THE MILITARY BALANCE BETWEEN GREECE AND TURKEY: HOW IT STANDS--WHERE IT IS HEADED--WHAT IT MEANS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP93T00837R000400040002-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 37
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 11, 2013
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: June 1, 1988
• Content Type: MEMO

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Director of -Secret-
Central
Intelligence
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The Military Balance Between
Greece and Turkey: How It
Stands Where It Is Headed?
What It Means
Interagency Intelligence Memorandum
This Memorandum represents the views
of the Director of Central Intelligence
with the advice and assistance of the
US Intelligence Community.
Secret
NI IIM 88-10006
June 1988
Copy 588
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Warning Notice
Intelligence Sources
or Methods Involved
(WNINTEL)
National Security Unauthorized Disclosure
Information Subject to Criminal Sanctions
STAT
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g sy, Central 25X1
's lip-9 Intelligence
NI IIM 88-10006
The Military Balance Between
Greece and Turkey: How It
Stands Where It Is Headed?
What It Means
Information available as of 24 May 1988 was used
in the preparation of this Memorandum.
The following intelligence organizations participated
in the preparation of this Memorandum:
The Central Intelligence Agency
The Defense Intelligence Agency
The National Security Agency
The Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
also participating:
The Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence,
Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence,
Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence;
Department of the Air Force
This Memorandum was approved for publication by the
Chairman of the National Intelligence Council.
?Seeret?
June 1988
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BELGRADE
Yugoslavia
TIR E
Alliania
Romania
BUCHAREST
*SOFIA
Bulgaria
Black Sea
200 Kilomets
200 miles
Soviet Union
? OP
a-)1
G r eCc - e % cE.
a L., ,, Aegean
Se'aDA
o ATHEleJ
Libya
b ?
- 67
Mediterranean Sea
Egypt
ANKARA
Turkey
NICOSIA
*
Cyprus
BEIRUT; -
Lebantan
I,/
Israel ,
Tel Aviv- Yet% I ) *
3,2 AMMAN
/ 4-4)
?,) Jordan
Iran
Syria
DAMASCUS
BAGHDAD
Iraq
Saudi Arabia
Boundary representation Is
not necessarily authoritative.
Unclassified
Secret
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Key Judgments
The Greco-Turkish military balance in [he Aegean will remain relatively
even through 1992, but it is beginning to tilt in Turkey's favor. Greece,
with its much smaller population and industrial potential, cannot expect to
maintain parity with Turkey indefinitely, despite its national commitment
and continued foreign military aid. Turkey's current military superiority on
the island of Cyprus will continue indefinitely. After the early 1990s, force
modernization will provide Turkey with significantly improved capabilities
against the Warsaw Pact or against Greece.
Greece's perception of the military balance is that its forces can repulse a
Turkish attack today
Turkey's perception of the
balance is that it can defend itself against any Greek attack, now or later.
As a consequence of the current balance of forces, an Aegean war today
would be generally inconclusive, although casualties on both sides, even in
a war of short duration, could be extremely heavy in both personnel and
equipment.
Although the existence of military parity through the early 1990s reduces
the likelihood of war, the potential for conflict will remain until the various
Greco-Turkish disputes over territorial sea, airspace, and continental shelf
ri hts in the Aegean and over the divided status of Cyprus are resolved.
These disputes have degraded the solidarity of NATO's southeast flank?
hence, of NATO's ability to defend the region. Today, because of its fears
of renewed Turkish expansionism, Athens is more concerned with defend-
ing itself against Turkey than against Bulgaria and other potential Warsaw
Pact adversaries. Although Turkey is more oriented toward defense against
the Warsaw Pact, Ankara is deeply concerned about the Greek Govern-
ment's obsession with the Turkish threat and Greek defense doctrine
identifying Turkey as the primary threat. Moreover, Ankara believes that
the Greek Government?not just the current one but any Greek govern-
ment?means to establish the Aegean as a Greek territorial sea in which,
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outside its own narrow band of territorial waters, Turkey would have no
more rights than any distant country with no shoreline along the sea.
The ramifications for US and NATO security of a Greco-Turkish war
would be profound. NATO defenses in the eastern Mediterranean would
be seriously weakened. Even if both nations remained in'NATO, relations
would be poisoned for years to come. Regardless of US attitudes and
actions, the US Government would be harshly criticized by at least one if
not both antagonists. A period of strained relations would follow', with the
possibility of a temporary or even permanent closure of US facilities in one
or both nations.
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Contents
Page
Key Judgments
I I I
Discussion
The Current Military Balance
1
Impact of the Cyprus Crisis
4
Comparison of Greek and Turkish Ground Forces in Thrace
6
Comparison of Greek and Turkish Forces in the Aegean
6
Air Forces
7
Naval Forces
9
Comparison of Military Readiness
10
The Potential for Change in the Military Balance
11
Ground Forces
11
Air Forces
13
Naval Forces
13
The Bottom Line
13
Defense Spending
16
Impact of the Military Balance on Greek and Turkish Behavior
20
External Factors That Might Inhibit Hostilities
22
Impact on NATO Preparedness on the Southeast Flank
24
The Warsaw Pact Threat
24
Outlook
25
Conflict Through Miscalculation
27
Attitude Toward NATO and the United States
28
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The Aegean Dispute
The friction between Greece and Turkey has his-
torical roots dating back centuries. The degree of
tension has varied?ranging from periods verging
on open hostility to periods of relative calm. The
1974 Greek-instigated coup on Cyprus and the
subsequent Turkish invasion marked an obvious
low point, although the two sides nearly came to
blows on two other occasions in the 1970s over
mineral exploration rights in the Aegean.
Throughout the early 1980s, tensions 'were con-
fined primarily to diplomatic skirmishes, but in
March 1987 the two sides nearly came to blows
again over mineral exploration rights in the Aege-
an, where Greece and Turkey maintain contrary
positions on delimitation of the continental shelf
and on resource exploitation rights.
Citing international custom and conventions that
permit countries to claim mineral and resource
exploration rights on their continental shelves,
Greece holds that each of its 2,383 Aegean islands
has a continental shelf that extends beyond its 6-
mile territorial waters, which Greece reserves the
right to extend to 12 nautical miles. Turkey,
concerned about its direct access to international
waters, maintains that, because of the Aegean's
unique geographical status, international custom
and conventions do not apply. Moreover, Turkey
holds that its continental shelf extends into the
Aegean westward of many Greek islands.
Major incidents occurred in 1974 and 1976 when
Turkish ships conducted undersea research in a
portion of the Aegean claimed by Greece. These
incidents led to the adoption in 1976 of the Berne
Declaration, whereby Greece and Turkey resolved
to refrain from provocative acts in the Aegean and
to begin discussions aimed at resolving their dif-
ferences over the delimitation of the continental
shelf. After the election of Prime Minister Papan-
dreou in 1981, however, the Greek Government
declared the Berne Declaration null and void
thou .h Athens continues to observe its provisions.
A crisis erupted in March 1987. The Greek-
chartered North Aegean Petroleum Company, in
order to prevent expiration of contractual rights to
drill for oil in the Aegean, prepared a research
voyage to investigate the possibility of oil deposits
near the island of Thasos in a disputed area of the
Aegean. In response, Ankara prepared a research
ship of its own for a voyage into the Aegean.
Greece let it be known that, if the Turkish re-
search vessel tried to engage in operations in
waters considered to be part of Greece's continen-
tal shelf, it would be stopped, by force if necessary.
As Ankara continued its preparations, Greece ini-
tiated limited mobilization procedures in anticipa-
tion of an outbreak of conflict, and Turkey put
some forces on alert. For a few days, it appeared
that the Aegean dispute might actually lead to
conflict.
The crisis was defused when Turkish Prime Min-
ister Ozal decided to limit the research conducted
by Turkey's ship to uncontested waters, provided
Greek research expeditions did the same. Since
then, Ozal has engaged in a series of private
communications with Prime Minister Papandreou,
and the two leaders have met twice this year to
initiate a dialogue aimed at concluding a series of
confidence-building measures designed to reduce
regional tensions. Believing that international le-
gal precedents favor its position, Greece wants to
settle the dispute through the International Court
of Justice at The Hague. Turkey, which believes
legal precedents weaken its case, insists on bilater-
al negotiations with Greece. Besides overlapping
continental shelf and territorial seas claims, addi-
tional Greco-Turkish disputes in the Aegean in-
clude the limits of national airspace, air traffic
control responsibilities involving the international
Aegean Flight Information Region, NATO com-
mand and control responsibilities in the Aegean,
and the Greek militarization of eastern Aegean
islands.
