NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY FRIDAY 13 FEBRUARY 1987

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88T00091R000400020008-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 20
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 30, 2012
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: February 13, 1987
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/09: CIA-RDP88T00091 R000400020008-4
?tE ' uurecior OT
Central
a ICI) intelligence
National Intelligence Daily
Friday
13 February. 1987,
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Top Secret
Contents
Lebanon-PLO: Camps War Intensifies ........................................
Peru: Counterterrorism Efforts .................................................
Suriname: Cabinet Resignations ..................................................
Australia-US: Support for Joint Facilities .................................... 5
Cambodia-Thailand: Non-Communist Resistance Troubles ...... 5
Morocco-Western Sahara: Extension of Berm .......................... 6
Egypt: Discussions With IMF Falter ............................................ 6
Mexico: Concern Over Economic Program ................................ 7
Sudan: Controversial Political Moves in South ............................ 7
Special Analyses
Libya-Chad-France: Moving Closer to Confrontation ................ 9
13 February 1987
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Top Secret
Fighting Continues at Refugee Camps
Palestinian refugee camps
BEIRUT
Mediterranean
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UNDOF
Zone`
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13 February 1987
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Top Secret
LEBANON-PLO: Camps War Intensifies
A cease-fire agreement, sponsored by the Arab League, between
the Syrian-backed Amal and Palestinian guerrillas has yet to be
implemented, and fighting has increased around Palestinian
refugee camps in the Beirut and Tyre areas.
The agreement to halt the four-month-old camps war following the
PLO's withdrawal from the strategic southern town of Maghdushah
has remained stillborn because of intense fighting around Palestinian
camps. Amal militias refuse to allow relief agencies to bring food and
medicine into the camps, which are widely reported to be running out
of supplies as a result of the prolonged Amal siege.
the Palestinians. e.x-ea#.ly.sent 4e4he-IJSb
asking that the l IN W4 -F. pr nsi a safe -$-a&
hze' ffp-Ara#a -a g$+ee at e4+S-is--
re5p.,=jble-fore safetyA.af Palestinian refugees der-t e- errn5 of
t?he$1=15?r4egetfa#ed agr-eernentg ? r,ow,da:ng.#,er4Jie-P,LO"s with-dr" a-" ili
PLO Chairman Arafat has increased international appeals for aid to
earlier this week.
i Amal leader Barr' remains in Damascus, where
he has been for the past three months. Daoud Daoud, Amal's military
commander in southern Lebanon, resigned from the organization
may be settling personal scores with the Palestinians.
fighters are growing less responsive to Barri's leadership and
Comment: Implementation of the Arab League-sponsored
agreement is unlikely. Daoud, having severed his relationship to Amal,
is not bound by the cease-fire agreements and is free to order forces
loyal to him to continue attacks against the Palestinian camps. His
resignation further weakens Barri's dwindling control of Amal. The
relentless shelling of the Beirut camps also indicates that Amal
ca
`~"5"o ~rafa 's tratP~na~ r,f rcinfil Ji,ghlers-i ta-Lebanon. s been
rely tested by the Amal resistance. His unsuccessfu - t?mpt to
ferry some 50 fighters from Cyprus to Leban week, despite
clear Israeli warnings earlier that it -would intercept Cypriot boats
carrying Palestinian passengers, uggests growing desperation.
Arafat probably will'have to return fighters to Maghdushah soon to
signal.to=A`rnal leaders that his forces are capable of resisting their
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President Garcia is hardening his approach toward terrorism
following the murder of a senior member of his ruling party last
month and an attack against the Indian Embassy in Lima that
coincided with his state visit to India.
Comment: Continuing terrorist attacks in Lima have embarrassed
Garcia politically and focused international attention on the declining
security situation during his administration. His intent to move quickly
against the terrorists undoubtedly stems from a desire to
demonstrate his commitment to stop violence
Top Secret
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SURINAME: Cabinet Resignations
Top Secret
The resignations of at least three Surinamese Cabinet ministers,
including moderate Prime Minister Radhakishun, pave the way for
harsh retaliation against rebels for recent acts of sabotage. According
to a source of the US Embassy in Paramaribo, Radhakishun recently
said he wanted to resign before the military committed more
atrocities against rebels and their supporters in the countryside. The
Embassy confirms that Health Minister Jessurun and Foreign Minister
Herrenberg-a close ally of Head of Government Bouterse-also
resigned. Interi enbosch has been named Acting
Prime Minister.
