TERRORISM REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00685R000200370002-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 64
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 22, 2011
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: July 1, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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Intelligence
Terrorism Review
J* 1986
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DI TR 86-008
July 1986
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Terrorism Revievv
1 Focus: Saudi Arabia: Prospects for Terrorism During the Hajj
5 Highlights
15 South Africa's ANC Targeting Civilians
23 Kuwait: Government Responds to Oil Facility Sabotage
25 Iran-Lebanon: Bargaining for Hostages
27 Cyprus's Terrorism Policy: Rolling With the Punches
Cuba's Role in Latin American Insurgency and Terrorism
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47 The Terrorism Diary for August
Chronology of Terrorism-1986
This review is published every month by the Directorate of
Intelligence. Appropriate articles produced by other elements of
the CIA as well as by other agencies of the US Intelligence
Community will be considered for publication.
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Terrorism Review I 25X1
July 1986
Focus Saudi Arabia: Prospects for Terrorism During the Hajj
Clashes between Saudi security forces and unruly pilgrims are likely during the
monthlong observance of the Hajj-the annual Muslim pilgrimage to Mecca that
begins in early August. Saudi security forces are particularly concerned about
possible disturbances and terrorist incidents encouraged by Iran and Libya, the
key troublemakers in recent years. Budget cutbacks have forced Riyadh to curtail
security coverage of the Hajj, and, although officials probably will be able to
contain most demonstrations, they may have greater difficulty preventing attacks
by determined terrorists.
This year, the Saudis expect nearly 1.5
million pilgrims to converge on the small city of Mecca during the Hajj season-a
number that would be comparable to 15 million persons attending a convention in
Washington, DC.
Making the Pilgrimage
The pilgrimage to Mecca is one of the five pillars, or rites, of Islam prescribed by
the Prophet Muhammad in the seventh century. It obliges every able-bodied
Muslim to travel to the holy city at least once in his or her lifetime. Most pilgrims
arrive by air, although a significant number from Iran, the Yemens, and other
neighboring countries travel overland, and some poorer pilgrims still come from
Africa and Asia by sea. According to the US Embassy, most Shia pilgrims travel
first to Medina to visit the tomb of the Prophet and the graves of other venerated
Muslims. Many Sunnis and virtually all Saudis consider this to be a form of saint
worship, which is heretical, and we believe that such conflicting religious practices
between the Sunni and Shia sects could lead to increased tension during the Hajj.
More Trouble From Iran
The 150,000 Iranian pilgrims-the largest national contingent-pose the most
serious security threat. They have frequently disrupted the Hajj with unruly
demonstrations, distribution of political propaganda banned in Saudi Arabia, and
clashes with Iraqi pilgrims. A group of Iranian-inspired Lebanese Shia pilgrims
carrying weapons and explosives was arrested in Taif during last year's Hajj. In
1984, Saudi security officials intercepted explosives flown into the kingdom from
Tehran, and a Saudi national was later shot in Spain, probably in retaliation for
the death of an Iranian during a scuffle with Iraqi pilgrims
Tehran is even more likely this year to encourage agitation by Iranian pilgrims
against the Saudi regime. Iran's hostility toward Saudi Arabia has increased
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July 1986
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Pilgrims at Grand Mosque in Mecca
The Rites of Haaj
The Hajj season begins this year in early August and ends
in mid-September. Pilgrims begin arriving several weeks
before the actual start of the Hajj. Before they leave home
or when they reach Saudi Arabia, they assume the Ihram,
or sanctified state, by donning two seamless garments that
usually are white. While in this state they must abstain
from sexual activity, bathing, the spilling of blood, and
other proscribed activities.
Activities directly related to the Hajj begin on 9 August
when individual pilgrims go to Mecca to perform the seven
circuits of the Ka'bah, the sacred stone located in the
Grand Mosque, and the seven processions between the
nearby mounds of al-Safa al-Marwa. Over the next four days
the pilgrims will gather on the plain of Arafat for
communal worship that involves emotional sermons
delivered in Arabic. Most pilgrims cannot hear or
understand the sermons; they often are driven to a
religious frenzy, capped at sunset by fireworks, military
music, and, in the past, a great deal of shooting into
the air.
The crowd then goes to Mina where each pilgrim must
throw seven small stones at the pile of rocks where Satan
is said to have appeared to Abraham and was driven away
by stoning. This ends the Hajj proper, but various
ceremonies follow, including the sacrifice of thousands of
animals on the holiday of Id al-Adha, celebrated this year
on 16-17 August.
After the sacrifice it is customary for the pilgrim to have
his head shaved, discard his garments, and return to a
secular condition. A few days later caravans of pilgrims
leave Mecca for Medina to visit the tomb of the Prophet
before being returned to Jiddah for departure.
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because Tehran believes Riyadh is attempting to undermine Iran's economy and
war effort with oil production policies that have drastically reduced Iran's oil
revenues. The failure of the June OPEC meeting to satisfy Iranian demands for a
sharp reduction in production has only heightened Tehran's perception that Saudi
policies threaten vital Iranian interests. Iranian propaganda since the OPEC
meeting has become more strident and explicit in threatening retaliation against
the Saudis.
Previous Libyan attempts to disrupt the pilgrimage have been stymied by Saudi se-
curity officials, and Riyadh will closely monitor the approximately 5,000 to 10,000
Libyans who will make the Hajj this year.
Saudi Security Preparations
Riyadh has already implemented many of the security precautions it follows every
year to prepare for the influx of pilgrims. Security is being tightened at all ports of
entry, and the National Guard will deploy four battalions with individual small
arms and wheeled support vehicles to Mecca beginning on 1 August. The Guard
will be augmented by units from the police and the Army with overall command
held by the Ministry of Interior.
Despite the increased risk of terrorism, however,
Riyadh may be scaling back its usually elaborate level of security operations
because of budget constraints. the Ministry of
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Interior is reducing substantially the number of security personnel who are
automatically transferred to Mecca and Medina during the Hajj and is cutting
back training for special security units to cut manpower costs.
Outlook
In our judgment, some demonstrations are likely during the Hajj this year. Riyadh
will deal harshly with disruptive pilgrims and has already warned Iran and Libya
that troublemakers will be arrested and deported. The Saudis probably would
receive widespread support from other Arab governments and from pilgrims who
strongly oppose efforts to politicize the event.
Recent tensions with Iran and past Libyan proclivity to use the Hajj to target op-
position figures also increase the likelihood of terrorism, which will be more
difficult to prevent. Saudi security forces can contain limited demonstrations, but
Riyadh probably could not forestall a determined, sophisticated terrorist attempt,
and the large crowds generated by the Hajj could lead to a substantial loss of life
in any attack. Of equal concern, the concentration of security forces around the
holy cities will leave other targets popular with terrorists-government buildings
in Riyadh or oil installations in the Eastern Province-more vulnerable.
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Highlights I 25X1
tinian with links to the anti-Arafat Abu Musa group.
Bomb Intended for El Al Flight Explodes Prematurely
On 26 June, a suitcase bomb exploded at the El Al check-in counter at Madrid air-
port during an inspection. Thirteen persons were injured, three seriously. The
bomb was a crude device consisting of potassium chloride, sugar, and phosphorus,
rigged to go off when the plane was in flight. Police traced the suitcase to a Pales-
other targets in Europe and possibly within the United States.
The Abu Musa group generally operates in the Middle East, but has conducted
some operations outside the area, including a 1984 car bombing outside the Israeli
Embassy in Nicosia. This recent attempt may foreshadow a more active terrorist
role for the group, reportedly including plans for attacks against US facilities or
paign.
Bank Robberies Presage New Wave of Violence
The leftist group Action Directe (AD) may be preparing for a new terrorist
campaign. Two recent bank robberies that netted the group over $15 million
suggest that the group may be building up its cash reserves for a major terrorist
operation. The likely target would depend on which AD element was responsible
for the robberies. The "nationalist" wing generally has attacked Jewish and
French targets, while the smaller "internationalist" wing has a more anti-US, anti-
NATO orientation. The 10 July bombing of police headquarters in Paris that left
one person dead and dozens injured may be more than a prelude to a new AD cam-
Insurgents Targeting Oil Facilities
On 8 May, leftist guerrillas of the Guatemalan Rebel Armed Forces entered an oil
exploration camp seeking food and other supplies. A US-owned supply helicopter
that arrived during the occupation was seized and destroyed. The guerrillas have
experienced setbacks recently and are likely to step up raids on foreign companies,
especially US-owned oil exploration firms, to secure badly needed supplies.
Libya Targeting US Facilities?
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criminal groups to carry out attacks against US facilities in retaliation for the US
airstrikes against Libya. Two Libyan nationals, carrying fake Saudi passports,
reportedly arrived recently in Cebu to conduct an unspecified terrorist operation
against personnel or property of the US Embassy in Manila or the Consulate in
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A group of Libyans is said to be financing Moro National Liberation Front
(MNLF) separatists to carry out an anti-US attack. The Libyans reportedly have
asked the MNLF to occasionally lob a mortar round into US facilities so that the
Philippines would be declared an unsafe area for US citizens, an action they hope
would lead to a US military pullout. This operation is also said to be planned for
Au ust or September.
United Kingdom- Counterterrorist Training for the Military
Jordan Britain's Ministry of Defense reportedly plans to conduct a series of small, low-
profile special forces exercises with the Jordanian armed forces beginning in
Jordan in July. The exercises are part of an effort to expand bilateral tactical coop-
eration.
Spain
exercises and unit exchanges.
The Defense Ministry also would
like to expand its interservice relationship with the Jordanian military by making
more soldiers available for foreign training in the United Kingdom. Growing
financial constraints, however, are likely to restrict the size and scope of overseas
visitors, brought the strike to an end.
CCC Members End Hunger Strike
On 20 June, four leading members of the Communist Combatant Cells (CCC)
ended a hunger strike they had begun on 29 April. The four, who have been
awaiting trial since their arrest last December, had demanded to be treated as
political prisoners and to be allowed to communicate with each other. Prison
officials did not meet the prisoners' major demands, but, by agreeing to provide ra-
dios in the cells and allowing the prisoners to receive censored mail and nonfamily
any significant attacks.
Officials had feared that the strike would inspire sympathetic acts of terrorism in
Belgium as occurred during the hunger strike by the West German Red Army
Faction in early 1985. No attacks took place as the strike lengthened, however,
and there is no evidence that any members of the group still at large are capable of
terrorist weapons that could lead to more lethal attacks.
Basques Obtain New Terrorist Devices
Spanish authorities are concerned about the recent acquisition by the Basque
separatist organization Fatherland and Liberty Military Wing (ETA-M) of new
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There is no indication that ETA will change its targets or increase the number of
its attacks because of the new weapons. Because the new devices may present
technical challenges in setting them up or firing them, they are unlikely to greatly
enhance the group's already formidable ability to attack Spanish Government and
military targets.
ETA-PM Announces Return to Armed Struggle
The Political-Military Wing of the Spanish Basque separatist group Fatherland
and Liberty (ETA-PM), after two years of inactivity, has announced its intention
to return to the "armed struggle." In a communique to Basque news services, the
group stated that military action is necessary in all Basque struggles, including
political struggles, and that it should not be subordinated to a negotiating strategy.
Basque politicians reportedly believe the communique is an ETA-PM attempt to
gain acceptance from the stronger, more militant Military Wing of the organiza-
tion, ETA-M.
Spanish authorities have not considered the group a serious threat for the last two
years; the exile of its leaders by the French Government in 1984 seriously crippled
its operational capabilities. It is doubtful that the few remaining members of ETA-
PM can carry out any of the recently stated objectives.
West Germany Red Army Faction Resurfaces in Car Attack
The Red Army Faction (RAF) claimed responsibility for the assassination on 9
July of Siemens executive Karl-Heinz Beckurts near his home in a Munich suburb.
Beckurts and his chauffeur were killed by a bomb detonated by remote control as
their automobile passed by. Beckurts is the fourth West German businessman
killed by the RAF since 1977 and the first assassination by the group since Ernst
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the attack.
Zimmermann was shot in February 1985 at his Munich home. The attack on
Beckurts displayed greater sophistication than in the similar, but unsuccessfdl,
effort against Gen. Alexander Haig in 1979. Reports by witnesses indicate the
attackers may have used several vehicles and CB radios to coordinate the timing of
plans to appeal.
