THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Tet Declassified
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 06772382
• Document Creation Date: January 28, 2019

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
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EO
13526
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13526
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MEMORANDUM
The Situation in Vietnam
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ARCHIVAL RECORD
PLEASE RETUR
AGENCY ARCHIVES,
Top S
r.
4 February 1968
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Information as of 1600
4 February 1968
.HIGHLIGHTS
The Communists are maintaining considerable
momentum in their offensive although the intensity
of their actions has tapered off. Communist re-
sistance in Hue is still strong, while in Saigon
only scattered clashes have been reported. Popular
reaction to the Communist offensive appears to be
one of shock at the ability of the Viet Cong tp
carry off such attacks and at the government's
failure to prevent them. Some underlying strains
in the government leadership have been revealed and
intensified by the crisis.
I. The Military Situation in South Vietnam:
The Communists have maintained considerable mo-
mentum in their offensive although the intensity of
their actions has tapered off (Paras. 1-2). Heavy
fighting in the city of Hue continued throughout the
weekend (Para. 3). Northern Quang Tri Province is
relatively quiet but the situation along the DMZ
continues to be threatening (Paras. 4-7). Considerable
allied progress has been reported throughout II Corps
although several coastal towns continue to be threat-
ened (Paras. 9-10). Several sharp clashes have been
reported in Saigon and there are indications of enemy
concentrations outside the city (Paras. 11-12). All
of the major towns in IV Corps are reported under
friendly control although there is still fighting on
the periphery of some cities (Paras. 13-15).
II. Political Developments in South Vietnam:
Popular reaction to the Communist offensive appears
to be one of shock at the ability of the VC to carry
off the attacks and at the government's failure to
prevent them (Paras. 1-3). After a slow start, the
government is now taking steps to handle the massive
clean-up effort (Paras. 4-5). Some underlying strains
in the government leadership have been revealed and
intensified by the crisis (Paras. 6-7). The govern-
ment has been fairly successful in gaining statements
of support from influential political figures and
power groups (Paras. 8-12).
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I. THE MILITARY SITUATION IN.SOUTH VIETNAM
1. -The -Communists have continued to maintain
considerable momentum in their offensive, but the.
intensityof :their actions has tapered off. and no
new attacks were reported on the night of 3-4 Feb-
ruary. Allied forces. have had some success in
clearing enemy elements from Hue, but a strong,Com-
munist force is still entrenched in the citadel
area. Improvement .is reported in most other areas,
and only scattered clashes have been reported.
around Saigon. There .are indications, .however,
that the Communists may be planning new offensives
around Saigon and Da Nang, and that they are-con-
tinuing to make .battle preparations around Khe Sanh
and the DMZ area.
2. Enemy killed in the fighting since 30 Janu-
ary now total around 15,000 and another 5,000 have
been captured. The Communists have apparently suf-
fered significant losses of high-level cadre. In-
formation from prisoners indicates that there has
been widespread involvement of units or men from
main and local force units,: as well as of guerrilla
units or new recruits especially trained for the
offensive. There are indications that the Communists
retain substantial reserves that could be committed
to new offensives.
I Corps.
3. Heavy.fighting,continued throughout the
weekend in the city of Hue. .Sporadid contact was
reported. between allied and enemy forces-in-the
citadel, north of the. Huong River, but such 'key .
points:.as-the citadel airstrip were in allied hands.
The allies are continuing to. sweep areas: outside
the.citadel, although enemy troops are.still.holed
up in Scattered buildings on. the southern bank of
the river. US Marines have recaptured the provincial.
jail, but-some 2,500 prisoners, including 390-500
Viet Cpng, apparently.esdaped in the initial enemy
4 February 1968
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� attack. The arrival of two US Marine supply convoys
from Phu Bai has been delayed by heavy enemy sniper
fire along the approach route.
4. Interrogation of a.prisoner.taken.in the
Hue fighting indicates-that-at-least-some of the
enemy force consisted of local .Viet Cong or' regroupees
from the north. The:captive claimed that-the.Hue. city
municipal unit and the 800th Viet Cong Battalion were
tasked with attacking allied sttongpoints and were
prepared to hold out for as long as a.week. There
have been indications of enemy reinforcements on
the outskirts of the, town, but these have apparently
been prevented from joining up with element S in the.
city.