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Discussion
The Current Military Balance
The military balance in the eastern Mediterranean is
determined by the military forces that Greece and
Turkey can effectively bring to bear against each
other along their mutual Thracian border, in the
Aegean Sea, and in the vicinity of Cyprus. Although
Turkey has a much larger military capability than
Greece overall, many of its ground forces are focused
against internal and external threats in regions far
from a potential Greco-Turkish area of conflict; thus
their participation cannot be counted on in such a
war, unless it is prolonged.'
Most Turkish people do not feel particularly threat-
ened by Greece. Sharing a 370-mile border with the
Soviet Union and recalling the history of attempts by
Russia to extend its influence and territory in the
area, the Turkish people generally view the Soviet
Union and its Warsaw Pact partner Bulgaria as the
greatest threat to Turkish security. In Greece, by
contrast, the perceived Turkish threat transcends all
others. Since the Cyprus crisis in 1974, the Greeks
have focused most of their military combat power
against Turkey in Thrace and the Aegean.
Greek political leaders do not perceive the Warsaw
Pact to be an immediate threat to the country's
security, though some Greek military planners are less
sanguine. The Papandreou government continues the
' This Interagency Intelligence Memorandum examines the balance
of ground, naval, and air, forces between Greece and Turkey in the
Aegean and the internal and external influences that have affected
that balance since the Cyprus crisis of 1974. The Memorandum
looks at the impact of the balance on NATO and the possibility of
renewed armed conflict because of a real or perceived shift in the
balance in the future.
1
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efforts of previous Greek governments to establish
amicable relations both with its Communist neighbors
to the north and with the Soviet Union. In so doing,
the Greeks have sought to reduce the threat from the
north and isolate Turkey further. Since March 1987,
Athens has expanded efforts to improve its relations
with Sofia. A friendship and cooperation agreement
with Bulgaria, and related consultations during and
since the March crisis, reflect Athens' success in
improving relations with Bulgaria. This has the added
benefit of complicating Turkey's military planning.
Bulgaria, a traditional enemy of Greece and Turkey,
is currently at odds with Turkey over Ankara's accu- 25X1
sations that Sofia is mistreating the approximately
1 million ethnic Turks who live in Bulgaria. Turkey
has also sought to improve relations with the Soviet
Union, but this effort has not altered its basic percep-
tion of the threat. 25X1
The concentration of Greek combat power almost
exclusively against the relatively limited areas of
operations to which an Aegean war would be confined
and the high level of Greek modernization since 1974
have permitted Greece to establish a rough equality of
combat power between itself and Turkey in the
Aegean. On Cyprus, despite improvements in the
equipment, posture, and training standards of the
predominantly Greek-led Greek Cypriot National
Guard, the balance remains overwhelmingly in favor
of Turkey.
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Figure 1
Territorial Sea and Continental Shelf Dispute in the Aegean
Thessaloniki.
Samothraki
Dardanelles
-0.
Sea of
Marmara
Gokyeada
Tays. Adalari
(Rabbi( Islands)
Boma
Ada
.1.arisa
Lesvos
Skiros
Evvoia
.Izmir
Turkey
ATHENS
Aridros
Mixos
Thad&
CYCLADES
Kalimnos
Paros
Amorgas
3'10Sif.---1...???-..-.7
CN, Astipalaia
Sea of Crete
Crete
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2
Present Greek-claimed territorial sea (6 nm)
1=I Limit of potential Greek territorial sea (2 nm)
Line reflecting Greek position on continental
shelf (median line measured from low-water
coastline)
Line reflecting possible Turkish position on
continental shelf (limit of Turkish petroleum
concession)
o sp Kilometers
60 Nautical Miles
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(543427) 6-88
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Figure 2
Airspace Dispute Over the Aegean
Thessaloniki.
Sea of
Marmara
thasos
Samothr kiKD
(/)
anelles -0
.1.arisa
limners
Ayios
T1121
)
S1
G
Skiros
ltios
r e ec e Evvoia (Psartco
Aegean
v
ATHENS
Inas
Kithira
readros
Tavjan Adalari
(Rabbit Islands)
Barca
Ada
Lesvos
Khios
Marfa
l'? S
ire
s
''1A Mikonos ----""'llatmos
CYCLADES ---Alaxos - -11:1
A
tZleros
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0 MilosOp 0? Amorgas es
ck> ---"Ait,palaia, oso
%Thira 17
1-eisiros
0
s
Simi ))_,..-------,_ 'S`t?
FT/lo
, Khalki Rhodes
Sea of Crete
Crete
Greek airspace recognized by Turkey
(6 nm)
Limit of airspace claimed by Greece
(10 nm)
Boundary of flight information region
(median line measured from low-water
coastline)
0 50 Kilometers
0 50 Nautical Miles
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The Cyprus Crisis
The Greco-Turkish dispute over the status of
Cyprus, which began in the 1950s, reached a peak
in July 1974 when Turkey's military intervention
foiled an attempt by the Greek military junta to
gain control of the Cypriot Government and lay the
foundation for the eventual union (enosis) of Cy-
prus with Greece.
Faced with this disaster, the Greek military junta
resigned and turned the reigns of government over
to former Prime Minister Constantine Karaman-
lis. His hastily formed interim civilian government
attempted to negotiate the withdrawal of Turkish
forces from northern Cyprus, but the talks broke
down due to Greece's refusal to accept Turkish
proposals that six autonomous Turkish C riot
cantons be established on the island.
Greece refused to accept responsibility for the
junta-engineered debacle. Instead, the Greeks
blamed the United States for what they viewed as
US support of the Greek military junta during its
years in power and acquiescence in the Turkish
intervention in Cyprus. The United States was even
accused of collusion with the junta in its attempt-
ed assassination of then Cypriot President Makar-
ios. Greek frustration was heightened by the plight
of some 160,000 Greek Cypriots who fled from
their homes in northern Cyprus to the southern,
Greek Cypriot sector of the island. Karamanlis,
though personally pro-American and pro-NATO,
felt compelled to demonstrate his country's dis-
pleasure with NATO?and especially the United
States?by withdrawing Greece from the military
wing of the Alliance. The consequences of this
decision are still apparent despite the ostensible
reintegration of Greece into NATO's military wing
in 1980.
If US attitudes before and during the Cyprus crisis
displeased Athens, the US arms embargo infuriat-
ed Ankara. Turkey retaliated by abrogating the
1969 Defense Economic and Cooperation Agree-
ment and by suspending operations at all US-
occupied military facilities in Turkey not clearly
connected with the NATO mission. These restric-
tions endured until the US embargo was lifted in
1978.
Impact of the Cyprus Crisis
After the 1974 Cyprus crisis, several factors combined
to allow Greece to reduce the military imbalance that
had existed in favor of Turkey until then. From 1975
to 1978, a US arms embargo against Turkey, imposed
because of Ankara's use of US-supplied weapons in
the invasion of Cyprus, virtually halted the modern-
ization of Turkey's armed forces and severely cur-
tailed its ability to maintain its military equipment,
which is largely of US origin. Greece, under no such
restrictions during this period, continued to receive
US military assistance and procure US tanks, air-
craft, and other equipment.
From the mid-1970s to the early 1980s, Greece's
economy grew faster than Turkey's. Greece was able
to supplement the equipment it procured with US
assistance with additional purchases of tanks,
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armored personnel carriers, fighter aircraft, missile-
equipped patrol boats, submarines, and frigates from
France, West Germany, and the Netherlands. This
influx of modern equipment enabled Greece to en-
hance the defensive capabilities of its ground forces in
Thrace and the Aegean islands and to establish a
qualitative edge over Turkey in modern aircraft and
ships.
By the time Prime Minister Papandreou and his
Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) were elect-
ed in October 1981, Greece was already well on its
way to establishing a strong defense in the Aegean.
Greece had fortified its Aegean islands, improved its
defenses in Thrace, and developed the potential to
challenge, if not defeat, the Turkish Air Force and
Navy in the Aegean.