Hijackers in Achille Lauro Case Convicted
On 10 July, a Genoa court convicted 11 Palestinians in connection with the
hijacking of the cruise ship Achille Lauro last October that led to the murder of
US citizen Leon Klinghoffer. The court handed down sentences ranging from life
imprisonment to six-year jail terms, although it failed to give Klinghoffer's
murderer a life sentence. The major results of the trial that began 18 June are as
follows:
? Muhammad Abbas (Abu Abbas), leader of the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF)
who planned the operation, was sentenced to life imprisonment in absentia along
with two of his top lieutenants.
? Yusef Magid al-Molki, one of the four hijackers and the self-confessed murderer
of Klinghoffer, received a 30-year sentence.
? Two other hijackers received terms of 24 and 15 years.
? The fourth hijacker was under age at the time of the hijacking and will be tried
later in a juvenile court.
The prosecution appealed the sentences on 11 July; the defense has said it also
attempted bombing of the Italian Consulate there the same day
if the hijackers were not released. The group claimed responsibility for the
bombing on 19 June of the Italian Chamber of Commerce in Athens and an
The trial had sparked a flurry of threats against Italian interests, but no serious
terrorist incidents. The Abu Abbas faction of the Palestine Liberation Front
recently repeated threats to target Italian interests both inside and outside of Italy
acquitted.
Red Brigades Members Sentenced; New Trial Begins
A Naples court on 3 June sentenced 15 Red Brigades members, including leader
Barbara Balzarani and Brigades ideologist and Naples column leader Giovanni
Senzani, to life in prison for murder, assault, and kidnaping. The trial, which
began in February, involved nine homicides, two shootings, a kidnaping, and an at-
tack on an Army barracks. In addition to the life sentences, 48 other persons were
sentenced to jail terms of from four months to 28 years, and 17 others were
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On 6 June, another 174 defendants accused of membership in the Red Brigades
went on trial for crimes committed between 1977 and 1982, including the
assassination of former Premier Aldo Moro. The most notable defendants include
founding father Renato Curcio, Senzani, and Balzarani. Thirty-two members of
the Red Brigades were convicted of complicity in the Moro kidnaping and murder
in a trial held in 1982.
retribution.
Libyan Diplomatic Staff Reduced
The Greek press reported on 7 July that the Libyan diplomatic mission in Athens
would be reduced by about one-third through the departure of 15 to 20 Libyan
diplomats. The reason for the reduction remains unclear. Tripoli may have recalled
its personnel as part of a recent general cutback in Libyan People's Bureau staffs
in several West European countries for "economic reasons." However, other
reporting suggests that Athens is taking the initiative for the cutback, probably to
avoid being "odd man out" to a European Community agreement on measures
against Libya. The Greek Government reportedly is reluctant to take credit for the
expulsion of the Libyan diplomats because of Prime Minister Papandreou's
relationship with Qadhafi, Greece's economic ties to Libya, and its fear of
PLO member at an Athens hotel.
Palestinian Official Assassinated in Athens
Two men assassinated Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP)
Central Committee member Khalid Nazal on 9 June as he walked along an
Athens street. Press reports indicate one gunman shot Nazal four times at close
range and then escaped with an accomplice on a motorcycle. Nazal had entered
Greece three days earlier on an Algerian tourist passport; he was to meet another
bility for the murder.
DFLP leader Nayif Hawatmah sent a message to Greek Prime Minister Papan-
dreou urging a full inquiry. The DFLP claimed Israeli intelligence agents were
responsible for Nazal's death and vowed revenge. No group has claimed responsi-
Turkey-Libya Libyans Sentenced for Bombing Attempt
An Ankara court on 6 June convicted two Libyans of illegal possession of
explosives in the 18 April attempt to bomb the US officers' club in Ankara. Each
defendant received a five-year sentence and a fine. The court acquitted the pair of
charges they conspired to kill more than one person, and ruled that Turkey could
not try three Libyan People's Bureau members implicated in the incident because
they had diplomatic immunity.
East Germany Libyan People's Bureau Involvement in Murder of Libyan Citizen
Muhammad Ashur, a Libyan citizen who was found dead in East Berlin in May,
reportedly was murdered by an official of the Libyan People's Bureau there. The
East German Government has told the official to leave the country within a
reasonable time. The East Germans reportedly are concerned about a possible
terrorist attack if they have to issue an expulsion order.
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demned US "state terrorism" and the economic boycott against Libya.
denounced military alliances affecting peace in the Mediterranean, and con-
Pro-Libyan Conference Denounced US "Terrorism"
On 5-6 July, some 60 to 70 people representing leftwing peace groups from Spain,
Italy, Greece, Cyprus, Britain, and the United States held a symposium on
"Problems of Peace in the Mediterranean" in Malta. The meeting was sponsored
by Libya and the "Maltese Peace Lab." A communique issued by the conference
gave little coverage to the event.
The conference received little support from the Maltese Government. President
Bonnici, scheduled to inaugurate the symposium, did not show up, and local press
small shops. Witnesses stated that many people were killed or wounded.
partially gutting a Gulf Arab Tourism and Travel Organization office and several
Bomb Blast Rocks Damascus
On 3 June, a large explosion occurred in a shopping area in downtown Damascus,
responsible for a number of car bomb explosions in East Beirut over the past year.
This incident follows the pattern of bombings in mid-1985, during which
commercial areas in Damascus were targeted for maximum visibility. While there
have been no claims of responsibility in these bombings, likely perpetrators include
the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, the Lebanese Forces, and pro-Arafat Palestin-
ians. The Lebanese Forces, a Christian militia group, has the greatest incentive to
conduct indiscriminate terrorism in Syria because Damascus is believed to be
imprisoned members were not released from Italian and French jails.
LARF Blows Up Italian Military Attache's Car
On 6 June, a bomb destroyed a diplomatic vehicle belonging to the Italian military
attache in Beirut. The "Group for the Defense of Arab and Middle Eastern
Prisoners in Europe" claimed credit for the act in an Arabic-language communi-
que sent to an international press service on 9 June. That name is believed to be a
cover for the Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Faction (LARF), a Marxist organi-
zation of Lebanese Christians that has killed US personnel in Europe. LARF
previously had threatened reprisals if its leader, George Abdallah, and other
employed at the oil facilities.
Iran Resuming Terrorism in the Gulf?
Iranian-backed terrorists probably were responsible for four sophisticated bombs
that exploded near Kuwait's crude oil tank farms 20 kilometers south of Kuwait
City and a fifth at an oil well north of the capital on 17 June. Iran may have decid-
ed to resume terrorism directed at Kuwait in retaliation for Kuwait's support
for Saudi oil policies and aid to Iraq. The bombs damaged the manifolds (devices
that direct oil from the oilfields through the tank farms to loading berths), leading
Kuwaiti officials to believe that insiders-probably employees of the Kuwait Oil
Company-were responsible. There are numerous Iranian sympathizers in Kuwait
among both native Shias and foreign workers, some of whom almost certainly are
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extradition of another member of Abu Nidal from an Arab state.
Terrorists Arrested for 1985 Attacks
In early July, Kuwait announced the arrest of suspects in the assassination
attempts on the Amir and a prominent journalist and in the bombings of two
popular seaside cafes last year. According to press reports, the detainees include
four members of the Iranian-backed Shia Dawa Party who are suspected in the at-
tack on the ruler and the cafe bombings, and a member of the Abu Nidal Group
who was allegedly involved in the attempt to kill Ahmad al-Jarallah, the editor of
the newspaper A1-Siyasah. The US Embassy says that Kuwait is also seeking
the US and French Embassies and Kuwaiti installations.
The announcement of the arrests, which reportedly took place four days after
terrorists bombed several oil installations in June, and the government's intention
to prosecute the suspects are probably intended to deflect public criticism of the
government's apparent inability to protect Kuwait's economic and strategic
installations. Abu Nidal and radical Shia groups supported by Tehran will
probably plan additional terrorist operations against Kuwait to free the most
recent detainees as well as the 17 Shia terrorists convicted of the 1983 bombing of
and probably were made locally.
Bombing Campaign in Qatar Unsolved
Qatari officials apparently have no suspects in a rash of bombing attempts that oc-
curred in June. Two of the eight crude bombs found actually exploded, but only
one left at a supermarket frequented by foreign workers and Western diplomats
resulted in damage. The other devices-two at US Embassy facilities, two at the
British Embassy, and others at the West German, French, and South Korean
Embassies-failed to detonate. The devices reportedly are similar in construction
Cooperation Council Summit.
The fact that the bombs appear to have been made locally explains Qatar's
reluctance to discuss details of its investigations and the withdrawal of an early re-
quest for US assistance. No group has claimed responsibility for the attacks, and
Qatari officials probably suspect disgruntled students or members of Qatar's large
foreign worker community. Young Qataris who are members of a small but highly
vocal anti-Western Sunni fundamentalist organization also may be culpable.
Qatar's small security forces are poorly trained to handle terrorist incidents and
bomb disposal, and some security personnel are foreigners who may be unreliable.
The last known foreign involvement in terrorism in Qatar occurred three years ago
when several policemen acted as agents for a terrorist plan against the Gulf
Threat From New Terrorist Group
A newly formed terrorist cell with ties to Nicaragua and Salvadoran guerrillas
may pose problems for Costa Rica's weak security forces. A militant leftist
associated with the radical New Republic Movement reportedly formed the cell,
which has some 20 members. It plans to conduct kidnapings and robberies to fund
its activities, and also intends to form a political wing to seek support from
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Opening of Possible Libyan Front Company
Tripoli reportedly is planning to open a special office in Panama under the guise of
a Libyan commercial venture to continue meetings with Caribbean radical leftists.
The new office will play a key role in coordinating the activities of the Libyan Peo-
ple's Bureaus in Suriname and Panama City but would be separate from them.
symbolic attacks.
Terrorist Group May Be Changing Tactics
Leftist terrorists of the Revolutionary Movement Tupac Amaru attacked a police
messhall in downtown Lima on the evening of 9 June and attempted to set fire to
the building. One police officer was killed in the attack and another injured. This
may signal a change in tactics by the group, which, in the past, has avoided killing,
has attacked targets in the early morning hours, and has engaged primarily in
dissatisfied with the group's leadership and lack of progress.
Surveillance of US Businesses
Dissident members of the leftist Revolutionary Workers' Party/Revolutionary
Army of the People (PRT/ERP) reportedly are surveilling US businesses operating
in Argentina for possible terrorist attacks. The PRT/ERP suffered serious losses
during the Argentine security forces' brutal countersubversive campaign of the
1970s and has not engaged in anti-US terrorism for several years. Any attacks
probably would be planned by dissident elements of the PRT/ERP who are
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an unidentified Indonesian
JRA Member Sought in Rocket Attack
Jakarta police reportedly confirmed that a member of the Japanese Red Army
(JRA) may have been involved in the 14 May car bomb and rocket attacks against
the US, Japanese, and Canadian Embassies. Fingerprints found in a hotel room
from which homemade projectiles were launched were identified as those of
Tsutomu Shirosaki, a convicted JRA terrorist. His fingerprints were also found on
a car rental application. Police are also seeking another unidentified Japanese and
Shortly after the attacks, unidentified males telephoned several news agencies in
Japan and Western Europe to claim that the "Anti-Imperialist International
Brigade" was responsible. The lack of a claim in the name of the JRA may
indicate that members of the organization may have lent their expertise to another
group for this attack. This is the first indication of JRA involvement in a terrorist
attack since a 1977 hijacking that sprang Shirosaki from prison in Japan. F 25X1
have been involved in kidnaping ten Filipino nuns the same weekend.
American Missionary Kidnaped
An American missionary, Brian Lawrence, was kidnaped on 12 July from his
residence in Mindanao Province. His abductors are believed to be members of a
Marcos loyalist group led by former Lanao del Sur Governor Ali Dimaporo. That
group was responsible for the abduction in June of a French priest. In that
incident, the kidnapers reportedly thought the priest was an American cleric.
Dimaporo's group is attempting to embarrass the Aquino government and may
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Secret
South Africa's ANC
Targeting Civilians
Recent bombings suggest that the African National
Congress (ANC) is continuing its shift toward attacks
on civilians despite the potential hazards of South
African retaliation and Western condemnation. Such
attacks will harden Pretoria's resolve not to negotiate
with the group.
