CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN - 1951/05/22

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Current/Central Intelligence Bulletin Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 02003063
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: March 18, 2019
• Document Release Date: March 28, 2019
• Publication Date: May 22, 1951

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*ego ra 1
22 May 1951
Copy No. Ca-
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT
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AUTH:.
DAT REVIEWEF
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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SUMMARY
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3.3(h)(2)
3. FrenchFord trucks arriving in Hong Kong for Chinese Ooinmunistj- r,240;
(page 4).
4. MacDonald expresses views on Southeast Asia (page 5).PA44.440 C1j34, tisJ
NEAR EAST
5, Shah states that admission of Greece and Turkey to NATO would 1-1?-kr MAIL
have bad effect in Iran (page 5).
6. Shah continues to fear actions of Iranian Prime Minister (page
7. King Farouk opposes break in Anglo-Egyptian defense talks (page6).
3.3(h)(2)
EASTERN EUROPE
WESTERN EUROPE
9. Dispute in Ruhr Authority sver German
10. 'PrOpects for continuation Of Adenauer
good (page 8).
11. French exert pressure on Tunisian Bey
12. Intensive Spanish propaganda campaign
strike (page 10).
� to
isokdeamllioscsatciaobnisne: :age 81:97::
coalition still conside-red
seeks to forestall Madrid
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French Ford trucks arriving in Hong Kong for Chinese Communists:
The US Consul General in-Hong Kong reports
that French Ford three-ton-trucks are now
arriving there in large numbers and that he is
urging the Colonial Government to stop the 3.3(h)(2)
reexport of these trucks to the Communist mainland. The colony
earlier this month stopped the shipment of 51 Dodge trucks, and ac-
cording to evidence obtained by the Consul General, the Communists
intend to abandon Hong Kong as a source for trucks if the government
bans export of the French Fords as well. The Consul General believes
the Communists may endeavor to effect future deliveries via the
Burma Road.
Comment With the progressive broadening
of Hong Kong's export controls, the Communists are said to be trans-
ferring their purchasing activities to other areas, particularly India,
where they reportedly negotiated a contract for several hundred five-
ton trucks earlier this month. Hong Kong's seizure of the French Fords,
following close on its seizure of the 51 Dodge trucks, would give future
impetus to Communist efforts to by-pass the colony and develop alternate
supply channels.
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4. MacDonald expresses views on Southeast Asia:
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Following a private conversation with the
� UK High Commissioner for Southeast Asia,
Malcolm MacDonald, the State Department
official present in Singapore for the recent
tripartite military talks,reports that MacDonald was less optimistic
regarding the situation in Southeast Asia than his public pronounce-
ments would indicate.
3.3(h)(2)
, Although MacDonald knew of no evidence of
support, in any substantial manner, to the bandit campaign in Malaya
by China or the USSR, he at no time expressed the view that the end
of the campaign was in sight.
With reference to Indochina, MacDonald
thought that the threat of Chinese Communist intervention overshadowed �
all other developments, He believed that General de Lathe had developed
a high degree of political ability but that possibly his political staff did
not carry out the General's views.
In his only mention of Burma, 'Ma4Donald
said that US action toward attempting to resolve the problem caused
by Chinese Nationalist troops in Kengtung has been very well received
by the Burmese Commander-in-Chief, Ne Win, and that Burmese sus-
picion of US support for these troops had been removed.
NEAR EAST
Shah states that admission of Greece and Turke to NATO would have
bad effect in Iran:
3.3(h)(2)
The Shah of Iran stated in a conversation with
the US Ambassador in Tehran that the admit-
tance of Turkey and Greece to NATO would have
a bad effect in Iran "if nothing were done about
Iran." The Ambassador feels that a statement by the US Government
regarding Iran at the time Turkey and Greece enter NATO would be in
order and helpful.
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Comment: The Shakand, other Iranian leaders
have let it be known during the past two years that they have been dis-
appointed and dissatisfied with the amount of aid given Iran in compari-
son with Turkey and Greece. In presenting their case, they have pointed
out that Iran was most vulnerable to Soviet aggression. While the pre-
sent government will hardly press its inclusion in Western defense ar-
ra,ngements, NATO's acceptance of Turkey and Greece will nevertheless
add to general Iranian bitterness and irritation.
Shah continues to fear actions of Iranian Prime Minister:
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In conversations with the US Anibassador in
Tehran, the Shah expressed the fear that Prime
Minister Mossadeq might "do harm" before Ms
government falls. The Shah deplored his own
position as a "looker�on"� and stated that he was afraid that the new oil
commission would be terrorized into action dictated by the extremists
and spearheaded by 1VIossadeq. In conclusions the Shah expressed him-
self very strongly on the futility of the Prime Minister's apparent pro-
gram neutrality.
Comment: The Shah reluctantly yielded to the ��-
popular demand for oil nationalization by appointing its foremost pro-
ponent Prime Minister. The Shah, however, has not changed his opiniOn
of Mossadeq. The latter's policies of free speech and free assembly
are being exploited by the pro-Communist Tudeh Party, and his anti
foreignism and mistrust of the army pose a real threat to Iran,
7. King Farouk opposes break in Anglo-Egyptian defense talks. 3.3(h)(2)
US Ambassador Caffery in Cairo has been :in
by the Egyptian Royal Pres' CounseDor
that King Farouk opposes any break In the Anglo-
Egyptian defense negotiations at the present
tie, assuming (a) that the forthcoming British reply leaves the door
open for future talks and (b) that the Foreign Minister is invited to London
soon for further discussions, According to the press counsel r, the
Egyptian Prime Minister and Foreign Minister have indicated that they will
not force a showdown on the defense negotiations at the present juncture.
