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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
MEMORANDUM cic)
The Situation in Vietnam
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26 November 1967
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WARNING
this document contains lassifico information affecting he national security
the United States within the i meaning of the espiewage laws, US Code
Title 18. Sections 793. 7A, and 798.
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Information as of 1600
26 November 1967
HIGHLIGHTS
I. The Military Situation in South Vietnam:
Only scattered contacts have been reported in the
western highlands as enemy activity shifted to coastal
II Corps (Paras. 1-6). On 24-25 November enemy forces
shelled or attacked 38 South Vietnamese installations
in the provinces of IV Corps (Paras. 7-9). Enemy
forces continue to be active in the northern III Corps
province of Phuoc Long and, after a period of relative
inactivity, have apparently increased their aggressive
posture in Bien Hoa Province (Paras. 10-13). US forces
in Quang Nam Province have evacuated over 11,000
persons from the area of their operation (Para. 14).
II. Political Developments in South Vietnam: The
government has announced the appointment of Nguyen Van
Huong as secretary general in the president's office
and has established a 19-man Central Revolutionary
Development Council to oversee the pacification pro-
gram (Paras. 1-2)./-
A third, probably opposition-oriented,
bloc in the lower house may be in the making (Para. 5).
Former presidential candidate Tran Van Huong has re-
fused to accept the chairmanship of the new Inspectorate
and will apparently remain out of public life entirely
(Paras. 6-9).
III. Military Developments in North Vietnam:
There is nothing of significance to report.
IV. Other Communist Military Developments: There
is nothing of sieTnificance to report.
V. Communist Political Developments: There is
nothing of significance to report.
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Demilitarized Zone
USA
OPERATION
FOSTER
j
AMBODIA
ORPS
a Trang
AM RANH
IV CORPS
SOUTH VIETNAM
68760 11-67 CIA
26 NOVE MB E R
25 50 75 100 Mties
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0 25 50 75 160 kilometers
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I. THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1. Only scattered shellings and one minor contact
were reported in the western highlands over the week-
end as enemy activity increased elsewhere.
suggest that major
enemy units in western Kontum--the 1st Division,
the 24th, the 66th, and the 174th regiments--are pull-
ing back to the triborder area.
2. On the morning of 26 November the Nha Trang
Air Base complex received about 32 rounds of enemy
82-mm. mortar and 75-mm. recoilless rifle ordnance.
The majority of the rounds impacted in the compound
of the headquarters of the 5th US Special Forces Group
which is located on the base. During the mortar bar-
rage an enemy ground probe was made against the Special
Forces camp, but was repelled. Twenty-nine US military
personnel were wounded in this incident, and three
transport aircraft were either destroyed or heavily
damaged. Another eight aircraft received minor dam-
age. No fueling facilities at the air base were dam-
aged and the runways and airfield are operational;
however, the ability of the US Special Forces Group
to resupply Special Forces camps and operations has
been temporarily impaired.
3. A reaction operation launched on the 26th
by the US Special Forces has passed to the operational
control of the 9th Republic of Korea Division. Con-
tact with an enemy force was established, and 15
of the enemy were killed in contrast to allied losses
of only four killed and 15 wounded.
4. The enemy unit responsible for the mortaring
of the Nha Trang base was probably an element of the
Over the past several months
there has been an upsurge of small unit and sapper-
type activities in the Nha Trang area and in the
entire coastal req-ion of Khanh Hoa Province.
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5. Recent increases in enemy activity in Khanh
Hoa appear to be aimed at undercutting the govern-
ment's Revolutionary Development program and at re-
gaining control of population lost to the government.
In recent months, the enemy has stepped up his infil-
tration of small units into the villages and hamlets
in the province. As a result of enemy action and
allied efforts to root out these units from the vil-
lages, over 5,000 residents were destroyed or damaged
during October. Additional numbers of refugees com-
pound the government's administrative burden; more-
over, these Communist actions probably had a dele-
terious psychological effect on the populace.
6. There are some indications that the enemy
is planning to further increase sabotage activities
in the Nha Trang area, which has been the focus for
Viet Cong terrorist and sapper activity in II Corps
for the past three months.
the Nha Trang City Committee held a meeting
on I./ November at which a new sabotage plan was dis-
cussed. This plan calls for increasing the number
of urban sappers--including the recruitment of laborers
on US bases for sabotage work--and further sabotage
of allied military installations. In addition to
the 26 November raid on the air base complex, ter-
rorists on the 24th detonated explosive devices near
the Khanh Hoa Provincial Headquarters and at a mili-
tary club located in the Nha Trang beach.
Activity in IV Corps
7. Enemy forces in IV Corps are continuing to
demonstrate their ability to conduct coordinated
harassment of government installations. During the
night of 24 November and into the early morning hours
of 25 November, enemy forces in IV Corps shelled or
attacked 38 South Vietnamese locations--administrative
centers, outposts, watchtowers, night defensive posi-
tions, and airfields. Among the government administra-
tive centers subjected to enemy fire were two distl:fict
towns in Dinh Tuong Province, three district towns
in Kien Giang, three district towns in Vinh Binh, three
district towns in Kien Hoa, and the provincial capitals
of Phong Dinh and Ba Xuyen provinces. Preliminary
friendly casualties from all of these incidents show 38
killed (25 ARVN and 13 civilians) and 130 wounded (98
ARVN and 32 civilians).
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8. In conducting these attacks the enemy ex-
pended at least 308 mortar rounds and an unknown
number of recoilless rifle rounds. In addition, the
enemy interdicted Highway #4 in Dinh Tuong Province
in 11 locations.