The ANC has not claimed credit for many recent
attacks and has denied responsibility for the bombing
in Johannesburg on 1 July. Nevertheless, the use of
Soviet limpet mines and landmines in most of the
attacks, the sophistication of operations such as the
car bombing in Durban on 14 June, and the absence
of other effective guerrilla groups in South Africa
strongly suggest that virtually all of these acts were
at security vehicles, the evidence leaves little doubt
that the ANC is targeting civilians in an attempt to
terrorize residents in rural areas.
Outlook
The trend toward increasingly bloody ANC attacks
and South African cross-border strikes will continue.
Against a backdrop of the worst domestic unrest in
South Africa's modern history and challenges pre- 25X1
sented by the state of emergency, the ANC leadership
apparently has decided that the attacks on govern-
ment targets alone are not sufficient. Alternatively,
but less likely in our view, the leadership's decision
last year to grant greater operational autonomy to
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the work of the ANC.
Changing Pattern
Until last year, the ANC generally tried to avoid
causing civilian casualties during the attacks on gov-
ernment targets; exceptions usually were unintention-
al or were justified as retaliation for South African
raids against ANC targets in neighboring states.
ANC spokesmen claimed, for example, that the car
bombing of the South African Air Force headquarters
in May 1983, in which 19 persons died and 219 were
injured, was in response to a South African attack on
ANC guerrillas in Lesotho six months earlier.
Following a major ANC conference in Zambia in
June 1985, ANC President Oliver Tambo said the
group would continue to strike at government targets
but would be less concerned about civilian casualties.
This decision reflected the growing influence of rest-
less, militant, rank-and-file youths opposed to what
they saw as inaction by the ANC's relatively moder-
ate "old guard" leadership.
Most ANC bombings since late last year have been
directed against civilian rather than government tar-
gets. Although some ANC spokesmen have told jour-
nalists the spate of landmine attacks has been aimed
Now that the group has proved
its willingness and capability to strike at civilian
targets in urban areas, it might decide to use false
bomb threats to disrupt major business centers and
sow even more uncertainty among whites.
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The ANC's new tactics risk unprecedented reprisals
by Pretoria. Even in exile, the group remains highly
vulnerable. South Africa's leading expert on the
ANC-a former police intelligence officer-boasted 25X1
recently in the press that an all-out six-week effort by
Pretoria would wipe out the ANC. Some of South
African President Botha's most influential security
Secret
DI TR 86-008
July 1986
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Secret
South Africa: Sample of Recent Terrorist Attacks Against Civilian Targets a
15 May Landmine exploded near eastern Transvaal farm; two guerrillas planting device killed as
well as black worker.
23 May Massive bomb discovered and defused in downtown Durban before evening rush hour.
Predawn bomb blast in Durban supermarket; no injuries.
25 May Two blacks killed and eight injured in eastern Transvaal when van hit landmine.
26 May Tractor detonated landmine in eastern Transvaal; driver injured.
10 June Two black farmworkers and white youth injured in three landmine blasts in eastern
Transvaal.
14 June Car bombing in Durban at crowded beachfront walkway killed three (two whites, one Indian)
and injured 70.
21 June Bomb exploded outside Durban cinema; no injuries.
23 June One black injured during attack on supermarket in black homeland by blacks armed with
AK 47s and RPG-7 rockets.
24 June Bomb in Johannesburg restaurant injured 18 of various races; second bomb at nearby hotel
injured one black.
26 June Truck detonated landmine on road north of Pretoria; black driver uninjured.
28 June Bomb exploded in eastern Cape Province shopping mall, injuring two (at least one white).
1 July Bomb at Johannesburg bus stop injured seven, including five whites.
4 July Bomb at Pretoria shopping center injured 19 persons, including nine whites.
a List excludes attacks against government targets during this period.
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advisers probably agree with this assessment and are
Indiscriminate ANC attacks are almost certainly
steeling Botha's resolve not to negotiate with the
group. Pretoria is likely to intensify its recent efforts
to "educate" the West on the ANC's Communist ties
and to portray it as a hardcore terrorist group in the
hope that Scandinavian countries-particularly Swe-
den-will halt their substantial financial support to
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the group.
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Secret
Abu Nidal and
Its Two Patrons:
The Technical Evidence
The Abu Nidal terrorist group-long believed to be
the most independent of the radical Palestinian
groups-may, in fact, be more willing to undertake
attacks on behalf of its state sponsors, Libya and
Syria, than previously believed.
Libya and Syria, on
the other hand, gain the services of a capable, ruthless
terrorist group with a strong record of success, and, at
the same time, maintain their ability to deny direct
involvement in specific terrorist attacks.
This view of the group's operations also helps explain
anomalies in recent Abu Nidal activities. For exam-
ple, the group has been unusually quiet thus far in
1986-only one claimed attack so far this year com-
pared to nine during the same period in 1985. Syrian
President Assad may have ordered the group to stand
down after the attempted bombing of the El Al plane
in London because he was badly embarrassed by
allegations of Syrian involvement and did not want a
high profile on terrorism. This speculative analysis
also provides a motivation for the hijacking of an
Egyptair flight last November. Whereas Abu Nidal
had not attacked Egyptian interests in more than six
years, Cairo represents a high-priority target for
Libya, and the hijacking may have been a Libyan-
instigated operation.
Libyan-Supplied Weapons
We have known since mid-1985 that Libya and Abu
Nidal had forged closer ties,
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Libya has much to gain from
strengthening its association with the Abu Nidal
Group, especially now that many of its terrorist
operatives have been expelled from Western Europe
after the US bombing raid. Abu Nidal, for its part,
may be willing to accept an assignment in exchange
for Libyan financial and military aid.
Secret
DI TR 86-008
July 1986
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Secret
Abu Nidal and Syria: The Ties That Bind?
Despite its deepening relationship with Libya, Syria
remains Abu Nidal's principal patron. We have long
had evidence that Syria provides extensive assistance
to the group, including training, documentation, and
safehaven,
ation have succeeded
campaign that Abu Nidal launched in late 1984-
mostly in Western Europe-coincided with other Syr-
ian efforts to deter Jordan from reaching rapproche-
ment with PLO leader Arafat. It probably is not
coincidental that Abu Nidal's anti-Jordanian attacks
have ceased since key Syrian policy goals of under-
mining Arafat and preventing Jordanian-PLO cooper-
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Secret
Prospects
Extensive aid from two key patron states has en-
hanced Abu Nidal's ability to carry out attacks
throughout Western Europe with sophisticated weap-
ons-a range of activity unmatched by any other
Middle Eastern group-but it may have proscribed
somewhat the group's freedom of action. And, for
analysts of the terrorist scene, it has become much
more difficult to determine whether it was Syria or
Libya-or neither-behind an Abu Nidal operation.
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President Assad is concerned that Syria could become
the target of a US or Israeli military strike, and he
does not want one to occur because of Qadhafi's
terrorist antics. While it is conceivable that Tripoli
and Damascus used Abu Nidal to launch coordinated
operations, it is more likely that Abu Nidal is in the
position of having to reconcile the wishes of two
separate-and sometimes competitive-patrons.
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Secret
Kuwait:
Government Responds to
Oil Facility Sabotage
The bombings of Kuwaiti oil installations have re-
duced popular confidence in the government's ability
to provide adequate security. The incidents were
probably the work of Iranian-backed terrorists in
support of Tehran's demands that its Arab neighbors
cut oil production and end aid to Iraq. Kuwait has no
suspects under arrest, and the likelihood that terror-
ists will try another operation-possibly against a
vulnerable water desalination plant-is high.
The Kuwaiti public has been critical of the regime's
inability to protect Kuwait's most important revenue
source-its oil industry. The US Embassy reports that
the reaction has been more intense than after the
bombing of the US and French Embassies and other
facilities in December 1983 or after the killing of a
dozen Kuwaitis when two popular seaside cafes were
bombed a year ago. Critics demanded the resignation
of the Oil Minister, a continuing target of parliamen-
tary attack, and the Interior Minister-both members
of the ruling family. National Assembly members
charged the government was withholding details of
criminal activity and external political pressure to
protect its security investigations. Angry over the
mounting criticism of the regime, the Cabinet re-
signed in late June and the Amir dissolved the
National Assembly. He also suspended parts of the
Constitution and placed restrictions on the press to
allow the ruling Sabah family to deal firmly with
contentious economic and security issues without be-
ing subjected to public or parliamentary criticism.
Damage From the Explosions
The explosions caused extensive damage to key com-
ponents of Kuwait's oil installations. The US Embas-
sy reports that exports and refinery operations have
returned to near normal, but that production capacity
has been reduced from 2 million barrels per day (b/d)
to 1.15 million b/d. Kuwaiti officials believe that the
five nearly simultaneous explosions at the Al-Ahmadi
complex were carefully planned and coordinated by
people with prior access to the sites, and the officials
Kuwaiti security officials reportedly have made no
arrests so far, even though the press claims that as
many as 20 suspects are being detained. A previously
unknown group calling itself the "Unified Arab Revo-
lution" claimed responsibility for the attacks on 19
June.
Iranian Strategy for Terror
Kuwait's suspicion of Iran probably is justified.
Iran has assets in Kuwait,
particularly among the native Shia and foreign work-
er communities. Some are probably members of the
outlawed Dawa Party and work in the government,
including the Oil and Defense Ministries, or in the oil
industry, and would be able to pass sensitive informa-
tion that Iran could use in industrial sabotage. If
Tehran was involved, the bombings probably are part
of a broader strategy to coerce Persian Gulf oil
producers into cutting their production; the attacks
may have been deliberately timed to take place
shortly before the OPEC meeting that opened on 19
July.
Tehran began its pressure campaign in April with
strikes on Saudi shipping, and in June attacked two
tankers in the territorial waters of the United Arab
Emirates. Iran is likely to intensify military and
terrorist attacks in the Gulf if Saudi Arabia and
Kuwait refuse its demands.
Kuwait's Response
Kuwait will not want to appear cowed by Iranian
pressure, although it is likely to cooperate with any
OPEC decision on production quotas. The govern-
ment will hope to answer domestic criticism by
strengthening security at the oil complex and port
facilities, and by making a show of rounding up the
usual suspects, especially from the Iranian and Ku-
waiti Shia communities.
are convinced the attack had Iranian backing.
Secret
DI TR 86-008
July 1986
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The government probably can do little, however, to
improve security at other prime targets for terrorists.
Kuwait's desalination plants supply more than 90
percent of the country's potable water. Terrorists
familiar with the layout of a plant could easily
penetrate the facility and severely disrupt water sup-
plies to a major city for an extended time. The
Kuwaiti military, which is responsible for security at
the oil facilities, is spread thin by Iranian occupation
of nearby Al Faw, and the civilian security services
are understaffed and lack training in counterterror-
ism.
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Iran-Lebanon:
Bargaining for Hostages
The willingness of France and Cyprus to negotiate the
release of several of their hostages in June is likely to
encourage Lebanese-based terrorists to use kidnaping
to gain political concessions. Most of the 16 Western
hostages remaining in Lebanon are thought to be held
by pro-Iranian factions that now may be willing to
bargain for their release. The fate of the five Ameri-
cans, however, is probably still dependent on the
release of the 17 Dawa prisoners being held in
Kuwait, and we believe it unlikely that Kuwait will
agree to a deal.
The Trend Toward Negotiation
France began negotiating with Iran for the release of
its hostages in Lebanon last year, and the deportation
of Iranian dissident leader Masud Rajavi from France
on 7 June was an important step in those negotiations.
Iranian officials have claimed publicly that they have
no influence with factions holding the Frenchmen, but
the release of two of the hostages soon after Rajavi's
departure was probably arranged at Iran's behest to
demonstrate good will and gain further concessions.
Several issues must still be addressed if Paris and
Tehran are to continue to improve relations: anti-
Khomeini activity by Iranian exiles living in France,
repayment of a $1 billion Iranian loan, French sup-
port for Iraq, and the question of the gunmen convict-
ed of the attempted assassination of former Iranian
Prime Minister Bakhtiar. Paris may already have
agreed to repay the loan and further restrict the
activities of Iranian dissidents, but the release of the
Bakhtiar assailants would be difficult to reconcile
with recent tough antiterrorist posturing by President
Mitterrand and Prime Minister Chirac.
