POSSIBLE FRENCH ARMS SALE TO PRC

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-120-6-14-6
• Release Decision: RIPLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: January 6, 2010
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: August 28, 1975
• Content Type: REPORT

No Objection to Declassification in Part 2010/01/06: LOC-HAK-120-6-14-6 j.E'J VlbbE 1
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POSSIBLE FRENCH ARMS SALE TO THE PRC
Summary
Reports from various sources indicate that
the French are negotiating with the Chinese Air
Force for .a sale of fighter aircraft or aircraft
engines and air-to-air and air-to-ground missiles.
While the reports differ as to details, the
deal does appear to involve some 200 units.
Such a sale would be important to the French air-
craft industry, which recently lost out on the
F-104 replacement. It would also significantly
upgrade the Chinese Air Force's capabilities.
French behavior in connection with the earlier
sale of helicopters to China suggests that Paris
might go ahead with the deal in the face of possible
US objections in CO.COM.
Chinese Interest in Mirages and Matra Missiles
No Objection
F_Tfte
s ory as already surfaced in the August 16 issue
of the Economist; the Economist's special publi-
cation, Foreign Report, gave further details in
.its July 23 and August 13 issues.
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Report No. 97
August 28, 1975
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Mutual Advantages of Deal
Specifically under negotiation are the Atar 9K-50 jet
engine and, alternatively, the Mirage 50 (the Mirage 5
airframe with the newer Atar 9K-50 engine). The Chinese
are interested in the 9K-50 engine by itself because they
have been unable to develop a suitable powerplant for
their indigenous fighter, which is still in development.
They have experienced similar difficulty in the development
of air-launched missiles and are seeking in the same nego-
tiations to arrange the purchase of highly sophisticated
missiles from the Matra company. These developments would
be consistent with China's restructuring of its armed forces
to emphasize modern technological advances. Since the PRC
does not yet have any first-rate fighters or aircraft mis--
siles in regular production, its acquisition of such
weaponry from France would dramatically improve its air
order of battle more quickly than would reliance on domestic
resources alone.
The French aircraft industry, for its part, needs the
financial lift that such a sale would provide, particularly
since France lost the "sale of the century" for the next
generation of NATO fighter aircraft., According to Foreign
Report, the. atmosphere at Dassault-Breguet, the Mirage's
manufacturer, was euphoric after preliminary discussions
with the Chinese.
Previous French-Chinese Arms Contacts
Chinese interest,in French arms apparently dates from
1967, when the PRC ordered 15 Alouette helicopters from a
French firm. But the first indication of more substantial
interest did not surface until 1970, when press accounts
suggested that the
was delivered in May 1974, but the rest have not yet arrived
(the production line had to be reopened for them).
The Chinese also approached the French in the summer
of 1973 for the purchase of 750 Matra R-530 air-to-air
missiles.
PRC wanted to obtain Mirage fighters or their attendant
technology.
Chinese interest in the Super Frelon helicopter dates
from at least the. summer of 1971. A sales agreement for 13
of these helicopters was concluded late in 1973. The first
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In January 1974, a French'press article claimed that
the PRC was interested in buying 30-40 Mirage III fighters,
and possibly in obtaining licensing rights for
pro-
duction in China.
Status of Talks
There is no firm evidence that military procurement
was discussed during Teng's recent visit to France, but
42 French defense experts under the aegis of the Center of
Advanced Studies of French Armaments arrived in Peking at
about the same time that Teng left for Paris. Leading
members of. the French group met with the Deputy.Chief of
the PLA General Staff and could have laid some of the
ground work for the current negotiations.
There are conflicting reports of where the current
talks are being held. According to Foreign Reort, the
first direct contacts were made when Chinese experts
visited Dassault-Breguet in July 1975. Foreign Report also
said that French Government officials have not yet partici-
pated in the talks, which are still at the technical level.
The clandestine sources indicate that the actual negotiations
were being held in Bonn in July.
COCOM Considerations
The implications for the US of this possible arms deal
arise in the context of the Coordinating Committee (COCOM),
set up by NATO in 1950 to control the sale of strategic
materials to Communist countries. France is still a ,member
of COCOM. The British, who have encountered COCOM opposi-
tion to their proposal to sell Rolls Royce military jet
engines to the PAC, would surely be concerned about losing
this sale to the French. Strong opposition might also
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come from Japan, the only non-European member of COCOM.
If the Super Frelon case is any indication, however, the
French might resist COCOM objections.
The Super Frelon Issue
The French proposal to sell Super Frelon helicopters
to the PRC was first raised by Foreign Minister Schumann
with Secretary of State Rogers in June 1971. That August,
the US formally opposed the sale on the grounds that it
could make a significant military contribution to the PRC.
France raised the issue in COCOM in February 1973.
The US continued its opposition to the sale because France
did not obtain formal assurances from the PRC that the
helicopters would be used for civilian purposes. In March
1973, the French stated that the helicopters would be used
to transport workers and food supplies to civilian projects.
In November 1973--the same month that the actual oontract
was signed--the French changed their story and stated that
they would-be used for civilian search and rescue .
The US is the only member of COCOM which has. still not
withdrawn its opposition to the sale. In expectation of
continued deliveries, Embassy Paris raised the issue again
with the French Government in August 1975. The French
replied that, since they had not heard any US objections
since December,1973, they considered the matter closed.
Soviet Considerations
If France decides to ignore a negative COCOM decision,
it would have to weigh the inevitable Soviet concern (already
evidenced by the Soviet diplomat in Tokyo) that would arise
over suchan improvement in the PRC's military capabilities.
Recent cooling of French-Soviet relations may lessen the
importance of the Soviet factor, but the French might think
it prudent to wait until after President Giscard's upcoming
visit to theSoviet Union, scheduled for October, before
raking a decision to sell aircraft or engines to China.
Prepared by George Dragnich
x23361
EXEMPT FROM DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE E.O. 11652:.513(2)
(Classified by M. Packman)
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