THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE: STRUGGLING FOR UNITY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00314R000100150004-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 19
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 6, 2010
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: June 1, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of -Sftf"-
Intelligence
Struggling for Unity
The Afghan Resistance:
NESA 84-10200
June 1984
Copy 324
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Struggling for Unity
The Afghan Resistance:
Directorate of Operations.
This paper was prepared byl I Office
of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis, with
contributions from Office of
Central Reference. It was coordinated with the
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, South Asia Division, NESA,
Secret
NESA 84-10200
June 1984
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The Afghan Resistance:
Struggling for Unity
Key Judgments Lack of unity continues to hamper the Afghan resistance. We believe
Information available disunity limits resistance efforts to influence international opinion, to have
as of 31 May 1984 a voice in negotiations on an Afghan settlement, to ensure diplomatic
was used in this report.
support and the flow of money and weapons, and to coordinate military
efforts.
Initiatives for unity have come from the exile community in Europe, the re-
sistance community in Peshawar, and local insurgent commanders in
Afghanistan. In Rome, former Afghan King Zahir Shah is attempting to
join all elements of the resistance and develop international support for a
United Front of Afghanistan. The Front probably will attempt to form a
government-in-exile:
? Zahir probably will fail to develop support from the USSR and Pakistan.
The Soviets want to maintain control over Afghanistan, and the Paki-
stanis want control over negotiations and fear that resistance unity could
be a powerful force in domestic politics.
? Deep divisions among fundamentalist resistance leaders and insurgent
commanders will prevent the United Front from achieving legitimacy.
? Many Afghans feel nostalgia for Zahir but probably not loyalty.
A weak, unevenly supported Afghan government-in-exile could pose
diplomatic recognition problems for Western nations and increase tensions
within the resistance.
We believe the Peshawar resistance groups will not develop more than
temporary, loose alliances formed for financial advantage and because of
outside pressure.
In our view, the guerrilla commanders inside Afghanistan will gradually
improve cooperation in military operations and maintaining supply lines.
Major Soviet operations in spring 1984 prompted several such improve-
ments. The insurgents, however, are unlikely to develop regular interre-
gional cooperation because of ethnic and language barriers, political and
religious differences, and communication problems.
Over the long term, the resistance probably will draw only slightly closer
than it is now.
iii Secret
NESA 84-10200
June 1984
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The Afghan Resistance:
Struggling for Unity
The Afghan resistance continues to be hampered by
lack of overall unity, despite initiatives to achieve that
objective. The absence of an organization able to
speak for the resistance as a whole limits its efforts to
influence international opinion, to have a voice in
negotiations on an Afghan settlement, to ensure con-
tinued diplomatic and material support, and to coordi-
appendixes A and B). In our view, however, the
common elements are insufficient to overcome rival-
ries and grudges, social and ethnic differences, and
conflicting religious views. Some commanders in Af-
ghanistan have begun efforts toward unification. Al-
though the insurgents have shown gradual improve-
ments in military cooperation, the sort of unity that
would permit significant interregional military coop-
nate military efforts.
The most publicized and ambitious of the initiatives
for unity, that of former Afghan King Zahir Shah,
envisions joining all Afghan elements opposing the
Kabul regime. Zahir's
backers have heavily lobbied Western governments to
support the former Afghan King as he -moves toward
forming a government-in-exile. We believe this initia-
tive has mainly grown out of fear that the Afghan
resistance may be left out of any political settlement
on Afghanistan. Zahir's backers also fear loss of
influence to rival resistance organizations unless the
former King leads the cause.
Initiatives in the resistance community in Peshawar
primarily seek stable political coalitions to ensure the
flow of funds and weapons. Initiatives among the
insurgent commanders in Afghanistan have military
cooperation as the main goal. We believe that pros-
pects are dim for all these initiatives.
The exile groups as well as the guerrillas inside
Afghanistan tend to be fractious, and their alliances
frequently shift. The common elements among the
resistance groups are Islam and a desire to oust the
Soviets and replace the Kabul regime (see box and
eration has remained elusive.
The Afghan resistance is divided into hundreds of
different groups. Significant disagreements exist even
about what it means to defend Islam and to free
Afghanistan from the Soviets. Most bands probably
are poorly acquainted with the goals of the fundamen-
talists or the moderates. In northeastern Hazarehjat,
for example, several bands routinely switch allegiance
from one Peshawar-based group to another
hose bands seek considerable
autonomy for their regions or ethnic groups and prefer
minimal interference in local affairs from Kabul.