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Comment: The opposition of King Farouk
to any break-down in the Anglo-Egyptian defense negotiations has
undoubtedly acted as a moderating influence upon the Wald govern-
ment's attitude on this question. While there is always the possibility
that Egyptian public opinion may become inflamed over the Suez and
Sudan issues and force the government to act in an irresponsible manner,
the Anglo-Egyptian discussions will probably continue through the sum-
mer in spite of the absence of any prospect that an agreement can be
reached.
EASTERN EUROPE
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9. Dispute in ituhT Authority over German coke allocations:
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In the meetin.gs of the International Authority 3.3(h)(2)
for the Ruhrthe Western European countries,
led by ?ranee, are presently disputing with
West Gerrnantr the amount of coke the Ruhr
will be required to export to Western Europe during the months of
July-September 1951. These exports are regarded as creating terms
of reference which will be used by the Schuman, Plan High Authority.
The French, who suspect the Germans of jockeying for the most
advaletpegeous starting position in the Schuman Plan, want a German
coke export of 6.75 million tons, whereas the Germans are offering
5.1 million tons. Privately, the permans have said they will agree
to the US compromise figure of SI million, which the French repre-
sentative will refer to his government. The French complain that
though e Ruhr Authority was established to give Europe control of
the Ruhr potential, in practice Germany controls Europe's steel ontput.
Comment; The Germans are attempting to
retain as much of their coke as they can, in view of the coming expan-
sion of industry. Since the Germans succeeded in gaining relaxation
of steel-production ceilings without making firm commitments on coke
deliveries t France, the French are becoming increasingly concerned
about the control Germany exercises over the European steel ind.ustry.
Unless the Germans show a more cooperative attitude now, French
Industrialists may be able to line up enough political opposition to the
Schuman Plan to prevent its ratification.
10. Pi_z_upects for continuation of Adenauer coalition still considered
US officials in Bon feel that, despite the 3.3(h)(2)
continuing trend of looses by West German
'Chancellor Adenauer' s Christian Democrats
in recent local elections, the outlook for t
successful continuation of the present government is reasonably good.
While the coalition partners have lost ground recently, the latest
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elections show that the opposition Social Democrats (SPD) are no
longer gaining ground. Recent SPD opposition to the Schuman Plan
has not been as profitable as earlier exploitation of the rearmament
Issue . The government's successful continuation is still largely
dependent on the maintenance of its slim working majority (211 out
of 402) in the Federal Parliament's lower house.. In spite of the
chancellor's somewhat dictatorial treatment ol his coalttion part-
ders, they are not likely to desert :a government which he heads.
Comment: Recent strains within the coali-
tion over questions of economic policy, such as the issue of codeter,.
min4tion in the coal and steel industries, have resulted from Adenauer's
concessions to labor over the objections of his coalition partners.
A similar situation is not expected to develop in the near future. The
coalition parties are united in support of the Schuman Plan, which is
actively opposed only by the Socialist opposition.
11. french exert pressure on Tunisian Bey to dismiss cabinet:
The French Resident General in Tunisia 3.3(h)(2)
has informed the reigning monarch, Larnine
Pasha Bey, that if he retains his present
cabinet the French will conduct no further
negotiations with it. This decision resulted from the cabinet's boy-
cott of the advisory Tunisian Grand Council during budget deliberations
and the Bey's attempt to rush reforms, Because the dismissal of
his ministers would be a difficult decision for the Bey, who has just
proclaimed his complete confidence in them, he probably will take
no action for the present.
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Comment: This ultimatum is another indi-
cation that the French intend to maintain a whiphand In. Twiisiao as
in French Morocco. Extremely modest reforms announced last June
have proceeded very slowly. French troops and police in the area
are capable of controlling disorders arising from the disagreement
of the Resident General and the Bey, but the anti-French sentiment
aroused in the Middle East by the Morocco crisis will be further
fanned by Fr enCh intransigence in Tunisia.
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12. Intensive Spanish propaganda campaign seeks to forestall Madrid strike:
The controlled Madrid�press has appealed to
the populace not to participate in the consumers'
strike called for 22 May, calling it a crime
against the state and threatening participants
with severe reprisals, such as loss of their jobs and possible imprison-
ment., Falange youth organizations are circulating leaflets blaming
agitation for the strike on a "masonic, Communist consviracv" and
urging the people to carry on their normal activities.
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Comment: The probable extent or success of
the strike cannot be gauged, but Madrid is not as volatile as the indus-
trial, separatist centers of Bilbao and Barcelona. The non-Communist
Lefty which is not effectively organized in. Madrid, is believed to regard
the action of the Monarchists in calling the strike at this time as too
precipitate. Available evidence points to Monarchist (and Catholic)
elements as the principal agitators of the strike. The action of General
Munoz Grandes sugge_Stidhat 00 Army may be taking a position of caution..
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