CZECHOSLOVAK COMMUNIST PARTY: BACKGROUND OF THE SLANSKY PURGE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00457R012700380009-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 11, 2013
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: July 16, 1952
• Content Type: REPORT

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FEB 1952 DA-4AA
CLASSIFICATION
COUNTRY
SUBJECT
DATE OF
INFO.
PLACE
ACQUIRED
Czechoslovakia
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION
50X1-HUM
INFORMATION REPORT REPORT
Czechoslovak Comminist Party:
Background of the Slansky Purge
CD NO.
DATE DISTR.
NO: OF PAGES
NO. OF ENCLS.
(LISTED BELOW)
SUPPLEMENT TO
REPORT NO.
50X1-HUM
16 July 1952
8
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THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE
OF THE UNITED STATES, WITHIN THE MEANING OF TITLE 18, SECTIONS 793
AND 794, OF THE U.S. CODE, AS AMENDED. ITS TRANSMISSION OR REVE-
LATION OF ITS CONTENTS TO OR RECEIPT BY AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS
PROHIBITED BY LAW. THE REPRODUCTION OF THIS FORM IS PROHIBITED.
THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION 50X1-HUM
1.
2.
The first step in the decisive attack against Rudolf Slansky and his com-
panions was the liquidation of Marie Svermova, Ota Sling, Viteslav Fuchs and
other Party officials who were known to be members .of the Slansky group.
The purpose of these first arrests was to lay the groundwork for the arrest
of Slansky and to test the reaction of the Czechoslovak public in the event
of his arrest. The psychological preparation of public opinion for Slansky's
arrest involved constant discussion at Party meetings of the cases against
Svermova, Sling, Fuchs, and other arrested Party members, with emphasis on
their connections with the West.
the Svermova case to the former Czechoslovak military attache 50X1-HUM
in Rome, Major Arnost Siibiger, who knew Svermova very well from the days
of his residence in the USSR. He emphatically denied that Svermova could
be a traitor, and was convinced that her arrest was merely a political
error which would-be rectified. HiB interpretation of her arrest was that
Sling deliberately tried to transfer blameto SvertSva, thus hoping to save
himself:
The Czechoslovak Ambassador in Rothe, Dr: Miloplav Matousek, who was in
Prague at' that time,-believ'ed that Svermova was merely a victim of her
own lack of political insight because she spoke too freely about confidential
Party matters.
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4. The leading officials of the Italian Communist Party who knew Svermova
well as a result of her political activity in the USSR and during her
residence in Italy in the spring of 1948 were very surprised by her purge'
from the KSC and by her later arrest. Matteo Secchia, Edoardo d'Onofrio,
and Vittorio Vidale voiced the opinion that perhaps it might be possible to
accuse Svprmova of a lack of political acumen, but that it was difficult
to believe that she, as early as the time of her residence in Moscow, was
a spy for the West. Matteo Secchia, at the request of his brother, Pietro
Secchia, spoke to Bedrich Geminaer in Prague about the Svermova case.
Geminder was not able to give him any-concrete news because the case was
still being investigated.
6.
the activities of Svermova were under
investigation, and that it was not at that time possible to publish the
results of the investigation because a very extensive network was involved,
and all aspects were not yet clear.
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the future would reveal the extent of Svermova's 50X1-HUM
participation in the activities of Sling.
7. The reaction of people of various political orientations in Czechoslovakia
fell into the following Categories: 50X1-HUM
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a. Those who were hostile towards the present regime welcomed the arrest
of Sling, Svermova, and companions as proof of inner conflicts within
the Czechoslovak Communist Party (KSC).
b. Those KSC members who tried to view the situation objectively were
unpleasantly affected by the arrest Of,Sverm9V4,_becau%e.Svernova had a
certain amount of popularity, especially amOng women. The published
reasons for herarrest were not convincing enough fully to justify
the action.
c. Those KSC members who adhered unquestioningly to the. Party line merely
parroted the reasons given by Vaclav Kbpecky in the Central Committee (UV)
of the KSC, making no attempt to explain them logically. _ _
, 8. In contrast to this, the Sling case did not evoke from the public any
particular reaction. Svermova was considered a victim of Sling.