5. The military situation in northern:Quang-
Tri Province remains relatively quiet, .but neat the
DMZ there are indications of increasing tactical
preparations by North Vietnamese units from Khe:Sanh
in the west to the coast. Elements of the 90th Regi-
ment, formerly engaged in-logistical activity-north
of Khe Sanh, have begun to' pass messages dealing with
reconnaissance activity: This suggests a.possible
shift in.the-unit.'s,-mission toward combat activity.
.A battalion of the 803rd Regiment/324B-Division in .
the southeastern DMZ area was' ,instructed, to recon-.
,noiter the.terrain in preparation for an attack by'
an -entire regiment. -
6. The Communists have the capability to strike
at any time with two divisions against'Khe Sanh, with
one division against US positions south of the DMZ in
the central part of Quang.Tri Province,; and with a
division-equivalent in the northeastern corner of the
province, .In Quang Tri city,' Communist forces have
been routed but apparently control much Of the sur
rounding-pacificatiOn area; and efforts to clear them:
May-cause further civilian casualties.
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7. a major .,concentration of 3.3(h)(2)
enemy. forces--involving elements of the North Vietnam-
ese..(NVA) 2nd Division, the NVA 31st Regiment, and
-the. NVA 368B Regiment--between Da Nang and the Southern.
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border of Quang Nam Province. These forces, to-
gether with other enemy elements north of Da Nang,
could be planningto sever communications routes-
leading to the city, possibly in concert with
further rocket attacks on Da Nang Air Base. A
US Marine battalion operating south of Da Nang on
3 February contacted a large enemy force, but few
details �axe available on the engagement.
8. About ten miles from Tam Ky, the capital of
Quang Tin Province, enemy forces on 3 February struck
a South Vietnamese field position and a nearby refugee
village, causing considerable damage as well as
casualties among the civilians, there has been evi-
dence of a major Communist buildup in this area.
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II Corps
9. The situation improved over the weekend in
several hard-pressed towns, particularly. in the
central highlands, and all major population centers
in the corps area are now considered in friendly
hands. Communist forces appear to be withdrawing
from Kontum city, Pleikt, Ban Me Thuot,- and Da Lat,
although sizable numbers of enemy troops remain in
-or-around these towns. In Kontum, light mortar,
and small-arms fire was reported continuing on-4 Feb-
ruary, and a probe against the airfield was repulsed.
Ban Me Thuot was reported-quiet, but a battalion of.
the NVA 33rd Regiment was identified. 3.3(h)(2)
as being just south Of the town. Only sporadic sniper
fire was reported in Da Lat.
10. The major fighting in coastal areas of the
corps was around Phan Thiet city, which was attacked
on 2 February by an-estimated. three enemy battalions.
These forces were routed from the immediate city
area by 4 February and are reported by a prisoner
to be withdrawing to a base northeast of the city.
A small attack on a: village north Of the town on
4 February may have been designed to cover this.with-
drawal. Farther north along the coast Communist -
forces on 3 February ambushed two South Korean con-
voys near Qui Nhon.
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III Corps
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11. Several sharp clashes occurred around
Saigon over the weekend involving military and police
action against small bands taking refuge in buildings
near the center of the city and in its outlying pre-
cincts. The city appeared generally quiet on 4 Feb-
ruary, although there continue to be reports of
enemy forces concentrated not far from the city.
Prisoners taken in the past few days have al-
leged that 25 to 30 battalions were massing north and
south of the city, but there has been no confirmation
of such a presence. a possible 3.3(h)(2)
distant threat to the Saigon area from elements of the
NVA 7th Division, which is situated about 30 miles north
of the city and is not yet believed to have seen ac-
tion in the recent offensive. On the other hand, the
headquarters of the 165th Regiment/7th Division has
been moving away from Saigon. Several elements of the
Viet Cong 5th and 9th divisions, the other two large
enemy forces in III Corps, have been involved in the
fighting although one regiment, possibly subordinate
to the 5th, has not been noted. Prisoners taken in
Saigon have claimed to be from elements of all three
subordinate regiments of the 9th Division.