Comment: The left-leaning Wijdenbosch, also a strong supporter of
Bouterse, is not likely to oppose plans for increased attacks against
the rebels and their rural black supporters. Bouterse probably will
retain Herrenberg in another capacity, but Radhakishun's departure
could prompt additional resignations from the Cabinet by members of
the traditional political parties and by businessmen. Such a reshuffle
might enable Bouterse to deflect blame for the country's deteriorating
economy but would seriously undercut his political legitimacy.
Top Secret
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AUSTRALIA-US: Support for Joint Facilities
of superpower conflict.
According to draft portions of an as yet unreleased Australian
defense white paper provided to US Embassy officials, Prime Minister
Hawke's government will strongly support US-Australian joint defense
facilities. The draft, which will likely be reviewed by the Cabinet later
this month, emphasizes the defensive nature of the facilities and
rejects claims by leftwing groups to the contrary. The paper
commends the deterrent role of the naval facilities at North West
Cape and defends the US presence at Pine Gap and Nurrungar for its
role in early warning and arms control. The draft concedes that the
joint facilities would be attacked in a US-Soviet nuclear exchange but
argues that removal of the US presence would increase the likelihood
limited, regional defense role for Australia. Moreover, the paper's
adoption by the Labor government would indicate that Hawke,
Beazley, and Foreign Minister Hayden have reached agreement
to oppose actively any leftist effort to have the facilities removed.
Comment: The staunch support for the joint facilities is probably
intended to address US and Defense Minister Beazley's concerns
about an earlier study-the Dibb Report-that expounded a more
collapse than ever before,
The larger of two non-Communist resistance groups in Cambodia-
the Khmer People's National Liberation Front-is in greater danger of
Last month, Front leaders moved most of their troops from a
refugee camp in Thailand to a rear base for regrouping and retraining,
but many fighters subsequently deserted.
if the current trend
continues, the Front probably will win a to less than 5,000 men by
the end of this year about one-half its strength in mid-1986.
propaganda windfall.
the rebels as little more than disorganized bandits-with a
Comment: A bitter two-year struggle for power between Front
President Son Sarin and military commander Sak Sutsakhan is
responsible for the disarray, and neither side appears ready to
concede for the sake of unity. If the Thai do not soon intervene to
restore order, the Front will edge closer to disintegration. Its inability
to maintain even a semblance of unity helps assure Khmer Rouge
dominance of the resistance and provides Vietnam-which portrays
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Top Secret
Moroccan forces are preparing to extend the berm-the earthen wall
erected to defend Western Sahara from Polisario Front guerrillas
based in Algeria-to the Mauritanian border. in order to deny the
rebels access to the Atlantic coast. 25X1
says work is scheduled to begin this week on a 25X1
275-mile (450-kilometer) extension of the berm, the first large
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berm will be built too far from Polisario base camps for the guerrillas
to offer more than token resistance to the construction force.
(S NF WN)
Comment: The extension is almost certainly intended to prevent the
Front from operating along the coast. For years, lightly armed
Polisario fighters in high-speed rubber rafts have harassed fishing
boats in that area and have damaged many foreign fishing boats,
including a Portuguese boat that was sunk last month. This has been
a recurring source of embarrassment for Rabat, which posts troops
on the boats for protection. Morocco may also be trying to improve
morale among its forces; he lack
of progress against the Polisario has adversely affected morale.
Negotiations between Egypt and the IMF are in danger of breaking off
without an agreement. The US Embassy in Cairo reports Egypt is
unwilling to submit a specific timetable for implementing reforms on
energy prices, exchange rates, and credit policies. The IMF team is
planning to return to Washington soon without resolving the
stalemate
Comment: President Mubarak's recent decision to call an election
of the People's Assembly has probably reduced the government's
willingness to commit itself on the timing of a reform program that
is certain to be controversial. Moreover, Egypt's improved foreign
exchange earnings and the financial assistance Cairo has begun to
receive from the Persian Gulf states have probably convinced
Mubarak that he now has more breathing space and can afford to
take a harder negotiating stance. Without agreement on a program,
however, Egypt's economic outlook will remain precarious, and
demands for financial ly to become
increasingly strident.
Too Secret
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Top Secret
Mexican Inflation, 1982-87
4exican
G vernme
roi ectio
13 February 1987
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another issue to exploit.
r
wr-TUP-ONW-PROTLE SIX-
member Council for the South, along with governors an deputies for
each province-all selected-by Sadiq-took office Monday. Although
southern politicians earlier had failed to agree on a formula for
governing the region, the announcement came as a surprise; those
leaders intend to prot st the move in a meeting with Sadiq later this
week
Comment: The decision is probably an effort by Sadiq to reassert his
authority after months of frustration. The move almost certainly will
intensify the squabbling among southern politicians, but it will also
anger southerners living in Khartoum and give southern insurgents
Top Secret
MEXICO: Concern Over Economic Program
Mexican officials are concerned that their economic program may
suffer because of a lack of public confidence and the 8.1- ercent
increase in prices last month.