9. The Czechoslovak deputy commercial attache in Rome, Josef Pliva,--who was
a.member of the KSC in Brno and who came to Rome in August 1951, said that
Sling was unpopular among Party members in the Brno region because of his
dictatorial manner. Slings attempt to build socialism rapidly and his
failure to take into consideration the special conditions prevailing in the
Brno region greatly contributed to his unpopularity. Sling's unpopularity
was greatest among the farmers who were compelled by drastic measures to
join the agricultural Cooperatives (JZD). Even among factory workers, how-
ever, the position of Sling was not much better. He tried to introduce
constantly higher labor norms, resulting in a decline of wages. -These
measures caused increasing unrest among the factory workers which resulted
in several strikes in departments of Zbrojovka Brno, where Pliva was employed
at that time. In several cases the KSC regional leaders in Brno were compelled
to retreat from their positioni because the KSC factory organizations and the
trade union organizations, under pressure from their members, were '6pposed to
the measures advanced by Sling. For this reason Sling's removal and arrest
provoked no unfavorable reaction in the Brno region; on the contrary, the
action was well received.
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10. Aster the arrest of Svermova and Sling, a number of Party officials in various
regions were arrested. All of these officials were known as collaborators of
Slansky, and it was obvious then that the net around Slansky and his closest
collaborators, who held important posts directly in the Central Secretariat
of the Party, was being tightened slowly but surely.
11. Not only Gottwald, but also Zapotocky was interested in the removal of
Slansky. Zapotocky supported Gottwald in this action. His reasons, however,
were quite different from those of Gottwald.
12. Gottwald acted against Slansky chiefly to enhance his personal position.
Es goal was to seize undisputed power within the state, and to accomplish
this goal he used methods similar to those of Stalin in liquidating opposition.
Had Gottwald, in removing Slansky, advanced only the argument that Slansky
and his group had tried to remove Gottwald, many people, even within the KSC,
would have proclaimed Slansky as a national martyr who merely opposed the
creating of a personal dictatorship by Gottwald. For the sake of public
opinion, therefore, it was argued that Slansky was not only a traitor to the
Party, but also a traitor to the country who had collaborated with the Western
powers for the purpose of establishing a Titoist regime in Czechoslovakia.
Therefore, after the arrest of Slansky the charge was advanced that "Slansky
was an ageht of the Western imperialists and had made preparations to flee
to the West."
13. Gottwald dared to make such a direct attack against Slansky becaUse he knew
that Slansky's popularity among the Czechoslovak population, was quite small
because of his wholly pro-Soviet political orientation. Zapotocky, in one
of his articles published in Prace prior to 1948, emphasized that although
in building socialism in Czechoslovakia the examples and experiences of
the USSR had to be followed, certain experiments could not be transferred
blindly. He wrote that, in applying these principles, the specific conditions
prevailing in Czechoslovakia had to be taken into consideration. Certain
Party members of long standing blamed Slansky for not paying adequate attention
to the special economic and political conditions existing in Czechoslovakia
when applying Soviet methods, and felt that Czechoslovak production suffered
because of this. This criticism was voiced by Dr. Velda Pithart, Deputy
Minister of Industry; 3ing. Dr. J. Jicinsky? director general of the Czechoslovak
United Steel Works; bag. K. Kabelle? coke industry specialist and director of
the coke kilns at Kladno; Dora Smolkova; and several others.
14. Gottwald's. accusation that Slansky and his collaborators were responsible
for the failure of Czechoslovakia to fulfill the economic plan was an argument
prepared for the benefit of Moscow which was of considerable importance. The
USSR was dissatisfied because of the_failure-of Czechoslovakia to fulfill the
Five-Year Plan, especially in the realms of heavy industry and agriculture, and
hence to fulfill her obligation to deliver a specified amount of material to the
USSR. Thus, upon Slansky and his companions was heaped the blame for the bad
internal economic situation existing in Czechoslovakia.
