SUPPORT OF VIET CONG BY ARVN AND CIVILIAN ELEMENTS AS OF 021200 EST

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Tet Declassified
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06766066
• Document Creation Date: January 28, 2019

Approved for Release: 2019/01/17 C06766066
MEMORANDUM
2 February 1968
SUBJECT: Support of Viet Cong by ARVN and Civilian Elements as of
021200 EST
1. There is little evidence that either ARVN or civilian elements
in the provincial cities and Saigon have supported the Viet Cong during the
series of attacks which began 30 January. Reporting for this period has
been screened, and the few instances of the VC receiving support are
recorded. It is still too early to state that the VC did not receive support
in the cities, since more detailed coverage is required. There is yet no
detailed reporting on what has occurred in the countryside outside the
cities. The problem is further complicated by reports of the VC use of
ARVN uniforms and also changing into civilian clothes.
SAIGON
2. The Viet Cong entered Saigon expecting internal support
elements to be greater than was actually the case. They had been misled
by exaggerated reporting from VC cadre within the city as to their effec-
tiveness in building support for the VC cause A VC
attempt to organize a demonstration for peace in Saigon failed
3.5(c)
3. At the An Quang Pagoda on 31 January the 2 GVN Marine
companies refused to attack, so combat police made the assault but were
driven back. There is no evidence that the VC in the An Quang Pagoda
have the cooperation of the monks. On the contrary, GVN authorities
believed the VC forced their way in and are not assisted by Thich Tri Quang
or his supporterE At 1200H some 30 monks and nuns3.5(C)
of the Pho Quan Pagoda in Gia Dinh demonstrated in sympathy with the VC
attacks on Saigon and were dispersed by the police.
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3GREf
4. Several VC prisoners captured by GVN military forces had been
bona fide members of GVN Combat Police who had apparently infiltrated that
organization
I CORPS
5. In Danang, Dai Viet and Buddhist leaders have cooperated with
the GVN in preventing VC sponsored demonstrations. In an attempt to take
over the Tin Hoa Pagoda on 30 January, the VC organized a rally and tried
to convince the people that the VC had won a significant victory. There was
little reaction by the populace, and the olice made a number of arrests
II CORPS
6. In Pleiku city during the night of 31 January, the Provincial
Reconnaissance Units who were protecting the American civilian compounds
were forced to pull back into these compounds after receiving heavy fire
from unknown sources believed by some to be ARVN elements
7. In Ban Me Thuot, the capital of Darlac Province, two American
civilian compounds came under .50 caliber MG and M79 grenade fire on the
night of 30 - 31 January from an armoured vehicle with indigenous personnel
in ARVN Uniforms. American advisors attempted to advise the supposed
ARVN troops that the compounds were American, and both advisor plus 6
Montagnard guards were wounded when the supposed ARVN troops responded
by throwing grenades. The Khanh Hoa Province chief informed 5th USSF in
Nha Trang that elements of the ARVN 45th Regiment, 23rd Inf Div.. had
defected to the VC and joined the fighting in Ban Me Thuot
3.5(c)
3.5(c)
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8. In Nha Trang, Khanh Hoa Province, the National Police Special
Branch reported that there are indications the VC attackers on 31 January
were being assisted by members of the extreme Buddhists Movement. Five
Buddhist nuns were arrested, and the police are attempting to confirm
Buddhist involvement. The VC attempted to organize demonstrations in pro-
VC hamlets in Bien Khanh District, 10 kms west of Nha Trang. The VC
succeeded in gathering about 200 persons, but there is no evidence of a
general uprising. According to interrogation of prisoners during the attack
on Nha Trang, NVA troops were told prior to the attack they would be able
to take and hold Nha Trang because the VC organization within the city had
organized the population to assist them. This assistance did not materialize.
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III CORPS
9. No information of support.
IV CORPS
10, In Ben Tre city, Kien Hoa Province, a large number of teenage
boys were seen riding on bicycles through the streets during the fighting.
They were unmolested by the VC and assumed to be acting as couriers for
the VC.
11. Prior to Chau Doc city's coming under attack on 31 January, it
appears the residents were aware of VC intentions to occupy the city, and
they did not inform GVN officials. The populace did not have TET celebrations
the night of 30 January but stayed in their homes. During the attacks, many
uniformed GVN officials abandoned their Uniforms and only put them back on
after the town had been secured by friendly forces. (Hqs. Comment: This is
not an unusual occurrence in the Delta and has happened previously.)
SAIGON (Additional)
12. Militant Buddhist leader Thich Tri Quang said there were no VC
in An Quang Pagoda before 31 January and that he and other senior bonzes
fled after VC came to pagoda. Buddhist Monks in An Quang 3.5(c)
Pagoda during the police assault on 1 February say there were no VC in the
pagoda before or during the attack. 3.5(c)
13. The VC effort to impress local intellectual circles with their
power and capability has had some success. There are definitely those who
feel that the current offensive proves there is no other solution than formation
of a coalition government with the NLF. The wife of well-known engineer
Nguyen Ngoc Bich advocates creation of such a coalition.
3.5(c)
14. A senior GVN official says that if the Viet Cong are not cleared
from Saigon within 48 hours the already deteriorating civilian morale will be
further reduced and supplies will begin to run short. The mood of the populace
is edgy, and its suspeptibility to rumors is high. . . . The use of such
measures as clearing target areas of inhabitants and firing these areas could
prove . destructive in terms of psychological support from the people.
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