12. East of Saigon, the provincial capitals of
Xuan Loc and Phuoc Le, which came under enemy at-
tack on 2 and 3 February, were apparently quiet on
4 February, although Xuan Loc remains tense and
anticipates new attacks. On the night of 3-4 Feb-
ruary, a US base and a district town in Binh Long
Province--north of Saigon near the Cambodian border--
were attacked, with the enemy using 122-mm. rocket
fire against the base. Although no reports of
casualties have been received, the Viet Cong re-
portedly have taken over many hamlets in the prov-
ince and have set up roadblocks around the provincial
capital of An Loc. Elsewhere in the northern part
of III Corps, a Communist force �of unknown size over-
ran several sections of the district town of Tan Uyen
on the night of 3-4 February, and at least two US
brigade-strength base camps nearby reported heavy
rocket and mortar attacks. US army sweeps around this
area as well as northwest of Saigon also reported
sporadic contacts over the weekend.
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14. At least two enemy battalions are still on
the outskirts of Ben Tre city and the town was struck
by mortar fire on the night of 3-4 February. An
enemy force of unknown size attacked Sa Dec city on
the morning of 4 February, penetrating the MACV com-
pound before being driven off; some enemy forces are
still believed to be in the city. The town was also
hit on 3 February, with its Chieu Hoi center a key
target. Another new attack was reported on 4 Feb-
ruary against Cao Lanh city, but the estimated two
enemy companies involved withdrew after an hour. Vinh
Long city, under heavy attack on 2 February, was con-
sidered to be secured on 3 February, but its airfield
was being harassed by mortar fire on 4 February.
15. Partially overrun Chau Phu city was reported
to be under almost complete government control by 3
February and no further attacks have been reported.
Over 4,000 homes were reported destroyed and 100 civ-
ilians were killed. A prisoner taken in the earlier
fighting claimed that Viet Cong main forces in his
area were told they were to "liberate" provincial
capitals, and that provincial units and guerrillas
would liberate district towns. He also claimed that
ten partymembers entered Chau Phu when the city was
attacked with the purpose of organizing a provisional
government. This prisoner claimed that he had first
heard of a "coalition government" about six months
ago, but that he had received no briefings on the
subject until just before the Tet offensive.
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II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1. Popular reaction in Saigon and other towns
struck in the wave of enemy attacks since 30 Janu-
ary appears to be primarily one of shock at the show
of enemystrength and the government's failure to
prevent the attacks. As enemy troops have gradually
been driven out of most towns, there appears to be
some growing understanding of the magnitude of the
failitarychallengethat faced government defenders
and also increased anger at the Viet Cong for the
timing of their offensive at Tet and for the havoc
they created. At the same time, there is some
criticism of the government's slowness in organizing
itself to cope with the massive dislocations and
casualties among the populace.
2. Clearly, it will be some time before the
full political and psychological effects of the Com-
munist offensive can be assessed. This is certain
to vary from province to province, depending on
what further actions the enemy takes and the gov-
ernment's success in restoring order and providing
assistance. In the countryside, moreover, evidence
of Viet Cong activities in the villages and hamlets
is only beginning to emerge. Several major towns
in the highlands and the delta have sustained major
damage. A massive refugee andcaualty problem is
already apparent--some 2,400 civilians have been
admitted to hospitals in Saigon alone--and food
shortages are beginning to appear in some areas.
3. Despite some evidence that much of the
populace in some provinces may have been aware of
the impending attacks, presumably through troop
movements and advance infiltration of agents into
towns, there continues to be no indication that
the Communist show of strength and subsequent
propaganda appeals have attracted any significant
public support. They have, however, spread con-
siderable public confusion and widespread fear;
at least one province has reported that rural
4 February 1968
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inhabitants believed the enemy's claims of total
victory, and even a few voices in Saigon have re-
portedly commented that there is no hope but to
compromise with the Viet Cong. There has been
some dissatisfaction over the damage and casualties
inflicted by counterattacking government troops,
and even isolated reports. of ARVN looting. On the
other hand, in some areas such as Quang Tri city,
there has been an impressive display of public ap-
preciation for allied success in driving off enemy
attacks.
3. Reactions in Saigon are as mixed as else-
where in the country, but the population remains
uneasy, particularly in Cholon where much of the
fighting has taken place. The government on 3 Feb-
ruary lifted its curfew in the city for six hours
to permit citizens to purchase food, and is now
reducing the curfew from 24 hours to the hours of
7 p.m. to 8 a.m. Although there are estimated to
be adequate food supplies for the coming week, dis-
tribution problems have arisen and prices of es-
sential foods have begun to soar, doubling and
tripling in many cases. Some essential services
including water supply have been disrupted, but
these are gradually being remedied. Electric power
is now 75 percent of normal, and the government
expects shortly to tackle the problem of garbage
collection and to begin widespread immunizations
against epidemics spreading from poor sanitation
and the large numbers of dead throughout the city.