15.
no improvement in the economic
conditions in Czechoslovakia over those of the fall of 1950. 50X1-HUM
Gottwald cleverly exploited the anti-Semitism existing in Czechoslovakia by
branding Slansky as a Jewish cosmopolite. The purge of SlanslOsgroup had some
effect on almost all of the Jews in the Party; today only a small number of50X1-HUM
Jews hold their original posi ions Anti-Semitism was stronger in Slovakia
than in Bohemia and Moravia. 1
describe Slansky as the exponent of international Jewry, who'appointed.Jews
irrespetive of their bourgeois origin to all important administrative And
production posts. in no Slovak factory 50X1-HUM
could a Jew be found doing manual labor and that every third director was of
Jewish-Hungarian descent. I
During the days of the First Republic, Jews in Slovakia were the main 50X1-HUM
representatives of capitaliwm and therefore-Slovak worker3continueito regard
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them as capitalists. The fact that the overwhelming majority of these Jews
joined the Communist Party did not change the attitude of Slovaks toward
them.; the time span of their political transformation was too short to erase
from the mind.s of Slovaks the association of Jews with capitalism. Thus,
the antiSemitism of Slovaks could not be regarded as based on xacism;
rather it had a Marxian basis, since the Jews prior to World War II were
the main capitalist exploiters of the Slovak working class. In addition
to this, Jews in Slovakia were also the chief propagators of Hungarianism,
and thus, from the national point of view, were the enemies of the Slovak
people.
similar opinions, though to a lesser degree, were also
spreading among Czech Communists. .
Knor, as Party
instructor, encountered these v1ews at many Party meetings and passed this
information on to Minister of the Interior Vaclav Nosek, with whom he .was
in constant contact. Nosek could give no explanation of the sudden wave
of anti-Semitic feeling.
17. a logical explanation of the above could be that Gottwald
deliberately supported the dissemination of anti-Semitism by his agents
as one means of accelerating the downfall of Slansky And his adherents.
If this explanation is correct, Gottwald Was again merely acting according
to the Soviet pattern since in the USSR Jews were also labelled class
enemies and carriers of capitalism and were then liquidated. -
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18. the time when Slansky was removed from his post 50X1-HUM
as Secretary General of the KSC and appointed a deputy premier of the
Government. The public was not antagonized by Slanskys removal and accepted
the news bassively. 50X1-HUM?
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a. Zapotocky told that Slansky in his self-criticism had, for the most
part, admitted the errors made by the KSC Secretariat and had stated
that he was being given an opportunity to prove by his work that tib
personally was not guilty of those errors.
b.
Dora Smolkova, a pre-war meMber of the Party who had lived for some
time in the USSR, thought that the removal of Slansky from his post
as Secretary General of the KSC was only a step toward his total liquidation,
after which control of the Party would pass to Gottwald and his followers.
With reference to the role of Zapotocky in this action, Smolkova said_
that "Tonik" (Zapotocky) ceased to hold Slansky in esteem when Slansky
adopted too dictatorial a policy on questions which were within the
competence of the cbvernment to decide. Smolkova expressed her
apprehension lest one personal. dictatorship (of Slansky and his followers)
be replaced by another (of Gottwald and his followers), which would
impair the prestige of the Party even more,_not only in the eyes of the
Czechoslovak people, but also in MOSCOW. Moscow, she said, already
viewed with distrust everything that happened in Czechoslovakia,
why she was so skeptical about the contemporary political 50X1-HUM
situation, she replied that she had recently talked with. leading Soviet
trade union officials during their visit to Pragueland that they were not
at all enthusiastic about what they say in Czechoslovakia and made this
known to Frantisek Zupka, the chairman of the Central Trade Union Council
(URO).
c. Dr. Matousek, Czechoslovak Ambassador in Romelwas very skeptical about
the Slansky case. He stated that he did not quite understand what was
happening, because Slansky's self-criticism, which was read. at secret
Party meetings, seemed to him unnatural, forced, and too superficial to
give an indication of what was actually involved. Matousek was a good
friend of Slansky since before the war, and had assisted, as an obstetrician,
at the birth of Slansky's first child.
