THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM - 1967/11/05

• Document Type: SPECIALCOLLECTION
• Collection: Tet Declassified
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 03029757
• Document Creation Date: July 27, 2018

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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE
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MEMORANDUM MEMORANDUM
The Situation in Vietnam
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Information as of 1600
5 November 1967
HIGHLIGHTS
Significant military operations in South Viet-
nam over the weekend were confined to IV Corps.
The situation remained quiet around Loc Ninh, where
adjusted enemy casualty figures now stand at 771
killed.
I. The Military Situation in South Vietnam:
Significant contacts with enemy forces over the week-
end were confined to IV Corps where Communist units
attacked three towns in the Mekong Delta region
(Paras. 1-2). The situation remained quiet in the
vicinity of Loc Ninh where, according to officially
adjusted casualty figures, the enemy lost 720
troops in the period 28 October - 2 November (Para. 3).
Recent Communist propaganda broadcasts have claimed
victory at Loc Ninh, claiming that the Communists'
activity there is in response to US raids on North
Vietnam (Paras. 4-5).
II. Political Developments in South Vietnam:
Lower house deputy Ho Huu Tuong had added to speculation
that the followers of Thich Tri Quang and Thich Tam
Chau are preparing to break away from their leaders in
order to resolve the impasse over the Buddhist charter
question (Paras. 1-3). A lower house deputy has been
convicted of violating the election law, but it is not
yet clear whether he will be allowed to take his seat
in the house (Paras. 4-5).
IV. Other Communist Military Developments: There
is nothing of significance to report.
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V. Communist Political Developments: North
Vietnamese leaders' speeches on the 50th anniversary
of the Soviet Union while replete with praise of the
Soviet Union, also included the possibility that
Hanoi has hardened its terms for talks (Paras. 1-5).
5 November 1967
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I. THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM
1. No major contacts with enemy forces in the
I, II, or III Corps Tactical Zones were reported over
the weekend. In the IV Corps area, however, the Com-
munists launched significant attacks against three
Mekong Delta towns in an apparent continuation of a
series of hostile actions begun in this region on 28
October.
2. The most recent attacks were mounted against
Chau Phu, the capital city of Chau Doc Province, Cai
Lay, in Dinh Tuong Province, and Long My, a district
town in Chuong Thien. Mortar attacks and ground as-
saults in the three incidents killed 38 South Viet-
namese soldiers and civilians and wounded 179 others.
Enemy losses reportedly were 31 dead.
3. The situation remained quiet in the vicinity
of Loc Ninh in Binh Long Province, where heavy fight-
ing broke out on 28 October. Officially adjusted
casualty figures through 2 November indicated that
31 friendly and 720 enemy troops had been killed in
the week-long battle. Field reports on 5 November
showed that the number of enemy dead subsequently
has risen to 771.
4. Recent Communist propaganda has claimed that
the activity at Loc Ninh is in response to bombing
raids on Hanoi and has also implied that it represents
an opening salvo in the much-heralded "winter-spring"
campaign.
5. A Hanoi broadcast on 31 October claimed that
the destruction of a multibattalion "US/Puppet" com-
bat group at Loc Ninh the previous day was to avenge
the victims of recent US bombing of Hanoi. This re-
port also asserted that this was the first major vic-
tory of the winter-spring season, and that it opened
bright prospects for the quick annihilation of big
enemy units in the near future. Another Hanoi broad-
cast on 2 November offered a detailed account of the
"victory" and concluded with the claim that "intensifi-
cation of the bombing of the North cannot in any way
save GIs in the South."
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II. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM
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1. Another source has contributed to speculation
that followers of the militant and the moderate Buddhist
factions are heading for a breakaway from their respective
leaders, Thich Tri Quang and Thich Tam Chau. Lower
house deputy Ho Huu Tuong, who is also vice-rector of the
Buddhists' Van Hanh University, told an embassy officer
on 2 November that a personal reconciliation between the
two leaders is unlikely because of their intransigent
stands on the charter issue.
2. He believes the solution to the dispute there-
fore lies in the removal of Quang and Chau, and the amal-
gamation of the two factions into a "third force" com-
posed of more moderate Buddhists who could unite the
church. Tuong even went so far as to suggest that the
Americans approach the government and recommend that
Quang and Chau be sent abroad. His choice for the leader
of such a third force would be a nun, Dieu Cong, who he
said is the most prestigious nun in South Vietnam.
