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FOR THE PRESIDENT'S EYES ONLY
Special Daily Report on North Vietnam
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5 February 1968
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Special Daily Report on North Vietnam
for the President's Eyes Only
5 February 1968
I. NOTES ON THE SITUATION
Hanoi on the Current Offensive: The Communist
military offensive is still being portrayed by Hanoi
and the Liberation Front as a spontaneous popular
uprising of "revolutionary forces" aiming at over-
throwing and replacing the Saigon government. The
political and military role of the Liberation Front
seems to be downplayed deliberately. The "revolution,"
as the Communists call the offensive, is said to have
generated new, broadly based organizations which, in
conjunction with the Front, will eventually establish
a coalition government for South Vietnam. These new
organizations, the propaganda insists, are winning
popular support, but there is an urgent note in Viet-
namese Communist statements stressing the benefits of
joining in the struggle or of at least supporting it.
On the political side, the Communists claim the
military offensive has brought about the formation of
political "alliances" throughout the country which
are supported by such noncombatant groups as students,
intellectuals, women, and businessmen, but whose
actual composition and organization have not been
spelled out. These alliances, the propaganda implies,
will have a key role in setting up a coalition gov-
ernment. An appeal from the alliance in Hue, broad-
cast by the Viet Cong radio on 2 February, stated
this objective most clearly. For the first time, it
claimed that one of the alliance's goals was the es-
tablishment of a "national coalition administration"
in the South and the setting up of normal relations
with the North in order to effect reunification. Pre-
vious appeals by Saigon and Hue "alliances" as well as
by a so-called "National Leadership" of the "Alliance"
have called for negotiations with the Front, but not
for the formation of a coalition government or the
reunification of Vietnam.
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The military struggle is also being portrayed
as based on popular support. Most recent statements
by Hanoi and the Front avoid singling out the Viet
Cong ("Liberation Armed Forces") as the focal point
of the Communist military effort and imply that the
offensive has spawned new "revolutionary" military
forces. A Front broadcast on 3 February, carrying
an appeal from the Viet Cong command, praised the
"revolutionary people" for "simultaneously" rising
up. It also hailed the "insurrectionary troops"
and patriotic armed forces in the "revolutionary
army" for rising up and "coordinating" their struggle
with the Viet Cong, and called for united action
against the common foe. In a broadcast the same day,
Hanoi also praised the "revolutionary forces." It
claimed such forces in Saigon were responsible for
the "armed uprising" and that they had created an
"insurrection committee" that eventually would es-
tablish a "revolutionary administration" in the city.
A similar revolutionary group has been formed in the
Tri-Thien-Hue area (Quang Tri, Thua Thien provinces),
according to another Hanoi broadcast. These groups,
like the "alliances," have made strong appeals to
the people for support or cooperation, and have
promised position, rewards, and safety in return.
There is virtually no evidence of any substance
to these Communist claims. Even the existence of
the "revolutionary organizations" and "alliances"
is unproved and there is nothing to suggest they
have any popular support or following. The Commu-
nists' purpose in creating such an organizational
facade remains unclear. They may have intended to
use it to help set up a "coalition government" if
their offensive won popular support, and they may
still intend to do so even though this has not hap-
pened. They could also use these organizations as
scapegoats for a failure of their "uprising" if their
current efforts peter out.
Several Hanoi commentaries have suggested that
the current military offensive is but one battle in
a more prolonged struggle. The Hanoi party paper
on 3 February said the current fighting was creating
conditions for additional military victories. The
North Vietnamese Army journal the previous day called
for the southern forces to maintain and develop their
victories, enlarge their fronts, and develop their
revolution.
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Trade Mission to Singapore: Lee Kuan Yew has
told Ambassador Galbraith that a North Vietnamese
trade mission will be coming to Singapore "imminently."
Lee believes that the North Vietnamese coming at this
time is part of a coordinated effort, related to the
current offensive in the South, to embarrass the US
and to try to discourage those who support the US in
Vietnam.
Lee concluded his talk with the ambassador by
saying, "Do not worry. There will be no trade."
* * *
II. NORTH VIETNAMESE REFLECTIONS OF US POLITICAL
ATTITUDES ON THE WAR
Effects of Tet Offensive: Hanoi, in a broadcast
beamed in Vietnamese to South Vietnam on 2 February,
offered its analysis of the effects the Communist Tet
offensive was having on the US political scene. It
reported that both Saigon and Washington were in a
"fever" and that the first person to lose grace was
"old US Ambassador Bunker." The broadcast played up
alleged consternation in US Government circles over
the Viet Cong penetration of the "impenetrable" US
Embassy and claimed that hundreds of Americans were
killed or wounded in that attack alone. Continuing
in this vein, the broadcast reported that the per-
son with the biggest headache in Saigon was General
Westmoreland whose "boastful nature" has been truly
exposed by the events of the past three days. As a
result of Westmoreland's boasting, the broadcast
contends, President Johnson could not eat and sleep
properly. He was confused "as the man in the moon."
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