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d. F. Knox*, mentioned above (paragraph 16), was convinced that Slansky's
liquidation was the work of Gottwald, but he was skeptical about the
opinion, widely accepted at the time, that the victory of Gottwald meant
the creation of a basis for so-called nationalistic communism. In
his opinion, MOSCOW would never allow the Uevelopment of such a tendency
within Czechoslovakia under the prevailing internatioral-aitilation..' On
the contrary, Knorr thought that the victory of Gottwald meant even closer
attachment to the US.
e. People who were not Party members generally felt 50X1 -HUM
that with the removal of Sisnsky the worst 'villain" in Czechoslovakia
was gone, political persecution of non-Party citizens might decrease,
and a partial detachment from the influence of Moscow would take place.
19. From what has been said above it would follow that the general reaction to
Slansky's arrest within the Party and among non-Party citizens within
Czechoslovakia was not as unfavorable as may have been assumed abroad. A
psychological preparation of public opinion for the liquidation of Slansky
and his adherents had been made. Thus, Slansky had not been arrested in
September 1951/ since it was necessary to ascertain first what public
reaction should be expected in the event of his arrest. He was arrested
only when it became obvious that his followers were a minority and that no
grave political consequence would result from his liquidation, and this was
followed by the systematic arrest of all those who were suspectedl-even
slightly, of being in his camp.
20. Slansky's arrest was followed by an upsurge of general nervousness in
Czechoslovakia, which was reflected in a further decline of labor efficiency/
both in agriculture and in industry, especially in coal) iron and steel
production. The arrest of Slansky and of those under his influence failed
to have a positive effect upon the Czechoslovak economy. Gottwald and
Zap/Stocky face difficulties in explaining this situation to Moscow' sinceit
was one of their charges that Slansky was chiefly responsible for the
economic situation in Czechoslovakia. It is probable that the purpose of
the visit of Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Valerian A..Zorin to Prague in
the spring of 1952 has been tO investigate the above conditions in Order to
give Moscow a basis for necessary action. 50X1 -HUM
the official announcement of the arrest of Slansky; Geminder?
and the others provoked a greater response within the Cominform than within
the KC.
50X1 -HUM
In circles close to the Cominform In Italy, the news of the arrest of Slansky,
and perhaps even more that of Geminder, was received with great surprise and
with a certain amount of skepticism. Immediately after the arrest' ofSlansky
and Geminder was announced, Pietro and Matteo Secchia asked for an explanation/
as the arrest had not been expected.
it was therefore agreed that the Italian Communist Party (CPI) would
send Matte? Secchia and Deputy Andivio3 to Prague and Moscow to ascertain
on the spot what had happened, and to assure the security of the secret CPI
archives which were being ' ent by Czechoslovak Embassy courier mail from 50X1 -HUM
Roulet() Prague to.Geminder.It was further agreed that Andivio, who knew
Gottwald personally, woudd deal directly with Gottwald aria would deliver to him
a personal letter from Palmiro Togliatti. Pietro Secchia mentioned that a
few days earlier he had received several letters signed by Geminder. He also
stated that a translation into Italian of some of Slansky's writings concerning
agricultural policy was being discussed. He was unnble to understand how
it was possible .,hat -Slansky, shortly'before his arrest, had obtained one of
the highest decorations of Czechoslovakia, and that, a few days prior to his
arrest, publication was begun of an edition of his complete writings 1n
view of the confused situation, L'Unita was instructed to publish only the
official announcement of the arrest as broadcast by Radio Prague and for
the time being to refrain from any comment.
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23. The arrest of Slansky was more or less a surprise to the Soviet Fmbassy in
Rome.
211
Kostylev felt that the most serious factor
was that the warrant against Slansky had been signed by Zapotocky himself.
Later, as news came in concerning the subsequent arrests of Slansky
collaborators, Mikhailov always asked whether or not the person concerned 50X1-HUM
was a Jew. He gradually gravitated toward the conviction that the purge
within Czechoslovakia involved liquidation of the so-called Jewish cosmopolites.
