THE SOVIET FOREIGN PROPAGANDA APPARATUS

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• Publication Date: April 1, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
The Soviet Foreign
Propaganda Apparatus
SOV 86-10016X
April 1986
484
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Intelligence
The Soviet Foreign
Propaganda Apparatus
This paper was prepared by
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Office of Soviet Analysis,F
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Central Reference. Comments and queries are
welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Third
World Activities Division, SOYA,
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Secret
SOV 86-10016X
April 1986
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Summary
Information available
as of 15 March 1986
was used in this report.
Propaganda Apparatus I 25X1
The Soviet Foreign
Union and to negate Western influence.
The Soviet Union devotes major resources to conveying Soviet views and
disseminating anti-Western propaganda to an increasingly large and
diverse audience. Moscow's primary instruments for attacking Western
initiatives and promoting Soviet policies on a day-to-day basis are its news
agencies and radiobroadcasts, as well as the coverage it gets in the foreign
media. Many other activities that serve a propaganda function-cultural
exchanges, scholarships, and high-level visits, for example-are used in an
effort to evoke in foreign audiences a positive sentiment toward the Soviet
tailor its articles for specific foreign countries, but
TASS, the Soviet Union's official news agency, has offices in 126
countries. Its effectiveness has been hampered by the Soviets' failure to
TASS is attempting to make its copy "more readable" for its
audiences by including more human-interest stories.
The USSR's "unofficial" news agency, APN (Novosti), distributes infor-
mation to at least 5,000 press and information organs in 110 countries. In
contrast to TASS, APN emphasizes the tailoring of propaganda for
individual countries, particularly developing countries. This effort includes
using foreign nationals, introducing a teletype service, and relying more on
photographic materials. APN also conducts a grant program that brings
substantial numbers of foreign journalists and public officials to the USSR.
the program is designed to
the world.
motivate recipients to speak and write favorably about the Soviet Union
upon their return. In 1983 the program had 2,000 recipients from around
The Soviets have the capacity to reach virtually every corner of the globe 25X1
with their radiobroadcasts. For the past 20 years they have gradually been
increasing their radiobroadcasts, and by the end of 1984 they were
broadcasting for 2,167 hours per week in over 80 languages. In addition to
their overt broadcasts, the Soviets operate two "unofficial" stations, which
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SOV 86-10016X
April 1986
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purport not to be run by the Soviet Government, and at least four
clandestine radio stations, located in the USSR, East Germany, and
Afghanistan, that support Soviet views.
The Soviets have a number of outlets for their television broadcasts, but,
for the near term, Soviet television is unlikely to have a major propaganda
impact. All direct broadcasts are aimed primarily at the domestic audience
and are conducted in Russian. They can be picked up outside the USSR
only with special, expensive receiving equipment. The Soviets do, however,
place television programs abroad through official agreements, and various
Soviet representatives abroad provide television materials, usually at low or
no cost, to commercial outlets.
The Soviet Union carries out an extensive cultural exchange program
worldwide. the USSR has intergovern-
mental agreements or formal programs with 120 countries. For the Soviets,
"cultural relations" is a broad term that includes such activities as science,
education, literature, music, sports, and tourism. The breadth and diversity
of these activities enable the Soviets to appeal to a wide variety of foreign
audiences. The Soviets also provide numerous foreign scholarships, particu-
larly to students from developing countries. In December 1984 over 57,000
students from less developed countries were studying in the USSR.
International Communist front organizations, although only covertly asso-
ciated with the Soviet Union, are an integral part of the foreign propagan-
da effort because they strive to rally world opinion around Soviet causes.
Among their numerous activities, which sometimes get wide media cover-
age, are rallies, conferences, and demonstrations. Additionally, each of the
major front organizations issues a regular publication and various ad hoc
writings that tout the Soviet line.
The propaganda management apparatus is a large, highly centralized
organization. Propaganda policy is formulated by the same authority that
approves Soviet foreign policy-the Politburo-with inputs from the
CPSU International Department and other party and government bodies.