France's negotiations for the release of its citizens
have been helped by the general improvement in
Iranian-French relations, but Paris is unlikely to
cooperate further unless more hostages are released.
A French official told the US Embassy in late June
that the government continues to press for the release
of the remaining hostages held in Lebanon, but
believes that Iran must make the next move.
The two Cypriot hostages released on 21 June proba-
bly were freed after the Cypriot Government prom-
ised to release a Hizballah prisoner held in Nicosia.
The Palestine Liberation Organization apparently
played an intermediary role in the negotiations, prob-
ably in the hope that any agreement between Hizbal-
lah and Cyprus could be extended to include the
release of the three Fatah prisoners held in Nicosia
for the murder of three Israelis in Larnaca last
September.
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Unreliable media reports-mostly 25X1
from sources seeking to discredit the Muslim factions
in Lebanon-regularly claim that the Americans will
be killed, but only Peter Kilburn's murder on 17 April
has been confirmed. Press reports in early April
claimed French, American, Lebanese, and Palestinian
prisoners were being held in the Shaykh Abdallah
Barracks in Syrian-controlled eastern Lebanon and
that some of the hostages were ill and being treated
by Iranian doctors.
A caller claiming to represent Islamic Jihad-an
umbrella term used by the Iranian-backed group that
claims to hold the American hostages-repeated the
demand for the release of 17 Shia prisoners convicted
in Kuwait for the 1983 bombings of the US and
French Embassies and Kuwaiti installations. The
Kuwaitis will probably continue to reject this demand.
Implications
French and Cypriot success in negotiating the release
of some of their hostages may encourage other gov-
ernments to explore similar methods to free their own
hostages. Although such negotiations may win release
of some hostages, countries that indicate they are
willing to negotiate could well increase the chances
that more of their nationals will be kidnaped in the
future.
Secret
DI TR 86-008
July 1986
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Status of Westerners Kidnaped in Lebanon
(as of 23 June 1986)
Name/Occupation
Date/Place
Claimant Group
Status
William Buckley, US diplomat
16 March 1984, West Beirut
Claimed by Islamic Jihad
Reportedly murdered by captors,
4 October 1985
Peter Kilburn, US librarian
30 November 1984, West
Beirut
Claimed by Islamic Jihad
Murdered with British hostages,
17 April 1986
Fr. Lawrence Jenco, US priest
8 January 1985, West Beirut
Claimed by Islamic Jihad
Released by captors, 26 July 1986
Terry Anderson, US journalist
16 March 1985, West Beirut
Claimed by Islamic Jihad
Probably held by Hizballah
David Jacobsen, US-AUB
Director
28 May 1985, West Beirut
Claimed by Islamic Jihad
Probably held by Hizballah
Thomas Sutherland, US-
AUB Dean
10 June 1985, West Beirut
Claimed by Islamic Jihad
Probably held by Hizballah
Alec Collett, British journalist
26 March 1985, Khaldah
Claimed by ROSM
(Abu Nidal)
Videotape of probable murder,
23 April 1986
Philip Padfield, British-
Director ILC
29 March 1986, West Beirut
Libya believed responsible
Murdered by captors, 17 April
1986
Leigh Douglas, British-AUB
professor
29 March 1986, West Beirut
Libya believed responsible
Murdered by captors, 17 April
1986
John McCarthy, British TV
journalist
17 April 1986, West Beirut
No claim
Marcel Carton, French
diplomat
22 March 1985, West Beirut
Islamic Jihad, Khaybar
Brigades
Probably held by Hizballah
Marcel Fontaine, French
diplomat
22 March 1985, West Beirut
Islamic Jihad, Khaybar
Brigades
Probably held by Hizballah
Jean Paul Kaufmann, French
journalist
22 May 1985, West Beirut
Claimed by Islamic Jihad
Probably held by Hizballah
Michel Seurat, French
researcher
22 May 1985, West Beirut
Claimed by Islamic Jihad
Reportedly murdered by captors,
6 March 1986
Philippe Rochot, French TV
journalist
8 March 1986, West Beirut
Organization of Revolution-
ary Justice
Released by captors, 20 June 1986
Georges Hansen, French TV
journalist
8 March 1986, West Beirut
Organization of Revolution-
ary Justice
Released by captors, 20 June 1986
Aurel Cornea, French TV
journalist
8 March 1986, West Beirut
Organization of Revolution-
ary Justice
Probably held by a faction of
Hizballah
Jean-Louis Normandin, French
TV journalist
8 March 1986, West Beirut
Organization of Revolution-
ary Justice
Probably held by a faction of
Hizballah
Camille Sontag, French
Peugeot representative
7 May 1986, West Beirut
Syria believed responsible
Unknown
Alberto Molinari, Italian
businessman
11 September 1985, West
Beirut
No claim
Chae Sung Do, Korean
diplomat
31 January 1986, West Beirut
Fighting Revolutionary
Cells
Unknown
Brian Keenan, Irish-AUB
teacher
1 I April 1986, Beirut
No claim
Unknown
Kirkas Panayiotis, Cypriot-
AUB student
28 April 1986, West Beirut
No claim
Stavros Yiannaki, Cypriot-
AUB student
28 April 1986, West Beirut
No claim
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Cyprus's Terrorism Policy:
Rolling With the Punches
Cyprus's strategic location makes it a convenient
waystation for many terrorist groups who have used
the island as a transit point to Western Europe and,
increasingly, a battleground for their disputes. In
response, Greek Cypriot authorities gradually have
taken a tougher stance on terrorism, barring entry of
known or suspected terrorists, and monitoring more
closely the activity of individuals associated with
terrorist groups. Nicosia's willingness to act decisively
against known and suspected terrorists, however, is
tempered by incidents such as the April kidnaping of
two Cypriot students in Beirut, longstanding econom-
ic and commercial ties to its Mediterranean neigh-
bors, and fear of losing international support for its
position on the reunification of Cyprus.
Dimension of the Problem
Cypriots are no strangers to terrorism. From the
1950s to the 1970s, the island was wracked by
domestic violence, but such indigenous terrorist acts
declined sharply with the dissolution of the National
Organization of the Cypriot Struggle (EOKA-B) in
1978 (see inset). In the 1980s, however, international
terrorist incidents in Cyprus have increased steadily
from two per year in 1981 to 13 in 1985-a total of 26
incidents for the four-year period. Most of the terror-
ist activity on the island has been Middle Eastern
related and appears to be mainly the result of interne-
cine struggles between rival Middle Eastern groups,
followed by attacks against British or US interests.
All of the reported incidents have occurred in the
Greek Cypriot-controlled side of the island where the
principal cities, ports, and international transportation
links are located.
The National Organization of the
Cypriot Struggle (EOKA)
EOKA was a Greek Cypriot guerrilla/terrorist group
led by the late George Grivas that fought the British
colonial authorities and demanded union with
Greece. The group's targets included British military
and civilian personnel, as well as members of the
Turkish Cypriot community. The majority of its
victims, however, were Greek Cypriots suspected of
collaboration with the British colonial administra-
tion. Former members of EOKA are regarded by
many Greek Cypriots as freedom fighters who were
responsible for securing Cypriot independence in
1960, and many of them currently hold respectable
positions in the island's business, professional, and
political communities. After the emergence of a new
EOKA organization. the older EOKA became known
as EOKA-A
A new EOKA, known as EOKA-B, was formed in late
1971; it also advocated the political union of Greece
and Cyprus. The group engaged in kidnapings and
assassinations, and in July 1974 joined elements of
the Greek military in a coup against the government
of Archbishop Makarios. Several of its members were
implicated in, but never tried for, the murder of US
Ambassador Roger Davies, which occurred in August
1974 shortly after the Turkish invasion of Cyprus
and during violent demonstrations against the United
States. The group apparently disbanded of its own
accord in 1978. ~
Cypriot Counterterrorism Policy: A Mixed Record
Cypriot authorities have officially condemned terror-
ism
Secret
DI TR 86-008
July 1986
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Secret
Terrorist Incidents in Cyprus, 1985-86
1985
31 January Nicosia: Arab youth with Syrian connections shoots and wounds Palestinian businessman.
The youth reportedly had fallen out with Yasir Arafat.
7 February Beirut: Six gunmen hijack Cypriot plane and demand the release of two Lebanese jailed in
Cyprus for hijacking a Romanian plane leased by Libya in 1983. The hijackers, who claimed
membership in the "Black Brigades of Imam Musa Sadr, " surrendered after Cypriot
authorities agreed to consider their demand.
12 February Limassol: Police defuse bomb at offices of Cypriot company representing Israeli interests. No
group claimed responsibility.
14 March Nicosia: Explosion damages Esso Oil Company's main offices. No one claimed responsibil-
ity, but police linked the bombing to the US veto of a UN Security Council resolution
condemning Israeli actions in Lebanon.
21 March Nicosia/Athens/Rome: Grenade attacks at Jordanian Airlines offices injure five. The Black
September Organization, a name used by the radical Palestinian Abu Nidal group, claimed
responsibility.
2 April Nicosia: Arab Unionist Nationalist Organization claims shooting death of Libyan business-
man. The group accused its victim of submitting information about Arab revolutionary
movements to "hostile services. "
Beirut: Lone Palestinian hijacks Middle East Airlines flight en route to Cyprus. The hijacker
surrendered to the pilot after being promised transport to Jordan.
Past Cypriot actions
against terrorists include the following:
? In April 1986, Cypriot authorities deported two
Libyans suspected of planning a terrorist action
against US and/or UK interests in retaliation for
the US airstrike against Libya.
? Airport security officials detained two persons, pos-
sibly Palestinian Arabs, on 19 June for attempting
to smuggle guns and ammunition aboard a Cyprus
Air flight to Kuwait. The two were permitted to
leave for Kuwait the following day, but the ammu-
nition was confiscated.
At the same time, Nicosia has generally downplayed
terrorism as an issue in its diplomatic relations with
its neighbors and has been willing to negotiate with
terrorists as the need arises:
? In 1984, Cyprus deported two suspects in the killing
of a Palestinian. According to rumors at the time,
the pair was released at the urging of the Syrian
Government and because a Cypriot purchase of
Syrian rockets was reportedly imminent.
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17 July Nicosia: Bomb damages home of PLO charge d'affairs. The attack may have resulted from a
dispute between Yasir Arafat and Palestinian dissident Abu Musa.
25 September Larnaca: Two Palestinians and British citizen kill Israeli woman and seize two other Israelis
on a yacht. Before surrendering, the terrorists killed the remaining two hostages. The three,
probably affiliated with Yasir Ara fat's PLO, were sentenced to life imprisonment by a
Cypriot court.
Yasir Arafat.
Nicosia: Dual bomb attack damages Iraqi state airline office, kills manager. The pro-Syrian
Eagles ctf the Revolution organization claimed the bombings in reprisal for Iraqi support of
machines hidden in refilled wine bottles.
Larnaca: Airport police arrest Palestinian carrying weapons, grenades, and silencer, possibly
for use in hijacking Swissair flight to Amman, Jordan. The weapons came through X-ray
26 December Nicosia: Bodyguards foil attempt by three men to place explosive device under car of PLO
representative to Cyprus. An anonymous caller later claimed the Eagles of the Revolution or-
ganization had condemned the representative to death for representing the reactionary
Palestinian right in Cyprus.
1986 To date, no terrorist incidents have occurred this year in Cyprus.
? In the spring of 1985, Cyprus freed two imprisoned
Lebanese Shia terrorists, ostensibly on the grounds
of illness. Their release had been demanded by the
hijackers of a Cyprus Air flight from Beirut to
Nicosia in February 1985. We suspect that Nicosia
agreed to the hijackers' demands to end the
incident.
? Two Cypriot students kidnaped in Beirut in April
were freed on 21 June after President Kyprianou's
personal plea to their captors through PLO leader
Yasir Arafat, who mediated the negotiations. The
kidnapers' demands reportedly included the release
of terrorist Sami Nasr, imprisoned in Cyprus for
attempting to hijack a Swissair plane in December
1985. We think it likely the government reached a
deal with the kidnapers; Nasr may be released
shortly.
Constraints
Cypriot officials and press opinion generally seem to 25X1
agree that Cyprus has enough problems without be-
coming a battleground for Arab groups, and that it
needs to act decisively to keep terrorists out of Cyprus
and deport those already there. By the same token,
Nicosia believes that an outspoken and activist policy
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Secret
on terrorism could affect important political and
economic interests. Thus, while Cypriot leaders pri-
vately approved the March US confrontation with
Libya in the Gulf of Sidra and the April US raid on
that country, they avoided siding openly with the
United States.