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Moreover, since the lifting of the US arms embargo in
1978, US military aid (including Foreign Military
Sales [FMS] credits to Greece and Turkey) has been
based on the Congressionally observed 7:10 ratio,
meaning that Greece is allocated 70 percent as much
as Turkey. Since Turkey needed major assistance
after the embargo, the military aid provided to both
countries was substantial?in Greece's case, more
than it could immediately absorb, permitting Athens
to accumulate a large reserve of unused FMS credits
over the years. This reserve has helped Greece to fund
major items such as its recent purchase of 40 F-16
fighter aircraft and its upcoming acquisition of arma-
ment packages for the four new frigates that the
Hellenic Navy plans to purchase from West Germany
in the near future.
While Greece was rapidly improving its military
capabilities in the late 1970s, Turkey was suffering
under the weight of the US arms embargo, a poorly
functioning economy, and political violence approach-
ing the scope and intensity of civil war. Only after
Turkish military intervention restored order in 1980
did the armed forces begin a long-postponed modern-
ization. US and West German aid, coupled with the
free-market orientation of the new Turkish Govern-
ment, facilitated the expansion and modernization of
Turkey's domestic defense industries. The M48A5
tank program, the coproduction of F-16s, and naval
modernization are examples of successful programs
that have significantly enhanced Turkey's capability
to defend itself against the Warsaw Pact?or against
Greece. Already, the qualitative advantage that
Greece developed during the late 1970s and early
1980s is evaporating. And, although the moderniza-
tion of Turkish ground forces has lagged that of the
Air Force and Navy, the armored units of the 1st
Army in Thrace and the XI Corps on Cyprus are now
equipped with upgraded M48A5 tanks with 105-mm
guns.
The major advantage that Greece derived from its
modernization and redeployment of forces to face
Turkey 2 was the ability to defend its border in Thrace
'In December 1984 the Greek Government ratified the new
Defense Dogma that identified Turkey as Greece's primary security
threat.
5
Figure 3. Ongoing tank modernization is a high priority for both
the Greek and Turkish Armies and, by the early 1990s, both
armies will be primarily equipped with M48A5 105-mm gun (or
equivalent model) tanks.
Figure 4. The A-7H fighter-bomber has been in service with the
Hellenic Air Force since the late 1970s. Greece hopes to replace
attrition losses by acquiring an additional 14 to 20 A-7s from the
United States.
and its major Aegean islands against a Turkish
attack. The Hellenic Air Force currently enjoys a
qualitative edge over the Turkish Air Force. Better
equipment and a superior level of training give Greece
the potential to make Turkey pay a high price in
casualties in the event of war. A significant benefit of
modernization included the deep-strike capability Of
the Hellenic Air Force A-7H fighter-bomber squad-
rons. Given the poor state of Turkish Air Force
preparedness in the early 1980s, the limited early
warning and tracking capabilities of Turkish radar,
and the ineffectiveness of the antiquated antiaircraft
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Figure 5. Turkey's recent acquisition of 72 British-built Rapier
SAM systems has greatly increased the Turkish Air Force's
capability to defend bases against low-level attack.
systems protecting Turkish bases, Greek fighter-
bombers constituted a serious threat to Turkish instal-
lations until just a few years ago.
Since the early 1980s, however, Greece's ability to
perform deep-strike missions against Turkish main-
land targets has been eroded by Turkey's acquisition
and deployment of Rapier surface-to-air missile
(SAM) systems at numerous Turkish installations.
The Turkish Air Force's acquisition of a large number
of well-maintained aircraft from the United States,
Canada, and West Germany has increased its capabil-
ities relative to those of the Hellenic Air Force.
Similarly, with US and West German assistance, the
Turkish Navy has acquired new submarines missile-
equipped patrol boats, and frigates.
Currently, the defenses that Greece established and
continues to improve in Thrace and the Aegean
islands preclude Turkey from easily seizing and re-
taining any significant portion of Greek territory. By
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the same token, Greece is not capable of seizing and
retaining Turkish territory.
Comparison of Greek and Turkish
Ground Forces in Thrace
Greek forces in Thrace are outnumbered by Turkish
forces almost 2 to 1. Turkey also has a slightly greater
number of tanks and more artillery than Greece (see
table 1). These Turkish advantages in personnel and
equipment, however, are offset by the terrain in Greek
Thrace, which is favorable to defensive operations,
and by Greece's possession of more modern self-
propelled artillery capable of firing extended-range
improved conventional munitions. To generate the
preponderance of offensive power necessary to assure
success in offensive operations in Greek Thrace, Turk-
ish forces would need additional modernization, rein-
forcement, and an upgrading of their logistic capabili-
ty to support operations beyond interior lines of
communication.
Comparison of Greek and Turkish
Forces in the Aegean
The major Greek islands of Rhodes, Kos, Samos,
Khios, Lesvos, and Limnos have been heavily garri-
soned and equipped. Each major island command has
composite tank, artillery, and air defense battalions
and an average mobilized strength of 7,000 troops.
The islands are intended to be mutually supporting
and to reinforce each other or organize task forces to
reinforce or retake smaller islands threatened or
overcome by attack. We believe that, if under attack,
resupply and reinforcement would be difficult, howev-
er, because of limited helo/sealift capability. Each
major island has one or more airfields capable of
supporting Hellenic Air Force fighters and resupply
operations. In the event that airfields were destroyed
or captured, reinforcements could be sent to the
islands by sea.
The Turkish 4th ("Aegean") Army is deployed on a
north-south axis along the Turkish Aegean coast. It is
primarily a training establishment with limited com-
bat units that would have to be substantially rein-
forced in heavy equipment and personnel before
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undertaking
operations against a major Aegean is-
land. Although much preparation would be necessary
for the conduct of such operations, the existing sup-
port forces would be sufficient.
Most of the Turkish Navy's amphibious assets are
located at Izmir, as are the headquarters of the 4th
Army and the Turkish Amphibious Command; a
Turkish marine regiment is stationed at nearby Foca.
Four airfields are located in the Izmir area; they are
defended by modern Rapier SAMs.
7
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Figure 6. Greece's 123 155-mm M109A1/2 self-propelled artillery
pieces are deployed with Hellenic armored and mechani
in Thrace and with the major Aegean island commands.
Air Forces
The development of the Hellenic Air Force since the
mid-1970s has been crucial in enabling Greece to
establish a rough equality of combat power with
Turkey in the Aegean. The acquisition of US (F-4,
A-7H) and French (Mirage F-1C) aircraft and the
development of an effective maintenance capability
have provided the Hellenic Air Force with a consis-
tently high in-commission rate for its aircraft that
offsets the numerical superiority of the Turkish Air
Force, which has a traditionally low in-commission
rate. Moreover, Hellenic Air Force pilots have been
generally regarded as superior to those of the Turkish
Air Force, although this qualitative edge has been
affected by lack of participation in NATO exercises.
Most of the forward deployment bases of the Hellenic
Air Force are located on Aegean islands. The Hellenic
Air Force has demonstrated the capability to respond
rapidly to alerts and to deploy its squadrons to
forward areas for combat within hours. We assess its
interceptor squadrons as better prepared for air-to-air .
combat than their Turkish counterparts. The Hellenic
Air Force's ability to defend mainland and especially
Aegean airfields from air attack is limited by the
small number of radar-guided Skyguard and Hawk
antiaircraft systems available. Most key Air Force
facilities in the island commands would be very
vulnerable to low-level air attack by Turkish Air
Force attack squadrons.
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Figure 7. The Mirage F-IC (top) and the F-4E Phantom (bottom)
are the Hellenic Air Force's primary interceptors and are expected
to remain in service through the early 1990s.
Until the mid-1980s, the comparative inefficiency of
the Turkish Air Force and its limited capability to
defend against the threat of low-level attack by
Hellenic Air Force fighter-bombers gave the Hellenic
Air Force the potential to cause severe damage to
Turkish Air Force bases and even to destroy Turkish
aircraft on the ground, reducing the number of Turk-
ish aircraft available for combat over Thrace and the
Aegean
In recent years, however, the Turkish Air Force has
markedly improved its capabilities by acquiring a
significant number of aircraft from the United States,
West Germany, and Canada and by procuring 72
Rapier SAM systems from the United Kingdom for
airfield defense. The pending transfer of four NIKE-
Hercules SAM batteries from West Germany, some
of which may be placed on Turkey's Aegean coast,
will further improve air defense capabilities. In addi-
tion, the Turkish Air Force has created an infrastruc-
ture of forward deployment bases in western Anatolia
that have the personnel, fuel, and ammunition stores
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Figure 8. The Turkish Air Force supplemented its all-weather
capabilities with the transfer of 40 F-4E Phantom fighters by the
United States under the Southern Region Amendment in 1987.
