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25 May 1951
Copy No. 0--;_
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO 4�#t.� s4
NO CHANGE IN CLASI--).X
1.1 DECLASSIFID
CLASS. CHAN(..f7D TO: fl S
NEXT REVIEW -4-
AUTH: HR
DATEP,,A_S 7 �
Office of ..Current IsAtelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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SUMMARY
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1. France and Portugal not ready to accept Greece and �f- T96464.12.a.A
Turkey in NATO (page 3).
2.
3.
4.
5,
FAR EAST
LIl
elsr
Communists' most recent attack concludes (page 3).
Soviet tankers make periodic oil deliveries to Tsingtao
(page 4).
Comment on Chinese Communist intent to increase L-t-t-r74 T1944
traffic on Burma Road (page 5).
Mixed reaction in Japan to US-Japanese economic co-
operation plan (page 5).
De Lattre believes he can successfully oppose a Chinese
Communist invasion of Tonkin (page 6). '74-44-1-r--.40�c�'
New coup d'etat plot is reported in Thailand (page 7)
NEAR EAST
Iran pressing for early control over oil company (page 8).
French official reports increased French prestige in
Syria (page 9).
WESTERN EUROPE
10. Opportunity seen for closing Soviet repatriation missions
(page 10).
TOP CRET
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TGir, � HET
L France and Portu
in NATO:
GENERAL
al not read to acce et Greece and Turke
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To clarify the French position in
regard to the inclusion of Greece
and Turkey in NATO, the French
Embassy in Athens has explained
that France recognizes the need
for some form of security guarantee
for Greece. The Embassy stated
that France is now studying the problem
and that, while participation in NATO is not excluded, the final
French decision must wait until after the French elections.
Meanwhile, the Secretary General of the Portuguese Foreign
Office has stated that his government does not favor the in-
clusion of Turkey and Greece in NATO as long as Spain is
excluded.
Comment: Foreign Minister Schuman
has stated that France favors integration of Greece and Turkey
Into the Western defense system, but that for the time being
the French hesitate to incorporate the two Mediterranean
countries in NATO because of Scandanavian opposition and also
to avoid additional provocation of the USSR. The French are
probably concerned also lest NATO become unwieldy as the
result of extending its commitments to areas which lend them-
selves less readily to a unified defense, but both France and
Portugal can be expected eventually to accept the US viewpoint.
FAR EAST
Communists' most recent attack concludes:
The US Far East Command reports
its estimate, based on present indi-
cations, that the second phase of
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the enemy's Fifth Offensive has, as a result of heavy casual-
ties, ended in failure. FECOM further comments that there
are no immediate indications pointing to early resumption of
the enemy offensive and that it may take the enemy from eight
to ten days before it can be resumed.
3. Soviet tankers make pert tdic.o:
Comm uk TIwse are believed to
be the first tankers to deliver oil from the USSR to a Chinese
port other than Dairen. These tankers are delivering about
half of all petroleum products imported int* China Proper
(not includtag Manchuria). Most of the other half comes
from the USSR by rail through Manchuria. Unless rail
shipments have dropped considerably, the use of Soviet
tankers significantly improves China Proper 's oil position,
although current imports are still believed insufficient to
meet both military and civilian requirements.
TOP RET
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Comment on Chinese Communist intent to increase traffic
on Burma Road:
Chinese Communists may
try to counter Western embargo efforts by routing.their
imports via Burma.
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Routing shipments over the Burma
Road would entail disadvantages to the Chinese because of
(a) the high cost of transport over the highways (b) the very
limited carrying capacity of the road (probably less than
five percent of 'China's current Imports) and (c) the long
distance from the road's terminus in Southwest China to
the main areas 44 need in the north and northeast With
Western nations banning the export of many strategic items
to Communist China however s the Chinese are� expected to
consider pressing the Burmese to permit increased traffic
over the Burma Road -- taking full advantage of Burma's
antiety to avoid provocation of the Communists on its
borders. Although the Burmese are not likely to allow the
Chinese unlimited use of the Burma Roads Communist
military intimidation would probably &tacit concessions en-
tailing increased transshipment over the road of some items,
particularly those not specifically covered by the UN embargo
resolution.
I e action In ra an to US$a.anese economic coo eration
p an:
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� Comment: Japan has considerable
idle industrial capacity which the Japanese hope will be
utilized both to assure continued economic stability in Japan
and to complement the Western industrial effort. The an-
nounced program, while falling short of Japanese expecta-
tions, nevertheless was welcomed in many of its aspects
(e. g., the opportunity to participate in US economic pro-
grams in Southeast Asia, the assurance that US credits
would be available, and indications of a lack of desire to
discriminate against Japanese shipping. )
6. De Lattre believes he can successfully oppose a Chinese
ComMunist invasion of Tonkin:
In conversation with US Minister
Heath in Saigon, General de Lattre
stated that taking into consideration
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his scheduled reinforcements from prance,
he could suc-
cessfully oppose the Viet rebels plus 50, 000 Chinese
"volunteers," providing an attack did not come before October.