9. There have been periodic surges of con-
centrated enemy activity in IV Corps since late Oc-
tober but, until-the last few days, each series of
coordinated actions has been confined to a single
province. The more widely scattered attacks in
several provinces on 24 and 25 November suggest that
the enemy has improved his command and control net-
work in the delta. If so, it is in keeping with im-
provements noted elsewhere in the country. The
motives behind these attacks in the delta may be
psychological as well as military, posSibly to deter
local inhabitants from moving to government areas.
Enemy Pressure on Northern III Corps
10. In III Corps on 25 November
contacts continued in the Song Be area.
small unit
11. On 25 November elements of the 275th Regi-
ment assaulted an ARVN outpost two and a half miles
southeast of Song Be. The outpost--manned by one ARVN
company--succeeded in repulsing an estimated two enemy
companies and inflicted losses on the enemy of 100
killed and 64 weapons captured. The defending force
suffered only six killed and 29 wounded.
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12. At almost the same time as the attack on
the outpost, enemy forces launched apparently coordinated
mortar barrages on the district town of Phuoc Binh and
on two ARVN bases in the Song Be area. Friendly
casualties in these incidents are still unknown.
� 13. Elsewhere in III Corps, a battalion of Viet-
namese soldiers made contact on 24 November with an
enemy force about 15 miles northeast of the city of
Bien Hoa. After a one-hour firefight, in which the
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allied force received artillery and air support, the
enemy withdrew with unknown losses. Friendly forces,
however, suffered 28 killed, 12 wounded, 12 missing
and lose 29 weapons. Later, on the morning of 26 No-
vember, enemy forces were active in an area approxi-
mately 15 miles southeast of Bien Hoa City. On this
occasion the enemy directed harassing fire into a
US artillery fire support base, the Long Thanh Dis-
trict headquarters, three Vietnamese Army outposts,
and two villages. The enemy's fire killed six
civilians and wounded 31 persons (18 US soldiers,
3 Vietnamese soldiers, and 10 civilians).
Refugees Generated by US Operations in Quang Nam Province
14. As of 26 November, US forces in Operation
FOSTER in Quang Nam Province have evacuated over 11,283
persons and 87 tons of rice from their operational
area, about 24 miles southwest of the city of Da Nang.
Approximately 5,400 persons and 21 tons of rice have
been evacuated from the operational area to temporary
refugee camps located at An Hoa, the district seat of
Duc Duc District; an additional 5,900 persons and 66
tons of rice has been evacuated to Ai Nghia, the
district town of Dai Loc District. Vietnamese dis-
trict officials report that there are now approximately
15,000 refugees clustered around these two towns. In
this clearing operation, US forces have destroyed over
5,500 structures and enemy fortifications.
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II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1. On 25 November the government announced the
appointment of Nguyen Van Huong, an adviser to Pres-
ident Thieu and his campaign manager during the elec-
tion, as secretary general in the president's office.
His duties in this position, as enumerated in the an-
nouncement and as Huong had earlier outlined for an
embassy officer, will include administration of all
agencies run directly by the president's office. He
will also be responsible for liaison between that of-
fice and the prime minister's office, the legislature,
and the various ministries. Huong will have the rank
of minister.
2. Also announced was the formation under Prime
Minister Loc of a Central Revolutionary Development
Council to oversee all aspects of the pacification
effort. The 19-man council, according to the announce-
ment, will include most cabinet ministers and the
five highest ranking generals, presumably including
General Nguyen Duc Thang, Deputy Chief of the Joint
General Staff in charge of the Revolutionary Develop-
ment Cadre Directorate and the Regional and Popular
Forces. Minister of Revolutionary Development Tri
will be secretary general of the council. Corps-,
special zone-, province-, city-, and district-level
councils will also be established.
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Possible Third Lower House Bloc
5. A third bloc in the lower house may be in
the making and could be the beginning of a concerted
opposition movement in the house. Au Truong Thanh,
a former economy minister in the Ky cabinet who was
disqualified as a presidential candidate, told a US
Government officer on 20 November that he and a few
colleagues are attempting to form a bloc of independ-
ent deputies. He mentioned Saigon deputies Nguyen
Trong Nho and Ho Huu Tuong as participating in the
establishment of the bloc. In view of Thanh's op-
position activities and the professed antagonism of
Nho and Tuong to the government, it would appear that
the proposed bloc is intended as an opposition group-
ing to counterbalance the essentially progovernment
Democratic and Farmer-Worker-Soldier Blocs.
Tran Van Huong on the New Government
6. Former presidential candidate Tran Van Huong
has turned down the government's offer of a position
at the head of the new Inspectorate and apparently
intends to hold to his earlier announced decision to
remain out of the new government. Both President
Thieu and Vice President Ky had hoped to persuade Huong
to accept the Inspectorate chairmanship, particularly
because corruption, which the new body has been set
up especially to investigate, has been Huong's special
interest and was one of his prime campaign issues.
7. During a conversation with an embassy of-
ficer on 24 November, however, Huong said he had re-
fused the post because, "as long as there are people in
this country who feel they are above the law," a body
like the Inspectorate can do little more than go after
corrupt officials at the lowest levels. District and
even province officials could be pursued, he said,
but "their higher ranking protectors" could not be
touched.
8. Huong also confirmed earlier reports that
he had been offered and had refused the prime minister-
ship. He portrayed this position in the new government
set-up as one wedged in among the president, the Na-
tional Assembly, and the generals and indicated he
would have been dissatisfied with being merely an
executor of the president's policies.
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9. Huong gives the new cabinet a life span
of only six months, claiming that it is merely a
transitional body. As for his own future, he is
apparently content to remain out of public life,
observing the political scene from a distance and
occasionally consulting with younger political
figures who often come to him for advice.
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III. MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH VIETNAM
IV. OTHER COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
V. COMMUNIST POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
1. There is nothing of significance to report.
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