Beginning this year, the United States will begin transferring
approximately 70 F-4CIDs to Greece.
necessary to support aircraft transferred from else-
where in the country. Despite the recent influx of
more modern aircraft into its inventory, the Turkish
Air Force still has only a limited all-weather capa-
bility due to equipment shortages and continuing
deficiencies in maintenance. Although the training
and overall flying skills of Turkish pilots appear to be
improving, this gain is at least partially offset by
recently identified serious pilot retention problems.
The Hellenic Air Force will retain advantages over
the Turkish Air Force because of its better pilot
retention rate and the higher skill level of its pilots.
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Figure 9. The Tusas aircraft factory at Murted, Turkey, is
currently coproducing F-16s in a joint venture with General
Dynamics. Turkey will acquire 43 F-16CIDs built in the United
States and coproduce approximately 117 F-16s by 1994.
These advantages will be offset by improved Turkish
airfield defenses (Rapier), a numerical advantage in
fighters, an abundance of primary and secondary
airfields in western Anatolia, and an F-16 program
that will deliver 160 fighters against 80 to 100 Greek
F-16s and Mirage 2000s. Though either air force is
capable of establishing local superiority over an area
of the Aegean for a short time, neither air force would
be able to establish overall superiority in an Aegean
war. This relative balance of airpower will preclude
either air force from dominating the other through the
early 1990s.
Naval Forces
Most of the surface combatants of the Hellenic and
Turkish Navies are World War II?vintage US de-
stroyers and destroyer escorts. Though modernized to
varying degrees, they remain vulnerable to virtually
all forms of modern air, surface, and subsurface
attack and would be of only marginal utility in an
Aegean conflict. On balance, we believe that the
Turkish Navy, because of its modernization program,
now enjoys a slight advantage over the Hellenic Navy,
and that this advantage would be evident though not
decisive, in an Aegean conflict.
Since the arms embargo against Turkey was lifted in
1978, the Turkish Navy has undergone a rapid mod-
ernization program that now gives it a slight qualita-
tive edge over the Hellenic Navy. Turkey has ac-
quired modern submarines, new missile-equipped fast-
attack craft, and two MEKO-class frigates. It is
building two other MEKOs and plans to acquire
additional frigates and submarines. In addition, the
9
_
Figure 10. The first of 40 French-built Mirage 2000 aircraft to be
delivered to Greece between 1988 and 1991. In late 1988. Greece
will also begin accepting delivery of 40 F-16CIDs purchased via
FMS credits from the United States.
Turkish Navy has purchased new missile-armed
ASW (antisubmarine warfare) helicopters, the
RIM-7M Sea Sparrow missile, and Close-in Weapon
Systems (CIWS) for the MEK0s. Some of the Type
209 submarines are being modified to carry Har-
poons.
Meanwhile, the Hellenic Navy has made no signifi-
cant acquisitions since delivery of its second Dutch-
produced Kortenaer frigate in 1982. While it now
appears that Greece has decided to sign a contract
with West Germany to acquire four new MEKO-class
frigates, these units will not come into service until
the mid-1990s.
In an Aegean conflict, the Hellenic Navy probably
would enjoy a slight initial advantage due principally
to its proximity to likely areas of conflict in the
Aegean and its familiarity with operating in the
region. By contrast, the Turkish Navy, which is
deployed principally in the Black Sea and Sea of
Marmara, initially would be farther away from the
area of hostilities. The maldeployment of Turkish
naval forces could exist at the beginning of hostilities,
but could be rapidly altered. After the onset of
hostilities, it is not certain that either navy could
control much of the Aegean beyond its coastline,
though either could deny areas of the Aegean to the
other. While the Hellenic Navy would have good
access to mainland support facilities and staging
areas, it is likely that facilities on the eastern Aegean
islands would not be available to the Hellenic Navy if
the Turkish Air Force were able to establish periodi-
cally a degree of air superiority over the islands.
Presently the only significant Turkish naval base in
the area capable of supporting larger surface combat
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Figure 11. Turkey has taken delivery of two of four West
German?built MEKO 200?class frigates. The third and fourth
MEKOs (built in Turkey) are expected to be commissioned in 1988
and 1989, respectively. Greece also recently selected the MEKO to
replace its aging destroyers, but is not expected to take delivery of
the first of four ordered until the 1991-92 tittle frame.
Figure 12. The West German?designed Type 209 coastal subma-
rine is the primary undersea combatant in both the Greek and
Turkish Navies. Three of Turkey's six 209s were constructed at
the Turkish navy yard at Gokuk, and Turkey has contracted for
the production of two larger 20911400 models also to be construct-
ed at Golcuk.
?
Figure 13. Greece's two Dutch-built Kortenaer-class frigates are
the most modern major surface combatants in the Hellenic Navy.
units and submarines in the Aegean is Izmir. The
constricted entrance to Izmir would provide Hellenic
Air Force fighters and Hellenic Navy missile-
equipped fast-attack craft and submarines with con-
siderable interdiction opportunities.
Secret
The Turkish Navy is constructing a major naval base
at Marmaris (Aksaz-Karaagac), 30 miles northeast of
the Greek island of Rhodes. When completed in the
1989-90 time frame, this facility will be capable of
homeporting half the Turkish fleet, significantly en-
hancing Turkey's ability to project seapower in the
southern Aegean and the eastern Mediterranean.
Comparison of Military Readiness
Readiness is more than a simple measure of alert
condition and the ability to engage an enemy on short
notice. In addition, it includes the ability to mobilize
trained reserves, the availability of modern materiel
and an adequate logistic system and most important,
recent and effective training.
Both Greece and Turkey consistently report high
readiness levels for their combat forces in Thrace to
NATO. However, much is not known about the
overall readiness of Greek and Turkish forces, and
both countries are sensitive to releasing information
regarding their logistic capabilities and limitations.
While large stocks of ammunition and fuel have been
positioned by both sides in Thrace, the ability of the
Greeks and Turks to transport and distribute these
and other crucial classes of supply under combat
conditions has not been determined.
We believe that, in both coun-
tries, serious deficiencies exist that would hinder the
movement of materiel necessary to sustain defensive
and especially offensive operations.
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The proficiency and training level of Greek and
Turkish forces will also have an impact on combat
operations. Both sides have adequate manpower pools
of previously trained and recently discharged con-
scripts to call upon as replacements for casualties. In
the more technical fields, their level of proficiency is
not believed adequate for effectively replacing their
active-duty counter ? arts who in many instances are
also undertrained.
While it is difficult to measure overall readiness and,
even more so, to compare countries in this area, we
believe that, in a war of short duration, neither side
would have a decisive advantage resulting from supe-
rior readiness.
The Potential for Change in the Military Balance
Ground Forces
The pace of the Greek modernization program that
began in the mid-1970s slowed greatly by the early
1980s. For example, Greece's tank modernization
program has turned out to be less ambitious than
Turkey's. By 1990, Turkey will complete moderniza-
tion of 2,120 of its M48 tanks to the AS standard of
11
improved power plants and replacement of the origi-
nal 90-mm guns with 105-mm guns. By comparison,
many Greek M48 tanks were only upgraded to the A3
standard of improved power plants, while the less
effective 90-mm guns were retained. In addition, the
Hellenic Army has experienced substantial main-
tenance problems with its approximately 200 French
AMX-30 tanks and may be compelled to retire or
otherwise dispose of them by the early 1990s. If so,
the scheduled delivery of 300 M48A5 tanks from the
United States over the next three years would result
in the net addition to the Hellenic Army of only two
battalions of diesel-engined 105-mm-gun tanks, in-
stead of the six battalions originally planned. Unless
the Hellenic Army accelerates the upgrading of its 25X1
older-model M48s, Turkey will continue to enjoy both
a qualitative and a numerical edge in armor available
for use against Greece. These advantages would be
significant if Turkey had to defend against a Greek
attack in Thrace, but would not be sufficient to
provide Turkey with the ability to conduct a success-
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On the other hand, Greece is slightly ahead of Turkey
in artillery modernization. However, the small advan-
tage it has gained via its acquisition of modern
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Figure 15. The Hellenic Army has reportedly experienced numer-
ous maintenance-related problems with its French-made AMX-30
tanks, which may lead to a decision to retire the system in the
early 1990s as additional M48A5s are acquired.
