CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Tet Declassified
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03186503
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: April 26, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 30, 2019
• Publication Date: January 15, 1968

Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03186503
DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
Jop4
3.5(c)
Central Intelligence Bulletin
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03186503
To cret
C TT
15 January 1968
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03186503
Tiw CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN is produced by the
Director of Central Intelligence to meet his responsibilities for providing
current intelligence bearing on issues of national security to the President,
the National Security Council, and other senior government officials. It
is produced in consultation with the Departments of State and Defense.
When, because of the time factor, adequate consultation with the depart-
ment of primary concern is not feasible, items or portions thereof are pro-
duced by CIA and marked with an asterisk.
hiterpretations of intelligence information in this publication represent
immediate and preliminary views which are subject to modification in the
light of further information and more complete analysis.
Certain intelligence items in this publication may he designated specifically
ha no further dissemination. Other intelligence items may be disseminated
but only on a need-to-know basis.
WARNING
This document contains classified information affecting the national security
of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, US Code
Title IX Sections 793, 794, and 798.
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03186503
Approved for Release: 2.019/03/29 C031865033.5(c)
r
15 January 1968
Central Intelligence Bulletin
CONTENTS
Vietnam: Situation report. (Page 1)
Laos: Communists overrun Nam Bac. (Page 3)
Cyprus: Makarios calls for presidential election.
(Page 5)
Cuba: Castro criticizes US "imperialism" and
Communists who lack revolutionary vigor. (Page 6)
Yugoslavia: Party purges opponents of Tito's liberal
reforms. (Page 8)
West Germany - Yugoslavia: Diplomatic ties (Page 9)
TOP RET
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03186503
3.5(c)
3.3(h)(2)
3.3(h)(2)
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03186503
THAILAND
\ NORTH
VIETNAM
7
0
-12
r'-st
�����
AN
!AND
L/ KkEN P
HONG
Demilitarized Zone
HINH
\
TAY LONG
NINH
BINH
UONG
HAD
GHIA
KI EN
TUONG
�.)
PH UOC
LONG
Da Nang
. ,
QUANG NAM
v.
QUANG DUC
CORPS
PLEIKU
DARLAC
LONG
KHANH
BINH
TuY
GULF OF
� SIAM
el�AN Of-/
AN
XL1YEN /
ON
DINN
DIN TOON
ONG
GO
KN H
V NH
SINN
TMEN ''BA X UYEN).
IV CORPS
PH UOC
TUY
roung-fau
BINH -DINW,
PHU
BON
BINH
THUA
intoi Special lone
PHU
YEN
1 CORPS
HOA
GAM RANH
NINH
THUAN;
0
SOUTH VIETNAM
. 2.5 50 7_5 120 Mdes
n 25 50 75 160 K1
3.5(c)
69276 1-68 CIA
15 Jan 68 Crip-p�ro�ved-fo7R-71e�a'se7 261703727 CO378.65.37IN Map
. 3.5(c) Fl
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03186503.5(C)
*Vietnam:
South Vietnam: There are continued indications
of Communist preparations for increased offensive ac-
tivity in South Vietnam's northern provinces.
the enemy
continues to re-position major command and control
elements in the vicinity of Khe Sanh and the western end
of the DMZ. Several recent small unit contacts with
Communist forces point up the increased enemy presence
in the Khe Sanh area. East of Khe Sanh, a reinforced
enemy platoon in well-fortified positions ambushed a US
Marine convoy on the morning of 13 January killing 19 and
wounding 70 Marines in heavy fighting. At least ten en-
emy troops were killed.
In the central DMZ area,
westward movement by major
enemy elements.
The government's continuing pressure on striking
workers in Saigon may be forcing labor to yield.
On 14 January, some electrical workers were
headed back to work under orders of the government.
Firm countermeasures against the strikers were au-
thorized by President Thieu who fears that the strikes
may be intended as a test of the new government's
strength.
One unconfirmed press report says a general
strike ordered for the Saigon area has been canceled
by union leaders. They reportedly will confer with
government officials today in another effort to seek a
settlement.
15 Jan 68
1
TO RET
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03186503
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03186503 /
North Vietnam:
rthe 12 January attack on the
Laotian outpost at Phou Pha Thi was conducted by four
North Vietnamese AN-2 (COLT) aircraft.
While two of the aircraft circled nearby, two others
each made bombing and strafing runs on the position. One
of the attackers was downed by rifle fire from an Air Amer-
ica helicopter and a second apparently by ground fire.
the Hight onginatea in
the Hanoi area and was controlled from the Hanoi/Gia Lam
Airfield.
This was the first time North Vietnamese aircraft
have been used to attack a target in Laos.
15 Jan 68 2
TO ET
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03186503
3.5(c)
3.3(h)(2)
3.3(h)(2)
3.3(h)(2)
3.5(c)
3.3(h)(
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03186503
CHINA
THAILAND
Loi Ch
Houni
sLuang Prabang
Ban Ba
Nog Khai
Udon Thani
THAILAND
25
3
MILES
69275 1-68 CIA
15 Jan 68 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN Map
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03186503
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03186503 3.5(c)
'Jr urc..1-1,
Laos: The Communists have succeeded in over-
running the important Laotian outpost at Nam Bac.
The collapse of the government's defense peri-
meter on 14 January culminated a ten-month campaign
by the Communists to reoccupy an area they lost in
August 1966, after controlling it for nearly ten years.
Government forces are being redeployed approximately
20 miles to the south to block further Communist ad-
vances.