3. Tuong has been accused of pro-Communist sym-
pathies and his Senate candidacy was disallowed on those
grounds. He has generally shown a marked sympathy for
the militant faction, but apparently believes that unity--
he would obviously favor a militant-oriented unity--un-
der new leaders is the only way out of the present im-
passe. He told the embassy officer that the line sep-
arating the militants from Communism is a thin one and
that further alienation of that faction could drive it
completely out of the government camp into the arms of
the Communists. Tuong, who is apparently angling for
the lower house chairmanship or at least the leadership
of a significant bloc in the house, probably also sees
some sort of Buddhist unity as necessary if he is to have
a responsive group in the house to give him the power
he probably envisages for himself.
Lower House Deputy Convicted
4. A provincial court has annulled the election of
a lower house deputy, but it is not yet clear whether
he will finally be barred from taking his seat in the
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house. According to a Saigon Post account, the Spe-
cial Court of Kien Giang Province disqualified Ta
Ngoc Mai, sentenced him to three months' imprison-
ment, and imposed a fine of 20,000 piasters for vio-
lation of the election law. Mai, along with four
others associated with his campaign who were also
convicted, was charged with using "armed pressure"
on voters. Almost 40 persons, including the provin-
cial judge, reportedly witnessed the intimidation at-
tempts.
5. The Post item did not mention under which
article of thee election law. Mai was convicted. In
view of the sentence and fine imposed, however, it
appears his conviction was for carrying a weapon
into a polling place. If that is so, he will be
allowed to defend himself before the lower house,
which- will have the final say on whether he is
seated. Other election law articles under which
Mai's conviction could have come carry heavier sen-
tences than that meted out to him, and require a new
election within three months.
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IV. OTHER COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
1. There is nothing of significance to re-
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V. COMMUNIST POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
1. Statements by Vietnamese Communist officials
in both Moscow and Hanoi over the weekend were replete
with high praise for the Soviet revolution, its ex-
ample for Vietnam and the world, and the importance
of Soviet assistance to the Vietnamese revolution.
Vietnamese spokesmen also used the occasion to spell
out once again Hanoi's unbending terms for a settle-
ment of the war, and to state their conditions for
talks with the US.
2. Party first secretary Le Duan, head of the
DRV delegation to Moscow, provided the major Vietnam-
ese statement in a speech to the Supreme Soviet on
3 November. In his speech--which has thus far been
transmitted only in a poor Russian domestic broadcast
based on a simultaneous translation--Le Duan recounted
the successful course of Communism since the October
Revolution, claiming that the Soviet victory has
helped the Vietnamese people to find a way to libera-
tion. He said that--chiefly by relying on their own
resources but bolstered by the material support from
the fraternal socialist countries--the Vietnamese
people are determined to gain complete victory.
3. Le Duan ridiculed what he termed "profuse
talk about a false peace" and restated Hanoi's demand
that the four points and the program of the Libera-
tion Front serve as the basis for a settlement of
the conflict. He added, moreover, that if the US
"wishes to reckon with talks with the DRV Government,
it must first of all, once and for all, and without
any conditions, stop the bombing and other acts of
war against the DRV."
4. Le Duan's formula for achieving talks--if
accurately translated and broadcast--suggests that a
further note of rigidity has been injected into
Hanoi's position on the war. In the past, authorita-
tive Hanoi spokesmen when speaking specifically of
the possibility of talks have called simply for an
"unconditional cessation of the bombing and all other
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acts of war against the DRV." Phrases such as "once
and for all," suggesting a permanent halt, have not
been used. Should Hanoi report Le Duan's statement
on this point as broadcast by Moscow, the North Viet-
namese would then appear to be demanding as a pre-
requisite for talks not only that the US stop the
bombings unconditionally, but that such a halt be
declared permanent as well.
5. In North Vietnam politburo member Truong
Chinh expressed many of the same sentiments in a speech
broadcast by Hanoi on 5 November. Chinh claimed that
the success of the Vietnamese revolution is clearly
assured by the support of the socialist camp. He
stressed that the particular assistance of the Soviets
was of "special importance" and that the services
rendered the people of Vietnam by the Soviet Union
were "truly great." The occasion for Chinh's speech
was a grand meeting held in honor of a visiting anni-
versary delegation from the Soviet Union. Vietnamese
rhetoric and attendance at this meeting, while in
keeping with the occasion, were nonetheless similar
in many instances to that afforded a Chinese delega-
tion present during Peking's National Day early last
month.
5 November 1967
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