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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
MEMORANDUM
The Situation in Vietnam
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20 November 1967
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Information as of 1600
20 November 1967
HIGHLIGHTS
Fighting has broken out again southwest of Dak
To, and US forces took serious losses in one engage-
ment. In the air war, intensive North Vietnamese
air defense measures have resulted in the loss of 18
US aircraft in the past five days.
I. The Military Situation in South Vietnam: Re-
newed fighting occurred southwest of Dak To. South
Vietnamese paratroopers have concluded a three-day
sweep northeast of the US base (Paras. 1-4). The dis-
position of Communist main force units in III Corps
suggests further attacks (Paras. 5-8). Operation
SHENANDOAH II has ended in northern III Corps (Paras.
9-10).
II. Political Developments in South Vietnam: Prime
Minister Loc is complaining that conflicting statements
and directives from the President and vice president is
hampering him (Paras. 1-2). A Quaker relief ship has
been denied landing rights at Da Nang (Paras. 3-4).
III. Military Developments in North Vietnam:
Eighteen US aircraft have been lost in the past five
days to aggressive North Vietnamese air defense measures
(Paras. 1-5).
elements of the probable 304th Infan-
try Division are in the process of moving southward
(Paras. 6-9). The 31st Regiment of the 341st Division
has been located in the Laos panhandle just north of
Route 922 (Paras. 10-12).
IV. Other Communist Military Developments: There
is nothing of significance to report.
V. Communist Political Developments: There
is nothing of significance to report.
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NORTH
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I. THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1. Renewed fighting in the hills several
miles southwest of Dak To on 19-20 November has
been described as the most vicious in the two-
and-one-half-week-old highlands campaign.
2. The largest of several new engagements
in the area began on 19 November when two company-
size US reconnaissance patrols ran into elements
of the North Vietnamese 174th Regiment in well-
prepared positions and bunkers. A third US
company joined the fight and was immediately hit
by another enemy force. Preliminary casualty
reports, based on incomplete information, show
heavy American losses of 40 killed, 42 wounded,
and another 32 missing. There is no word yet
on enemy casualties.
3. Also on 19 November, two battalions of
South Vietnamese paratroopers engaged an enemy
force northeast of Dak To. The enemy was identified
as a subordinate of the North Vietnamese 24th
Division which has been involved in the recent
fighting north of Dak To. This engagement
culminated a three-day drive along three miles of
ridge line and accounted for 51 enemy soldiers
killed. Our losses were 34 killed and 161 wounded.
4. Since the current campaign began in
southwestern Kontum Province on 3 November, US
forces have killed 868 enemy soldiers and captured
nearly 150 weapons. American losses for the 18-
day period now stand at 197 killed, 750 wounded,
and 41 missing. The South Vietnamese say they
have killed some 350 Communists, raising the over-
all number of enemy dead in the immediate Dak To
area to more than 1,200.
20 November 1967
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The Situation in Northwest III Corps
5. The disposition of main force enemy regi-
ments in the III Corps area north of Saigon suggests
that further attacks can be expected in this region.
6.
a command group of the Viet Cong 5th Division remains
near the US Special Forces camp at Song Be in west
central Phuoc Long Province. This group controls
the Viet Cong 275th and North Vietnamese 88th regiments
and conducts extensive reconnaissance activities. In
addition, the 272nd Regiment--a subordinate of the
Viet Cong 9th Division--has been noted moving recently
to a position along the Phuoc Long border just west
of Song Be. Together these units make up a division-
size force which could threaten Song Be or Phuoc Binh,
the nearby provincial capital.
7. The other two subordinates of the Viet Cong
9th Division, the 271st and 273rd regiments, are be-
lieved to be positioned along the Cambodian border in
northern Tay Ninh and Binh Long provinces, where
they are resupplying and reorganizing. Mortar attacks
against allied positions have increased in. this area
during the past week. New fighting in the Loc Ninh
area of northern Binh Long Province could erupt with
little warning.
8. The headquarters of the North Vietnamese
7th Division and its subordinate 101st and 141st regi-
ments have not been fixed recently, but probably re-
main in their normal operating areas in northern Tay
Ninh Province.
enemy forces may
be positioning rice caches for planned offensive opera-
tions in this area. Likely objectives would be dis-
trict towns and Special Forces camps and possibly
Tay Ninh city. The 9th Division's third regiment,
the 165th, was located
on 15 November near a district town in southern Binh
Long Province.
20 November 1967
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Operation SHENANDOAH II Ends
9. The 51-day multibattalion search-and-destroy
operation, SHENANDOAH II, ended on 19 November. The
operation accounted for 956 enemy soldiers killed.
The sweep began in north-central Binh Duong Province
some 38 miles north of Saigon and was extended to in-
clude all of Binh Long Province when Communist forces
mounted a series of large-scale attacks in the Loc
Ninh area.