The de facto division of Cyprus into a Turkish Cypriot
self-declared "state" in the north and a Greek Cy-
priot-controlled area in the south decreases Nicosia's
states' support for their position.
options in combating terrorism. The Greek Cypriot-
controlled area enjoys international legitimacy, and
its leaders do not want to alienate Middle Eastern
neighbors, who tend to support Greek Cypriot posi-
tions on the settlement of the Cyprus question. The
Greek Cypriots have therefore permitted a PLO office
to function in Nicosia, in part to encourage Arab
support of terrorism.
Cyprus's commercial ties to its Arab neighbors are an
important consideration. Almost half of Cyprus's
exports in 1984 went to Middle Eastern countries.
Trade ties probably have restrained Cyprus from
taking an aggressive public stand against Libya for its
ment attempts to monitor them.
Finally, a large Arab population-approximately
20,000 persons-further complicates attempts to con-
trol terrorism. In recent years, Lebanese refugees and
other Arab immigrants have boosted the Cypriot
economy with their wealth and businesses, and gained
social and political influence. Arab residents and
businesses have reportedly provided logistic support
for Middle Eastern terrorist groups. The large Arab
population in Cyprus also enables would-be terrorists
to blend into their surroundings and hampers govern-
Signs of Change
Despite Cyprus's perceived need to protect its com-
mercial and political equities, the government lately
has become increasingly concerned with terrorism and
has adopted some measures to control terrorism in the
country. These measures include:
? Increasing airport security. In June 1985, a 15-man
contingency force was stationed at Larnaca airport,
more police immigration officers were assigned to
better monitor foreigners' movements into and out
of Cyprus, and plainclothes police were tasked with
randomly checking people and baggage in the air-
port's lobby.
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I
Police stand next to the shrouded body of Walid
Adami, an Iraqi Airlines representative killed by
a bomb attached to his car on 8 November 1985.
dealing with terrorism on an ad hoc basis rather than
formulating a consistent strategy for handling the
problem.
There are, however, several indicators that bear
watching to detect changes in Nicosia's policy toward
terrorism:
? Reaction to future incidents involving Cyprus.
? Public statements on terrorism by government
leaders.
? Budgetary allocations for counterterrorist programs
as well as augmentation and training of counterter-
rorist forces.
? Developments in commercial and political relations 25X1
with states sponsoring terrorism.
? The government's stance on terrorist issues in inter-
national forums.
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? Use of stop lists. We believe Cypriot police have
been circulating lists among immigration and cus-
toms officials to screen out suspected terrorists
before they enter the country.
? Monitoring foreigners. According to the Cypriot
press, security forces now are questioning foreign-
ers, mostly Arabs, on their reasons for being in
Cyprus and are ordering some to leave the country
within three days.
Muddling Through
The Government of Cyprus treads a fine line between
political and economic necessities and a desire to
adopt a more activist and less defensive policy toward
international terrorism. Although Cyprus has initiat-
ed some steps to prevent terrorist activity on the
island, in our view these actions are probably not
enough to curb the problem. We doubt that, in the
near term, Nicosia will radically change its policy of
negotiating with terrorists as the need arises and of
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Cuba's Role in
Latin American Insurgency
and Terrorism
Cuban Goals and Policy
Cuban President Fidel Castro has selectively support-
ed a variety of radical leftists, insurgents, and terror-
ist groups in Latin America as part of his overall
revolutionary program. Castro's ultimate goal is the
replication of the Cuban revolutionary experience
throughout Latin America. To achieve this, Cuba has
developed a revolutionary strategy that seeks to:
? Create, from traditionally splintered radical groups,
unified fronts committed to armed struggle.
? Obtain ideologically committed cadres in urban and
rural guerrilla warfare.
? Encourage the use of terrorism as a revolutionary
tactic when local conditions warrant.
Castro views terrorism as a legitimate weapon in his
efforts to promote the revolutionary conditions needed
to destabilize a regime. During the 1950s, Castro's 26
July Movement bombed civilian targets and employed
assassinations to provoke the Batista government to
become repressive, to polarize Cuban society, and to
attract recruits to armed struggle. Thus, Castro en-
courages rebel groups to use terrorism when he
perceives that revolutionary conditions are ripe.
Policy Implementation and Support Apparatus
The America Department of the Cuban Communist
Party, headed by Manuel Pineiro Losada, is responsi-
ble for coordinating Cuban-sponsored subversive ac-
tivity and spreading Cuban influence in Latin Ameri-
ca. The America Department also serves as a link
between terrorists and insurgent groups and the Gen-
eral Directorate of Intelligence (DGI).
parties or insurgent organizations work with Cuban
Interior Ministry officials to select students and ob-
tain slots for these courses. The training programs
include courses on Marxist-Leninist ideology, commu-
nications and communications security, tradecraft,
self-defense, and weapons training. Course instruction
is provided by Cuban Army personnel and Ministry of
Interior specialists, often assisted by Soviet advisers
High-Level Cuban Support
Chile. Cuba's special interest in Chile dates back to
the Allende years and has persisted during the Pino-
chet era. Following the overthrow of the Allende
government in September 1973, Castro promised
those Chileans who opposed the military takeover all
the aid that Cuba could provide, and offered mainte-
nance assistance for about 10 years without expecting
in the near term that the radical left would engage in
violence. Only recently has Castro acted to increase
his support to Chilean terrorist groups, apparently
viewing the time as propitious for an escalation of
violence.
Of special interest to Cuba has been the Movement of
the Revolutionary Left (MIR). Havana has supported
the MIR by providing substantial training since the
Secret
DI TR 86-008
July 1986
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 elsewhere. Unless Castro promotes armed revolution
in countries such as Argentina or Peru, where Mos-
cow has important economic and political stakes-a
development we view as unlikely in the next few
years-Moscow and Havana probably will continue
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The USSR and Cuba share a broad range of goals in
Latin America and are in general agreement as to
policies concerning the use of subversion and terror-
ism. At present, the shared strategy focuses primarily
on unifying leftist groups and strengthening regional
cooperation among radicals in preparation for oppor-
tune revolutionary conditions.
Throughout the 1960s, the Soviet Union was suspi-
cious of Cuba's policy of inciting armed violence,
preferring to work through established Moscow-line
Communist parties. Disagreement over this issue was
a serious point offriction for several years. Cuba
denounced the Soviet policy of 'peaceful coexistence"
as a fraud, arguing that it implicitly undercut the
legitimacy of aiding "national liberation" struggles.
At the 1966 Tricontinental Conference, Cuba sought
to enlist North Vietnam and North Korea and create
a more aggressive revolutionary internationalism.
None of these Latin American insurgencies fomented
by Havana, however, aroused much popular support,
and they all failed.
At present, Moscow and Havana appear to favor a
more active policy of subversion in Chile, while
guarding against damaging their political objectives
Cuba also supports the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic
Front (FPMR), a radical leftist terrorist group affili-
ated with the Chilean Communist Party (PCC) and
responsible for the bulk of terrorist incidents to date.
The precise relationship between Cuba and the
FPMR remains unclear. Since the group first pro-
claimed its existence in December 1983, Cuba has
provided training and material assistance.
Colombia. Cuba has a longstanding relationship with
several Colombian guerrilla groups, particularly the
19th of April Movement (M-19). Relations between
to work along parallel tracks in the region.
Despite this general confluence of goals, however,
he two countries occasionally
work at cross-purposes. For example, Havana has
maintained only formal ties to the Soviet-sponsored
moderate elements of the Bolivian Communist Party
(PCB), a result of the PCBs refusal to support the
he Soviets
reportedly blame the Cubans for what they consider
an undesirable development and are refusing to deal
with the leftist splinter group. Havana, while official-
ly agreeing with Moscow, is maintaining informal
contact with the leftist group,
Colombia and Cuba have not improved significantly,
despite signs of warming after President Belisario
Betancur's inauguration in 1982. We believe Presi-
dent Betancur would encounter substantial political
and military opposition if he tried to reestablish full
diplomatic relations, chiefly because Havana has con-
tinued to provide extensive support to Colombian
guerrillas. The new President, Virgilio Barco, is un-
likely to be receptive to Cuban diplomatic overtures,
Although a change in diplomatic relations is unlikely,
we believe that Castro will increase the level of Cuban
assistance to Colombian terrorist groups. Havana may
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have attempted to revive the sagging fortunes of the
M-19 and may have encouraged it to take the lead in
uniting the various smaller terrorist groups into a
larger guerrilla coalition. Cuba could attempt to
establish contact with the Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia (FARC), the only group that has
nominally honored the 1984 peace accords, and could
encourage the group to violence.
Low-Level Cuban Support
In addition to offering support to terrorists in Chile
and Colombia, we believe Castro also will continue to
provide low-level assistance to radical leftists in
several other Latin American countries. In some of
these countries-Argentina, Bolivia, and Uruguay-
Cuba may seek to establish toeholds or bases or
regional support to facilitate the funneling of
assistance to subversive groups in the region.
Elsewhere, such as the Caribbean, Cuba appears to be
tempering its policy of revolutionary violence while
encouraging political organizing, recruitment of new
members, and exploiting labor unrest. Cuba will
maintain its ties to radical leftists and former
terrorists throughout Latin America, preserving for
some future date the possible return to violence.
Ecuador. Cuba's relationship with Alfaro Vive,
Carajo! (AVC), the most prominent and active
terrorist group in Ecuador, is difficult to assess. A
number of AVC members have received guerrilla
training in Cuba. We believe that this training,
coupled with operational support from the Colombian
M-19, has enabled the group to grow from a weak,
ineffective organization to one that has been able to
spring prisoners from jail and conduct raids on
Ecuadorean police weapons arsenals. AVC's
operations, although not entirely bloodless, have
focused for the most part on efforts to gain maximum
media publicity for its views while minimizing
damage and casualties.
Although the AVC poses no serious
threat to the stability of the Ecuadorean Government,
it could become a more dangerous and lethal force if
it continues to recruit new members and if the
Ecuadorean security services fail to develop the
capability to counter it.
The Revolutionary Socialist Party of Ecuador
(PSRE)-one of the most radical political parties in
Ecuador-has advocated the use of terrorist tactics
and has received Cuban support during the past year.
After the PSRE rejoined the legally certified Socialist
Party of Ecuador (PSE) in 1985, the PSE appears to
be moving the mainline Socialist Party toward a more
radical stance. Several former PSE leaders have been 25X1
replaced with more hardline PSRE members, thereby
opening the way for implementation of the PSRE's
far more radical policies.
Honduras. Honduran territory has in the past been
the target of Cuban destabilization efforts. In July
1983, about 100 Cuban-trained Honduran nationals
reportedly were infiltrated from Nicaragua into
eastern Honduras. About a year later, another group
of Cuban-trained guerrillas entered Honduras. Both
groups were annihilated by the Honduran Army.
Since then, Havana has been cautious in its use of
violence in Honduras.
The destabilization of Honduras clearly would
enhance the position of the Salvadoran and
Guatemalan insurgencies. Havana also probably sees 25X1
in Honduras a chance to intimidate or destabilize the
major base for anti-Sandinista insurgents fighting in
Nicaragua. Although Havana clearly is not providing
as much support to Honduran terrorist groups, as it
has to the established Central American insurgencies,
we believe Castro will attempt to bolster the divided
Honduran left with financial and training assistance.
Given the failure of insurgency attempts, Havana
probably sees terrorists as its only mechanism in
Honduras for pursuing its regional goals.
Bolivia. During the tenure of former President Siles,
there was a great deal of Cuban activity in Bolivia.
Since the election in August 1985 of Paz Estenssoro,
however, both the Cubans and the Soviets have been
kept at arm's length. Paz Estenssoro probably hopes
to gain greater access to US aid by adhering to US-
encouraged reforms.
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The Cubans reportedly have used Bolivia as a staging
the Montoneros to attempt to acquire a measure of
political legitimacy. Cuba may at some future point
begin to view the generally relaxed environment for
leftists as conducive to a renewal of subversive sup-
port. In that event, Cuba might seek to take advan-
tage of its links to the Montoneros to renew subversive
operations.
area for support to Chilean terrorist groups.