155-mm self-propelled howitzers will be short-lived in
light of present Turkish plans to upgrade its artillery
on a major scale. After the upgrade programs in both
countries are completed in the mid-1990s, Turkey will
have a larger inventory of artillery capable of firing
improved conventional munitions in Thrace.
Both the Greek and Turkish Armies plan to obtain
large numbers of armored personnel carriers (APCs)
or infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs). Greece plans to
manufacture approximately 300 Austrian-designed
Leonidas II IFVs over the next several years. Turkey
has recently awarded a contract to FMC Corporation
for the production/coproduction of 1,700 US IFVs
over the next decade. Today, the overall quality of
Greece's fleet of largely diesel-engined M113A1/2
APCs is higher than that of Turkey's fleet of largely
gasoline-engined M113s. Over the next several years,
however, Turkey plans to upgrade many of its M113s
with diesel engines and, in the early to middle 1990s,
will probably surpass Greece in the number of modern
APCs and IFVs fielded in Thrace.
Secret
Figure 17. The Hellenic Vehicles Industry Plant (ELBO)will begin
production of 316 improved versions of this Leonidas I APC,
designated Leonidas II IFV, to supplement US. French, and
Leonidas I APCs currently in service with the Hellenic Army.
.41:f
Figure 18. The Turkish Government recently selected the FMC
IFV for a joint-venture project for the production of 1,700 vehicles
over a 10-year period.
12
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Air Forces
The most dramatic modernization program currently
under way in Turkey is the joint US-Turkish project
for the acquisition of 160 F-16 fighters for the
Turkish Air Force by 1994. This program, which
includes coproduction, will provide the Turkish aero-
space industry with an experience base and manufac-
turing capability for complex aircraft better than that
of the Hellenic aerospace industry. This capability
would be difficult for Turkey to maintain unless the
partnership with the US manufacturer were to contin-
ue beyond 1994. To increase its deep-strike capability,
the Turkish Air Force would also like to acquire 40
Tornado aircraft, but funds for such a project are not
likely to be available through the early 1990s.
The Hellenic Air Force will receive 40 US-manufac-
tured F-16s by 1990, and Athens is expected to
exercise its option to buy 20 more. At the same time,
the Hellenic Air Force has begun taking delivery of
40 Mirage 2000 aircraft ordered from France. These
new aircraft, coupled with planned acquisitions of
older aircraft (F-4, A-7) over the next few years from
the United States, will ensure that the Hellenic Air
Force will be able to maintain a rough parity with the
Turkish Air Force through the early 1990s. However,
as Turkish F-16 production continues beyond 1992,
the Turkish Air Force will eventually deploy a total of
160 F-16s against the Greek Air Force's 40 to 60
F-16s and 40 Mirage 2000s. Moreover, Turkey would
be able?with US assistance?to replace losses and
produce additional F-16 aircraft more easily and
cheaply than Greece.
Naval Forces
The Turkish Navy has made impressive gains. Pro-
jected acquisition of modern missile-equipped fast-
attack craft, submarines, and frigates ensures that the
Turkish Navy will retain its recently established edge
over the Hellenic Navy in overall capabilities. By
13
contrast, since 1982, no new surface or submarine
combatants have been added to the Hellenic fleet.
This is a particularly crucial problem for the Hellenic
Navy since leadtimes in acquiring major surface
combatants are so lengthy. The ability of the Hellenic
Navy to keep pace with the growing potential of the
fast-improving Turkish Navy is increasingly question-
able.
The Bottom Line
We believe that the current sum of all Greek-Turkish
military capabilities is rough parity. Today, Greek
and Turkish forces in the Aegean lack a decisive edge
that might encourage offensive action by one against
the other. Turkish forces are stronger overall, but
have significant obligations elsewhere that preclude
their total commitment against Greece in the Aegean.
In the Aegean itself, Turkish naval forces today are
only marginally better than those of Greece and are
dependent upon reinforcement from the Sea of
Marmara. The Hellenic Air Force is superior, but is
constrained by the distance to potential front areas
(particularly Cyprus) and the resulting short loiter
time. Greece has well-prepared ground forces on the
islands, which adds to the advantage that always goes
to the defense, but suffers from proximity to the
Turkish mainland and the difficulty of their resupply
and reinforcement.
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We believe that the rough military balance that exists
today between Greece and Turkey will not change
dramatically during the period of this assessment, but
it is steadily shifting toward Turkey. We believe that 25X1
the reasons for this are primarily the balance of
foreign military assistance to each country and the
relative size of their two economies. We also believe
that the inevitable change in the balance to Turkey's
advantage will not result in conflict on the basis of
this imbalance alone. 25X1
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Figure 19
Greece and Turkey: Total Military Expenditures, 1974-88a
Billion US $
4

3
- _inr
-[in 7i ir
rJ
0 Greece
Turkey
Ii
2
-16
0
1974 75 76 77 78 79 80 81
a Constant 1986 dollars.
b Budgeted.
Defense Spending
82 83 84 85 86 87 88b
So long as the fear of a Turkish threat remains high,
Greek governments will continue to devote a large
percentage of their annual budgets to defense, with
the full support of the Greek population. From 1974
(after the Cyprus crisis) to 1986, Greece devoted an
average of approximately 6.6 pet-Cent of its GDP to
defense annually, making it the only NATO country
besides the United States to spend such a large
portion of its GDP on defense. In 1986 Greece spent
an estimated $2.417 billion on defense, which consti-
tuted 7.44 percent 3 of its GDP. Defense spending is
projected to increase by a nominal 15 percent to
$2.78 billion this year.4 These large increases in
defense spending obviously reflect Greek concern
about maintaining a military balance in the Aegean.
'Actual 1986 NATO data. (u)
'NATO estimates of November 1987. (ti)
Secret
317446 6-88
Even this high level of expenditures, however, may
fail to reverse the trend: 82.3 4 percent of Greece's
military budget is devoted to operations and mainte-
nance, including pay and allowances, leaving less than
18 percent available for the purchase of new equip-
ment.
Considering the high cost of military equipment,
whether domestically produced or procured abroad,
the likely reduction in the amount of US FMS credits
extended annually, along with the necessity of repay-
ing FMS loans previously extended, it is apparent that
Greece will find it increasingly difficult to match its
extensive modernization requirements against the
available resources over the next several years. The
Greek economy, although improved since the institu-
tion of austerity measures in 1985, continues to suffer
from numerous difficulties that will take years of belt
tightening and restructuring to correct. In anticipa-
tion of the 1989 national election, however, the
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Papandreou government has already begun to relax
these austerity measures to increase their appeal to
the voters, though this may undo the limited accom-
plishments of the past three years.
Increasingly high modernization costs have prompted
Athens to request that a large portion of future US
assistance be given in the form of nonreimbursable
grant aid. In addition, Greece wants a substantial
increase in credits for FY 1989, namely, $600 million
in FMS financing, compared with $343 million in
both FY 1987 and FY 1988. Greek purchases would
include 200 M113 APCs, 50 M48A5 tanks (or the
equivalent), 75 assault bridges, 50 attack helicopters,
two Barbel-class diesel submarines, and additional
maritime patrol aircraft. The Greek Government
probably realizes that its request is unlikely to be
granted, given the many other claims on available US
funds.
The FMS credits accumulated by Athens over the last
decade have largely been committed to the F-16
program or reserved for the weapons suits of the
Hellenic Navy's frigate program. Because Greece is
already spending such a large portion of its GDP on
defense, the difference between the amount of mili-
tary aid requested and the much smaller amount
likely to be granted in future years probably cannot be
made up from domestic sources. Instead, Greece will
have to reevaluate and reprioritize its modernization
requirements.