All government employees have been ordered to
resume normal work on5 February, and those oper-
ating essential services were to be back on the
job on 4 February.
Government Measures
4. After some fits and starts, the Saigon
government is now beginning to gear itself for
the massive effort of emergency assistance to
victims of the recent fighting. President Thieu
on 3 February issued a statement designed to re-
assure the public that the situation was under
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control, to appeal for support and understanding
of the emergency controls being instituted, and to
dispel rumors that a coalition government with
the National Liberation Front might be imposed in
Saigon with US collusion. Top government officials
have been meeting frequently for the past three
days to determine priorities with the US, and to
get needed services rolling. On 4 February, Thieu
announced the formation of a joint US-GVN task
force, headed by Vice President Ky with Ambassador
Komer as his counterpart, to assess requirements and
assure that needs are met. Thieu, who has reportedly
delegated broad authority for handling military
matters to Joint General Staff chief Vien and Police
Director Loan, also promised that the army and po-
lice would provide food and assistance to needy
victims.
5. The proposed taskforce will have an opera-
tions center in Saigon for the entire country, as
well. as local centers in the provinces. It will
evidently concern itself withsuch tasks as reopen-
ing�lines of communications, mobilizing resources,
preventing hoarding, intensifying the information
effort, appeals for. unity, and requests for third
countky. assistance. Telegrams are being sent to
each of the 44 provinces requesting that they out-
line their damage and requirements.
Frictions in the. Government
6, Some underlying strains are already evident
amongtop-level GVN leaders on the task force. Thieu
apparently suspects that theUS may be trying to pro-
mote Ky's fortunes, according to a.high-ranking Viet-
namese official, but he agreed "without enthusiasm"
to Kys new role. He also agreed to Ky's suggestion.
thatMajor General Thang, the recently resigned paci-
fication chief on the Joint General Staff, be'deSig-
nated Ky's principal deputy. Moreover, according to
the same Source, General Vien, who is nominally in
charge of coordinatingemergency services- in Saigon,
has begged off on grounds of pressing '� military and
security problems. . He reportedly -has designated
Lieutenant General Tran Ngoc Tam, who is "completely
ineffectual," to serve - in his stead on the taskforce.
4 February 1968
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7. Most of the criticism of the government, how-
ever, centers about Prime Minister Loc, who has al-
legedly shown little inclination or ability to take
decisive action in the crisis. Members of the govern-
ment and of the National Assembly are complaining of
Loc's performance, holding him responsible for inef-
ficiency among other ministers, and speculating that
he may be dropped when the immediate crisis ends.
One clandestine source has claimed that Loc's initial
attitude was that civilians, in the government and
in groups on the outside, could do nothing constructive
until the military had restored some order. It is
also reported that his current concern is that his
cabinet will be dissolved through military pressure
and that Thieu will rule by decree.
Statements of Support for the Government
8. Some effort is now being made, however, by
both Thieu and Loc to gain expressions of support
from the National Assembly and leading civilian cir-
cles. On 3 February, the chairmen of the Upper and
Lower houses of the assembly issued a statement of sup-
port for the government's actions in meeting the crisis,
a denunciation of the Viet Cong, and an appeal for pub-
lic unity and support. A similar statement was issued
by the Upper House National Defense Committee, which
also called for joint executive-legislative cooperation,
and by the Lower House in a session on 4 February. The
Upper House is scheduled to meet on 6 February and is
expected to take similar action. Several deputies not
in Saigon have been active in trying to rally the
populace in their own provinces.
9. Although there is a considerable amount of
mixed feeling among assembly deputies concerning the
extent of political damage done by the Communists and
in regard to the government's performance, most ap-
parently believe that they have little choice but to
pledge full support and to assist where possible.
Dissatisfaction centers principally over the
authority cited by Thieu for his declaration of
martial law and for the imposition of press censor-
ship--a state of war decree issued on 24 July 1965
and claimed to be still in effect. The deputies
4 February 1968
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III. MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH VIETNAM
1. Two North Vietnamese MIG-21s supported
by a third fighter aggressively, engaged a flight
of two US F-102s over the DRV/Laotian border on
3 February and downed one of the US aircraft with
an air-to-air missile.