Other groups, such as Maoists and social democrats,
have little power and are unlikely to influence the
resistance much.
Another factor that hampers intergroup ties is that
the leadership structure is in flux in Afghanistan and
among the refugees who provide the guerrillas' man-
power pool. According to Western journalists, young
men with automatic weapons have replaced village
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elders as the highest authority in areas hard hit by the
war. Only traditional leaders who are combatants
retain their influence. In the refugee camps, rival
groups have formed over distribution of food and arms
and the issue of religion. As they have for centuries,
tribal and ethnic ties continue to divide as well as
unite Afghans. A Pakistani refugee official told West-
ern journalists that it is impossible, for example, to
put Ghilzai tribesmen into a Durrani camp, since 25X1
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neither side would accept such a situation, though
both are ethnically Pushtun. Similar divisions persist
inside Afghanistan, including among the rural inhab-
itants who have sought refuge in Kabul,
Control over distribution of food and
weapons, however, can sometimes cause tribal and
ethnic ties to loosen.
regime.
most fighting among themselves, also have the great-
est access to the world press. Instead of promoting a
common program, however, insurgents provide the
media primarily with fragmentary, exaggerated
claims of successes against the Soviets and the Kabul
without adequate backing.
Zahir's effort to unify the resistance is ambitious and
extensive. Backed by the Peshawar moderate alliance,
Zahir publicly opened his campaign in summer 1983.
His principal goal is to create a United Front of
Afghanistan that can participate in negotiations lead-
ing to a Soviet withdrawal. In summer 1983 an aide to
Zahir said that creation of a government-in-exile
would depend on the will of a national assembly,
which Zahir's supporters hope to convene when suffi-
cient backing has developed. Professing a desire to
serve as a personage around whom the Afghan resist-
ance can coalesce, Zahir in press conferences has
portrayed himself as a conciliator rather than a
leader, disavowing personal ambitions or any attempt
to restore the monarchy (see box and appendix Q.
The former King and his supporters apparently be-
lieve that international support will make him influen-
tial enough to bring the major resistance leaders to his
side. Some observers believe that ambitious advisers
will push Zahir into forming a government-in-exile
The Soviet Position
We believe Zahir is not likely to get Soviet support,
though he realizes the need for it. In a press interview
in June 1983, Zahir indicated that he considers
friendly relations between Afghanistan and the USSR
a necessity, though he harshly condemns the Soviets
and the Kabul regime.
The Soviets have not taken a public position on Zahir
Shah's initiative. In January 1984 limited attacks on
Zahir by Afghan Government media-which are
controlled by the Soviets-testified to Soviet concern
about Zahir's unity effort. The Soviets probably fear
Insurgent efforts to influence international opinion
continue to be hindered by an inability to decide on a
common program. The Peshawar groups, who do the
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Fundamentalist and Moderate Resistance Groups
The fundamentalists are anti-Western as well as anti-
Communist and seek to reorder Afghan society on
Islamic principles, The
most extreme group is the Hizbi Islami faction led by
Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, who favors an Iranian-style
government and society in Afghanistan. The Hizbi
faction led by Yunus Khalis is more open to compro-
mise, and the Jamiat-i-Islami, led by Burhanuddin
Rabbani, is even less doctrinaire. Like the moderates,
Rabbani acknowledges the need for coexistence with
the USSR and has ties with some Afghan exiles in
the West.
The moderates also cover a wide political spectrum.
They acknowledge the need for compromise and
coexistence with the Soviet Union. They have good
connections with the educated refugees in the West,
the former landowners, and the Afghan communities
in the United States and Europe. The Harakat, led
by Muhammad Nabi Muhammadi, is the most con-
servative. The group in the center of the moderate
spectrum is that of Sibghatullah Mojadedi, and the
most nearly Western and closest to the exiled royal
family is the group led by Sayyid Ahmad Gailani.
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that the former King may succeed where the Pesha-
war-based resistance leaders have failed, yet Moscow
does not want to improve his prospects by mounting a
major propaganda campaign against him.
