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EO 13526 3.3(D)(1)25Yrs
EO 13526 3.5(c)
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USIB
UNITED STATES
INTELLIGENCE
BOARD
National Intelligence
Bulletin
3.5(c)
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_lap-S-ecrer
February 7, 1976
N2 678
3.5(c)
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3.5(c)
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�.sup .
National Intelligence Bulletin
February 7, 1976
CONTENTS
� ARGENTINA: Military
preoccupied with coup prospects
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National Intelligence Bulletin
February 7, 1976
3.3(b)(1)
3.3(b)(1)
ARGENTINA
Recent events in Argentina suggest that the military is getting in a position to
take over the government, but there is no firm evidence that they have made a
decision to move yet. Reported discussions in the high command no longer focus on
whether a coup is necessary or feasible, but on how and when it should be
undertaken. Two key personnel shifts will facilitate the execution of a coup.
General Suarez Mason, long considered a coup advocate, has been appointed
army chief in Buenos Aires. His immediate predecessors were only lukewarm to the
idea of a take-over.
Another reputed proponent of a military take-over, General Harguindeguy, has
been named head of the Federal Police, which patrols the borders and has important
responsibilities in combating terrorists. The police could also be a vital element in
countering reaction by militant Peronist civilians after a coup.
navy commander Admiral Massera has said
that the recent positioning of ships far up the Parana River is intended not only to
support the counterinsurgency effort, but is also designed to seal off potential
escape routes of those who would try to flee after a coup.
Massera claims it is a foregone conclusion among the armed forces that they
will at some point remove the present government.
Massera and army commander
in chief General Videla are giving some thought to specific courses of action to
follow in the event of a coup. to
prepare lists of prominent persons to be arrested following a take-over. The purpose
of the arrests, which would concentrate on prominent citizens suspected of
subversion or other illegal activities, would be to build public sympathy for the
revolt.
Videla is said to have commented that if there were a coup, the three service
chiefs would probably form a governing junta. The junta might designate a fourth
officer as virtual prime minister or give primary responsibility to one of its own
members. Videla said further that sympathetic civilian advisers have provided the
military with a "library" of plans on how to proceed after a coup, although the
officers have made no specific decisions.
Officers looking for a pretext to move against Peron may be heartened by
growing indications that labor, long one of her mainstays, as well as the business
sector, are becoming increasingly restive. Continuation of this trend would in these
officers' eyes bring public repudiation of the President to the point they consider
necessary before moving.
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