CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1951/05/17

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02003062
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: March 18, 2019
• Document Release Date: March 28, 2019
• Publication Date: May 17, 1951

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4-64-1-------11.CJ " 
17 May 1951 
Copy No. 0-'7 
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN 
DOCUMENT NO. 
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. 
r) DECLASSIFIED 
CLASS, Ck-IAINKED TO: TS 104:501 
NEXT FIEVIEVV DATE: 
AUTH: 
DATE� wrA  
Office of Current Intelligence 
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 
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SUMMARY 
FAR EAST 
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.fAi12e0,1-624. 2. De Lattre again exhibits antagonism toward US economic, aid to Indo-
china (page 3). 
-7,75r7004.4- 3.A Indonesia claims its trade policy will depend upon UN decision (page 4 
le  
NEAR EAST 
ForhP4. Pakistan will send troops to Korea if US supports it against India 
-1L-fir6r7 and Afghanistan (page 5). 
G 
EASTERN EUROPE 
j. _41404(7-
Tito seeks tanks and artillery from the West (page 5). 
3.3(h)(2) 
�.Pft-rjrri*L_L 
'4214-tii45548. 
FfThrv-e'El4 
WESTERN EUROPE 
Peopl&s Party exploits Communist support of Socialists (page 6). 
Austrian export control effort assessed (page 7). 
De Gaulle's ourse expected to aid Communists in 17 June 
elections age 7). 
LATIN AMERICA 
PrAbg-)Ar 10. Military junta ousts Bolivian President (page 8). 
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FAR EAST 
De Lattre again exhibits antagonism toward US ecaiomic aid to Indo-
china: 
US Minister Heath in Saigon reports that, 
while General de Lattre's "apparent new 
policy" of respecting Vietnamese aspira-
tions and his support for the creation of 
a truly National Army is intelligent and beneficial, De Lathe has, 
however, evidenced increased determination to exclude "foreign" 
(i. e0, American) influence from French-Viet relations. De Lattre 
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Is particularly suspicious of the ECA,program, and any mention of 
US economic aid in Indochina in the leading French language news-
paper (which is controlled by the French High Commissariat)� is now 
strictly pr hibited, The first ugpleasant public incident between 
Heath and De Lattre took place recently when the general, in the 
presence of several other officials, told Heath there would be more 
housing for US military aid personnel in Saigon "if you would get rid 
of s me of your ECA men and yOur American missionaries." 
Comment; Thedeveloping ECA program 
in Indochina has already evoked enthusiastic response from the Viet-
namese in those areas where it has been applied and promises in the 
future to be a vUtal factor in undermining the prestige and influence 
of Ho Chi Minh's movement. De Lathe's previous criticisms of ECA 
have been interpreted as resuittz from temporary pique, but it now 
appears that he actually possesses a deep-seated antagonism toward 
US economic aid. 
3. Indonesia claims its trade policy will depe d upon UN decision: 
Comment: Although it is likely that Indo-
nesia would nominally adhere to a UN-recommended embargo, pri-
marily because it does not wish to prejudice its opportunity to obtain 
US assistance, it would not impose the stringent measures necessary 
th prevent its rubber from reaching China. 
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NEAR EAST 
. Pakistan  will send troops to Korea if US supports it against India and  
a77Inu E an:  
Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan of Pakistan 
has assured the US Ambassador in Karachi 3.3(h)(2) 
of his government's willingness to provide 
one division of troops for service in Korea 
if the US is prepared to support Pakistan against India in the matter 
a Kashmir and against Afghanistan in the matter of Pushtoonistan. 
The Prime Minister stated that the US should commit itself to his 
country's support just as it asked Pakistan to make a decision that, 
in his opinion, would constitute an irrevocable tie to the West 
EASTERN EUR.OP:E 
5. Tito seeks tanks and artillery from the West:  
In reply to a query regarding Yugoslav arms 
aid talks in Washington between the US, UK 3.3(h)(2) 
and France, the Department of State has 
informed the US High Commissioner in 
Germany that the talks are based on arms requirement lists submitted 
by Yugoslavia to the US and UK. The lists include light,and medium 
artillery, tanks, and other items. The Department can find no evidence 
that the Yugoslav decision to inform the US and UK of Yugoslav military 
requirements was based on an estimate that hostilities are imminent 
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WESTERN EUROPE 
Pe4pl&s Party exploits Communist support of Socialists: 
US High Commissioner Donnelly in Vienna 
states that the Communist decision to support 
Socialist candidate Koerner in the run-off 
presidential election on 27 May represents 3.3(h)(2) 
the most skillful Communist effort to date 
to drive a wedge between the Socialist Party 
and its coalition partner, the cariservative 
People's Party., The Socialist Party re-
sponded to the Communist maneuver by instructing its officials to re-
ject every Communist offer of cooperation in the Koerner campaign. 