The Soviets may also still hope that Zahir will
ultimately help the Afghan Communists consolidate
their control of Afghanistan. Members of his entou-
rage have told US academic experts there have been
periodic contacts between the Soviets and emissaries
of the former King, although he denies it. Moscow's
preference could be for Zahir to return to Afghani-
stan as a figurehead like Souvanna Phouma in Laos
after the Communist takeover there. We doubt that
Moscow would ever permit the King real power.?
The Pakistani Position
Zahir's backers claim to have the support of President
Zia, but that is not likely. In our view, Pakistan would
have several reasons for opposing the former Afghan
King. A unified resistance would diminish Pakistan's
authority in negotiations toward a political settlement
of the Afghanistan issue. In late autumn 1983,
Pakistan wanted to
increase its influence over the resistance by establish-
ing direct ties with insurgents in the field and circum-
venting the Peshawar parties.
the Pakistani Government wanted to sponsor the
formation of an Afghan exile political council in
Peshawar that could negotiate, under Pakistani guid-
ance, with the Soviets to pursue a peace settlement. In
December 1982 Pakistani officials expressed strong
Afghanistan
reservations about promoting Afghan resistance uni-
ty, claiming that the resistance had sufficient coher-
ence to sustain military operations in Afghanistan.
The Pakistanis feared that resistance unity could be a
powerful force in domestic politics should the refu-
gees' hope of returning to a free Afghanistan fade.
Finally, the Pakistanis disliked Zahir when he was in
power because of his association with the Pushtunis-
tan issue.
We believe, however, that Pakistan will not obstruct
Zahir Shah's efforts. Obstruction could invite interna-
tional criticism and jeopardize relations with Muslim
states that support the resistance. In October 1983 a
Pakistani Foreign Ministry official said that Pakistan
had not formulated any policy in regard to Zahir
Shah. He made clear, however, that Pakistan is not
opposed to a government on good terms with the
Soviets. Recently, Pakistan quietly provided courte-
sies to Zahir's backers.
the Pakistani Government provided facilities and se-
curity for Zahir's representatives in fall 1983 when
they tried to develop support for the former King
among refugees in the North-West Frontier Province
and adjoining tribal areas.
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The Fundamentalists' Position
We believe the opposition of the fundamentalist
resistance groups will prevent Zahir and his backers
from achieving any legitimacy that the planned Unit-
ed Front may eventually claim. Fundamentalists'
reaction to Zahir's program has ranged from passive
opposition to outright hostility.
fundamentalists in Peshawar wi not
suppo~tional assembly planned by Zahir's back-
ers. Programs approved by such an assembly would be
meaningless without participation by most fundamen-
wish to head such an organization. We believe his
opposition to Zahir Shah is more personal than
ideological. Rabbani
believes the former King's plan to develop a united
front is unrealistic. In a Western press interview,
Rabbani said the front would have to be built on
Islamic principles, free from foreign domination. He
sees Zahir as having close ties with the West and not
the Afghan people. The front, said Rabbani, "may not
be led by persons whose relations with the people are
weak and loose." In an interview with a fundamental-
ist publication in early 1984, Rabbani labeled Zahir's
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talist leaders, because they influence the most effec-
tive insurgent groups.
the fundamentalists believe Zahir is morally bankrupt
and has ignored the insurgency while living in comfort
in exile. Some fundamentalists also suspect the mod-
erates are manipulating Zahir and find that sufficient
reason to distrust him
The Jamiat. Jamiat leader Rabbani apparently con-
siders a united resistance desirable for dealing with
the Soviets and Kabul regime, but he would probably
efforts as "impracticable expectations."
some other Jamiat
officials also oppose the return of Zahir. They blame
his policies for leading the Soviets to invade and
believe he would be unfit as spokesman for the
resistance because he lacks influence among the popu-
lace inside Afghanistan.
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The Kabul Regime's Position
We believe the Kabul regime has carefully limited its
attacks on the King, fearing the publicity might
promote Zahir's cause among regime opponents. US
Embassy reports indicate the regime has attacked
Zahir Shah in Afghanistan's English-language press
but not the vernacular press. A commentary in Janu-
ary 1984 entitled "Mad Fantasies of Zahir Shah"
played up charges that the King is backed by the
United States, that he is living in luxury, that his
feudal tenure caused starvation and poverty, and that
he ruled by exploiting conflicts among tribes and
ethnic groups. In autumn 1983, Kabul television
implied criticism of Zahir by briefly showing a photo-
graph of him that was propped against weapons
allegedly captured from insurgents
Hizbi (Khalis). A spokesman for Yunus Khalis in
January 1984 denied that his leader contemplated
cooperating with supporters of Zahir in forming a
united resistance front, asserting that Zahir has not
gathered the necessary public support.