Kostylev openly declared his view that what was involved in the Slansky ?
case was probably a large conspiracy of international Jewry against Czechoslovakia.
and that the public trial, which he felt should be held as soon as possible 50X1-HUM
would show the Czechoslovak working people the issues at stake.
he hoped that there were no more Jew 50X1-HUM
Czechoslovak Embassy in Rome. the USSR had to fight
similar difficulties, that theseaifficulties were only of a temporary 50X1-HUM
nature which had been successfully overcome, and that this would certainly
also be true in our case,
25. Matteo Secchia, after his five-week trip to Prague and Moscow, was not as
optimistic as Kostylev. the CPI archives were found to be 50X1-HUM
in complete order and that he had spoken personally to Gottwald- and had
come to an agreement that the archives would continue to be sent to Prague.
1 He had also come to an agreement with Gottwald. about a list of CPI members
who could in the future get Czechoslovak visas without previous consent of
Prague, merely on the basis of a written request from Togliatti, Pietro
Secchia or d'Onofrio (but not of Giuseppe di Vittorio).
26. As far as Slansky aria Geminder were concerned, Matteo Secchia said he was
assured by Gottwald that there was abundant, convincing evidence proving -
their guilt. This evidence was to be presented at a trial held during 50X1-HUM
the second half of April 1952.
27.
284
it was difficult to ascertain who
was to be blamed for the current economic and political situation:. He stated'
that no economic improvement was apparent in Czechoslovakia, even after
the liquidation of Slansky. In answer to a question concerning the validity .
of the charge that Slansky and Geminder were actually Western agents, Secchia
replied that there were many types of so-called indirect collaboration from
which a charge could be formulated. As far as Geminder was concerned,Secchla
expressed his opin.lon that Geminder would not appear in. the same trial with
Slanaky. The whole internal KSC situation was so complicated, he said, that
a persbn did not know whom it was possible to believe. Therefore, CPI mail .-
to the KSC which was transmitted by Czechoslovak diplomatic courier was to be
addressed to the Foreign Department of the UV KSC, without Indication of
any individual addressee. Secchia said that the future chief of the Foreign
Department of the UV KSC would probably be Antonin Novotny, but until the
CPI received official notification of this, all mail would be addressed in the
manner described above.
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Vidali, declared
I:rankly that he did not believe Slansky and Geminder were Western agents,
since he knew them very well as a result of their previous activity In the
Comanform. He said that they probably made certain political mistakes from
which it would be possible to deduce Western connections. The trial.against
them would certainly be very interesting ftoM a pOlitical.pbint of vielq, but,
if not well prepared; it would harm rather than benefit their accusers.
29. Dr. Matousek was very disturbed by Slansky's arrest. As his wife told. mine,
he expected his recall daily. After the subsequent arrest of Slansky's
collaborators, especially after the arrest of General Jaroslav Prochazka and
the removal of LadislavKopriv9. as Minister of National Security, 50X1-HUM
he had ceased to understand all that was happening in Czechoslovakia since
he had known personally most of the persons arrested. They had all worked
for some time within the USSR, and there had never been the least suspicion
that they were unfriendly toward the USSR.
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Zapotocky, who signed the warrant against Slansky? was not 50X1-HUM
motivated by personal interest as Gottwald was. Zdpotocky was aware of the
fact that Slansky and his group had seized most of the key positions both in
the economic and political spherea) so that the Government was in a position
inferior to that of the Secretartat-of the Party. This naturally damaged
the prestige of the Government in the eyes of the public. Things had progressed
so far that general managers of Czechoslovak nationalized enterprises, in
order to settle important matters, did not conduct their business with the
ministry of the Udilstry tolihich.they were subordinate, but went directly to
the Secretariat Of the XSC? where the final decisions were made.
the chief political director of the Czechoslovak me a urgic
industry, Fr. Kacha, in 1951. KOpecky, especially, criticized Slansky --."50X1-HUM
this respect. It was the general opinion that the ruling power within
Czechoslovakia was centered in the UV KC and not in the Government.
31. :Zapotocky considered this tactical approach of Slansky detrimental both to the
Party and to the building of socialism in Czechoslovakia, and, therefore, joined
forces with Gottwald. in order to weaken Slansky's hegemony. It is open to
question if Zapotocky fully agreed with the arrest of Sisnsky and his followers
as agents ,Ig the West since in the case of Vladimir Clementis he had suggested
that a less drastic measure be taken. The fact remains that it was Zapotocky
who signed the warrant for Slansky's arrest. This fact, however, does not
constitute sufficient proof that Zapotocky agred with this measure of Gottwaldts,
since it is always he who is called upon to announce unpopular measures- This
is well known among his followers, who do not condemn Zapotocky for the government
measures he makes public.