Lack of communication with Nam Bac has pre-
cluded an accurate assessment of the situation, but it
appears that the Laotian Armed Forces General Staff,
faced with growing Communist military pressure, de-
cided that it was not worthwhile to hold the position.
The King, fearing the loss of Nam Bac would threaten
the approaches to the royal capital at Luang Prabang,
had pressured the military into overextending itself
in order to defend the area. This had resulted in a
general weakening of the government's defense posture
throughout Laos, most significantly in the south.
The loss of Nam Bac is more a reflection of the
lack of decisive leadership within the Royal Laotian
Army than an indication that the Communists have em-
barked on a larger offensive role in Laos.
Commander in chief General Ouan Rathikoun's
reputation will probably be eroded, and there may be
3.5(c) a new round of political maneuvering within the mili-
tary for control of the armed forces.
15 Jan 68
3
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03186503
3.5(c)
Approved for Release:-2019/03/29 C03186503 5(c)
1 lfr
15 Jan 68
4
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03186503
3.5(c)
3.3(h)(2)
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03186503 3.5(c)
'1 01 'CHET
Cyprus: President Makarios' sudden call for na-
tional elections next month may represent a significant
change in his public posture on a final settlement of the
Cyprus dispute.
His widely publicized statement calling for new
elections warned the Greek Cypriots that compromise
will be necessary since "what is desirable" is not al-
ways "feasible." He appeared to be telling the Greek
Cypriot community that enosis--union of the island with
Greece--is no longer a realistic goal.
In an apparent gesture to the Turkish Cypriots,
Makarios for the first time referred publicly to the
"Turkish Community" rather than speaking of the
Turkish minority on the island. He also noted that a
"Charter of Rights" would be "entrenched" in the con-
stitution.
Makarios further appeared to be calling for direct
talks between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. He de-
clared that his government is developing a "document"
which could become the basis for discussions and urged
the other side to do likewise.
Both Ankara and the Turkish Cypriot leaders have
reacted cautiously to the announcement. Ankara has in-
dicated it will not oppose elections if they are held ac-
cording to the present constitution, but this could be a
sticking point as Makarios no longer regards this con-
stitution as valid. Turkish Cypriot leaders have thus
far declined to comment, probably awaiting guidance
from Ankara.
Although Makarios' new overture to the Turkish
Cypriots may clear the way for direct talks between the
two communities, past experience with Makarios weighs
heavily on the side of caution. He may be trying to con-
solidate support within his own community by silencing
criticism from the right-wing element that has been
pushing for enosis. 3.5(c)
15 Jan 68
5
TOP :ET
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03186503
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C031865035(c)
ijriicjii
Cuba: Fidel Castro has delivered one of his
most bitter 'verbal attacks against US "imperialism."
Speaking at the closing session of the interna-
tional Havana Cultural Congress on 12 January, Castro
abandoned the relatively passive tone of his more re-
cent speeches. He called the US a "universal enemy,"
the "buttress of all the reactionary governments" in
the world and compared US foreign policy with that
of Hitler. He expressed special annoyance with the
US economic denial program, saying that the US is
"sabotaging" Cuban efforts to make trade deals in
Western Europe.
Castro, returning to his theme of last summer,
made some stinging remarks about Communists who
are lacking in revolutionary rigor. Undoubtedly re-
ferring to the pro-Moscow parties in Latin America,
Castro said that Marxism needs to be revamped to
"conduct itself like a revolutionary force, not like
a pseudorevolutionary church." Castro castigated
those parties not supporting "armed struggle" as
being in the "rear guard" of the struggle against im-
perialism.
He described Ernesto "Che" Guevara as a
paragon of revolutionary virtue, and offered to trade
100 political prisoners in Cuba "to be selected by the
CIA and the Pentagon" for Guevara's corpse.
15 Jan 68
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03186503
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 c031865035(C)
l..)1(t, 1
15 Jan 68
7
TOP RET
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03186503
3.5(c)
3.3(h)(2)
-�����
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03186503.5(c)
l'tJLl.)1�.1_2J _L
Yugoslavia: The Yugoslav party has taken an-
other step in its long-awaited purge by ousting 400
members of the Belgrade city organization.
The expulsions are the first large-scale reflec-
tion of Tito's call in a TV interview on 29 December
for cleansing the party of members who oppose his
liberal economic and social reforms. Most of those
marked for expulsion are conservative older ex-par-
tisans and minor bureaucrats who had backed former
party secretary Aleksandar Rankovic before he was
ousted in July 1966 for opposing the reforms and
plotting against Tito.
Replacement of his supporters with new, younger
members, combined with a current reorganization of
local party machinery, will be an important step by
the liberals in consolidating their control prior to the
party congress scheduled for December.
The purge is likely to add to the regime's al-
ready ticklish nationality problem. Many Serbs, in
particular, regard the decentralizing reform program
as a blow to their prestige and economic interests.
3.5(c)
15 Jan 68
8
TOP �ET
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03186503
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03186503 3.5(c)
1 Ur UK.U., 1
NOTE
West Germany - Yugoslavia: German and Yugo-
slav officials will meet in Paris this week to discuss
procedures for restoring diplomatic ties between Bonn
and Belgrade. Despite some anxiety about repercus-
sions in Bonn, both countries are eager to normalize
relations, which have been broken for more than ten
years. Neither is expected to attach conditions to such
a step. Controversial issues yet to be resolved, how-
ever, include the Yugoslav demand for indemnification
of victims of the Nazis and Bonn's desire for Yugoslav
support of the German right of self-determination.
15 Jan 68
3.5(c)
9
TOP ET
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03186503
3.5(c)
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03186503
Approved for Release: 2019/03/29 C03186503