THE POTENTIAL FOR POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN ARGENTINA, ETHIOPIA, AND THAILAND JUNE 1975 [SANITIZED] - 1975/06/01

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Argentina Declassification Project - The "Dirty War" (1976-83)
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06628554
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: April 3, 2019
• Document Release Date: April 12, 2019
• Publication Date: June 1, 1975

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Research Project
The Potential for Political Violence in
Argentina, Ethiopia, and Thailand:
Report on a Quantitative Analytical Model
Progress Report No. 6
-Cenfidirlitrar-
3.5(c)
June 1975
3.5(c)
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3.5(c)
3.5(c)
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Progress Report No. 6 June 1975
The Potential for Political Violence in Argentina, Ethiopia,
and Thailand: Report on a Quantitative Analytical Model
This is the sixth and last in a series of reports on the testing of an analytical
model of political violence adapted from Ted Robert GMT'S frustration-aggression
theory (Why Men Rebel, Princeton University Press, 1970). The Gurr theory
is based on the proposition that political violence is the product of group frus-
trations reinforced by the belief that violence is justified and by the capability
to turn the resulting politicized anger into collective aggression. The form of the
ensuing violence�turmoil (riots or demonstrations), insurgency (terrorist acts
or small-scale guerrilla operations), conspiracy (attempted_coups), or internal war
(large-scale revolutionary actions or civil war )�will depend upon the kinds
of relationships which are found to exist among various types of groups in the
country under examination. A complete description of the theory and of the
procedures devised to operationalize it as an analytical tool is contained in an
earlier OPR report of an experimental, ex post facto test of the model in the
Chilean situation of mid-1973 (OPR 502, Revised, November 1974).
The purpose of this second phase of the project is to test the value of the
Gun model as a technique for assessing the nature and potential for political
violence in societies of varying stages of development and with quite different
cultural heritages and political institutions. The three countries chosen�Argen-
tina, Ethiopia, and Thailand�seem to meet our requirements: each represents
a different stage of development in a distinct geographic area, and each is con-
fronted with domestic unrest or political conflict.
For each of the three countries, a panel of five CIA analysts assigns nu-
merical evaluations at regular monthly intervals to the model's key variables�
relative deprivation or collective frustration, belief in the justification for violence,
coercive force, and institutional support. The evaluations are made for each
group or "actor" which, in the panel's judgment, represents a significant political
force in the country. The country's actors are also assessed in terms of their
identification with four basic actor-categories: Pro-regime, mass-oriented
(PR-MO); pro-regime, elite-oriented ( PR-EO ); anti-regime, mass-oriented
(AR-M0); and anti-regime, elite-oriented (AR-EO). After each monthly assess-
ment, the panel's evaluations are combined statistically, using computerized pro-
cedures devised in the Office of Political Research, to produce overall evalua-
tions of the Potential for Political Violence (PPV) and of the conditions con-
ducive to particular types of violence in the country under observation.
NOTE: Comments or- questions on this project will be welcomed by its autho
Office of Political Research, code 143, ext. 4091.
1
CON,ArlIAL
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ENTIAL
The summary below presents the principal findings from the seventh set
of assessments made by the country panels in mid-June 1975. The graphs on suc-
ceeding pages display trends based on the seven sets of assessments made to
date. This progress report completes the present test phase. A final wrap-up
report will, as part of a general critique of the model, examine trend changes
over time in the panels' scoring patterns, and thus in the model's projections
of the potential and form of political violence, compared with actual develop-
ments in each of the three countries during the test period.
Summary of Principal Findings
( NOTE: The data cited below and in the following graphs are
keyed to each country's Potential for Political Violence or PPV, as re-
flected by the median PPV score of each five-member country panel.
The figures should not be regarded as representing either probabilities
or absolute quantities; they should be interpreted merely as indicating
relative status or strength, compared to other variables in the model
assessed by the same country panel or to corresponding variables assessed
by the other two country panels.)