Greek priorities through the early 1990s include naval
modernization; the acquisition of additional tanks,
APCs, and IFVs; the upgrading of artillery; the
upgrading of its command, control, communications,
and intelligence (CI) capabilities; and the acquisition
of new helicopters for the Army and Navy. Greece
will continue its research, development, and produc-
tion of improved conventional munitions, light anti-
tank weapons, mortars, remotely piloted vehicles, and
other projects such as more Artemis-30 air defense
systems where Greek arms industries may be able to
satisfy domestic needs economically and compete in
the international arms market. Without additional
US and other NATO assistance, however, Greece
may have to delay or reduce the scope of many of
17
r-
Figure 20. The Greek Artemis 30 (twin 30-mm) radar-guided air
defense gun is in production and scheduled to enter service with the
Hellenic Army in 1988. Greece plans to produce 184 Artemis fire
units by 1990.
these programs; we anticipate that artillery modern-
ization and helicopter acquisitions are likely to bear
the brunt of funding shortfalls.
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Turkey is much less affluent on a per capita basis
than Greece, although its 1986 GDP of approximately
US $54 billion was about 68 percent higher than
Greece's 1986 GDP of approximately $32.1 billion.
Since 1980 Turkey has spent about 4.8 percent 5 of its
GDP annually on defense, a lower proportion than
Greece. In 1986, Turkish defense expenditures (in-
cluding $70.71 million in NATO infrastructure funds)
were $2.769 billion.' As in Greece, a large percentage
of the Turkish defense budget (the 1984-87 average 25X1
was 76 percent 6) is devoted to operations and mainte-
nance, including pay and allowances. Turkey is also
highly dependent on foreign military assistance for
most of its modernization needs. To support its mod-
ernization program, Turkey would like to receive
more than $1 billion per year in US security assis-
tance; thus, Ankara has been disappointed in US
security assistance in FY 1987 and FY 1988 (see
table 2). 25X1
Turkey has nevertheless managed to establish a num-
ber of major domestic military production (or copro-
duction) programs. By working with the US and West
'Actual 1986 NATO data. (u)
6 NATO estimates of November 1987. (u)
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Table 2
US Military Assistance
to Greece and Turkey, 1985-88
Million US $
1985
1986
1987
1988
Greece
FMS credits
500
430
343
313
Military Assistance Program
0
o
- o
30
Total
500
430
343
343
Turkey
FMS credits
485
409
178 a
334 b
Military Assistance Program
215
206
312 .
156
Total
700
615
490
490
One half of FMS credits extended to Turkey were at concessional
interest rates lower than the treasury rate normally extended for
FMS-financed military assistance.
b Of the estimated $334 million in estimated FY 88 FMS credits
German Governments and major private arms manu-
facturers in America and West Germany, Turkey has
established tank upgrade facilities, modern plants for
the production of tank ammunition and antiaircraft
artillery, a factory for F-16 coproduction, and a
strong naval modernization program. Turkey has also
benefited from concessional rates of interest for part
of its FMS debt, free equipment transfers via the
Military Assistance Program, an annual allocation of
$150 million in US Economic Support Funding, and
additional equipment transfers (notably 40 F-4E
Phantoms) provided under special programs such as
the Southern Region Amendment in 1987. Turkey's
recent award of a contract to the FMC Corporation
for the establishment of an IFV production facility in
Turkey and planned coproduction of MLRSs are
other examples of the country's robust modernization
effort.
The Turkish military historically has been accorded a
high budget priority. Nevertheless, owing to funding
shortfalls, Turkey may also fail to achieve its modern-
ization goals through the early 1990s. Lower-than-
anticipated levels of FMS assistance may slow the
production of F-16 fighters and impede artillery and
helicopter modernization through the early 1990s.
Tank modernization will not be affected due to its
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extended to Turkey, $178 million will be at concessional interest
rates, and $156,000 in previously accumulated FMS obligations
will be "forgiven" and subtracted from Turkey's overall FMS debt
obligation to the United States.
status as a "dependable undertaking." High-priority
programs (such as the establishment of a domestic
capability to produce IFVs) may be scaled down but
will probably survive, because of the Turkish Govern-
ment's commitment to the development of such pro-
jects and the willingness of other NATO govern-
ments, as well as private US and other Western
weapons manufacturers, to agree to generous offset
concessions and favorable financing arrangements.
Turkey's large requirements for major equipment
items, coupled with an abundance of cheap labor, put
it in a better position than Greece to obtain conces-
sions from Western weapons manufacturers in return
for allowing them to participate in the establishment
of domestic production facilities. This advantage and
the continuing high levels of military, technical, and
7 A "dependable undertaking" as applied to a specific multiyear
security assistance program (for example, the Turkish M48A5
upgrade program) is a calculated judgment that assumes that,
regardless of annual increases or decreases in security assistance, a
minimum level of security assistance will be provided annually over
a period of years. In Turkey's case, key projects such as the tank
upgrade are referred to as dependable undertakings, which denotes
that long-term financing will be available to complete the project.
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financial assistance from West Germany as well as
the United States place Turkey in a better position
than Greece to accomplish its future modernization
goals.
Impact of the Military Balance on
Greek and Turkish Behavior
The existence of rough parity between the two mili-
tary establishments throughout the late 1970s and
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early 1980s has undoubtedly played an important role
in restraining the Greeks and the Turks from employ-
ing military operations to resolve their outstanding
differences. Yet parity is not the only factor affecting
whether they resort to armed conflict. Other factors
that could also contribute to fomenting or restraining
aggression in the Aegean include domestic stability,
leadership styles, national objectives, and perceptions
of each other. However, so long as neither has a
decided advantage in Thrace and in the Aegean, it
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would be far too costly for either to enter into a major
of prolonged armed conflict. On occasion since 1974,
both the Greek and Turkish Governments have raised
the level of tension in the Aegean. Papandreou's past
unwillingness to pursue discussions on Aegean dis-
putes and the improvements of Greek defenses in the
Aegean and Thrace, which culminated in the 1984
ratification of the New Defense Dogma identifying
Turkey rather than the Soviet Union as Greece's
primary threat, have tended to reinforce Turkish
perceptions of an intransigent Greece. Ankara's fre-
quent penetrations of Greek-claimed airspace and the
creation of the 4th "Aegean Army" have tended to
confirm Greek perceptions of an aggressive Turkey.
Yet both parties have sought to avoid military conflict
and prevent minor incidents from mushrooming be-
yond their control. Since nearly coming to blows in
21
March 1987, the two Prime Ministers have taken
tentative steps to reduce tensions through dialogue
and confidence-building measures.
Overall, we doubt that the shift in the military
balance in Ankara's favor will significantly increase
the possibility of Turkish aggression over the next five
years. Prime Minister Ozal's increasing influence over
all aspects of Turkish Government affairs, his good
working relationship with President Evren, and his
recent electoral victory place him in a good position to
encourage a reduction in tensions with Greece. Tur-
key's primary goal in the Aegean is to maintain its
free access to the sea and to share Aegean resources.
As a result, Ozal does not need to initiate hostilities
unless Greece takes the unlikely step of declaring a
12-mile territorial sea or explores for oil in disputed
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Figure 23. The first substantial step toward rapproachment be-
tween Greece and Turkey occurred during the January 1988 World
Economic Forum at Davos, Switzerland, when Papandreou and
Ozal issued a joint communique pledging to avoid confrontation
and to work together toward easing mutual tensions in the Aegean.
waters. Having made Turkey's entry into the EC a ?
primary foreign policy objective and having numerous
other issues outside the Aegean with which to concern
himself?including Turkey's other hostile neigh-
bors?Ozal almost certainly appreciates the benefit of
improved relations with Athens.
As Greece's core objective in the Aegean is to main-
tain the status quo, Athens is unlikely to initiate
hostilities so long as Ankara does not challenge the
status quo. Prime Minister Papandreou has no need to
engage in military adventures to distract public atten-
tion from the domestic scene. He is firmly in control
of his party, the government, and the military.
If a new Greek government results from the election
that must take place by June 1989, we would not
expect it to change traditional Greek objectives in the
Aegean. A conservative government would adopt a
more flexible tactical approach toward Greco-Turkish
relations, but the substance of conservative positions
on the Aegean and Cyprus differs little from that of
Papandreou. The conservatives are more pro-Western
than Papandreou and may reverse his policy of non-
participation in NATO exercises?although not in the
Aegean?and may place less emphasis on relations
with Greece's Balkan neighbors. They may also be
less prone to harsh rhetoric and more likely to formal-
ize a dialogue with Turkey on Aegean problems.
