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The President's Daily Brief
-T-0-p�sef446.t_ 22 February 1968
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TOP CECRET
DAILY BRIEF
22 FEBRUARY 1968
1, South Vietnam
2. Geneva
Conference
TOP SECRET
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Sharp fighting continues around
Saigon. Elsewhere, there have been no
significant changes in the military
situation during the night.
In Hue, some progress is being
made toward repairing the city's dis-
rupted facilities. Our station in Sai-
gon, however, believes that re-estab-
lishment of civil government in Hue will
be difficult.
Few of the city's significant pub-
lic officials have even tried to return
to work, while others have surrendered
to the Viet Cong. Those officials who
are on the job show little initiative
and do not control their subordinates.
The Saigon government has not yet
weighed in with enough authority to re-
establish confidence and public support.
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3. Japan
4. Laos
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5. Panama
6. Communist China
7. Soviet Union
�Te-P�S-EGRE--T -
Robles has further inflamed the
bitter struggle for control of the elec-
toral machinery by engineering the sus-
pension of two pro-Arias electoral
judges. If the judges are in fact dis-
missed, Arias might carry out his threat
to impeach Robles or call a massive
march on Panama City.
Robles has assured Ambassador Adair
that he will maintain public order and
respect democratic processes. The Na-
tional Guard, which feels caught in the
middle, was put on full alert Tuesday
and probably could keep order in the
short run.
Posters attacking one Chi Pen-yu
have recently been seen in Peking. This
personage was a charter member of the
radical Cultural Revolution group set
up in 1966 and one of its chief spokes-
men throughout last year. He was also
one of the last of the group to be pub-
licly active, most of the rest having
faded from sight back in September.
These attacks on Chi, apparently
officially inspired, strengthen our be-
lief that the radical elements in the
leadership continue to lose ground.
On 12 February the Soviets made
the first test flight of a new launch
vehicle, probably intended for a weap-
ons system.
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ANNEX
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Interrogation of North Vietnamese Captain
Preliminary interrogation of a North Vietnamese
Army captured in Danang is pro-
viding a large volume of information on enemy strategy
and future intentions. Much of what the prisoner says
appears to reflect at least general familiarity with
Communist plans for the current military campaign.
The prisoner's comments indicate the Communists
see their current effort as one which will extend over
several months and eventually conclude with a politi-
cal settlement on their terms. He also makes clear
that major new attacks against urban centers are
likely and he suggests that the build-up at Khe Sanh
is basically intended to divert US resources and at-
tention to that area while Communist forces make
headway elsewhere.
The prisoner says that the current offensive is
part of a three-phase strategy in which the Commu-
nists would first launch a general offensive against
the cities. If this failed, they were to regroup in
rural areas to besiege the cities and at the same
time lure US forces into the Khe Sanh area where they
would be "wiped out." Finally, "decisive" battles
would be fought in the Western Highlands or near Sai-
gon and, as a result of sustained pressure on the
allies, a coalition government would be established.
In support of this, the Communists were stepping up
activities in southern Laos to permit large-scale in-
filtration of regular North Vietnamese forces to tie
down more US troops.
The prisoner gave very detailed and probably ac-
curate information on Communist plans and organization
in the Danang area. He had served off and on there
and he obviously was familiar with
this subject. His comments that major enemy ground
attacks can be expected in the northern coastal prov-
inces are in accord with intel-
ligence.
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Beyond the area in which he himself served, the
prisoner's knowledgeability is more questionable.
His description of the basic outline of enemy strategy
probably is correct, but we doubt that he can speak
with authority about such specific subjects as where
the "decisive" battles will be fought. Moreover,
on broad political topics, such as his allegation
that the Chinese have offered two million combat
troops to North Vietnam and will enter the conflict
if the United States increases its military strength
in the South, he is unlikely to have had access to
first-hand information.