Khalis would be willing to cooperate with
moderate resistance groups, but not under Zahir's
aegis, because that would risk loss of support by his
insurgent followers. Khalis, like Rabbani, according
to the spokesman, blames Zahir for creating condi-
tions that led to the Soviet invasion. US Embassy
officials in Pakistan in January 1984 found no evi-
dence that Khalis was willing to support Zahir-only
speculation by the moderates that he eventually may.
Hizbi (Gulbuddin) and Sayyaf: The most radical
fundamentalists are the most strongly opposed to the
King. In August 1983, Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, head of
the fundamentalist alliance, publicly threatened to kill
Zahir and accused him of having opened Afghanistan
to strong Soviet influence in the 1950s and 1960s by
accepting large amounts of Soviet aid. At a press
conference in Peshawar in August 1983, Gulbuddin
asserted that plans by moderate Afghan leaders to
form a government-in-exile represent a Soviet-US plot
against the Islamic revolution in Afghanistan. Gul-
buddin claimed that the King was a Soviet pawn and
linked the "conspiracy" with the Geneva talks.
Afghan Popular Views
The Afghan people, in our judgment, have little more
than a nostalgic affection for Zahir. That good will,
however, could develop into active support should the
former King receive widespread backing by other
resistance leaders. According to US Embassy reports,
Western reports of Zahir's press interviews aroused
warm memories in Kabul's bazaars of the days before
the Soviet invasion and prompted hope that the
Soviets would soon leave Afghanistan and the King
would return. Western observers note, however, that
the public showed little dismay when the King was
overthrown and regarded some of the King's advisers
with considerable hostility.
Other Initiatives for Unity
The Peshawar Resistance Groups
In our view, the Peshawar resistance groups are
capable of only temporary, loose-knit alliances. The
alliances, we believe, have usually developed for fi-
nancial advantage rather than from common goals
and have existed more on paper than in reality.
the Afghan insurgents
have never been interested in the formation of a
common front (see box). The principal leaders have
long resisted unifying, fearing curbs on their powers
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merge in May 1983 to improve finances.
According to press reports, the seven major funda-
mentalist resistance groups based in Peshawar
formed a loose coalition in 1981 and decided to
the parties continued to function sepa-
and pulled his group out of the alliance.
rately, however, and that bickering in the leadership
caused the alliance to lose influence within Afghani-
stan. In December 1983, Yunus Khalis publicly
charged alliance leader Sayyaf with misusing funds
the fundamentalist alliancefunc-
lis's departure.
affairs.
In our view, one indication of the depth of the
divisions among the Peshawar groups is that major
moves toward unity have not arisen from within.
pressure on the funda-
mentalists in spring 1983 to form an alliance came
from members of the Muslim Brotherhood in several
Persian Gulf states and from the Pakistan Jamaat
Islami Party. The outsiders urged an end to quarrel-
ing, disbanding individual parties, election of officers,
and tighter financial control. The inducement was as
much as $40 million in aid to the alliance but not to
an individual.
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We believe differences between the moderates and 7r-,X1
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abbani has said that, if he is not 25X1
Alliance members' differences sometimes have led to
bloodshed. in October
1983, Gulbuddin's forces attacked Sayyaf's forces in
Wardak Province, and Gulbuddin claimed the attack
was in response to Savvaf's interference in Hizbi
wide divisions exist
between the Jamiat and most other fundamentalists.