Nevertheless, the People's Party press is playing up the "Marxist 
danger" and has termed the Communist decision a "momentous clari-
fication, intimating that the Socialists deliberately chose a candidate 
who was acceptable to the Communists. 
Comment: The People's Party, although 
well aware that the Socialists do not want Communist support, is un-
willing to abandon a propaganda theme that has been effective in the 
past Communist support cannot elect Koerner, if, as expected, 
People's Party candidate Gleissner picks up the large minor party 
vote that went to the rightist candidate in \the 6 May presidential elec-
tion. However, the 5train put upon the present coalition �vernrnent 
will be very great. 
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8. Austrian export control effort assessed:  
US Legation and ECA officials in Austria 
report the Austrian Government is co- 3.3(h)(2) 
operating effectively with the US in con-
trolling East-West trade and, given the 
limitations imposed .by the Soviet occupation, has gone as far as 
possible in thwarting Soviet economic penetration Austria and in 
denying the USSR strategic materials. The Austrians must be circum-
spect in their efforts to control this trade because of the ever-present 
possibility of Soviet retaliation, which could result either in the par-
tition of Austria or in restrictiins upon shipments from the Soviet 
zone to other parts of Austria. Only a small number of items subject 
to embargo are produced in Austria, but the USSR would retaliate im-
mediately if the action were taken to control transit shipments origi-
nating in other Western countries, and furthermore, the Austrian 
Government has no controls over the exports of the Soviet authorities 
and plants. In matters of trade, Austria has been conceding to Eastern 
Europe only what has been necessary to obtain essential Austrian im-
p rts (principally coal) and to maintain the Eastern markets for Austrian 
goods that do not sell ita the West. US officials declare that the con-
tinued.orientation of Austria's trade tkward the West will gradually 
further curtail Austria's dependence upon the East for raw materials 
and markets. 
Comment: Although the Austrian Government 
doubtleas tries to control trade with the East, its ability to do so is 
limited because of the predominance of S viet influence in Austria. 
Soviet firms not only pr duce large quantities of 1-B items in Austria, 
but Soviet-controlled shipping companies', in Vienna are actively en-
gaged in buying up required items throughout Westrn Europe and 
sending them East, 
. De Gaulle's ourse expected to aid Communists in 17 June elections: 
As Le French electoral campaign �Pens, 
the c mparative apathy of the electorate 
promises to hurt all parties except the 
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Communists. The Right, however, is expected to show "substantial 
gains-, " presumably at the expense of the Center. If all non-Communist 
parties formed electoral alliances, they could obtain the majorities 
necessary to eliminate Communist reprtseritation, but De Gaulle has 
ruled out this possibility by refusing to alLm.w his party's candidates 
to affiliate with other parties. Since this decision will actually reduce 
the num r of seats De Gaulle can expect to win, he is evidently more 
anxious to undermine the strength of the Center than to decrease Com-
munist representation. Both the Gaullists and the Communists, by 
ignoring the Center in tJeir respective campaigns, hope to attract 
those middle-of-the-road elements which could be expected to vote 
for one extreme in protest agaList the other. 
Comment: A gradual trend toward the Right 
in French politics has been observed since 1947, and De Gaulle's 
Rally of the French People can expected to become a major party 
in the next Assembly at the expense principally of the centrist Popular 
Republicans. The Communist Party, whose strength has shown little 
or no decline in Assembly by-elections, is likely to benefit from the 
growing inflathon. Electoral reform was intended to reduce Communist 
representation sharply, but its effect has been largely counterbalanced 
by De Gaulle's injunction against electoral alliances. 
I. 
LATIN AMERICA 
10. Military junta *usts Bolivian President: 
President Urriolagoitia has left Bolivia 
following the military coup of 15 May, and 
a military junta has installed General 
Ballivian as President and Minister of 
Defense. 
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Comment It has been expected that a mili-
tary junta wruld take over the Bolivian Government in order to counter 
the anticipated revolutionary activity of the Nationalist Revolutionary 
Movement Additional incentives for effectik., the coup at this time 
were probably (a) the increasing public comment in favor of permitting 
the Nationalist Revolutionary MAvement to assume power, and (b) the 
return from exile of alvINR labor leader who directed the violent 
strikes at Catavi in 1949 and who, the junta fears, may again incite 
-violence among the miners. The junta is expected to attempt to main-
tain the normal flow of 'dm to the US. 
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