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FOR THE THE PRESIDENT'S EYES ONLY
Special Daily Report on North Vietnam'
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22 February 1968
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Special Daily Report on North Vietnam
for the President's Eyes Only
22 February 1968
I. NOTES ON THE SITUATION
North Vietnam Claims Civilian Casualties: Hanoi's
claim on 10 February that 800 civilians were killed
or wounded by US air strikes around Hanoi, Haiphong,
and Vinh Linh during the last three months of 1967 is
comparable with periodic claims made during the first
nine months of last year. The February claim increased
Hanoi's reported total of civilian casualties for
1967 to about 5,000.
* * *
Hanoi Atmospherics:
end of last month:
comments on life in Hanoi at the
--Some efforts were made during Tet to brighten
up the state store. More goods were on display for
those fortunate enough to obtain permission to shop
there. Prices were very high, however, with the
cheapest, smallest transistor radio selling for three
times the average worker's monthly wage and a bicycle
selling for ten times his monthly wage.
--Every major government building is being equip-
ped with its own massive bomb shelter. The embassies
of the Communist nations are following suit, but the
non-Communist representatives continue to live unpro-
tected.
--New Year's Day (29 January) brought out large
and happy crowds of people who enjoyed themselves for
24 hours but not,
IThe temper of the masses as it was
displayed during Tet does not suggest war weariness so
severe as to be a critical factor in the situation.
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Hanoi Promotes a General with Experience in
South Vietnam: A North Vietnamese broadcast indi-
cates that a major general with a long background
in South Vietnamese military affairs has been pro-
moted into a defense ministry job in Hanoi, pre-
sumably after giving up his former responsibilities
in the South.
The broadcast says that Major General Nguyen
Don, identified as vice minister of national de-
fense and an alternate member of the party commit-
tee, is in Moscow heading up a delegation to the
celebrations of Soviet army day. Don has been iden-
tified for years by prisoners and captured documents
as a leading figure in the Viet Cong military com-
mand structure in South Vietnam. In the early 1960s
he became commander of Viet Cong Military Region
Five, which covers most of the northern half of
South Vietnam. One prisoner captured a year ago
claimed that he had been demoted to deputy commander
of the region in mid-1966, but there is no other
evidence of this. There has been no hint of Don's
activities over the past year or so.
General Don's move to the defense ministry may
be a routine personnel shift for a man with many
years of active duty in the South. His trip to Mos-
cow and his new position indicate he is still in
good standing, and it seems likely that in his new
job he will continue to play an important military
role. It is even possible that he was shifted to
the defense ministry in order to provide the Hanoi
high command with the benefit of his specialized
knowledge of the situation in the northern half of
South Vietnam, where the Communists now seem to be
focusing their attention.
* * *
Swedish Ambassador in Peking Travels to Hanoi
Today: The Swedish ambassador to China, Leonart
PFTFT, is scheduled to travel to Hanoi on 22 Febru-
ary,
This will be Petri's second trip
to North Vietnam. It also is the latest step in
Hanoi's current campaign to present its position on
settling the war to representatives of Western and neu-
tralist governments.
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the Swiss ambassador to Peking, who has been in
Hanoi for the past three days, was scheduled to
return to China on the evening of the 21st. In
�part, the ambassador's visit was apparently to
establish some form of diplomatic relations with
North Vietnam. According to a 21 February announce-
ment of the Swiss foreign minister, the ambassador
has been named official "representative" to North
Vietnam--a position involving "purely technical con-
tacts" with the North Vietnamese, but not to be con-
strued as full diplomatic recognition. France is
the only other non-Communist European country with
which Hanoi currently has diplomatic relations.
II, NORTH VIETNAMESE REFLECTIONS OF US POLITICAL
ATTITUDES ON THE WAR
Hanoi Praises US Writers Who Oppose the War: In
its English language broadcast of 21 February, Aanoi
included a message from several Liberation Front
writers' organizations to a group of 448 American
writers and editors who have refused to pay a "war
tax" and who are opposed to "Johnson's war policy."
The message predicted that the American people would
oppose more strongly "the Johnson administration's
immoral war policy" and would demand that the US
settle the war on Communist terms.
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