This ensures that propaganda supports policy and can be changed when
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policy demands it. The coordination of the propaganda effort with the 25X1
Soviet media organs is largely the job of the CPSU International
Information Department (IID), headed by Leonid Zamyatin.
We have no objective means for measuring the overall effectiveness of
Soviet propaganda in influencing public thinking and policies abroad, but
the huge investment the Soviet Union has made in its propaganda effort-
in radiobroadcasting, news agencies, publications, and cultural and infor-
mation activities-attests to Moscow's high regard for propaganda instru-
ments as political tools.
In spite of this massive effort, Soviet leaders have continually voiced
concern about the quality and timeliness of their foreign propaganda.
The lack of credibility of their news and information is the most serious
problem for the Soviets. They combat this shortcoming in part through
repetition-presenting their propaganda on a particular theme in a number
of outlets, both overt and covert. They also use the foreign media as a vehi-
cle for their propaganda, hoping their ideas will gain the Western media's
credibility. Soviet commentators, particularly since Gorbachev became
General Secretary, have been appearing regularly in the foreign media to
present the Soviet version of issues and events.
Timeliness is also a problem that, on major issues, will not be resolved easi-
ly. Various incidents have shown that the propaganda effort breaks down
quickly when instructions from the top are not forthcoming or when
bureaucratic interests are conflicting. Close party controls and inflexible
procedures also contribute to inertia and delays. Soviet leaders have
acknowledged that these delays mean their interpretation of events is not
the first heard by foreign audiences and thus loses some of its impact. The
presence of a strong leader may reduce some of the delays. There have
been rumors that Gorbachev plans to reorganize the propaganda apparatus
by merging the III) with other Central Committee departments. This
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change is unlikely to resolve all of the conflicting bureaucratic interests
that have caused problems in the past on issues of major importance, but it
may speed up the process by reducing the number of players in the
coordination process.
The Soviets are currently undertaking a "massive new effort" to educate
people around the world about Soviet proposals and policies because they
feel that their ideas are not being heard,
the Soviets are likely to emphasize
greater use of radio and television and introduce additional clandestine
radio stations targeted at Western Europe in the near future. Additionally,
Gorbachev has ordered the propaganda apparatus to:
? Improve the supply of publications, especially books, with most of the
increase probably going to developing countries.
? Double the equipment budget of propaganda agencies for the purchase of
more sophisticated computers and radio, television, and other audiovisual
equipment.
? Tailor the propaganda for individual countries and regions.
In addition, we believe that TASS and APN will continue to increase the
number of subscribers to their services, offering the services at low or no
cost, and that Soviet commentators will increase their use of the foreign
media as a propaganda outlet.
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Summary
Scope Note
ix
Press Agencies
Publications
4
Periodicals
5
Radiobroadcasting
5
Television
8
Cultural Activities
10
Front Organizations
13
The Apparatus for Propaganda Management
14
International Department
15
International Information Department
16
Propaganda Department
18
Bloc Relations Department
18
Cadres Abroad Department
18
18
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
19
19
20
21
21
Leadership Dissatisfaction
21
Rumors of Change
23
Propaganda Techniques and Recent Improvements
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The New General Secretary
24
Press Conferences
25
Gaining Access to the Foreign Media
25
The Controlled Leak
26
Exploitation of UN Information Organs
26
Conclusions and Prospects
27
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The Soviet Foreign
Propaganda Apparatus
Scope Note This paper describes the instruments and techniques of Soviet foreign
propaganda and analyzes the bureaucratic apparatus that formulates its
themes and strategies. It assesses trends in the management and tactics of
this propaganda but does not analyze its content.
Open-source Soviet publications provided information on
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the reach and scope of the Soviet propaganda organs. The United States 25X1
Information Agency provided valuable information on Soviet cultural and
informational activities as well as radio and television broadcasting.