Secret
Nonetheless, the conservatives would be no more
prone than Papandreou to compromise on the basic
issues that divide Greece and Turkey in the Aegean.
Regardless of Greek or Turkish perceptions of their
respective military capabilities, there are circum-
stances under which neither country would back down
from a conflict between them. For example, Ankara
has publicly stated it would not tolerate an extension
of the territorial waters of Greek islands from 6 miles
to 12 miles. Under such circumstances, Turkey would
seriously consider armed conflict even if it perceived
Greece to have a military advantage in certain areas.
Similarly, in the event that Turkey attempted to
extend the territory under its control on Cyprus,
Greece might feel compelled to go to war with
Turkey. Even the Greek perception that the military
balance significantly favored Turkey and that, conse-
quently, sovereign territory would be at risk would not
necessarily dissuade Athens from supporting Cyprus
under such circumstances.
External Factors That Might Inhibit Hostilities
In a crisis, the military balance will not be the only
factor?or even necessarily the most important fac-
tor?affecting the decision of either Greece or Turkey
to undertake military operations against the other.
On the other hand,
both Greek and Turkish expectations that the United
States and NATO would intervene diplomatically to
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ecret
prevent or control a conflict may encourage a poten-
tially dangerous disregard for the implications of their
own actions.
The behavior of the Warsaw Pact in a future Aegean
crisis could help dissuade either Greece or Turkey
from undertaking planned military action. In an
Aegean crisis, both Athens and Ankara would watch
Moscow closely. Both would pay particular attention
to any Soviet statements alluding to a threat to the
security of the Soviet Union or Bulgaria or to the
unhindered safe passage of Soviet Bloc merchantmen
through the Turkish Straits.
Actually, during the March 1987 crisis, the Soviet
Union adopted a neutral and nonthreatening stance
and encouraged Greece and Turkey to resolve their
differences in a peaceful manner. More worrisome to
Turkey was the sudden visit of Greek Foreign Minis-
ter Papoulias to Sofia for consultations during the
height of the crisis. The specter of Greece and
Bulgaria?traditional enemies of each other as well as
of Turkey?consulting during the crisis undoubtedly
raised suspicions in Ankara.
Although it is highly unlikely that the Greek-Bulgari-
an rapprochement will result in military cooperation
against Turkey, the Turks are extremely suspicious of
the recently improved relations between Athens and
Sofia. For their part, Moscow and Sofia are probably
happy to exploit Greece's fear of Turkey and its
concern about whether and how much the United
States and NATO would support Greece in a Greco-
Turkish conflict. The Soviet Union would presumably
try to take advantage of a Greco-Turkish war to
promote its own goals. In NATO's southeast flank,
these goals include the removal of US and NATO
facilities from Greece and Turkey and the eventual
decoupling of one or both states from the Alliance.
Impact on NATO Preparedness
on the Southeast Flank
We believe that the current military capabilities of
both Greece and Turkey have not been determined
solely by actions taken in response to the perceived
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threat from the other. Turkey clearly considers the
Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact as its primary
threat and recognizes its threats in the east and south
as well. Greece also has not dismissed the threat from
its northern neighbors, even though it does consider
Turkey to be its principal potential adversary.
Although both Greece and Turkey have sought to
respond directly to their perceived requirements to
meet the threat from outside the Aegean, the result-
ing military modernization and improved capabilities
efforts of each nation, as a result of the Aegean and
Cypriot questions, have also benefited them both
directly and indirectly. For example, as one country
succeeds in acquiring either funds or materiel (regard-
less of the underlying purpose), the other has routinely
been considered for an offsetting program?the 7:10
US aid ratio.
Whether these improved capabilities have benefited
NATO preparedness depends on how each country
has used or plans to use them. Neither has always
seen fit to employ or deploy the improved capability to
the sole advantage of NATO's interests. For example,
much of Greece's best equipped and trained ground
forces are better deployed to meet a Turkish threat
than they are to defeat a Warsaw Pact attack. And,
although perhaps less guilty than Greece, Turkey also
has maldeployed its forces including having some of
its best forces in Cyprus.
We believe that NATO capabilities have benefited
from the collective improved preparedness of Greek
and Turkish forces, but that much of this improve-
ment would be of little immediate value to NATO,
given the present disposition of these forces and lack
of cooperation.
The Warsaw Pact Threat
In Thrace, even without the active participation of
Romania or the 15 Soviet motorized rifle divisions
(MRDs) in the Kiev Military District, the Warsaw
Pact is capable of mounting a 21 to 23 division attack
against Greece and Turkey. The primary Pact objec-
tive would be the seizure of the Turkish Straits and
possibly Greek Thrace. The majority of Bulgaria's
forces-11 to 12 MRDs (or the equivalent), with an
estimated mobilized armor strength of 1,130 tanks?
would form a "Balkan front" directed primarily
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against Greece. The Pact forces deployed against
Turkish Thrace would essentially form an "Odessa
front" composed of the 10 Soviet MRDs of the
Odessa Military District and one guards airborne
division. We estimate that the "Odessa front" would
have an armor strength of 2,100 tanks.
The full cooperation of Greco-Turkish forces in Greek
and Turkish Thrace would be essential for NATO's
southeast flank to have a chance of containing or even
impeding such a Pact attack. Because of the Greek
and Turkish tank modernization programs, Greece
and Turkey can together field more than 2,000 mod-
ernized tanks in Thrace to meet a Pact attack.
Currently, the Hellenic Air Force and the Turkish Air
Force could commit 500 to 600 combat aircraft
against an estimated regional Pact air strength of 700
aircraft. With the completion of the Hellenic Air
Force and Turkish Air Force modernization programs
over the next three to five years, the qualitative edge
will be in Greece and Turkey's favor. Today, despite
their numerous deficiencies in modern artillery, air
defense, ammunition reserves, and nuclear-biological-
chemical (NBC) protection, Greece and Turkey are
better equipped to resist a conventional Pact attack?
if they fight together?than they have ever been in
the past. However, the ability of NATO's southeast
flank to resist a Pact attack effectively has been
seriously eroded by the distrust between Athens and
Ankara and the lack of joint military planning and
exercising since 1974. Greece's refusal to participate
in all Alliance exercises has not helped.
Today, it is not inconceivable that, in the event of a
Pact attack against Turkey but not against Greece,
Greece would opt out of the conflict, choosing not to
commit its forces against Bulgarian or Soviet forces.
Similarly, it is not inconceivable, though perhaps less
likely, that Ankara would opt out in the event that
Greece were attacked. Today, the only action that
would guarantee joint Greco-Turkish cooperation
against the Pat would be a Pact attack against
Greece and Turkey simultaneously. There is little
doubt that Moscow is aware of these possibilities. In
this sense, Greco-Turkish animosities have seriously
increased the southeast flank's vulnerability to a Pact
attack.
25
Figure 24. Venerable F-I04 (top) and F-5 (bottom) aircraft will
continue to be operated by both Greece and Turkey through the
early 1990s until gradually replaced by the influx of new fighters
like the F-I6.
Figure 25. Training and increased proficiency in amphibious oper-
ations have been increasingly emphasized by Greece and Turkey
since 1974.
Outlook
The military balance between Greece and Turkey in
the Aegean will gradually change through the early
1990s, as the rough parity that exists today gives way
to Turkish advantage. Because Turkey's moderniza-
tion programs and plans for the expansion of its
indigenous military-industrial complex are more ex-
tensive than those of Greece, we estimate that the
military balance will shift in Turkey's favor during
the mid-1990s. Despite the expansion of its own
military industries and the annual commitment of a
large portion of its budget to defense, Greece will find
it increasingly difficult to maintain military parity
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The Roles of International Organizations
In the Aegean
Major international organizations have generally
attempted to steer clear of the Greco-Turkish
disputes in the Aegean. The International Court at
The Hague in 1979 held that it lacked jurisdiction
to rule on the continental shelf dispute without the
consent of both parties. UN involvement has been
limited to Resolution 395, adopted in 1976, which
urged the two parties to refrain from provocative
actions and recommended the bilateral negotia-
tions that were later set up under the terms of the
1976 Berne Declaration
NATO has similarly tried to avoid becoming
enmeshed in the Aegean disputes, for fear of
further weakening the thin links that hold its
southeast flank together. Instead, the NATO
countries have adopted the position that Greece
and Turkey should work together to reconcile
their differences in the Aegean. The Alliance re-
fused to address Prime Minister Papandreou 's
1981 request for protection against attack 'from
all sides." NATO has put little pressure on Greece
to comply with the terms of the 1980 agreement
governing the reintegration of its armed forces into
NATO's military wing. Both Greece and Turkey
have fruitlessly sought NATO support for their
strong, though opposing, stances on the Greek
militarization of Limnos. NATO has neither
condemned Greece's militarization of the Aegean
islands, as Turkey has demanded, nor agreed to
include the Greek forces stationed on Limnos in
the Alliance's military structure, as Greece has
demanded over strong Turkish objections. Because
the Alliance does not count Greek forces on Lim-
nos as assigned to NATO, Greece since 1984 has
refused to participate in any NATO exercise.