US Embassy sources recently speculated that Khalis
and Rabbani may ignore the other fundamentalists
elected resistance head, he and the Jamiat will follow
no other leadership even if 25X1
Zahir succeeded in convening a nationa assembly as
a step toward founding a United Front, there would
still be a split between the moderates and fundamen-
talists. Should Zahir be elected leader, Rabbani be-
lieves, most of the moderates would come over to the
Jamiat. Rabbani indicated that he would in any case
continue to try to unite elements of the Afghan
resistance within Afghanistan under the Jamiat.F_
fundamentalists in maintaining cooperation.
o likelihood exists ofthe
provinces.
ative missionaries supported by Sayyof have
prompted armed clashes within the resistance in three
and criticism of their activities and decisions,
In spring 1984 the fundamen-
talists and moderates made an unprecedented call for
unity and for assistance to the Panjsher Valley insur-
gents, who became the target of a large-scale Soviet
offensive. cooperation
among insurgent groups in the Panjsher Valley area
has improved, but internecine fighting has continued
in several Afghan provinces.
three moderate parties orming a consolidated front.
the three-party moder-
ate alliance holds together because of strong pressure
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from "elements in Europe," presumably the Afghan 25X1
exile community. We believe that the moderates'
European backing and dealings with Zahir Shah will 25X1
prevent reconciliation between them and the funda-
mentalists. even 25X1
the moderates' ostensibly common goal of setting up 25X1
Zahir Shah as resistance spokesman has created
tension. ojadedi and 25X1
Nabi may have reservations about the initiative,
which they see primarily as a Gailani move.
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Major Peshawar Resistance Organizations
Ethnic
Composition
Political/ Religious
Composition
Area of
Strength
Harakat-i-Inqilab-i-Islami
(Islamic Revolutionary
Movement)
Muhammad Nabi
Muhammadi
Pushtun
Hizbi Islami (Islamic Party)
(Gulbuddin)
Gulbuddin Hikmatyar
Pushtun
Hizbi Islami (Islamic Party)
(Khalis)
Muhammad Yunus
Khalis
Pushtun
Islamic Union for the Liber-
ation of Afghanistan
Abdul Rasul Sayyaf
Pushtun
Islamic fundamentalist
Eastern Afghanistan
(mainly Kabul City)
Jabha-i-Najat-i-Milli
Afghanistan (Afghanistan
National Liberation Front)
Sibghatullah Mojadedi
Pushtun
Moderate Islamic
Eastern Afghanistan
Jamiat-i-Islami (Islamic
Society)
Burhanuddin Rabbani
Tajik
Islamic fundamentalist
Northern and Western
Afghanistan
(National Islamic Front)
The Insurgent Commanders Inside Afghanistan
Factors Hampering Unity. Several insurgent com-
manders in Afghanistan have promoted guerrilla uni-
ty, but poor communica-
tions are a major barrier to unification. Ethnic,
cultural, political, and religious differences deter co-
operation as do mountainous terrain, great distances,
and hostile troops between district commanders and
their various headquarters.
Most commanders also lack local and regional politi-
cal ties. Even if the Peshawar exile groups unified, the
effect on the insurgents in Afghanistan would be
slight. the number of
insurgent bands having nominal ties with exile organi-
zations has increased in the past three years. The
exiles, however, do not appear to have any greater
control over the fighting, and most exile leaders have
only limited influence even with the bands that ac-
knowledge their authority.
We believe that many commanders lack political
skills and care about little but their own small areas of
Efforts Toward Unity. In our view, of all the insurgent
commanders in Afghanistan, Panjsher commander
Masood has made the most ambitious effort to build
alliances. Masood
strengthened his standing with the local populace and
with insurgent commanders outside the Panjsher Val-
ley following a cease-fire arrangement with the Sovi-
ets in early 1983. In December 1983, Masood held a
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Probably far more typical than Masood is the Shura
commander of the Hazarehjat, Sayyid Muhammad
Hassan Jaglan.
observer, Jaglan has concluded a cooperative arrange-
ment with Jamiat forces in Ghowr Province. Under
the arrangement, Jaglan prevents rival Hizbi convoys
from passing through the Hazarehjat to Ghowr. In
return, Jamiat forces block the movement of Iranian
arms to a group that rivals Jaglan's in the Hazarehjat.
Throughout 1983,
Jaglan was so preoccupied with fighting rival insur-
gent groups that he had neither the time nor the
manpower to initiate actions against the Soviets
Panfsher Valley insurgent com-
mander Ahmad Shah Masood
conference of Jamiat commanders from eight prov-
commanders from other par-
Masood hoped to win allies without
alienating other groups. His approach involves being
unemotional and carefully balanced, finding capable
aides, and having sufficient military supplies to dis-
tribute to new groups or groups whose support is
needed.
