THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Tet Declassified
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02003032
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: April 26, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 30, 2019
• Publication Date: November 30, 1967

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
ret
MEMORANDUM
The Situation in Vietnam
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30 November 1967
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%we 401ejeCreir NIS
WARNING
This document contains classified information affecting the national security
of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, US Code
Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798.
Jop-Secrer
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Information as of 1600
30 November 1967
HIGHLIGHTS
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A unit, possibly of regimental size, sub-
ordinate to the 304th NVA Infantry Division has
been initially located on 29 November in the Laos
panhandle. It is the second North Vietnamese unit
of this size detected moving southward through
Laos in the last few weeks.
I. The Military Situation in South Vietnam:
Commianist forces have intensified their activities
in the northern half of Kontum Province (Paras. 1-3).
Enemy forces have attacked
allied positions near Bo Duc for the second day in
a row (Para. 5). Weekly Battle Statistics (Graphs).
II. Political Developments in South Vietnam:
The Saigon city gov-
ernment has taken some steps to tone down the glitter
of establishments which cater to foreigners (Paras.
3-4). The government continues to crack down on
corrupt officials (Paras. 5-6).
III. North Vietnamese Military Developments: A
unit possibly of regimental size, subordinate to the
304th Infantry Division,was initially located in
the Laos panhandle on 29 November (Paras. 1-4).
IV. Other Communist Military Developments: There
is nothing of significance to report.
V. Communist Political Developments: A North
Vietnamese commentary attempts to refute General
Westmoreland's four-phase program for victory in Viet-
nam (Paras. 1-4). Soviet Premier Kosygin has once
again indicated that Moscow is not now willing to take
any initiative toward peace talks (Paras. 5-6).
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68814 11-67 CIA
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I. THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
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1. Communist forces in the western highlands have
intensified their activity in the northern half of Kon-
tum Province. A delayed report from Dak Pek Special
Forces camp states that a patrol from the camp was am-
bushed on 27 November by a company-size enemy force.
Six of the patrol were killed and 13 were wounded;
three of the attackers were killed.
This is the first eiadence of an enemy force in the area
since North Vietnamese 174th Regiment elements were pin-
pointed there last July. The unit involved may be the
6th Battalion of the North Vietnamese 24th Regiment, which
has previously operated in western Kontum and has not
been identified in the recent series of attacks near Dak
To.
3. On 29 November, two South Vietnamese battalions
and an estimated 500-man enemy force fought for five
hours some nine miles northeast of the US stronghold at
Dak To. The Communist force, believed to be another
subordinate of the North Vietnamese 24th Diviion, re-
portedly lost 130 killed in the heavy fighting The
government troops were supported by well-coordinated
artillery and air strikes. Preliminary reports indicate
that South Vietnamese casualties were light.
30 November 1967
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Another Attack Near Bo Due
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5. Enemy forces attacked allied positions near
Bo Duc some 85 miles north of Saigon for the second
consecutive day late on 29 November. This time a
battalion of the US 1st Infantry Division, which had
been rushed in to reinforce South Vietnamese forces
in the area, was the target of a mortar and rocket
barrage and a probing ground attack. Five US troops
and nine enemy soldiers were killed in the action.
Another 11 Americans were wounded. The enemy also
shelled three nearby South Vietnamese outposts. Bo
Duc is situated three miles east of the Cambodian
border.
30 November 1967
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Weapons Losses
119-25 NOV
1
Casualties
(Killed only)*
Jjet Cong/NVAI
GVN/US/other 6-ee World
; 19-25 NOV
1/826
1,664 436
US Casualties Casualties to Date: Killed15/168 Wounded 94.371 Captured 220
*Due to a change in the reporting of personnel losses, beginning 72 February 7967, the weekly and monthly
figure will represent only personnel killed.
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Viet Cong Attacks
SEPT
260
19-25NOV
J.4.11.14,141z
1P63 1964 1965 1 966 196 7
Viet tong Incidents
(Excluding Attu ks)
120 17P"Pcganda
- 64561boNge
7 39 terronsm
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II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM
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2. Several ministers, holdovers from the previous
government, have privately expressed their dissatis-
faction with the present arrangements. For example,
Nguyen Bao Tri, minister of Revolutionary Development,
reportedly commented that unless more rigorous pro-
cedures are introduced the cabinet will never get
down to serious business.
Austerity Moves in Saigon
3. According to the semiofficial Vietnam Press,
the city governMent is going to crack down on the
glitter in Saigon by requiring that all colored neon
signs on bars, restaurants, and similar public es-
tablishments be replaced by all-white signs. Also,
in a move reminiscent of the Diem regime, all restau-
rants, bars, commercial, and industrial establish-
ments with foreign names must change them to Viet-
namese ones. This ruling will apply equally to the
flamboyant bars that dot the center of the city as
well as to the more conservative and respectable
hotels and eating places.