During the flareup in March 1987, NATO Secre-
tary General Lord Carrington offered Greece and
Turkey his assistance to help resolve their differ-
ences if they were amenable. Neither party showed
much enthusiasm for the offer. It is likely that the
Alliance will continue the low-profile approach it
has taken in its relations with Greece and Turkey
and will be careful not to imply support for either
side.
On Cyprus
The United Nations has been the primary interna-
tional body dealing with the Cyprus problem since
1964. In addition to the continued maintenance of
a UN peacekeeping contingent on the island, Secre-
tary General de Cuellar has made numerous
unsuccessful attempts to get the Greek and
(continued)
with Turkey in the Aegean. Even a continuation of
the current 7:10 US aid ratio will not permit Greece
to keep up with Turkey.
Before the end of the century, Turkey will significant-
ly improve its current limited capability to invade and
retain one or more major Aegean islands, as well as
part of Greek Thrace, but it is unlikely that Turkey
could defeat Greece overwhelmingly in an Aegean
war.
On Cyprus, Turkey will continue to maintain an
insurmountable military advantage over Greek and
Greek Cypriot forces. Despite Nicosia's increasing
Secret
commitment to the training and modernization of its
forces, Nicosia will not be able to repel a determined
Turkish attack even in the unlikely event that the
current level of Greek forces and equipment on the
island were substantially increased
Regardless of the military balance, the Greeks have
always considered the Turks to be more powerful. For
a number of reasons, Greece may adopt a more
flexible tactical approach toward Turkey in the
future, but Greece's traditional intransigence regard-
ing its differences with Turkey is likely to remain
because Greeks across the political spectrum believe
their fundamental sovereign rights are at stake. Were
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The Roles of International Organizations (continued)
Turkish Cypriots to the negotiating table over the
past several years: His latest draft agreement
(March 1986) governing the initiation of intercom-
munal talks aimed at resolving the status of the
divided island was rejected by the Greek Cypriot
government of then President Spiros Kyprianou,
which held that its irovisions favored the Turkish
Cypriots.
The Turkish Cypriot government of President
Raid Denktash's self-proclaimed "Turkish Repub-
lic of Northern Cyprus" (TRNC) has indicated
that the March 1986 UN framework is the only
one by which it is prepared to negotiate and that,
unless the Gre'ek Cypriot government accepts the
framework, the "TRNC" will abandon any effort
to come to an agreement with the Greek Cypriots.
Instead the "TRNC" will attempt to gain recogni-
tion from the international community as an inde-
pendent state. At present only Turkey recognizes
the "TRNC," but, in spite of this, Turkey will
continue to control "TRNC" attempts to gain
recognition from other countries to protect its own
relations with the United States and the European
Community (EC). The Governments of Cyprus and
Greece have threatened to sever diplomatic rela-
tions with any state that recognizes the government
of the "TRNC."
During the past two years, Soviet diplomatic activ-
ity on Cyprus has been of considerable concern.
Moscow's goal is to neutralize the island and
remove the foreign military presence, including the
British Sovereign Bases, to deny NATO use of
facilities there in a general East-West conflict.
Moscow's proposal for an international conference
paralleled then President Kyprianou's policy ini-
tiative to "internationalize" the Cyprus problem,
though Nicosia showed virtually no interest in the
remainder of Moscow's proposals, including re-
moval of the 'foreign military presence," meaning
British bases. Ankara and the "TRNC" complete-
ly rejected the Soviet proposals. Though Moscow
for now appears to have abandoned this idea, the
election in Cyprus of a president not affiliated with
any political party, but supported by the Cypriot
Communist Party (AKEL), may provide new open-
ings for Soviet participation in the reunification
process. Neither the United States nor the rest of
the NATO allies wishes to see the Soviet Union
gain a voice in determining the future of this
strategically placed island.
Ankara to gain a clear-cut military edge over Athens
in the Aegean, we would expect Greece to be even
more apprehensive than it is today about possible
Turkish designs on Greek territory.
Prime Minister Ozal's increasing influence over all
aspects of Turkish Government affairs, his good work-
ing relationship with President Evren, and his recent
election victory place him in an ideal position to take
the lead in establishing better Greco-Turkish rela-
tions. Ozal fully understands the benefits to Ankara
of reducing tensions with Athens?prospects for regu-
larizing Turkey's association with the EC are consid-
erably improved, as is the outlook for Turkey's appli-
cation for full EC membership. Moreover, reduced
27
tension in the Aegean gives Ozal the opportunity to
focus fully on other pressing domestic and foreign
policy problems: the economy, expanding Kurdish
insurrection in southeastern Turkey, rising Islamic
fundamentalism, the Cyprus dilemma, strained rela-
tions with Bulgaria and S ria, the Iran-Iraq war, and
the Soviet threat.
Conflict Through Miscalculation
Despite the improving communications between
Athens and Ankara during the past year, there is still
a possibility that a-conflict in Cyprus or in the Aegean
will be touched off not by design but through miscal-
culation or overreaction to an unanticipated incident.
In the event of an accidental confrontation, the
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Figure 26. The heavily armed Greek La Combattant?class (top)
and Turkish Dogan-class (bottom) missile-equipped fast-attack
craft are ideally suited for operations in the island-studded
Aegean.
political leadership in both countries will be under
domestic pressure not to be the first to back down.
This will reduce their maneuvering room and increase
the potential for a conflict that neither side actually
desires.
Attitude Toward NATO and the United States
Although Greece and Turkey have improved the
capabilities of their forces, Greco-Turkish differences
in the Aegean and over Cyprus will continue to
degrade NATO's solidarity and preparedness to de-
fend against the Warsaw Pact threat on the southeast
flank. Although the so-called "spirit of Davos" pro-
vides a glimmer of hope for better Greco-Turkish
relations in the near future, no solution to fundamen-
tal differences appears to be in sight.
Since initiating the Davos process, Papandreou has
emphasized the need to exclude external influences
from Greco-Turkish relations. Nevertheless, both
sides will continue to press NATO and the United
States to support their respective positions with regard
Secret
to the Aegean and Cyprus. Absent a NATO tilt
toward Athens, Greece will continue to refuse to
participate in NATO exercises and to deny the use of
Greek facilities to NATO forces participating in
future Aegean exercises with Turkey.
Greece considers the maintenance of the 7:10 ratio of
US aid to be essential to its efforts to remain militari-
ly competitive with Turkey in the Aegean. Athens
would view a change in the ratio in favor of Turkey as
a significant shift in US policy that would threaten
Greek security and further erode the already weak-
ened foundations of Greek-US relations. That would
reduce the chances of reaching an agreement for the
continued use of US military facilities in Greece on
terms favorable to the United States. Athens could
also retaliate by reducing the number of US facilities
or by adding restrictions regarding their operational
use.
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On the other hand, Ankara views the 7:10 ratio as
unfair to Turkey and indicative of a US tilt toward 25X1
Athens. Ankara, while taking note of the increased
level of Greek preparedness in the Aegean that can be
directly attributed to US aid, is more concerned about
the setback of its own modernization programs caused
by what it views as the diversion of US aid to Greece
that might otherwise be going to Turkey. Ankara
believes that, unlike Greece, it has been a loyal and
steadfast supporter of NATO and therefore deserves
more consideration in security assistance than Greece.
Like the Greeks, the Turks are in a position to signal
their disapproval of US policies by tightening restric-
tions on US use of military facilities in Turkey. The
recent Turkish ratification of the Defense Economic
and Cooperation Agreement, however, suggests that
such reprisals are unlikely, at least in the short run.
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