By December 1983,
Masood had expanded his ties to both Jamiat and
non-Jamiat commanders, establishing links with ma-
jor groups in Balkh, Herat, and the Hazarehjat. He
was also seeking close links with Jalaluddin, a po
ful Hizbi (Khalil) commander in Paktia Province.
Masood believes a further
political move now-such as setting up an Afghan
political council-would be remature and would lack
popular support. no
merger is possible because of traditional rivalries as
well as Masood's distrust of the hardliners and the
hardliners' suspicion of Masood for his willingness to
negotiate.
Jaglan is trying to improve cooperation with other
groups that share his enmities, but his attempts seem
inept. in early 1983, for 25X1
examp e, Jag an sent a tests as emissaries to a
conservative Jamiat group in Faryab Province.=
Jaglan wants self-rule in the
azare ,fat and has little interest in who governs in
Kabul so long as the Hazarehjat retains its autonomy.
Over the long term, the resistance probably will not
draw much closer together than it is now because of
political and religious differences. Outside pressure is
unlikely to bring the resistance politically closer to-
gether. Various Saudi groups provided the impetus for
the fundamentalist alliance, but it has never devel-
oped more than nominally and now seems to be
disintegrating. More funds from Saudi sources will
not keep the alliance from breaking up. Afghan exiles
in Europe have persuaded the moderates to maintain
a loose alliance but can do little more. Iran's influence
is limited to the extreme fundamentalists. Pakistan,
because of its own concerns for control, has little
desire to see a truly unified resistance. No other
nations have sufficient influence with major resistance
elements to be able to affect moves toward unity.
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We believe an even chance exists that Zahir Shah and
his backers-with exaggerated claims of support-
will convene a national assembly and set up a govern-
ment-in-exile. Any Afghan government-in-exile will
lack solid support from the insurgents and various
resistance organizations because political, religious,
and ethnic differences are likely to remain very
strong. A weak, unevenly supported government-in-
exile would be worse than none at all because it would
increase tensions among resistance factions. We see
little hope, moreover, that the Soviets will seek a
negotiated settlement that would result in an Afghan
regime acceptable to all major parties (see box).
We believe the Peshawar parties will continue quar-
reling and that their control over insurgent command-
ers will remain quite limited. Inside Afghanistan, the
commanders will probably continue to increase coop-
eration gradually, with Jamiat forces in particular
growing more cohesive. We believe, however, that
unity will elude both the political and military ele-
ments of the Afghan resistance.
Implications for the United States
A weak, unevenly supported Afghan government-in-
exile would present several problems for the United
States and its allies. Its establishment could embar-
rass the host country and give rise to Soviet counter-
measures and pressure. It would also pose diplomatic
In spite of the optimism of some resistance figures, we
believe it is highly unlikely that the Soviets will pull
out of Afghanistan without a pro-Soviet government
firmly in place.
recognition problems for Western nations that main-
tain embassies in Kabul. Were the United States or
other Western governments to recognize the govern-
ment-in-exile, little justification would exist for main-
taining embassies in Kabul. Were the embassies to
close, an international window on the war would close.
Western ties to a government-in-exile formed by
Zahir and the moderates would generate greater anti-
Western feeling among the fundamentalist insurgents.
Soviet countermeasures could include military pres-
sure on Pakistan or aid to opposition elements in any
country serving as host for the government-in-exile.
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Appendix A
Selected Major Insurgent Groups
Abdul Hai
11,000 men
Jamiat-i-Islami
Baghlan Province
Abdul Haq
6,000 to 7,000 men
Hizbi Islami (Khalis)
Kabol Province
Abdullah
300 to 360 men
Jamiat-i-Islami
Badakhshan Province
Amin Wardak
1,500 to 3,000 men
Mahaz-i-Milli-Islami
Ghazni and Vardak Provinces
Din Muhammad Khan
5,000 men
Harakat-i-Inqilab-i-Islami
Balkh Province
Turan Muhammad Ismail Khan
600 men
Jamiat-i-Islami
Herat Province
Jamiatullah Jalal
500 to 1,500 men
Independent front
Honarha Province
Ahmad Shah Masood
7,000 men
Jamiat-i-Islami
Parvan and Kapisa Provinces
Amir Ostat Abdulai
4,000 men
Jamiat-i-Islami
Baghlan Province
Haji Anwar Pilot
2,000 men
Harakat-i-Inqilab-i-Islami
Farah Province
Sayyid Muhammad Hassan
Jaglan
15,000 to 20,000 men
Shura-Inqilab-i-Itafaq-i-Islami
Hazarehjat
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3ecrer
Appendix B
Religion, like tribal ties, divides as well as unites
Afghans. Approximately 75 percent of Afghans are
Sunni Muslims and 25 percent are Shia. Within each
of the two communities,
=a wide range of opinion separates numerous
factions. In our view, no sect can become influential
enough to unite the resistance, though one group, in
particular, may be working to do so. Sufism-an
ascetic, mystical form of Islam that has both Sunni
and Shia adherents in Afghanistan-provides cohe-
sion in certain areas.