4. This move may presage even more stringent
moves against the bars and other establishments
that cater to foreign clientele. These establish-
ments have been an increasing source of irritation
to the Vietnamese, and President Thieu recently hinted
in public that there would be some moves made to create
a more austere atmosphere in Saigon.
30 November 1967
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Continuing Crack-Down on Corruption
5. The Vietnam Press also announced on 30 Novem-
ber that several officials of the refugee program in
Binh Dinh Province had been imprisoned for the embezzle-
ment of some 10 million piasters. The former chief of
the refugee service in Binh Dinh, the former Hoai Nhon
District chief, and several other officials involved
in the case have been charged with misuse of public
funds. Investigation of the case was begun on the basis
of complaints from local inhabitants.
6. According to another unconfirmed press report,
a second lieutenant has been sentenced to death for
embezzlement of government funds. No further details
are available.
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North Vietnamese Regiments Moving Southward in Laos
- Principal road
o 25 5p 7,5 Miles
0 215 50 75 Kilometers
G F
DEMILITARIZED ZONE
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III. NORTH VIETNAMESE MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
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1. On 29 November, a unit, possibly of regi-
mental size, subordinate to the 304th NVA Infantry
Division was initially located in the Laos panhandle,
some ten miles north of Tchepone and some 25 miles
west of the western end of the Demilitarized Zone.
This particular terminal was last located near the
City of Dong Hoi in the DRV, some 63 miles to the
northeast.
2. This terminal is believed to serve one of
at least four regimental-echelon entities associated
with the 304th NVA Division which have been on the
move in the last few weeks. This is also one of the
304th terminals which has been in contact with the
DMZ Front, presumably because it passed through the
DMZ Front's area of responsibility.
3. The current location of this possible regi-
ment makes it difficult to determine the unit's ul-
timate destination. It is possible, 'however, that
it is en route to the A Shau Valley area of Sout
Vietnam. If so, this 304th subordinate will probably
be preceded by another North Vietnamese regiment--
the 31st of the 341st NVA Division--which was located
on 27 November some 23 miles west of the A Shau Valley.
Communist efforts to extend roads and trails
from Laos into the A Shau Valley area have been under
way now for more than a year. Moreover, there is
ample evidence that the North Vietnamese have been
busy building and fortifying a major base area within
or near the A Shau Valley. The movement of sizable
enemy forces into this strategic part of South Viet-
nam could be intended to outflank US Marine forces
in the western and central parts of the DMZ. The A
Shau Valley also provides an excellent supply pipe-
line and rear area for Communist forces targetted
against the coastal lowlands of Quang Tri and Thua
Thien provinces.
30 November 1967
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IV. OTHER COMMUNIST
MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
1. There is nothing
significant to report.
30 November 1967
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V. COMMUNIST POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
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1. North Vietnam's army daily Quan Doi Nhan Dan
published a lengthy and scornful commentary on 26
November refuting General Westmoreland's four-phase
program for victory in Vietnam. The main theme of
the piece is that Westmoreland's assertions are false
and that the "defeated general" is being used not to
fight the war, but to fight US public opinion.
2. The daily acknowledges that in phase one US
intervention saved the South Vietnamese "puppets"
from defeat, but asserts that this paved the way for
an even bigger "strategic defeat of the Americans."
Even in phase one, says the daily, the US suffered
because the South Vietnamese were unable to carry their
share of the load, and because the "developing people's
war" forced the allies to split up into smaller units.
Above all, the US failed to achieve its "number one
strategic objective of breaking the backbone of the
Viet Cong." This failure, said the commentary, brought
about the defeat of all the tasks which Westmoreland
had set for the first phase.
3. Regarding the second phase, the commentary
said that Westmoreland's report shows the "Americans
are retreating," while Communist forces have not only
preserved their units, but have also developed these
units into division-size ones. It claims the US was
dealt an "unexpected strategic blow" in 1966 when it
had to divert troops to the DMZ area to cope with
the Communist offensive there.
4. In describing the current situation, the com-
mentary quotes an unnamed US journalist as saying re-
cently that the Communists have the initiative and are
capable of engaging in coordinated actions on a nation-
wide scale. US strategy, the commentary claims, has
gone from crisis to stalemate, and, the winter-spring
campaign is proving that the US military situation
has deteriorated and that US strategy is deadlocked
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Soviet Position Toward Peace Talks
5. Premier Kosygin has indicated again that
Moscow is not now willing to take any initiative
toward peace talks, stating that Hanoi must decide
its own destiny. The Soviet premier's remarks were
made to visiting Swedish Foreign Minister Nilsson,
according to a US press report.
6. Probably convinced that there is not suf-
ficient "give" in prospect by either side in the war,
Moscow appears resigned for the time being to its
continuance. Last month, in reply to an effort by
the president of the World Federation of UN Associa-
tions to convene a conference of the Geneva co-chair-
men and the three ICC members, Kosygin stated that
"the convening of any sort of international conference
within the framework of the Geneva conference mechanism
is as yet unrealistic."
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