TERRORISM REVIEW 7 JULY 1983[SANITIZED] - 1983/07/07
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
05360540
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
U
Document Page Count:
36
Document Creation Date:
April 3, 2019
Document Release Date:
April 12, 2019
Sequence Number:
Case Number:
Publication Date:
July 7, 1983
File:
| Attachment | Size |
|---|---|
 TERRORISM REVIEW 7 JULY 1[15515278].pdf [3] | 716.7 KB |
Body:
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,oait Directorate of
Intelligence
Lq- MASTER FILE COPY
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3.5(c)
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Terrorism
Review
7 July 1983
3.5(c)
Seefet
GI TR 83-014
7 July 1983
Copy 478
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3.5(c)
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Terrorism
Review
7 July 1983
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3.5(c)
3.5(c)
23 Argentina: Status of the Monteneros
(ALA)
3.5(c)
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3.5(c)
3.5(c)
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Argentina: Status of the Montoneros
up to
several dozen leftist Montonero guerrillas have reen-
tered the country and may be planning to resume
military activities. Well-publicized incidents�inter-
ruptions of television broadcasts by Montonero propa-
ganda speeches, discovery of weapons caches, and
other crimes for which the terrorists reportedly have
claimed responsibility�have reinforced concerns.
3.5(c)
3.3(b)(1) 3.3(b)(1)
scheduled for next January. The security forces ap-
parently recognize these constraints and
do not expect any signifi-
cant actions by the Montoneros until well after the
military leaves power. 3.5(c) 3.3(b)(1)
For now and probably beyond elections in October,
the Montoneros are likely to focus on political action.
they
continue to work through organized labor and leftist
political parties. The extreme left wing of the predom-
inant Peronist Party appears to be especially open to
Montonero influence. Its leader, Vicente Saadi,
since
early April, the police have captured some 10 Mon-
toneros, and the press reports that police have killed
several leaders in firefights.
The deaths of the Montonero leaders�one of whom
was reportedly found with weapons, funds, and plans
for further subversive activity�have been used by
regime officials to bolster the position of the security
services against civilian critics who have called for an
end to the military's role in internal security matters.
Regime leaders, for example, followed up the most
recent shootout with a highly publicized report that
detailed the history of Montonero terrorist activity.
They also privately briefed leading politicians on the
ongoing terrorist threat. Although there is growing
evidence that the shootings may have been staged
executions, the report and briefings have thus far
helped dissipate criticism by most moderate politi-
cians; all but the harshest regime critics have publicly
acknowledged the need for continued efforts to com-
bat subversion.
In our view, the Montoneros are unlikely to mount
more than small-scale operations over the coming
months. The security forces continue to successfully
penetrate their organization abroad and apparently
have had little difficulty in ferreting out what little
remains of the terrorist network in Argentina. In
addition to the high personal risk of renewed terrorist
actions, the Montoneros may calculate that more
intense activities could prompt a military crackdown,
posing a threat to the transition to civilian rule,
23
is a longtim3.3(b)(1 )
backer of the Montoneros and receives a monthly
stipend from funds kept in Mexico. In addition, his
newspaper, La Voz, was started about two years ago
with Montonero capital and has become an important
vehicle for the organization's propaganda. 3.5(c)
Should the Montoneros decide to renew terrorist
activity, moral support would remain strong among
some Latin American leftists, but we judge that
material assistance, if forthcoming, would be limited.
The Mexicans and Bolivians, for example, while
willing to provide a safehaven, would not supply the
Montoneros with weapons and would probably bloA-
significant arms buys and military activity within 3.3(3)(1
their borders. The Cubans,
have
renewed their commitment to the terrorists after a
year's respite. Havana, however, is already spread
thin and, considering the high political costs and low
likelihood of success, is unlikely to furnish more than
shelter, training, some financial assistance, and covert
propaganda support; Nicaragua would probably fol-
low a similar policy. Outside Latin America, the PLO
would probably continue to provide training and
political support. 3.5(c)
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7 July 1983
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