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The Soviet Foreign
Propaganda Apparatus
Press Agencies
The Soviet news agencies occupy a central position in
most foreign propaganda endeavors. A number of
Soviet papers and news services have representatives
abroad,' but the most active foreign propaganda
vehicles are the press agencies-TASS (Telegraph
Agency of the Soviet Union) and APN (Agentstvo
Pechati Novosti). The primary role of these agencies
is to respond to world events, particularly actions by
the United States, and to publicize Soviet policies.
TASS. TASS, the oldest of the Soviet news agencies,
is the major publicist for the Soviet leadership. It is
the official news service of the Soviet Government and
party and the acknowledged spokesman for the Soviet
political bureaucracy in affairs of state. Its responsi-
bilities are quite broad-the collection and dissemina-
tion of information for both domestic and foreign
audiences as well as the provision of commentaries to
explain the official Soviet viewpoint.
Director General, TASS, since 1979... age 58 ... in-
ternational affairs specialist ... apparent protege of
Leonid Zamyatin, Chief of the Central Committee
International Information Department ... current
position appears stable under General Secretary Gor-
bachev ... chief editor of TASS foreign affairs
editorial office, 1967-72 ... fluent in English, French,
Sergey Losev has been the director general of TASS
since 1979. Losev was
appointed with the support of Leonid Zamyatin, the
previous head of TASS and currently the head of the
CPSU Central Committee's International Informa-
tion Department, so that Zamyatin could maintain
control over that organization. The headquarters staff
of TASS in Moscow totals approximately 3,000 per-
sonnel; about 1,000 are journalists, and the remainder
are support personnel. TASS also has a substantial
overseas representation.
the
agency has over 400 Soviet nationals serving abroad
at any one time-including correspondents, engineers,
' The Soviet newspapers that are known to have representatives
abroad are Pravda, Izvestiya, Trud, Komsomolskava Pravda,
Novove Vremya, Sotsialisticheskaya Industriva, Selskaya Zhizn',
Literaturnaya Gazeta, Krasnaya Zvezda, Sovetskaya Kultura, and
and Spanish; speaks some Hebrew.
and typists. It has correspondents accredited in 126
countries-nearly every country that has relations
with the USSR.' In most major capitals of the world
there are several TASS correspondents and often
several locally hired office workers and stringers.
' The Soviets probably have correspondents stationed in only about
90 countries because journalists often cover more than one country,
particularly in Africa and Asia. In comparison, Reuters, also one of
the world's largest news agencies, has correspondents or news
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A major activity of TASS is providing copy to foreign
news agencies, newspapers, radio and television net-
works, and ministries of information. In the past 20
years, the number of countries receiving TASS re-
leases has almost doubled. TASS has also substantial-
ly increased the number of outlets for its news.
According to TASS's own accounting in 1985, its
information now goes to more than 600 networks,
agencies, newspapers, and radio stations in 115
countries.
A major selling point for the TASS news service is its
low cost. At full price it is substantially cheaper than
Western news services, a major advantage for infor-
mation agencies in developing countries that are short
on hard currency. Moreover, the Soviets have provid-
ed TASS services free of charge to some countries-
for example, Sierra Leone, Suriname, and Tunisia in
1984 and Lesotho in 1985. In Suriname, the Soviets
agreed to supply both radio receiving equipment and
TASS's services for free. The US Embassy in Para-
maribo noted, as a result of that agreement, an
appreciable increase of TASS reporting in the Surina-
me News Agency (SNA) bulletin. In addition, because
the two privately owned and operated newspapers in
Suriname had access only to SNA for their news feed,
they often had no choice but to present the Soviet
view on issues.
From the standpoint of many recipients, the chief
drawback of the TASS service has been the failure of
the Soviets to tailor it to meet the needs of specific
foreign consumers; hence, most national agencies,
particularly in developing countries, have found only a
APN. APN, or Novosti, purports to be an unofficial,
nongovernmental organ. It was formed in 1961 by a
group of ostensible Soviet "public organizations."'
' APN's founding organizations were the Union of Journalists, the
Union of Writers, the Union of Soviet Societies of Friendship and
Cultural Relations With Foreign Countries, and the National
Union for the Dissemination of Political and Scientific Knowledge.