__Cuba has for many years provided safeha-
ven to former Tupamaros. Many of these have subse-
quently served with various Central American
guerrilla groups. Cuba
does not view the time as propitious for it to support a
revolutionary strategy in Uruguay but may view the
country as a possible staging and transit area for
Cuban subversive activity in the region.
Argentina. The Cubans have a long history of associa-
tion with terrorists in Argentina. The Cubans gave
financial and logistic support to the Montoneros and
the People's Revolutionary Army (ERP)-the two
groups responsible for unleashing the wave of leftist
terrorism that swept Argentina in the 1970s. Havana
trained them in Cuba in urban and rural guerrilla
warfare. These terrorist groups were virtually elimi-
nated as a result of the Argentine military's brutal
counterinsurgency campaign, and Castro allowed the
remnants of their leadership to relocate in Havana.
Since then, the radical left has remained extremely
weak and factionalized, and Argentina has been free
from leftist terrorismi
We do not foresee Castro encouraging any indigenous
radical groups to pursue a path of terrorist violence
because he would be reluctant to jeopardize his newly
established relationship with the government of Raul
Alfonsin. At present, Cuba probably is encouraging
Cuba may be using Argentina as a possible staging
area to provide logistic support to Chilean radical
leftists. As in the case of Bolivia, Cuba may be
facilitating travel by, and logistic support to, the
Chilean terrorist groups, and may be employing Mon-
toneros in the supply network.
Caribbean. More than two years after its setback in
Grenada, Cuba is struggling to recover its political
influence in the Caribbean. Castro continues to sup-
port leftist political groups and to promote political
coalitions among them, but he apparently views the
strengthening of regional radicals as a long-term
effort unlikely to have a near-term impact. Cuban
policy is to offer Caribbean leftists political advice,
organizational assistance, and limited financial aid as
the basis for a foothold in the region.
Jamaica. Jamaica is a good example of Cuba's cur-
rent policy in the Caribbean. Castro is pressing
Jamaican radicals to support former Prime Minister
Michael Manley's party because Manley represents
the best hope over the next few years for left-of-center
forces to come to power. Cuba may be providing
limited aid to radical groups to prepare for, and
possibly encourage, a climate of instability. We be-
lieve that, for the most part, however, Cuba will
continue to promote moderation and foster increased
leftist political activity.
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Cuban-Libyan Rivalry
Havana is
particularly worried that Libya's increasingly close
relations with Caribbean leftists may undermine
Havana's more cautious strategy. Moreover, Havana
is worried that the United States believes it is
cooperating with Tripoli in supporting indiscriminate
violence, and that Libya's meddling could provoke
US retaliation against Cuba.
Already, Libyan activities in the Caribbean have
prompted warnings by Cuban officials to Caribbean
leftists about the dangers ctf cooperating with Tripoli.
French Departments. Cuba has long viewed the
French Caribbean as falling within its legitimate
sphere of influence, and would be reluctant to lose any
leverage to the Libyans who have become increasingly
active in the region. Cuba has responded to Libyan
inroads with warnings to local leftists about the risks
of involvement with Qadhafi, and Havana probably
will step up its offers of training scholarships,
organizational assistance, and financial aid.
Dominican Republic. In the early 1980s, Cuba
encouraged leftist radicals in the Dominican Republic
to unite and prepare for armed actions.
the Dominican Liberation Party
Cuba also provided military instruction to members of
small extremist splinter groups such as the Social
Worker's Movement and the Socialist Party as well as
to the pro-Moscow Dominican Communist Party and
Cuba has encouraged
In its attempt to counter growing Libyan influence,
Havana has stressed to various leftist groups the
drawbacks ctf cooperating with Libya, citing Tripoli's
international reputation as a centerfor terrorism and
arguing that increased links to Libya will prompt US
countermeasures. Havana also has pointed out that it
has maintained longstanding assistance to regional
leftist groups over the years as part of its traditional
Latin American revolutionary role.
some of these radical leftist groups-in particular, the
Dominican Liberation Party-to engage in civil
disturbances and strikes. Havana is maintaining or, in
some cases, restoring contacts with opposition
elements, ranging from moderate left to radical. Cuba
believes that the economic and political situation will
continue to deteriorate, placing the radical
elements-and, by association, Cuba-in a favorable
position.
Cuban Support for Insurgents
Throughout Latin America, many radical leftist
groups seek at some point to become insurgent or
guerrilla organizations and maintain both rural and
urban fronts. Cuba has supported many of these
groups in the past, and in some cases has maintained
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the relationship over the years. Cuba generally
provides these groups with guerrilla and military
training, rather than specific tactical or operational
support.
Over the past two years, many of the insurgent groups
in El Salvador and Guatemala have been on the
defensive and have adopted the tactics of urban
terrorism. Although Cuba has provided many of these
insurgents with training in urban tactics-and most
likely will continue to do so-we see little evidence of
Cuban operational direction or sponsorship of specific
urban terrorist acts. In fact, Cuba reportedly has
encouraged some groups to focus their attacks against
government and military targets, and not civilians.
El Salvador. Prior to 1979, Cuban support to
Salvadoran radicals involved training small numbers
of guerrillas, providing modest financial aid, and
serving as a political conduit between Salvadoran
extremists and leftists outside the hemisphere. During
the Nicaraguan civil war, Cuba concentrated on
support for the Sandinistas. After the fall of Somoza,
Cuba began intense efforts to help pro-Cuban
guerrillas come to power in El Salvador. In fact, Cuba
played a critical role in bringing together the various
fragmented elements of the Salvadoran left leading
ultimately to the forging of the Farabundo Marti
National Front (FMLN).
As Cuba saw the level of violence escalate, it
increased the flow of weapons and financial support to
the Salvadoran guerrillas. Larger numbers of
Salvadoran guerrillas went to Cuba to receive
political and military training and returned to El
Salvador to augment the guerrilla ranks. Cuban
training increased sharply in 1980 as Cuba
concentrated on building a trained army capable of
mounting major offensives. A typical three-month
training program included courses in guerrilla tactics,
marksmanship, and use of artillery. In addition, Cuba
provided selected guerrillas more intensive training in
specialized subjects such as underwater demolition.
Over the past few years, however, Cuba has been
more cautious in its support for the Salvadoran
insurgency and has attempted to temper Salvadoran
zeal for dramatic terrorist attacks. Castro has
concentrated his efforts on forging more effective
unity among the guerrilla groups and on making clear
that the struggle would be neither easy nor short. We
suspect that Cuba will continue to exert a more
moderate influence on the plans of the Salvadoran
insurgents, especially if the groups continue to suffer
both military and political losses, and will attempt to
dissuade them from mounting indiscriminate terrorist
attacks.
Guatemala. Guatemala serves as an example of
Cuban attempts to form a union of disparate guerrilla
groups. In November 1980, the four major insurgent
organizations signed an agreement to establish the
National Revolutionary Union (URNG). Following
the signing ceremony held in Managua,
representatives traveled to Cuba and presented the
document to Castro. Despite the show of unity,
however, the Guatemalan groups have not become a
cohesive organization and only occasionally engage in
joint terrorist operations.
At present, we believe the revolutionary groups
seeking power in Guatemala are far from achieving
their objectives. The successful counterinsurgency and
civic programs and the progress of the
democratization process have undercut their domestic
support and give them little hope of success in the
near future. The URNG seems to have little real
power, serving only as a propaganda mechanism and
political front.
We believe Havana will maintain its political and
military training programs, but it is not likely to
encourage an increase in violent activity. Most
probably, Cuba will stress the importance of
negotiating and seeking to achieve a measure of
political legitimacy.
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Outlook
In our judgment, Castro will continue to selectively
sponsor Latin American terrorist activity as part of
his commitment to the revolutionary struggle, while
being careful to not endanger his own regional
interests or come into conflict with Moscow. Havana
will carefully maintain deniability in order not to
reverse the diplomatic and political inroads it has
made in several countries in Latin America or
preclude future diplomatic gains.
Havana also recognizes, however, that its known ties
to guerrilla groups can present opportunities for
exercising leverage on Latin American regimes. As
the price for restoration of diplomatic relations in the
mid-1970s, for example, Havana pledged
noninterference in Colombia's internal affairs-a
promise it quickly reneged on. Uruguay hoped to
make cessation of Cuban meddling in Uruguayan
internal affairs a condition for its diplomatic
recognition of Cuba. We believe Havana has been
reluctant to support indigenous Uruguayan terrorist
groups, such as the Tupamaros, for fear of
jeopardizing the establishment of full diplomatic
relations. Full relations were restored in October
1985, however, and Havana may now choose to
pursue a more active relationship with Uruguayan
opposition groups, encouraging political activity but
Cuba probably will continue to place high priority on
assistance to Chilean terrorists during the comine
center-left political parties view accommodation with
President Pinochet as increasingly unlikely, they may
become more tolerant of leftist violence and perhaps
even offer support to radical leftists.
In our view, Castro will continue to encourage the
Chilean radical left to reach a rapprochement with
the moderate opposition to lessen its political isolation
and to strengthen prospects for the radical left to play
a role in opposition efforts to oust Pinochet, as well as
in a future, post-Pinochet period. Castro also will
continue to stress that Chilean terrorist groups,
especially the MIR, remain committed to armed
struggle and political violence as part of their overall
strategy to maintain pressure on the Pinochet
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Castro will seek to protect his longtime influence with
the group even if that means countering Libyan
support.
Havana probably will increase its support to
Caribbean leftist groups, possibly in an attempt to 25X1
mitigate any decline in influence resulting from the
Libyan presence. Havana is increasingly concerned
that Libya's courtship of Caribbean leftists could
prompt a US response.
Libya's growing involvement with leftists, both in the
Caribbean and elsewhere in Latin America, may spur
Castro to step up his support to various guerrilla
groups, especially if these groups effectively use their
ties to Tripoli as leverage in an attempt to gain
greater financial support from Havana. Cuba could
also make more effective use of what it has to offer-
a logistic support base to Caribbean leftists that is far
more useful than what Libya can offer the region, as
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Although Havana's ideological animosity toward the
United States may make targeting US installations
and personnel tempting, we believe Castro fears
retaliation and would be responsive to likely Soviet
urgings that he avoid a confrontation with
Washington. It is nevertheless important when
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behavior to remember the "wild card"-Castro's own
ego needs and his propensity for emotional responses
when suddenly confronted by actions he perceives as
embarrassing to himself or hostile to his regime.
25X1
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4 August 1984
5 August 1960
5 August 1962
7 August 1985
9 August 1965
9 August 1971
10 August 1809
11 August 1952
11 August 1960
11 August 1983
13 August 1927
The Terrorism Diary for August
event.
Below is a compendium of August dates of known or conceivable significance to
terrorists around the world. Our inclusion of a date or event should not by itself
be construed to suggest that we expect or anticipate a commemorative terrorist
Burkina. Another coup overthrows ruling military regime.
Burkina. Independence Day.
The Bahamas, Grenada, Jamaica. Emancipation Day (independence from United
Kingdom).
Bolivia. Independence Day.
United Arab Emirates. Accession Day of Shaykh Zayed bin Sultan al-Nayhan,
Emir of Abu Dhabi.
Ivory Coast. Independence Day.
Ecuador. Alfaro Vive, Carajo! kidnaps Guayaquil banker (later killed in rescue
attempt).
Guatemala. Coup by Gen. Oscar Mejia Victores overthrows President Rios Montt.
West Germany. Red Army Faction and French Action Directe bomb Rhein Main
Airport.
Singapore. Independence Day (secession from Federation of Malaysia).
Northern Ireland. Internment without trial introduced.
Ecuador. Independence Day (national day).
Jordan. Accession Day for King Hussein.
Chad. Independence Day.
Ecuador. Montoneros Alfaristas steal bust of Gen. Eloy Alfaro; recognized as
founding date of Alfaro Vive, Carajo! (Alfaro Lives, Dammit!).
Northern Ireland. Protestant commemorative marches mark day apprentice boys
locked gates of Derry against James II's forces.
Cuba. Fidel Castro's birthday.
Secret
DI TR 86-008
July 1986
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13 August 1960
13 August 1984
14 August 1947
14 August 1971
15 August
15 August 1945
15 August 1947
15 August 1960
15 August 1975
16 August 1960
17 August 1945
17 August 1960
19 August 1968
19 August 1981
20 August 1953
20 August 1960
23 August 1944
25 August 1825
25 August 1944
26 August 1945
26 August 1966
27 August 1979
Central African Republic. Independence Day.