General:
1. In the final month of the test period, all three countries showed increases
in potential for political violence. Ethiopia continued to display the largest po-
tential, as it has throughout the six-month period. Thailand, maintaining its rela-
tively high level of the past two months, ranked second. Argentina, displaying
a sudden upsurge, moved up to a close third behind Thailand.
2. In Argentina, conditions conducive to internal war and conspiracy in-
creased markedly. In Ethiopia, conditions continued to tilt toward internal war
and conspiracy, but with strong secondary tendencies emerging toward insurgency
and turmoil. In Thailand, conditions favorable to riots and demonstrations (tur-
moil) continued to dominate the scene.
3. In all three countries anti-regime actors continued to show greater po-
tential for political violence than pro-regime actors. In Argentina and Thailand,
anti-regime mass actors displayed the largest potential; in Ethiopia anti-regime
elite actors showed the greatest potential.
4. All three countries displayed high degrees of politicized frustration.
Ethiopia continued to rank highest, while Argentina, registering a sharp jump
in politicized discontent, moved into second place, slightly ahead of Thailand.
Though the capability to turn this frustration into actual political violence in-
creased somewhat in Argentina, it remained relatively stable in all three countries.
5. Concurrent with the sharp increase in potential for political violence in
Argentina, the range of assessments among members of the Argentine panel
widened considerably in June compared to May. The range among Ethiopian
panel members remained about the same, while divergencies among members
of the Thai panel narrowed sharply compared to the previous month. In Argen-
tina and Ethiopia, divergencies between one or two outliers and other panel
members continued to characterize the pattern of assessments.
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CON TIAL
Argentina:
In the May-June period the potential for political violence in Argentina
jumped to its highest level in the entire six-month test period (a PPV score of
63 in June, compared to only 46 in May). Within the limits of that considerably
enlarged potential, conditions conducive to all four types of violence increased
sharply, but the gains for conspiracy (11 to 17) and internal war (16 to 21)
were larger than those for insurgency (9 to 11) and turmoil (10 to 14). The
potential for political violence among anti-regime mass actors increased markedly
(from 16 to 26). To a lesser extent, the potential among anti-regime elite actors
and pro-regime elite actors also increased (13 to 18 among the former, 8 to 11
among the latter). The main factor in the large increase in PPV appeared to
be the widening sense of politicized frustration (from 31 in May to 44 in June).
The capability to translate that frustration into actual political violence also
increased somewhat over the previous months (7 to 9 for coercive force, 8 to 10
for institutional support). Divergencies in assessments among members of the
Argentine panel increased sharply in June (jumping from a range of 44 around
a median PPV score of 46 in May to a range of 60 around a median PPV score
of 63 in June). Analysts A and B, at the low end of the PPV scale, continued
to deviate sharply from the other three panel members.
Ethiopia:
The potential for political violence in Ethiopia increased slightly in the
May-June period (a PPV score of 72 in May, 75 in June). Within limits of that
continuing, relatively high potential, conditions conducive to turmoil and in-
surgency became somewhat more apparent (an increase in PPV from 12 to 15
for turmoil, from 16 to 18 for insurgency), but conditions favorable to conspiracy
and internal war (both at 21) continued to dominate. Anti-regime actors con-
tinued to display much more potential for political violence than pro-regime
actors (49 for the former group, only 26 for the latter), but cutting across these
categories the potential among elite actors rose slightly (13 to 16 for PR-EO,
26 to 29 for AR-EO), while that among mass actors declined somewhat (12 to 10
for PR-MO, 21 to 20 for AR-M0). Politicized frustration in Ethiopia rose from
May to June (from 48 to 53), but the capacity to transform that frustration into
actual political violence declined slightly (from 12 to 11 for both coercive force
and institutional support). The range of variation among members of the
Ethiopian panel remained about the same as in May ( a range of 35 around a
May median PPV score of 72, compared with a range of 36 around the June
median PPV score of 75). One outlier, Analyst D, at the low end of the PPV
scale, continued to deviate sharply from his colleagues bunched closely at the
upper end of the scale.