32, The Siansky purge has been .so. extensive that even the persons but slightly
suspected of being followers of Slansky, or of having a critical attitude
about Soviet policies., have been arrested. It is possible to deduce that
. Gottwald was given a free hand by Moscow to create order within Czechoslovakia.
The results, however, have been fur from Satisfactory from Moscow's point
of vieWl as indicated by the following
a. Labor morale and efficiency still have a declining tendency.
b. Even the mass mobilizaelon of various population strata into production,
especially of women, as not raised production to the level anticipated
by the Five-Year Plan.
c. Declining production, which has become chronic in Czechoslovakia, i?
a
responsible for the failure of Czechoslovakia to fulfill the obligations
imposed by Moscow for the rearnamen;of the satellites which do not as
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yet have war industries of their own. This failure hampers the USSR
.considerably in its war preparations since it is one of the chief tasks
Of Czechoslovakia to produce arms and other war material, and not to form
a large army. In this connection Zapotocky for
the time being, did not believe in the possibility of war between the US$R
and the US. He stated that it was necessary for Czechoslovakia to build
'up it industry, which is of greater importance than the creation Of an
exceedindylarge Czechoslovak army. Frantisek Kalkns, former UV XSC
member and head of the Civil Servants Association of URO, as 50X1-HUM
early as 1950 that the main task of Czechoslovakia in the event of war
would not be to create a large Czechoslovak army but to produce arms and
war materials. Since Czechoslovakia had the greatest number of specially
qualified workmen for this type of work and since such workmen were scarce
in the USSR and the other satellite states, it would be a pity to use them
as soldiers.
d. The standard of living in Czechoslovakia is continually declining. This
leads to a gradual deterioration of political morale which is evident
from the constantly decreasing attendance at KC meetings.
33. As economic conditions within Czechoslovakia have not improved since the
arrest of Slansky, Zorin was sent to Prague in May 1952 to ascertain the
situation. Gottwald has been "sick" for a considerable time, and does not
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appear in public. Today, Zapotocky appears before the public as the de
facto head of the state. Prior to Gottwald's "sickness" it was Zapotocky
who did not appear officially in public.
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first secretary of the
Polish Embassy in Rome, 4apOtoc1y was sharply criticized during a secret
session of the Cominform in January, 1952rin Warsaw, for the failure of
Czechoslovakia to fulfill its Obligations to the USSR and other satellites.
As a result of this, Zapotocky was called to Moscow in February, 1952, together
with Minister of Foreign Trade Antonin Gregor, to report on the economic
and political situation in Czechoslovakia. 50X1-HUM
The temporary "illnesses" first of Zapotocky, and, at the present time,
of Gottwald have a direct connection with the case of Slansky and his
followers. MOSCOW is now_reviewing the advisability of Slansky's arrest
in view of the fact that Gottwald's and Zapotocky's hopes regarding an
improvement of the political and economic situation have not materialized.
It is for this reason that the trial of Slansky? which was to have been staged
in the latter half of April , has been postponed for an indefinite period
of time. In this connection, other political surprises may come; as for
example, treatment of Gottwald in the USSR, or Zapotocky 4! to ill aft
to prevent him from fulfilling his duties as Premier, etc. A of this will
depend on the report Zarin will forward to the Kremlin.
35. additional purges within the leadership of the
bring about the results Moscow expects from Czechoslovakia.
such purges can only lead to further deterioration of the internal economic 50X1 -HUM
and political situation. Gottwald, and to even a greater degree, Zapotocky?
today enjoy a certain popularity within Czechoslovakia; their removal would
do more harm than good. If they are liquidated in the future, it will
indicate that the international political situation has become so grave that
the USSR has no time to consider advantages and disadvantages of such measures,
and is using methods usually adopted in handling occupied countries in time of
war.
Kisc will not 50X1-HUM
50X1-HUM
SECRET
, Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/11: CIA-RDP82-00457R012700380009-8