ENEMY INTENTIONS IN LAOS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: Library of Congress
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): LOC-HAK-289-1-10-9
• Release Decision: RIFLIM
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: January 11, 2017
• Document Release Date: October 2, 2012
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: March 4, 1970
• Content Type: MEMO

No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/10/02: LOC-HAK-289-1-10-9
NSS, State Dept. reviews
completed
.4rZN
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
*
FROM: Henry A. Kissinger
SUBJECT: Enemy Intentions in Laos
INFORMATION
State has produced a brief analysis of the Communist's short-term
intentions in Laos (Tab A.) You may find it of interest.
State concludes that the chances are at least even that the Communists
will strike some new targets, such as the Neutralist headquarters at
Yang Vieng north of Vientiane, or the headquarters of the Mee guerrilla
general Yang Pao, southwest of the Plain of Jars. Even without going
so far as Yang Vieng. they could cut the Vientiane/Luang Prabang road
at Sala Phou Khoun. They could make feints at a major town (all of which
are within reach of their forces. except Vientiane). They may engage in
terrorism or harassment but are unlikely to take a major town. Similarly,
State does not expect a drive to the Mekong to divide Laos, since the
Communists probably wish to keep the options of dealing with Souvanna
and revitalizing the Geneva accords.
Both State and CIA have recently tended to upgrade the possibility that
the Communists might put pressure on Laos as a technique to increase
war weariness in the U.S.
The Pathet Lao spokesman in Vientiane has recently suggested the possi-
bility that the Communists would stop at the "1962 line" if the U.S. stops
bombing in Laos. His reference to the "1962 line" raises a point which
may not have come to your attention. There is an Imprecise but real
understanding as to what constitutes the "1962 line". In brief, the Rightists
controlled the Mekong plains, the Communists controlled the eastern and
northern highlands, and the Neutralists controlled the Plain of Jars and
the river valleys north of Vientiane. Since 1962, however, the neutralist
military forces have split into two factions, one of which continues to
support Souvanna, the other supporting the Communists. (Neither neu-
tralist force is worth anything militarily.) As a result of the division,
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both sides conceive of the erstyvhile neutralist areas as being on "their
ate of the 1962 line." Souvanna in his recent offer of neutralization at
least seemed to offer the possibility of some compromise on this point.
The Communists have not made any such gesture.
The Communists have good reason to assert their ownership of the true
neutralist movement since, under the 1962 arrangements, this would give
them two legs of the tripartite government and would pretty much make
Souvatma their hostage. On the other hand, Souvanna'a legitimacy itself
is based upon his claim to represent the neutralists, and he cannot willing-
ly allow the Communists to claim the neutralist area or to destroy the last
vestiges of his neutralist forces.
The important point is that the area in which State thinks that the Commu-
nists may try to take the offensive this spring are ones to which both sides
lay claim, and the "1962 line" is of no use even as a concept for resolving
this 1 z sue.
The issue is further complicated by the fact that the base for Vang Pao 's
Meo guerrillas is within this neutralist zone. With our help, these forces
are a much more serious irritant to the Communists than in 1962. This
reinforces the Communists' inclination to assert control over the area
and drive Yang Pao to take refuge west of the Mekong.
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INTELLIGENCE''""6E BRIE
DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH
? To :? The Secretary
ThrouIr;SS
From ?.INR George C. Denney, Jr.
SuOect.f, Enemy Intentions in Laos
,
' two weeks', the Communists in Laos have recaptured all that yang. Pao had
conquered in the Plain of Jars, .
February 27, 1970
U./
thereby restoring the territorial situation
as of June 1969. Judging by previous Communist dry-season drives, we doubt that
the current campaign has yet run its course. The question is how far will the
Communists push.
Further Communist Attacks Likely. We think the chances are at least even
that the Communists will strike some targets they have previously avoided, even
though these have been clearly within their capabilities. Such targets include
the Neutralist headquarters at yang Vieng and yang Pao's headquarters at Sam
Thong and Long Tieng, south and southwest of the plain;'Communist,troops have
already been reported as possibly deploying toward Long Tieng. The Communists
may also, or alternatively, take the much softer target, Sala Phou Khoun, just
west of Muong Soul at the juncture of Routes 13 and 4, the access point to Luang
Prabang to the north. They could move from Sala Phou Khoun to Vang Vieng which
controls Route 13, the important access route to Vientiane to the south. They
may even go as far as to make threatening feints at some important urban centers
(such as Luang Prabang, Paksane, and Pakse), without actually attacking them,
and they may step up terrorist and harassing actions generally throughout the,'
country.
This report was produced by the Bureau
of Intelligence and Research. Aside
lithn normal substantive exchange with ri-^nr.riM^ 1-^nmresu nresrmi
other agencies W t No Objection to Declassification in Full 2012/10/02: LOC-HAK-289-1-10-9 '
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We believe that the Communists might be encouraged to embark on a more
extensive campaign of this kind in the belief that the costs involved would be
justified by the political impact in the United States as well as in Laos.
A principal objective would be to put pressure on Souvanna to request an
end to the US bombing of Laos and to accept an internal political settlement
favorable to the Communists. The Communists, of course, cannot be entirely certain
that Souvanna's request for a bombing halt would be honored or that he and other
non-Communist leaders would cave in the face of such military pressure. But
short of this, they could deal still further blows to RLG morale.and military
capability, thus advancing the prospect that final settlement will be on Communist
terms.
Another objective--and one that we believe is increasingly important to the.
Communists--would be to demonstrate to the American public that military progress
in Indochina is fleeting, that Communist military, proficiency, despite reports
from South Vietnam, is still formidable, and that Laos is a military and political
morass, thereby adding to American war-weariness and pressures for limitations on
US activities.
But Not A Drive To The Mekong. However, we do not believe that the
Communists will drive to the Mekong or seize Luang Prabang or Vientiane.
They will be restrained, as they have been in the past, by their desire to
retain the Geneva facade. Hanoi sees this facade as enhancing its image abroad
and preserving important political options for the Pathet Lao, while not
critically restricting its ability to achieve its immediate military, and political
objectives in Laos. Similarly, Hanoi does not want to take actions that would
destroy all prospects of a future accommodation with Souvanna (and the King).
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As the Geneva-sanctioned and internationally respected leader of neutral
Laos, Souvanna's acquiescence would lend legitimacy to a Hanoi-dictated
political settlement.
In addition, the Communists, while less concerned than in the past,
cannot be certain that the US would not respond militarily--at least, in
terms of intense air action in Laos and possibly North Vietnam--to an all-out
Communist push in Laos. Finally, an effort of these proportions, while within
Hanoi's capabilities, would require the diversion of manpower and logistic
resources more needed for the war in South Vietnam where victory, the Communists
probably believe, would quickly enable them to bring Laos under their control with
relative ease.
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ACTION
SECRET March 4, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR DR. KISSINGER
FROM: John H. Holdridge
SUBJECT: State's Assessment on Laos
INR in State has produced a brief estimate of short-term Communist
intentions in Laos. The President might find this of interest.
R EC oMMENDATION:
That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab A.
Att.
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