Morocco, Libya. Union established.
Pakistan. Independence Day.
Bahrain. Independence Day.
Muslim world. Id al-adha (commemorates Abraham's willingness to sacrifice his
son).
North and South Korea. Liberation Day.
India. Independence Day.
Congo. Independence Day (overthrow of Youlou regime).
Bangladesh. Military coup and assassination of Shaykh Mujibur Rahman.
Cyprus. Independence Day.
Indonesia. Independence Day (proclamation of republic).
Gabon. Independence Day.
Czechoslovakia. Invasion by Soviet and Warsaw Pact troops.
United States, Libya. US planes down two Libyan fighters over Gulf of Sidra.
Morocco. King's and People's Revolution.
Senegal. Independence Day (withdrawal from Mali Federation).
Romania. Liberation Day.
Uruguay. Independence Day.
France. Liberation Day.
Hong Kong. Liberation Day.
Namibia. Namibia Day (South-West Africa comes under UN control).
Northern Ireland. Assassination of Earl Mounbatten by Provisional Irish Republi-
can Army (IRA).
Nigeria. Buhari regime overthrown by coup.
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28 August 1985
29 August 1944
29 August 1969
31 August 1957
31 August 1962
31 August 1978
31 August 1980
Colombia. M- 19 guerrilla leader Ivan Marino Ospina killed by security forces.
Czechoslovakia. Slovak nationalist uprising.
United States, Palestinians. First hijacking of US airliner by Palestinians.
Malaysia. Freedom Day; Malaysia Day (independence from United Kingdom).
Trinidad and Tobago. Independence Day.
Libya, Shia world. Lebanese Shia cleric Imam Musa Sadr disappears in Libya.
Poland. Solidarity trade union founded.
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Chronology of Terrorism-19861 25X1
this publication are not included.
Below are described noteworthy foreign and international events involving
terrorists, or the use of terrorist tactics, which have occurred or come to light
since our last issue. In some cases, the perpetrators and their motivations may not
be known. Events and developments that have already been described elsewhere in
24 April Greece: Unidentified individuals throw molotov cocktails at Athens bookshop and
Greek National Political Union. Both bombs exploded, but caused little damage.
1 May West Germany: Police discover arms cache in Saarbruecken. The materials found
could be used to make approximately 40 kilograms of explosives
3 May
regional group belonging to the Red Army Faction periphery.
West Germany: "Autonomous Cells" claim responsibility for 25 April NATO
pipeline firebombing in Vollersode. The Autonomous Cells are believed to be a
responsibility for a 3 May grenade attack against the Bilbao police station.
Spain: Basque Fatherland and Liberty admits "dramatic error" in 2 May
shooting of 72-year-old businessman in San Sebastian. The ETA also claimed
7 May Northern Ireland: Gunmen in Belfast kill Protestant woman, wound Catholic
husband. Police believe members of the Ulster Defense Force were responsible.
Lebanon: Three Lebanese men fail to kidnap Austrian Ambassador in Beirut. Two
other Austrian Embassy employees were injured in the incident. No group has
claimed responsibility.
were fired at the judge's car.
Spain: Supreme Court President Antonio Hernandez Gil and his bodyguard
escape assassination attempt in Madrid. The Basque Fatherland and Liberty
group claimed responsibility for the attack, in which remotely controlled rockets
9 May Austria: Bomb attack in South Tirol damages train station. There has been no
claim of responsibility
Secret
DI TR 86-008
July 1986
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Turkey: Picnicker finds briefcase containing bombs, pistols, and silencer in
Istanbul park. Press reports claim that the bombs and pistols resemble those seized
in the April attempt to bomb the US officers' mess in Ankara.
shop.
Northern Ireland: Ex-member of Ulster Defense Regiment shot dead in Newry by
Provisional Irish Republican Army. He was killed while making deliveries to a
responsibility for the incident.
West Germany: Bomb explodes in Hamburg bar, killing one customer and
injuring bartender. The bomb apparently was brought into the bar by the
customer and exploded as he removed it from a plastic bag. No one has claimed
Spain: Bomb explodes at Renault dealership in Eibar, destroying two cars. The
Basque Fatherland and Liberty group claimed responsibility for the attack. F--~ 25X1
arrested 25 FLNC members.
Corsica: Explosion at vacation village near Ajaccio kills two and injures four.
The National Front for the Liberation of Corsica (FLNC) claimed responsibility,
but said it had not intended to kill anyone in the attack. The following day, police
claimed responsibility.
France: Four men using guns and explosives attack Interpol headquarters in St.
Cloud. The police guard on duty was injured. The terrorist group Action Directe
extradition.
France: Suspected Basque terrorist expelled to Cape Verde to join seven other
Basque militants deported since January 1984. Jose Rementeria Barruetaben, also
known as Patxi, was arrested in Biarritz on 11 March. He was expelled after the
Spanish Government failed to produce the appropriate documents for his
Police suspect the Basque groups Fatherland and Liberty or Iraultza.
Spain: Police defuse bomb found in Ford Motor Company showroom in Gijon.
the security forces.
Northern Ireland: Three gunmen assassinate Protestant businessman on his way
home from work in Belfast. The Provisional Irish Republican Army claimed
responsibility for the shooting and claimed that the victim was a senior member of
Spain: Basque separatists machinegun French truck near San Sebastian. Police
suspect the separatist group Fatherland and Liberty.F---] 25X1
highways.
Spain: Civil guard detains four members of Basque Fatherland and Liberty and
discovers arms cache near detainee's house in Guipuzcoa Province. Police believe
the group was responsible for recent shooting at French trucks along Spanish
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21 May
before US Defense Secretary Weinberger's visit to Lisbon.
Portugal: The Popular Forces of 25 April claim responsibility for mortar attack
against NATO Iberlant facility in Lisbon. A 60-millimeter mortar round fell
short of its target and caused no injuries or damage. The attack took place one day
The explosion caused a fire and minor damage, but no injuries.
Greece: Two unidentified persons throw molotov cocktail at Athens police station.
terrorists probably suspected him of being a police informer.
Northern Ireland: Provisional Irish Republican Army murders young Catholic
man in Armagh. The statement taking credit for the killing ordered other
"common criminals" in the area to leave the country or "face severe action." The
arson attack. The Revolutionary Cells probably were responsible.
West Germany: Business office of Hamburg Federal Railroad target of attempted
Spain: Three gunmen kill policeman in Bilbao and escape in stolen taxi.
Although no group claimed res nsibilit , police suspect the Basque separatist
group Fatherland and Liberty.
17 commando group conducted the attack.
Israel: Remote-controlled bomb damages two army vehicles north of Jerusalem.
According to an anonymous caller, the Palestine Liberation Organization's Force
bomb went off in an area where Gaza Strip dayworkers assemble.
Israel: Bomb explodes near Ashqelon, causing damage but no casualties. One
22 May Canada: Four Canadian Sikhs attack member of Punjab state parliament at party
during official visit to Montreal. The victim was not injured.F___-] 25X1
Northern Ireland: Landmine near Crossmaglen kills British Army major and two
policemen. The Provisional Irish Republican Army claimed responsibility for the
attack. This was the group's most serious attack since the signing of the November
1985 Anglo-Irish agreement.
Israel: Roadside bomb explodes in North Jerusalem as army vehicle passes by.
The bomb caused no casualties or damageF___1 25X1
22-23 May West Germany: "Anarchistic Cells "carry out arson attack against Dyckerhoff
and Widmann firm in Burghausen. A German newspaper received a claim letter
from the previously unknown group on 2 June
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1982
Italy: Three members of the Red Brigades given life sentences for January 1983
murder of prison warden in Rome. Francesco Donati, Carlo Garavaglia, and
Barbara Fabrizi also received concurrent 30-year sentences for wounding the
prison's doctor in the attack and for a raid on an Italian Air Force depot in August
responsibility.
Greece: Unidentified individuals throw molotov cocktail at Socialist Party offices
in Athens, causing little damage and no injuries. There was no claim of
damage or injuries. No group claimed responsibility.
Greece: Athens bank target of bomb attack. The homemade bomb caused no
International Sikh Youth Federation.
Canada: Cabinet Minister from India's Punjab state seriously wounded in
assassination attempt on Vancouver Island. Police arrested four members of the
Ashkelon. One person was injured.
Israel: The Palestine Liberation Organization's Force 17 commando group claims
three bombings in the Tel Aviv area. Two of the bombs went off in the town of
Kfar Saba, while the third exploded at a soldier's hitchhiking station outside
in damage.
West Germany: Suspected RAF periphery members carry out arson attack on US
Army training facility in Reichersbeuren. The fire caused approximately $15,000
Army.
Northern Ireland: Bomb kills one British soldier, injures two others at Kilkeel
gas station. The victims were examining the device when it exploded. No group
has claimed responsibility, but police suspect the Provisional Irish Republican
explosives.
Canada: Sikh plot to bomb Air India 747 in New York thwarted. Authorities
arrested five Sikhs believed to be members of the radical Babbar Khalsa
underground group in Canada on charges of conspiring to possess or fabricate
bombing.
Sri Lanka. Bomb destroys bottling plant in Colombo, killing 10 workers, injuring
more than 50 others. The bomb was hidden in a truck that brought empty bottles
from the Vavuniya District. Police have arrested two Tamils in connection with the
responsibility for the attack.
Spain: Explosion at civil guard barracks near San Sebastian causes extensive
damage but no injuries. The Basque group Fatherland and Liberty claimed
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Organization of Students, has claimed responsibility for the blast.
Sri Lanka: Bomb explodes on Colombo-bound passenger train, killing 12 persons
and injuring 50 others. Police believe the bomb was timed to explode when the
train reached the capital. A Tamil militant group, the Eelam Revolutionary
Armed Resistance (FARNH) was responsible.
Honduras: A bomb, discovered on a bus in a privately owned parking lot in San
Pedro Sula, failed to detonate. The police suspect the Honduran National Front of
claimed responsibility.
West Germany: Firebomb thrown at Frankfurt church causes minor damage. A
previously unknown organization called the "Revolutionary Agitation Group"
Liberty group, but there was no claim of responsibility for the murder.
Spain: Basque lawyer found dead in San Sebastian home. The man had allegedly
received death threats and extortion demands from the Basque Fatherland and
as he entered his home. No group has claimed responsibility.
Syria: Abu Musa, leader of Syrian-backed anti-Ara at Fatah dissident group,
escapes assassination attempt in Damascus. Someone reportedly threw grenades
Fatherland and Liberty organization, operated in the Durango and Elorrio areas.
Spain: Police in Vizcaya break up so-called "legal commando group, "arresting
nine members and seizing weapons. The group, said to be part of the Basque
Israel: Roadside bomb explodes near the town of Tubas in the Gaza Strip. There
were no casualties or damage.F____1 25X1
and six children. Tamil separatist guerrillas probably were responsible.
Sri Lanka: Unknown assailants attack Sinhalese refugee camp, killing 10 adults
claimed responsibility.
India: Three unidentified assailants kill two bank employees in robbery attempt
in Sangrur District. The assailants escaped on a motorcycle, and no one has
5 June Corsica: Two bombs damage beauty parlor in Calvi, slightly injuring one person.
The National Front for the Liberation of Corsica is suspected.F__1 25X1
Israel: Unidentified gunman wounds Israeli civilian in West Bank town of
Nablus. The shooting occurred on the 19th anniversary of the 1967 Middle East
war, but no group claimed responsibility for the shooting.
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bombing in that town this year.
Israel: Bomb explodes near police station in Afula. The incident was the 10th
Israel: Bomb explodes in Jerusalem supermarket, wounding two women. An
anonymous caller claimed that Fatah's Force 17 was responsible.0 25X1
responsibility
Israel: Bus firebombed near Jenin. There were no injuries or claims of
boat. No one has claimed responsibility
India: Tamil politician escapes bomb explosion at seaside rally in Madras. The
device blew up about 300 yards from the speaker's platform, destroying a fishing
West Germany: US Army motor pool in Frankfurt target of arson attack. A
firebomb device thrown over a fence caused no damage. The "Revolutionary
Agitation Group" claimed responsibility.
responsible.