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Like all Soviet information agencies, however, it is
controlled by the Communist Party. APN provides
"supplementary" material on all aspects of the politi-
cal, economic, and cultural life of the USSR not
normally covered by TASS, and it occasionally dupli-
cates TASS reporting on issues. It has a wider variety
of methods and uses a less stilted writing style than
TASS to deliver Moscow's message to foreign audi-
ences.
APN has been headed by Valentin Falin, former
Ambassador to West Germany and later a first
deputy chief of the Central Committee International
Information Department, since March 1986. Accord-
ing to its own accounting, as of 1983 APN provided
information to 5,000 information organs in 110 coun-
tries. It prepares books, pamphlets, articles, commen-
taries, press releases, interviews, conversations, sur-
veys, sketches, communiques, and illustrations to be
distributed to the foreign press, information agencies,
publishing houses, and radio and television organiza-
tions. The APN publishing house produces books,
brochures, guides, and booklets in over 50 languages
with combined editions of around 17 million copies
annually. Additionally, APN publishes both abroad
and at home a number of journals, newspapers, and
pamphlets for foreign audiences (see inset).
((circa 1978)
APN headquarters in Moscow had about 2,100 per-
sonnel-1,100 journalists and approximately 1,000
technical and administrative personnel. The number
of APN correspondents serving abroad in 1983 was
reported to be about 80, not including foreign employ-
ees of APN.
Information Departments (SIDs).
SIDs are located in most embas-
and act essentially as APN bureaus.
164,000 articles based on
Soviet materials were printed in the Indian press in
1984. These materials included Soviet Government
? Soviet Weekly published weekly in Great Britain
and disseminated to more than 70 countries.
? Soviet Life published monthly in the United
States for the American public.
? Soviet Land published biweekly in 13 native lan-
guages of India.
? Moscow News-weekly newspaper in Russian, En-
glish, French, Spanish, and Arabic, with a total
circulation of about 1 million in 140 countries.
? Sputnik-monthly illustrated digest journal dis-
seminated in several languages in 100 countries.
documents, APN articles, commentaries, and back-
grounders, as well as materials from other Soviet mass
media. As of early 1985, the SID in New Delhi was
publishing five periodicals in English and 12 other
national languages with a combined overall printing
of 1.5 million copies a month and issuing 40 to 50
book titles yearly with an overall printing of 550,000
copies. It sent propaganda materials in English and in
the Indian languages to the APN bureaus in Asian
countries, and it distributed more than a million
copies of books and pamphlets from the APN publish-
er. The SID in India, with its main office in New
Delhi and branch offices in Madras, Calcutta, and
Bombay, had 42 Soviet employees and about 400
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Indian employees in early 1985.
APN places a great deal of emphasis on preparing
propaganda tailored for individual countries, particu-
larly developing countries. APN is increasingly using
foreign nationals in its foreign activities because the
Soviets believe that local personnel understand their
audience better and are able to operate more freely
and more effectively than Soviet citizens. The intro-
duction in July 1983 of a teletype service called APN
Press Information for News Agencies of the Develop-
ing Countries was another effort to attract the devel-
oping countries. Additionally,
APN places a high priority on provid-
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the foreign press because, in developing countries with
a population at a basically low level of literacy, the
people are "frequently influenced more convincingly
by visual photoinformation."
An important propaganda and active measures activi-
ty for the USSR is the APN grant program for visits
to the USSR. According to public Soviet statements,
as of late 1983, the grant program had about 2,000
recipients annually, including journalists, writers, and
public figures from more than 80 countries. During
their trips to the Soviet Union, the selected foreigners
travel around the country to sightsee and meet with
Soviet political leaders, academics, and others. One
Soviet official noted that, upon returning from the
USSR, the foreign guests annually publish as many as
3,500 articles devoted to the Soviet Union.
The grant program, which apparently is conducted in
every country that has an APN office or representa-
tive, is administered by APN correspondents overseas.
an play a major role in
political influence activities. Journalists have good
access to a wide range of individuals-more so than
Soviet diplomats and trade officials. Through fre-
commitments from the grantees, it is generally under-
stood that, upon returning from their all-expense-
paid, two- to three-week visit to the USSR, the
grantees will write and speak favorably of the USSR
and their experience.