Thailand:
Though the potential for political violence in Thailand increased only
slightly ( a PPV score of 66 in May, 67 in June), the conditions for particular
types of violence shifted perceptibly during the period: conditions conducive
to turmoil increased (from 22 to 26) while those favorable to the other three
types remained the same or declined slightly ( a continuing score of 8 for con-
spiracy, small� declines from 18 to 16 for insurgency and from 18 to 17 for
internal war). The potential for political violence for each type of actor remained
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stable, with anti-regime mass actors displaying the greatest potential (25) and
pro-regime elite actors somewhat less (19). The degree of politicized frustration
in the country showed little change (40 in May, 41 in June). Similarly, the ca-
pability to translate that frustration into actual political violence remained
unchanged (at 13 for both coercive force and institutional support). Paralleling
the relatively stable PPV pattern, the range of variation among Thai panel
.members narrowed considerably during the period (from a range of 44 around
a May median PPV score of 66, to a range of only 20 around the June median
PPV score of 67), as the previous month's outlier, Analyst E, rejoined his col-
leagues in a relatively small band at the middle-upper end of the scale.
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Conditions Conducive to Particular Types of Political Violence
20
0 _
Dec 74
PPV
100
BO
T26
0 �
Dec 74. . .....:�Jan 75 Feb .� ....mar: � � �Apr May Jun
Ca
DENTIAL
Shaded areas represent, within the limits of each country's potential
for political violence. (PPV), the degree to which that country pane's
median scores an key Variables fulfill the conditions hypothesized by
the 6urr theory as conducive to each type Of political violence. .
T - Turmoil �
l 7 _Insurgency
.Conspiracy �
Internal War
CTI AL
566326 6-75 CIA
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The Potential for Political Violence (PPV) for Each Type of Actor
Dec 74
Jan 75
Feb
Mar
Apr
63
PH-MU
Pli-E0 11
AR-910 26
AR-E0 18
May Jun
ETHIOPIA
PPV
80
60
40
20
Dec 74
100
80
60
40
20
Jan 75
Feb
Mar
Apr
May
75
Pli-M0 10
PH-E0 16
AR-MO 20
AR-E0 29
Jun
THAILAND
Dec 74 Jan 75
CO � NTIAL
Feb Mar
Shaded areas represent each country
panel's median scores for PPV for
each actor category.
67
P1148 0 11
PII-E0 19
AR-MO 25
AR-E0 12
Apr May Jun
PR -MO -Pro-R egime, Mass-Oriented Actors
PR-E0- Pro-Regime, Elite-Oriented Actors
AR-MO-Anti-Regime, Mass-Oriented Actors
AR-E0- Anti-Regime, Ude-Oriented Actors
C"trO ENTIAL
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The Potential for Political Violence (PPV) in Terms of Key Variables in the Gurr Model
PPV
100
PPV
PPV
80
SO
40
20
ARGENTINA
63
'$ 10
CF
Dec 74
100
80
Jan 75 Feb
60 11�1111111/�'-
..
40
20
0
Dec 74
100
75
IS 11
CF 11
PF 53
Jan 75.
Feb
Mar
Apr
THAILAND
CF 13
IS 13
PF 41
Dec 74
CON TIAL
Jan 75
Shaded areas represent sums of each country
panel's median scores for each key variable for
all actor categories.
IS, Institutional Support
: Coercive Force
PF Politicized Frustration
.
(relative deprivation
justification for. voilenqe)
7
CO cENTIAL
5663213 61.A
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PPV
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Individual Analysts' Assessments of the Potential for Political Violence (PPV)
100
BO
so
20
ARGENTINA
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Colored lines.regresenf-the range of jodlOidbol-
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analysts' scores for PPV around each -country
panel's median score for PPV.
Analyst-A
Analyst-C
AnalystLE
Co TIAL
C9I.V0 NTIAL
56629 6-75:6I
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