Sri Lanka: Two bombs explode in Colombo-one on empty train and another near
Hindu temple, injuring two persons. Authorities suspect Tamil separatists were
village, killing two Hindus. Two police officers were injured by the fleeing Sikhs.
India: Four Sikh extremists shoot at workers in grain market in Khudur Sahib
merchant at his home in Punjab. No group has claimed responsibility. 25X1
India: Two Sikh gunmen posing as doctors seriously wound a Hindu cloth
Socialist Party offices on 24 May.
Greece: Unidentified persons throw molotov cocktail at Athens church, causing
minor damage and no injuries. Police suspect the same group that set fire to the
Hindus were killed. No group has claimed responsibility.
India: Six Sikh extremists fire indiscriminately into crowd of ice cream sellers as
they collected their stock from the ice factory in Amritsar. Three Sikhs and two
India: Unidentified gunmen kill Iranian student riding on motorcycle. No one
has claimed responsibility for the shooting.F--~ 25X1
No one has claimed responsibility.
Pakistan: Car bomb extensively damages Afghan building, kills five Afghans and
injures more than 30 others in Qissa Khswani Bazaar in Peshawar. The bombing
occurred on the eve of 'Id al-Fitr, marking the end of the Islamic month of fasting.
Secret 56
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Northern Ireland: Police defuse 90-kilogram bomb inside hijacked van in
Londonderry. No warning was received and no group claimed responsibility._25X1
9 June Spain: Civil guard assassinated in Mondragon. The Basque Fatherland and
Liberty group claimed responsibility on 14 June.F--] 25X1
March
France: Lyon court arraigns Action Directe cofounder, Andre Olivier. He and two
others were charged with voluntary homicide, illegal detention, and armed robbery
in connection with October 1980 holdup of an armored car. They were arrested 28
injured.
Spain: Demonstrations in Bilbao follow 8 June death of imprisoned member of
Basque Fatherland and Liberty. Joseba Asensio died of an active tubercular
infection while in the Herrera de la Mancha prison. Thirty demonstrators were
and no claim of responsibility.
Japan: Unidentified terrorist throws molotov cocktail at Defense Facilities
Administration Bureau in Okinawa's Naha City. There was no property damage
France: Police arrest five persons, including leader of Irish National Liberation
Army, Sean Hughes, in Le Havre for smuggling arms and ammunition. The
weapons were shipped from the United States and intended for INLA use.l 25X1
Israel: Bomb explodes in the Tel Aviv suburb of Ramat Gan, slightly injuring one
man. No one has claimed responsibility.F--] 25X1
prevent reprisal attacks.
Sri Lanka. Tamil separatists blow up two buses in Trincomalee, killing 40 people
and injuring 73 others. Authorities immediately imposed a 12-hour curfew to
Sri Lanka: Bomb explodes outside movie theater in Colombo, killing three people
and injuring 12 others. Tamils are believed to be responsible.
expert. The "Commandos of France" claimed responsibility for the attacks.
France: Two bombs explode at tourist information center and bookstore in
Drauignan; another explodes at record shop in Frejus, injuring a bomb disposal
Txema Zambrana, Josu Borau, and Inaki Sierra
Spain: Police arrest three ETA suspects in Bilbao. The three were identified as
and injury to 15 others.
India: All airports across the country put on alert for widow of one of Prime
Minister Indira Gandhi's assassins who is eluding police. Last week she led a
rampage through Amritsar's Golden Temple, resulting in the death of one guard
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station.
India: Unidentified Sikh gunmen fatally kill caretaker of cemetery in Fatehgarh
Churian, two Hindus at religious place in Amritsar, and two Hindus riding
scooters in Maneharpur Riar. The Hindus retaliated by lynching one Sikh,
injuring two others, and ransacking the local government hospital and police
Vietnam: Unidentified person throws grenade at Czechoslovak Embassy in Hanoi,
causing no casualties and only minor damage. The assailant was arrested by the
police. No group has claimed responsibility for the attack.F_~
Spain: Madrid court sentences two Basque Fatherland and Liberty members to 33
years' imprisonmentfor November 1984 murder of a suspected member of the
Antiterrorist Liberation Group (GAL). F
African Government.
Botswana: Four gunmen attack home in Gaborone, killing one person and injuring
two. The attack was directed toward members of the African National Congress.
The Botswana Government has charged that the attack was the work of the South
African National Congress.
South Africa: Car bomb explodes outside Durban Hotel, killing three women and
injuring 69 other persons. Fifty cars, two hotels, and an apartment block were
damaged in the incident. Although no group has claimed credit, police suspect the
Corsica: Three explosions destroy government office building in Bastia, injuring
four people. The National Front for the Liberation of Corsica claimed responsibil-
ity.
were no injuries
Israel: Bus firebombed outside Jerusalem. The vehicle was damaged, but there
Pakistan: Bomb blast derails Khyber Mail express train in Peshawar, killing one
person and injuring eight others. Authorities suspect Afghan secret police are
behind the planting of bombs and the creating of disorder among Afghan refugees.
the murder.
Northern Ireland: Catholic businessman doing construction for security forces
assassinated near South Armagh. The Provisional IRA claimed responsibility for
activists.
Netherlands: Shell station firebombed in Amsterdam, causing extensive damage.
No one claimed responsibility for the attack, but police suspect antiapartheid
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Chile: Two Santiago subway stations bombed, killing one person and injuring six
others. No group has claimed responsibility for the explosions.F__1 25X1
disperse a crowd of onlookers. No one has claimed responsibility.
Pakistan: Bomb explodes near Firdaus Cinema in Peshawar, killing three
policemen and injuring seven others. The device went off as police were trying to
of the explosion. No one has claimed responsibility for the bombing
Pakistan: Bomb rips through bazaar in Peshawar, killing three policemen and
injuring 25 other people. The police were examining a crate in the road at the time
Pakistan: Bomb destroys two empty buses in North Waziristan, causing no
casualties. No group has claimed responsibility.F--] 25X1
ity.
Pakistan: Bomb damages wall of Miran Shah power station, but causes no
injuries. The main building was not affected, and no one has claimed responsibil-
Muslim separatist rebellion
Philippines: Grenade explodes in Shoppers'Plaza department store in Zamboan-
ga, injuring at least 11 persons. This area is a hotbed of a 14-year-old
17 June Spain: Three soldiers killed by automatic weapons fire in Madrid. The Basque
Fatherland and Liberty claimed responsibility for the attack.F__1 25X1
Colombia: 19th ofApril Movement crashes tow truck into Minister of Government
Jamie Castro's motorcade in Bogota, hitting his bodyguard's car. One policeman
was killed and two bodyguards seriously injured in the incident.
claimed responsibility.
Pakistan: Rockets destroy electric power grid station in Baluchistan. Power was
cut off to about 150 small settlements and a number of tubewells. No group has
police suspect the Provisional IRA
Northern Ireland: 230-kilogram bomb in stolen van explodes outside police
station in Cloughmills, injuring six people. No one claimed responsibility, but
Northern Ireland: Police defuse 170-kilogram bomb near South Armagh. No
group claimed responsibility. 25X1
in Diwar Village. No claim of responsibility has been made
Pakistan: Explosion in explosives dump kills four persons, and injures four others
19 June France: Iparretarak member sentenced in Bayonne to four years' imprisonment for
illegal possession of arms and explosives. 25X1
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Fatherland and Liberty group's campaign to disrupt the tourist season.
evacuated after receiving bomb threats. This was the ninth bomb in the Basque
Spain: Bomb explodes in Seville hotel, injuring one person. Two other hotels were
the defendants in the Achille Lauro trial that began on 18 June.
Greece: Bomb explodes at Italian Chamber of Commerce in Athens, injuring a
passer-by; a second bomb was discovered outside the Italian Consulate and
defused by police. An Abu Abbas spokesman in Beirut called for the liberation of
protest Emperor Hirohito's planned visit to Okinawa
Japan: Two crude incendiary projectiles launched at main gate of Japanese
Ground Self-Defense Forces Naha Base in Okinawa. The leftwing organization
Kakurokyo (Revolutionary Workers Association) claimed credit for the attack to
Israel: Police arrest 20 suspected terrorists residing in North Jerusalem refugee
camp. The suspects are being blamed for several attacks in Jerusalem earlier this
year, including a bus firebombing in April that wounded 10 passengers.
claimed credit.
India: Three unidentified Sikhs open fire with machineguns in market in
Nakodar, wounding 12 shoppers. The assailants escaped, and no group has
Amritsar, killing five Hindus. No one has claimed responsibility.
India: Two unidentified gunmen attack office of Punjab Electricity Board in
similar to those frequently used by the African National Congress
South Africa: Three bomb blasts in Durban damage chemical plant, shops, and oil
refinery. There were no injuries. The explosions were caused by limpet mines
Republican Army.
Northern Ireland: British bomb experts defuse 450-kilogram bomb at Ulster golf
club. No group claimed responsibility, but police suspect the Provisional Irish
damage. There have been no claims of responsibility.
Israel: Bomb explodes outside post office in Ashdod, causing no injuries and little
Pakistan: Bomb explodes outside police station in Peshawar, injuring 21 persons.
No one has claimed responsibility for the incident.
24 June South Africa: Bomb explosion in Johannesburg damages restaurant. Police
suspect the African National Congress.
South Africa: Bomb explodes in Holiday Inn in downtown Johannesburg, injuring
one and damaging hotel's first floor canopy. Authorities suspect the African
National Congress.
25X1
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Colombia: National Liberation Army claims responsibility for five bombings in
Pereina. Targets included military and business offices. There were no injuries but
damage was extensive
South Africa: Bomb explodes in trash can at shopping center in Queenstown,
injuring two persons and damaging several offices and five vehicles. No group has
South Africa: Police kill four African National Congress guerrillas at roadblock
near Botswana border. A fifth guerrilla escaped, leaving behind three Soviet-made
automatic rifles, nine loaded magazines and three handgrenades. One police
officer was slightly wounded0
Ecuador: Police raid Alfaro Vive, Carajol hideout in Cuenca, killing one terrorist
and arrestin three others. Police also reportedly seized a large amount of
weapons.
People's Struggle claimed responsibilit
Greece: Bomb damages Environmental Ministry offices in Athens. A second bomb
at another ministry office failed to explode. The terrorist group Revolutionary
least ten persons. Police suspect Muslim secessionist rebels
Philippines: Grenade explodes at entrance of bar in Zamboanga City, injuring at
30 June France: Libyan businessman killed in Paris. A police investigation has been
launched to determine whether the murder was politically motivated.
is suspected.
South Africa: Bomb explodes in motorcycle shop in Johannesburg, shattering
windows and injuring ix adults and two children. The African National Congress
explosives, two Polish machine pistols, some other weapons, and radio equipment.
Italy: Palestinian sentenced in Venice for possession of illegal weapons and
explosives. Omar Sa'dat Salem, who had been arrested in Verona in December
1985, received a 13-year term for possession; a lower court sentence of 14 years for
weapons smuggling was overturned. The weapons cache included 20 kilograms of
assassins than to ordinary criminals
Italy: Two Yugoslavs, one Italian arrested in Genoa trying to sell submachine-
guns. Police said the weapons, Swiss-made SG-57s, are more suited to terrorists or
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7 July
Zealand dairy exports to Europe.
New Zealand: Wellington agrees to release French agents jailed for sinking
Rainbow Warrior in 1985. The agents will serve three years' confinement on a
French island in the Pacific, and, in return, France agreed to apologize to New
Zealand, to pay $7 million in compensation, and to refrain from blocking New
State University's agricultural school, and APRA's state secretary in 1983.
Peru: Five Sendero Luminoso terrorists kill member Of American Popular
Revolutionary Alliance Party in southern city of Puno. The victim was dean of the
responsibility for the bombing
Bolivia: Bombs destroy Jesuit-run radio station in city of Tarija. Five hooded
individuals detonated two large bombs after assaulting a guard. No one claimed
claimed responsibility for either attack.
Pakistan: Bomb derails train in Kohat, injuring one person. It was the second at-
tack in three weeks on a train in the North-West Frontier Province. No group
Sri Lanka. Unknown assailants hurl a bomb at Colombo's Hotel Empress 36
hours before Tamil separatist leaders arrive for peace talks. Police said the bomb
caused only minor injuries to four persons. The attackers have not been identified.
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