APN officials believed that
the program a been successful in Europe, and, as a
result, the CPSU Central Committee agreed to in-
crease funding elsewhere. One official stated that the
majority of the increase would go to Third World
countries, with particular attention to Latin America.
quent contact over extended periods of time, these
journalists try to build rapport and influence the views
and reporting of their colleagues, particularly those in
the media.
had increased to 74 million rubles.
Publications
The Soviet Union is one of the world's largest export-
ers of printed material. In 1982 it officially exported
about 50,000 titles and more than 70 million copies of
books and pamphlets, a figure that does not include
those disseminated through means other than direct
sales-the sale of rights, free distribution, copublish-
ing, publication abroad, and book exchanges with
libraries and other institutions. According to a Soviet
book trade official, in the period between 1973 and
1982 the Soviet Union increased its book exports more
than two and a half times. Soviet official statistics on
the ruble value of exports of printed matter (including
books, journals, newspapers, and other material) indi-
cate that their monetary value has more than tripled
in the past decade. In 1973 the value of printed
matter exports was 23.5 million rubles, and by 1984 it
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According to a study done by the United States
Information Agency (USIA) in 1983, Soviet publica-
tions have the advantages of low prices and wide-
spread availability. They appear to have large reader-
ships mainly in countries where Western publications
are expensive or are difficult to obtain. For example,
according to USIA, inexpensive Soviet books are
popular in Sri Lanka.
The Soviets participate in a number of domestic and
foreign book exhibits each year. The Moscow Book
Fair, which has been held every two years since 1977,
is of major importance to the Soviets. There publish-
ers from around the world display their books in the
hopes of boosting sales. The Soviet book agency,
Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga (MK), did more than 100
million rubles worth of business in the 1985 fair. Over
100 publishers participated, compared with 94 pub-
lishers in 1983. Countries represented for the first
time included Botswana, Cameroon, Mauritania,
Malta, Rwanda, and Sao Tome and Principe. The
number of companies and organizations represented
increased steadily from 1,535 in 1977 to 3,300 in
1985.
There are six major Soviet publishing houses involved
in the export of books: Aurora, Mir, APN, Progress,
Raduga, and Russkiy Yazyk. Soviet books have a
number of outlets abroad, including bookshops owned
by local Communist parties or friendship societies,
book fairs, Soviet embassies, and cultural and "friend-
ship" organizations.
Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga, an all-union association
under the Ministry of Foreign Trade, is the middle-
man for the selling and buying of publications abroad.
It handles all foreign trade in books, newspapers,
magazines, music, phonographic records, tape record-
ings, illustrations, postage stamps, and foreign
"rights" to Soviet publications. MK has ties to over
1,000 firms in 140 countries and an export catalogue
that includes over 5,000 titles of newspapers, periodi-
cals, and specialized journals published in 21 foreign
languages.
MKL
did most of its work with the Communist parties,
bookstores, and publishing houses of various coun-
tries. It used these outlets to fund the activities of the
? Soviet Literature-monthly distributed in 10 lan-
guages to over 100 countries.
? Soviet Woman-monthly published in 14
languages.
? Culture and Life-monthly published in five
languages.
? New Times-weekly published in nine languages.
? Soviet Union-monthly published in 20 languages.
? Asia and Africa Today-monthly published in Rus-
sian, English, French, Arabic, Persian, and Portu-
guese.
local Communist parties and to disseminate propa-
ganda materials, mostly in the native language.=
MK tended to emphasize materials of a
political nature targeted to influence the local popula-
tion.
in 1981 the
Soviet Union produced 245 journals and periodicals
for foreign readers. Many such publications are print-
ed outside the Soviet Union, probably because of the
poor quality of Soviet printing and the legal advan-
tages of circumventing local laws against importing
Communist literature. Some periodicals are printed in
other Communist countries, on foreign presses under
contractual arrangements, by certain international
organizations and other groups under Communist
influence, or by Soviet embassies in local languages
(see inset).