With respect to an invasion after October, he hopes that, with
the outside assistance of four infantry divisions and an air-
craft carrier (all from unnamed allies), he will be able to
repulse a Chinese attack of up to 150, 000. Owing to terrain
factors, De Lattre believes this is roughly the maximum
attacking Chinese force that might be expected. He stated
that if the outside assistance he envisions is not forthcoming,
he would fall back on Cochinchina,
De Latt re stated his belief that the
recent US-UK-French conference at Singapore, which he
attended, removed any doubt in the minds of the US and UK
delegates as to the extreme importance of the military
campaign in Indochina. He admitted that several thousand
Chinese Communists were serving with the Vietnamese
rebels in Tonkin, but reported no indication of organized
Chinese units there.
New coup d'etat plot is reported in Thailand:
� Comment: Since 1932, chan.ges of
governments in Thailand iiiir-FIRViently been effected by
coups d'etat. While there is no recent information to confirm
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this report, the Thai Navy has always been antagonistic
toward the Phibun regime and would probably assume
leadership in plans to remove Phibun and his chief sup-
porters whenever a favorable opportunity is presented.
NEAR EAST
8. Iran pressing for early control over oil company:
On 24 May, the Iranian Finance
Minister informed the Anglo-
Iranian Oil Company that, unless
it appointed a negotiator by 30 May,
Iran would be left with no choice but to act in accordance
with the nationalization legislation. More detailed data
concerning Iranian intentions are contained in an unconfirmed
parliamentary oil committee "blue print" for action which
has reached the British Embassy in Tehran. This reported
Iranian plan provides for: (1) establishing an Iranian mana-
gerial board to direct the oil industry; (2) taking over the
AIOC administrative offices in Tehran and then in Abadan;
(3) offering a two year contract to most of the British tech-
nicians now employed by the AIOC; and (4) progressively
assuming control of the production and refining units.
Meanwhile the tilt Foreign Office is giving careful considera-
tion to a conditional acceptance of the Iranian request of
20 May for the appointment by the company of a negotiator
to help implement the nationalization bill/ Foreign Office
officials suspect that Iran might not agree to a conditional
acceptance; however, they feel that any other British action
might either make negotiation impossible or prejudice the
UK position.
Comment: The Finance Minister's
statement does not necessarily mean that Iran would take
over the company immediately, inasmuch as the nationaliza-
tion law passed on 30 April provides a maximum of three
months to arrange for implementation. Serious differences
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have apparently arisen in the parliamentary oil committee,
but the radicals seem to be definitely in control. If the
"blue print" as outlined above indeed represents the govern-
ment's plan, there remains little basis for negotiation, as
the amount of participation left the British under the plan
would be unsatisfactory to them.
. French official reports increased French prestige in Syria:
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Comment: French culture is still
the predominant foreign influence in Syria as well as in
Lebanon, and French diplomatic officials have been attempting
to regain, to some extent, the strong political position they
previously had in the Levant before World War IL Reports of
an improved French position in Syria have occurred at the
same time that French influence has suffered a setback in
Israel. The Israelis recently objected to the presence of two
French officers at the Mixed Armistice Commission meetings,
and they have indicated their belief that the French attirtude on
the Israeli-Syrian border dispute is too pro-Syrian.
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WESTERN EUROPE
10. Opportunity seen for closing Soviet repatriation missions:
The US High Commission in Vienna
believes that a favorable situation
has been created for Western Allied
action to terminate the Soviet re-
patriation missions in the western zones of Austria, as the
mission in the US zone has just been caught using two displaced
persons for espionage. Without connecting the termination
with the espionage case, High Commissioner Donnelly intends
to inform the Soviet High Commissioner on 25 May that the
mission in the US zone must be withdrawn by 8 June. The
British have been informed, and have agreed to proceed with
termination of the mission in their zone at the end of the
current Paris negotiations. Donnelly will urge the French
to take parallel action at an early date.
Comment: In March, Donnelly
proposed joint tripartite action to terminate the Soviet mis-
sions, which have completed their legitimate functions and
now operate mainly as intelligence and propaganda agencies.
The French, who were unwilling to take action at that time,
may fall into line if the US and British have already proceeded
independently. The USSR may be expected to retaliate.
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