10. American casualties totaled 107 killed and
322 wounded. Enemy losses also included nearly 400,000
pounds of rice and more than 100 weapons.
20 November 1967
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II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM
Quaker Relief Ship Barred From South Vietnam
3. The yacht Phoenix, chartered by Quakers to
deliver medical supplies to South Vietnam has been
denied landing rights at Da Nang and will be escorted
to international waters on 22 November. The final
decision was made by President Thieu and Vice Presi-
dent Ky after they learned that the Quakers would
try to distribute their supplies to the militant
Buddhists. The government contends that the Quaker
plan violates the conditions under which entry visas
were granted to them in Hong Kong--namely that the
supplies would be turned over to the Vietnamese Red
Cross for internal distribution. The US Embassy
believes that the government apparently decided
that religious and social groups other than the mil-
itant Buddhists would get a share and that this may
have influenced the Quakers to attempt to hand the
supplies directly to the militants.
20 November 1967
--T-011-SIECItrT
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4. An official spokesman told the press on
20 November that, since the medicines on the Phoenix
had been brought to South Vietnam only because
Hanoi refused to let them be landed in the North,
the South Vietnamese Government was denying entry
to the Quakers. Since this bare-bones explanation
will probably leave the government open to criti-
cism, the embassy is urging that another statement
be issued which will present the government's ac-
tion in a better light.
20 November 1967
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III. MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH VIETNAM
1. Three more US aircraft were shot down by
North Vietnamese air defense units on 20 November.
This means that 18 US planes have been lost in the
past five days. The heavy losses occurred in a
period of intensive air operations which began on
16 November against targets in the Hanoi/Haiphong
area. In the preceding week, inclement weather had
held air activity and losses to a minimum.
2. Communist air defense successes in recent
days appear to have been the result of a more vigorous
application of normal tactics, rather than any new
weapons or procedures.
indicate a particularly high
level of surface-to-air missile (SAM) and antiaircraft
artillery (AAA) fire. SAMs accounted for 10 of the
18 US losses, while conventional gun fire was respon-
sible for two.
3. The success on the part of the SAMs, which
customarily have been far less effective than AAA,
is probably attributable to the great number of mis-
siles fired.
controller commanding an operational SAM site
northwest of Hanoi on 19 November, but there was no
indication that personnel had assumed an active
role in the SAM system in general or that any new
techniques were being employed.
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4. North Vietnam's MIG fighters accounted for
two, probably four, American planes, a significant
accomplishment in view of the limited number of fighters3.3(h)(2)
remaining in country. 3.3(h)(2)
The group of fighters which has at-
tacked US strike groups with such success during the
past five days probably consists of about eight air-
craft, four of which may be MIG-21s.
20 November 1967
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NVA Division May Be Deploying in North Vietnam
6.ele-
ments of the probable 304th NVA Infantry Division and
possibly the entire division are in the process of
deploying southward. The 304th has been based in the
Thanh Hoa area of central North Vietnam.
8. It is too early to determine whether ele-
ments of the 304th Division will move into Laos and
thence into South Vietnam or whether they will move
southward toward the Demilitarized Zone. It is also
too early to determine whether the entire division
or a single regiment is on the move.
9. The 304th Division long has had a training
role for units headed for South Vietnam, The 66th
NVA Regiment, for example, which is involved in the
Dak To fighting was a subordinate. Other elements
trained by the 304th Division have recently moved
through the A Shau Valley area of South Vietnam where
they became part of the 6th Regiment.
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20 November 1967
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31st Regiment in Laos
10. Airborne radio direction finding on 19
November located the headquarters of the 31st Regi-
ment of the 341st North Vietnamese Division just
north of Route 922 in the Laos panhandle. This is a
move of approximately 100 kilometers from the regi-
ment's 11 November location near the junction of
Routes 911/912.
11. The ultimate destination of the 31st Regi-
ment is not known. It would appear that the unit is
headed for either the A Shau Valley area of Thua Thien
Province. It could take up a flanking position near
the Khe Sanh outpost.
12. The unit had formerly confined its opera-
tions to the eastern part of the Demilitarized Zone
area. Elements of the regiment were active, for ex-
ample, around Con Thien and against South Vietnamese
units farther east. The deployment of the regiment
into the Laos panhandle after a period of refitting
and rest in North Vietnam suggests that another unit
has taken its place in the eastern DMZ. It is pos-
sible the 31st Regiment is preparing, in conjunction
with other NVA units, for coordinated combat activity
along the whole length of the Demilitarized Zone.
20 November 1967
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IV. OTHER COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
V. COMMUNIST POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
1. There is nothing of significance to report.
20 November 1967
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VI.
OTHER MAJOR ASPECTS
20 November 1967
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