The government
percent.
projects inflation to be 70 to 80 percent, but
observers are generally convinced that it will reach at least 120
recovery is stalled.
Comment: The lack of public confidence might lead to increased
capital flight and a sharp rise in inflation, which would greatly limit the
government's effort to restore economic growth. Last month's price
increase jeopardizes the government's hopes for reduced inflation
this year. Because the budget for this year is based on a forecast of
low inflation, the government's expenditures-especially for domestic
debt payments-are likely to be much higher than projected. The
presidential aspirations of Budget Minister Salinas, who is closely
identified with Mexico's growth program, may be dashed if economic
SUDAN: Controversial Political Moves in South
Prime Minister Sadiq's decision to impose a new administration on
F`7 the country's three southern provinces may create more problems
jL than it solves T
t
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ILLEGIB
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Tog) Secret
- Kabul lodged formal protest with UN over shootdown of AN-26
transport by insurgents in eastern Afghanistan Monday ... regime
claims it was civilian airliner, 30 passengers, six crew killed
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- M.R. Srinivasan named to head India's nuclear program ...
believes priority should be to boost nuclear power, not to develop
nuclear weapons ... may increase efforts to import technology ...
will be adviser to Prime Minister, not decisionmaker.
- Jean Obeid, prominent Christian -aide to Lebanese President
to halt export insurance to Cuba.
Gemayel with ties to Syria at least until recently, was kidnaped
in West Beirut, according to press ... sees self as
uccessor to Gemayel next year.
- Cuba closing commercial office in Milan because of hard currency
shortage, . trade with Italy, sixth
largest Western exporter to Havana, also hurt by Rome's decision
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Special Analysis
LIBYA-CHAD- Moving Closer to Confrontation
FRANCE:
The Libyan military buildup in northern Chad during the past
month has prompted France to send additional troops to the
country as a signal to Libyan leader Qadhafi that Paris will live up
to its commitment to Chadian President Habre. France's recent
forward deployments and willingness to support Habre's forces
in the north increase the possibility of direct conflict with Libyan
forces. If the expected Libyan drive to retake Fada threatens to
overwhelm the Chadian Government forces, the French probably
will use air support to save Habre's troops.
Tripoli has concentrated its efforts over the past month on building a
force to retake Fada, which Chadian Government troops seized early
last month. The Libyan force in northern Chad now numbers about
11,000-an increase from the 7,000 or 8 000 there in mid-January.
More than 4,000 are at Ouadi Doum.
French and Chadian Buildup
Sudanese border.
The French are increasingly concerned about the buildup at Ouadi
Doum and the possibility that Libyan troops could pass through
western Sudan for an attack below the 16th parallel. They have begun
sending additional troops to Chad to set up a logistic base at Abeche
and forward defense positions there and at Biltine and Adre, on the
By this weekend, the French may have as many as 2,400 troops in
Chad. They also have sent air defense radars and Crotale surface-to-
air missiles to Abeche.
area. the pace of air resupply to Bir
says Habre has augmented Chadian air defenses in the Tibesti
Mountains by deployin 42 of the 50 recently delivered Redeye
surface-to-air missiles.
late last month. Meanwhile
Kalait, the Chadian garrison on the 16th parallel, has quickened since
Top Secret
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Probable Strategies
The Libyans will probably follow a cautious strate
in their attempt to
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Habre probably still plans to attack Faya-Largeau, Ouadi Doum, or
both, but he may wait for the Libyans to assault Fada first. He may
calculate that attacking the approaching Libyans between Fada and
the Libyan garrison at Ouadi Doum will disrupt Tripoli's forces and
give his own troops a chance to pursue the Libyans, possibly to Ouadi
Doum or Faya-Largeau.
The deployment of additional Redeyes to the Tibesti area probably
reflects Habre's concern about frequent Libyan airstrikes on Chadian
forces in the far north. Habre is also eager to build on the successes
of his air defense units, which have shot down at least four Libyan
aircraft-two in the Tibesti area-since November.
The French hope that a show of military strength and political resolve
will deter Qadhafi and give them political leverage against Libya. Paris
is leery of dealing with Tripoli, however, and probably is pessi
about reaching agreement soon on a mutual troop withdrawal~lsl~
While efforts to achieve a diplomatic settlement will continue, Paris
will probably try to bluff Tripoli by threatening a strong French
response to any loss of French aircraft or lives. The French do not
want to engage in ground combat but would probably send limited air
support if Libyan forces threatened to deal Habre a major defeat.
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