Amirates will further complicate the situation
in the gulf.
The federation of Bahrain, Qatar, and the seven
Trucial sheikdoms is slated to come into being on
30 March, the first day of the Muslim new year. No
one, however, including the participants, seems to
know just what the federation will entail. The British
have already indicated that the date is "without signi-
ficance" with respect to their relations with the gulf
states, which they will continue to treat as nine, sepa-
rate, British-protected entities. At least some Arab
states and the Arab League apparently intend to extend
recognition to the federation, however.
According to the agreement, the federation is to
be responsible for both the defense and foreign policy
of its members-- matters reserved for the British in
existing treaties. Decisions are to be taken by the
unanimous consent of the nine rulers involved, which
will almost certainly mean that very few decisions
will be taken.
Meanwhile, the Shah of Iran is irritated because
the federation is to include Bahrain and various is-
lands in the gulf which Iran claims. He apparently
intends to denounce the federation, but is unlikely to
take military action at least as long as Britain remains
in the gulf. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM/BACK-
GROUND USE ONLY) (Map)
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TOP--gEeft-ET
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Guatemala: President Mendez' removal of Defense
Minister Colonel Arriaga yesterday may provoke army
reprisals.
Mendez reportedly has also decided to replace the
commander of the Honor Guard Brigade in Guatemala
City and the commander of the powerful army brigade
in Zacapa, who is alleged to have been implicated in the
kidnaping of Archbishop Casariego on 16 March. Other
high-ranking military officers are rumored to have been
involved, and Vice President Marroquin has been cen-
sured by the Congress for his newspaper's irresponsible
coverage of the incident.
Unless key troop commanders have collaborated
with Mendez in his action, there is a strong possibility
that a military move against the government will follow.
In any case, without continued support from the mili-
tary, President Mendez would have little chance of com-
pleting his term which ends in 1970.-69ffeRtur-110-
rerichitAi DISStIVI
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*Panama, Renewed violence last night following
a National Union (NU) women's march gave rise to the
most serious incident yet in the four-week-old im-
peachment crisis.
Yesterday's protest march, which included the
wives of "President" Delvalle and prominent NU lead-
ers, drew an estimated 15,000 people--the largest
turnout since the conflict over two presidents came to
a head last weekend. When the crowd began to disperse,
hoodlums looted and smashed store windows in the cen-
tral business district; others attacked National Guard
units and set five cars and two buses afire. Two per-
sons reportedly were killed and many were injured
before the vandals were brought under control by the
Guard using tear gas.
Guard Commandant Vallarino yesterday cautioned
his commanders against indiscriminate use of tear gas
in coping with NU demonstrators because of recent criti-
cism of the Guard's alleged heavy-handed use of force
in quelling disorders.
In the three days remaining before the Supreme
Court reconvenes to consider issues relating to the im-
peachment crisis, antigovernment disorders may re-
sume. Unless rioting becomes widespread and prolonged,
however, the Guard probably will be able to contain any
further outbursts--though at the cost of increasi resent-
ment over its support of the Robles government.
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NOTES
Hungary-Rumania: Hungary's expert on inter-
party affairs, Zoltan Komocsin, says the Hungarians
will try in high-level talks with the Rumanians to smooth
over, among other things, the differences arising from
Rumania's walkout at the Budapest conference of Com-
munist parties last month. Komocsin told a television
interviewer that party and state "bilateral relations can-
not be damaged by regrettable events that occurred at
the meeting." The Hungarians will probably try to hold
bilateral talks before the next session of the Buda est
preparatory commission set for 24 April.
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ilir----rr'Ci/C.L
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
The United States Intelligence Board on 28 March
1968 approved the following national intelligence estimate:
NIE 80/90-68
"The Potential for Revolution in
Latin America"
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