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Ned TO JAKI: Nfte`
13 May 1951
Copy No. el-
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLADS.
f -I DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO:
NEXT REVIEW D''.;"'-'�
AUTH:HR
DATE) t.14 7_ ItV,E..-`NC4--il
Office of Current Intelligence
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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3.5(c)
3.5(c)
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SUMMARY
GENERAL
k44.44,p,a-Luda1. Indian UN delegate suggests declaration on non-crossing of 38th
Parallel (page 3).
lit#10-14
FAR EAST
61:110J evr"2. Communist forces believed ready to renew offensive (page 3).
L...rjU4) 14g " " "14. Chinese Nationalists reportedly hope to use their troops in Indochina
(page 4).
NEAR EAST
6. Anti-US Tudeh demonstrations in Iran (page 5).
Les*.e. Iranian Tudeh Party expands activity to Kuwait (page 6).
EASTERN EUROPE
poi# 9. Bulgarian resistance group known to Communists (page 7).
to10. US Embassy in Belgrade sees need for formal Yugoslav arms re-
quest (page 7).
LATIN AMERICA
00041. Arosemena declared President of Panama (page 8).
ve4.44/-fr12. Political unrest continues in Bolivia (page 9)
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3.3(h)(2)
3.3(h)(2)
3.3(h)(2)
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3.5(c)
1.
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TCsISECRET
GENERAL
jjECEIJ2le ate siE ests declaration on non-crossingof 38th
According to the US delegate to the UN, Indian 3.3(h)(2)'
delegate Rau has informally suggested that the
General Assembly make an overture to the
Communists in Korea regarding the non-crossing
of the 38th Parallel. /2-tu proposed that, after it adopts a selective em-
bargo resolution, the General Assembly should declare that UN forces
would not cross the 38th Parallel if the Chinese Communist and North
Korean authorities issue a similar declaration. The US delegate be-
lieves that Rau has no clear conception of the means necessary to in-
sure the security of UN forces and to prevent a Communist build-up
beyond the Parallel.
3.5(c)
comment: The Communists have not indicated
any willingness to modify their demand for a complete withdrawal of
UN forces from Korea. It is conceivable that heavy losses in the Korean
venture would persuade the Communists to agree not to cross the Paral-
lel. During the civil war in China, the Communists employed such
agreements to gain breathing-spells for fresh build-ups.
FAR EAST
2. Communist forces believed ready to renew offensive:
On 12 May the US Far East Command observed
that the "pattern of enemy activity currently
developing in the battle area bears a striking
resemblance to the series of events observed
during periods immediately preceding past
enemy offensives." It concluded that the enemy can resume the offen-
sive within the next 72 to.. 96 hours. As evidence for this conclusion, the
Far East Commandtited :the stiffened enemy resistance encountered by UN
patrol activity, the daylight movement of enemy troops into the front line, the
use of smoke to 'screen daylight movement and an increase in aggressive
enemy patrolling and small unit attacks.
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TGIts,SECRET
According to the Far East Command, the
main effort of the renewed offensive probably will be directed along
the Han River corridor east of Seoul and the Chunchon-Wonju corri-
dor in the central sector.
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3.3(h)(2)
4. Chinese Nationalists reportedlyhope to use their troops in Indochina:
The US Minister in Saigon has received copies
of two alleged telegrams from the Nationalist 33(h\(2
Foreign Office in Taipei to the Chinese Consul �
General in Saigon. The messages state that
"our (Nationalist) long-standing plan" for operations in South China�
using Indochina as a base, "remains in full force," and instruct the
Consul General to work, with the appropriate French officials to ensure
that Nationalist forces are held t,in readiness. "
Comjnent More than 30,000 Nationalist troops
are interned in Indochina and local French officials have occasionally
recruited irregulars from these internees. However, it is French policy
in Indochina to avoid provoking the Peiping regime, and the French have
been adamant in refusing to permit these Nationalist forces either to oper-
ate in South China or to be repatriated to Taiwan.
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NEAR EAST
Anti-US Tudeh demonstrations in Iran:
According to the US Ambassador in Tehran,
several thousand persons held an "orderly
and well disciplined" demonstration in front
of the US Embassy on 11 May, demanding
"peace" and calling upon the US to "stop aggression in Korea. These
"Partisans of Peace" (actually members of the pro-Soviet Tudeh Party)
then proceeded to Parliament Square where they hailed Stalin, de-
nounced the "Anglo-American warmongers" and demanded the immedi-
ate expulsion of the US military mission to the Iranian Army.