Sufis have recently begun attempts to spread their
beliefs among Afghan refugees in Pakistan. In some
places Sufism is both a religious and a political force,
serving to bind together adherents from different
ethnic groups and insurgent organizations.
Sufism as a politi-
cal-religious force is most influential in northwestern
Afghanistan, where spiritual guides arbitrate differ-
ences between insurgent groups resulting from ethnic
frictions or partisan rivalry. In Faryab Province, one
Sufi leader has been very successful in controlling
internecine feuding. Where their influence is strong,
Sufi religious leaders can determine who becomes a
resistance organization province chief. Herat is the
largest Sufi stronghold in Afghanistan. In the insur-
gent organizations based around Herat City, most
local commanders and their followers are members of
a single Sufi organization. In eastern Afghanistan,
Sufi political leaders such as Gailani seldom spend
time on religious responsibilities, devoting themselves
instead to resistance politics.
in autumn 1983 that a Sufi insur-
gent organization, the Madrasa-i-Koran, is working to
unite the various Afghan resistance organizations.
The group's leader claims to have 10,000 members
dispersed throughout other insurgent organizations in
Afghanistan and 70,000 civilian members.
Mirajan Saheeqi, leader of the Madrasa, claims that
his members have infiltrated major resistance organi-
zations and are moving into senior positions. They
believe they will have to fight the Soviets for years
and are preparing for the struggle by providing
political and religious indoctrination to all members,
insurgents and civilians. The leaders are working on a
representative form of government for Afghanistan
that would bear no resemblance to the authoritarian
government in Iran. The organization has published
in Dari several books and manuals for its member-
ship. Some are doctrinal and political, and others are
military training manuals
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necrea
Appendix C
The United Front
of Afghanistan
According to a document from Zahir Shah's organi-
zation, the United Front is to be governed by a council
that will follow Islamic principles and will represent
all elements of Afghan society. The council is to
consist of representatives from each province and
district, from the nomadic tribes in the various regions
of the country, from each resistance organization,
from refugees in Pakistan and Iran, from European
Afghan exiles, and from immigrants to the United
States, India, and other countries. Religious figures,
spiritual leaders, prominent civil and military person-
alities, intellectuals, and tribal chieftains will also be
included.
The most important of Zahir's supporters are the
three moderate resistance leaders, since they are the
only ones who retain any influence among the insur-
gent commanders within Afghanistan. The person-
ages who approved the plan for the United Front of
Afghanistan at meetings in Rome in August 1983,
include:
Former Afghan Ambassador to the
UN.
Muhammad Nabi Head of the Harakat.
Muhammadi
The publicly announced principles for the United
Front are based on UN resolutions that:
? Afghanistan be a neutral, nonaligned Islamic state.
? All Soviet forces be withdrawn.
? Afghanistan's territorial integrity be respected.
? Afghanistan has the right to self-determination with
no foreign interference.
? Afghanistan's spiritual and national values be re-
stored.
plans for forming the
front involve following the traditional Afghan pattern
of calling a national assembly to ratify a charter for
the United Front.
the front will act as an official
voice theistance, not as a movement to restore
the monarchy. A document on the arrangements for
establishing the front indicates that the alliance of
moderate resistance groups, the Islamic Unity, will
perform the functions of the United Front until it can
be established.
Sayyid Abroad Gailani Head of the National Islamic
Front.
Sibghatullah Mojadedi Head of the Afghan National
Liberation Front.
Muhammad Yussuf Former Afghan Prime Minister.
Abdullah Malikyar Former Afghan Ambassador to the
United States.
Abdul Wali Former head of the Afghan Army,
Zahir's son-in-law.
25X1
25X1
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Secret
Secret
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