2. The Communist fighters involved in the
engagement were flown by the same two highly quali-
fied pilots who made several flights to the area
of Vinh Airfield in the southern DRV in January.
These flights, together with the recent establish-
ment of air defense communications near Vinh, have
suggested that the Communists may be preparing to
undertake intercept operations in southernmost
North Vietnam and the DMZ area, possibly against
B-52s.
4 February 1968
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IV. OTHER COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
1. There is nothing of significance to report.
4 February 1968
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V. COMMUNIST POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
1. The Communist military offensive is still
being portrayed by Hanoi and the Liberation Front
as a spontaneous popular uprising of "revolutionary
forces" aiming at overthrowing and replacing the
Saigon government. The political and military role
of the Liberation Front seems to be downplayed de-
liberately. The "revolution," as the Communists
call the offensive, is said to have generated new,
broadly based organizations which, in conjunction
with the Front, will eventually establish a coali-
tion government for South Vietnam. These new organiza-
tions, the propaganda insists, are winning popular
support, but there is an urgent note in Vietnamese
Communist statements stressing the benefits of joining
in the struggle or of at least supporting it.
2. On the political side, the Communists claim
the military offensive has brought about the forma-
tion of political "alliances" throughout the country
which are supported by such noncombatant groups as
students, intellectuals, women, and businessmen, but
whose actual composition and organization have not
been spelled out. These alliances, the propaganda
implies, will have a key role in setting up a coali-
tion government. An appeal from the alliance in Hue,
broadcast by the Viet Cong radio on 2 February, stated
this objective most clearly. For the first time, it
claimed that one of the alliance's goals was the es-
tablishment of a "national coalition administration"
in the South and the setting up of normal relations -
with the North in order to effect reunification. Pre-
vious appeals by Saigon and Hue "alliances" as well as
by a so-called "National Leadership" of the "Alliance"'
have called for negotiations with the Front, but not
for the formation of a coalition government or the
reunification of Vietnam.
3. The military struggle is also being portrayed
as based on popular support. Most recent statements
by Hanoi and the Front avoid singling out the Viet
Cong ("Liberation Armed Forces") as the focal point of
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the Communist military effort and imply that the
offensive has spawned new 'revolutionary" military
forces. A Front broadcast on 3' February, carrying
an appeal from the Viet Cong command, praised the
"revolutionary people" for "simultaneously" rising
up. It also hailed the "insurrectionary troops"
and patriotic armed forces in the "revolutionary
army" for rising up and "coordinating" their
struggle with the Viet COng, and called for united
action against the common foe. In a broadcast the
same day, Hanoi also praised the "revolutionary
forces." It claimed such forces in Saigon were
responsible for the "armed uprising" and that they
had created an "insurrection committee" that eventually
would establish a "revolutionary administration" in
the city. A similar. revolutionary group has been
formed in the Tri-Thien-Hue area (Quang Tri, Thua
Thien provinces), according to another Hanoi broad-
cast. These groups, like the "alliances," have made
strong appeals to the people for support or coopera-
tion, and have promised position, rewards, and safety
in return.
4. There is virtually no evidence of any sub-
stance to these Communist claims. Even the existence
of the "revolutionary organizations" and "alliances"
is unproved and there is nothing to suggest they
have any popular support or following. The Commu-
nists' purpose in creating such an organizational
facade remains unclear. They may have intended to
use it to help set up a "coalition government" if
their offensive won popular support, and they may
still intend to do so even though this has not hap-
pened. They could also use these organizations as
scapegoats for ''�failure of their "uprising" if their
current efforts peter out.
Reaction in Hanoi
5. Several Hanoi commentaries have suggested
that the current military offensive is but one battle
in a more prolonged struggle. The Hanoi party paper
on 3 February said the current fighting was creating
conditions for additional military victories. The
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North Vietnamese Army journal the previous day
called for the southern forces to maintain and
develop their victories, enlarge their fronts, and
develop their revolution.
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6. 3.3(h)(2)
the DRV military, command has sent a message to the
Front units in Hue and Saigon assuring them that
the North Vietnamese armed forces stand "ready every
second to coordinate their actions with them." In
Hanoi itself, mass meetings are 3.3(h)(2)
being held by various political and religious groups
in support of the offensive in the South. It would
appear that the North Vietnamese authorities are
utilizing the offensive in the South to pump up morale
in the North.
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