3.3(h)(2)
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Comment: In view of Prime Minister Mossa-
deq's stand on freedom of expression and assembly, such demonstrations
are to be expe ctdct. If he clamps down on the Tudefirs current activities, the
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,party may resto more extreme measures. In any event, the em-
phasis the Tudeh Party is placing on the expulsion of the US military..
mission could 11,ave very unfortunate repercussions for Iranian stability
and, � therefore,1,Tranian-US relations as well, particularly in view or
Prime Minister Mossadect s known dislike .of all foreigners.
7. Iranian Tudeh Party expands activity to Kuwait:
3.5(c)
Comment: The Tudeh Party, which is still il-
legal in Iran, has an organTaTMerground, appears to be Well-financed
and has established close liaison with the USSR. Tudeh has joined the
chorus demanding the nationalization of oil, but it has managed to cloak
whatever connection it may have had with the recent violencedri the oil -
fields, It is in a good position to aggravate the anti-foreign feeling pre-
valent in Iran and to focus this feeling on the West.
Kuwait has not previously been identified as a
Tudeh center; it is, however, conveniently located to the Iranian oil in-
dustry. A rich oil-producing locality, Kuwait is itself "a target for the USSR.
6
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TLP ET
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EASTERN EUROPE
9. Bulgarian resistance group known to Communists:
3
Comment: The prompt measures taken against
this group indicate the effectiveness of the Bulgarian Security Police.
10. US Embass in Bel rade sees need for formal Yu
oslav arms re uest:
US Ambassador Allen in Belgrade recommends
that the US obtain a clear written request from
the Yugoslav Government regarding its military
requirements before Congress is asked for ap-
propriations. Allen points out that the last official Yugoslav statement
on the subject was a press release of 12 April, in Which the Yugoslav
(government admitted only that it was seeking arms through com-
mercial channels abroad. The Ambassador warns that the Yugoslav
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Government might feel called upon to deny, during US Congressional
hearings, that it has sought arms from the US on other than a commer-
cial basis, leaving the implication that the US was pressing arms on a
reluctant recipient. In Allen's opinion, the Yugoslav Government may
still be hesitant, primarily because of internal Communist Party politics,
to make an outright request for arms on a non- commercial basis, al-
though it would make such a request if the US let it be known that no
action could be taken o any other basis.
LATIN AMERICA
11. Arosemena declared President of Panama:
On 10 May the Panamanian Supreme Court
declared that the impeachment of Arnulfo
Arias and the installation of Alcibiades Arose-
mena, the First Vice, President, was a con-
stitutional act. As a result of this decision, deposed President Arias
is confronted with a solid opposition consisting of the Supreme Court,
the National Assembly, the National Police and a combination of politi-
cal parties other than his own.
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comment; Alcibiades Arosemena is a color-
less, venal politician from a prominent Panamanian family. He has been
strongly pro-Arias for the past ten years, and it is unlikely that he is
on good terms with Police Chief Remon. If Remon can find some legal
way to replace Arosemena, he may do so. On the other hand, if Arose-
mena proves tractable, Remon's desire to avoid public criticism may
lead him to support Arosemena until the scheduled presidential elec-
tions are held in 1952.
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Political unrest continues in Bolivia:
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The US Charge in La Paz, Liter an interview
with the Bolivian Foreign Minister in which the
latter tried to prove that the pro-facist Nation-, 3.3(h)(2)
alist Revolutionary Movement has definite COM-
munist ties, estimated on 11 May that the Foreign Minister was "anxious"
to go ahead with the previously reported army coup and that the coup may
occur "over the weeke..4," but commented that some of the army district
commanders who came to La Paz for consultation were still there. Mean-
while, political unrest continues in the wake of the 6 May presidential
elections; the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement candidate apparently
still maintains his plurality.
Comment: Since the government and allied
groups have a majority in Congress, they can be expected to name
Gosalvez, the government-sponsored candidate, when Congress meets
on 6 August to choose the president from among the three candidates
who received the most votes in the recent election. However, the army
may well take over the government and establish a junta in order to be
in a better position to counter the expected revolutionary activity of
the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement -- which might not wait to act
until Congress has made its decision.
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