Radiobroadcasting
The Soviets have long recognized the propaganda
value of radio as a medium unrestricted by geopoliti-
cal boundaries; Lenin stated that radio would be "a
newspaper without paper and without distances." The
Soviets have had for some time the capability to reach
virtually all parts of the globe with their radiobroad-
casts and, in the past few years, have been intensify-
ing their effort by adding more broadcasts in a variety
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Figure 2
Weekly Hours of International
Radiobroadcasts by the USSRa
These total figures represent total broadcasting time in terms of program
hours per week. The regional figures represent the total time Soviet
broadcasts are targeted to geographic regions. In many cases such programs
are broadcast to more than one region simultaneously. The figures include
the output of Radio Moscow as well as all other Soviet stations originating
external broadcasts (Radio Peace and Progress and the regional stations).
Worldwide
South Asia
North America
Near East and North Africa
Europe
East Asia and Pacific
Africa (Sub-Saharan)
of languages. By the end of 1984, total Soviet interna-
tional broadcasting was over 2,167 hours per week in
more than 80 languages (see figure 2).4
Many union-republic radio centers have been given
foreign broadcasting responsibilities. Sometimes they
broadcast in the native languages of their republics to
audiences across the border that speak the same or
similar languages, as in the case of Radio Yerevan's
Armenian service. They also broadcast in the lan-
guages of other non-Soviet target audiences; for in-
stance, transmissions from Baku and Tashkent are in
Persian. Other republic radio centers that have for-
eign responsibilities are those in Dushanbe, Kiev,
Riga, Tbilisi, Vilnius, Alma-Ata, Tallinn, and Minsk.
? Soviet foreign broadcasts to areas other than North America total
about 2,090 hours per week. In comparison, US foreign broadcasts
to areas other than the USSR and Eastern Europe were about 986
hours per week at the end of 1984. The US figure does not include
Radio Marti, which did not start broadcasting until November
The focus of Soviet radiobroadcasts changed little in
14 years. Europe and East Asia are still high in Soviet
broadcasting priorities, and Africa and North Ameri-
ca appear to have moved up slightly. The downturn in
broadcasts to Latin America, instead of indicating a
lessening of Soviet interest, undoubtedly reflects the
role of Cuban broadcasts in the area: as of December
1983, Cuba was the leading Communist broadcaster
to Latin America with about 283 hours per week of
transmissions.
Programing. Radio programing consists of news,
commentary, and features (on subjects ranging from
political, economic, and trade affairs to science, cul-
ture, education, and sports) interspersed with music.
The structure and style of the programing are repeti-
tive; many programs are played two or more times in
the timespan of a day or a week. Moreover, official
policy lines are set forth in authoritative statements
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that, in turn, form the basis for lower level commen-
tary, which reinforces the theme. The broadcasts to
specific target audiences discuss local and regional
In the late 1960s, for example, RPP's commentaries
on Indian politics caused irritation and protests from
topics, in an effort to create listener interest.
In the past few years the Soviets have improved their
radiobroadcasts both quantitatively and qualitatively.
The improvements have included:
? The introduction in October 1978 of an English-
language service called the Radio Moscow World
Service. The service is now broadcast continuously
throughout the world.
? An increase in total external broadcasts of 75
program hours per week in 1980, the largest in-
crease in over 10 years.
? The revamping and expansion of Radio Moscow's
French broadcasts in 1983 to form a new service
called Radio Moscow International. On the air 46
hours per week, the program is beamed to both
Europe and Africa.
Radio Peace and Progress. In addition to programs
emanating from Radio Moscow and the union repub-
lics, a special foreign radio service known as Radio
Peace and Progress (RPP) was initiated in 1964. Like
APN, RPP was established as a station of Soviet
"public organizations" and thus is claimed to be a
nongovernmental broadcasting station. Its self-
defined task is to "promote mutual understanding and
trust among the people of all countries," but in
practice it seems to concentrate on the countries of
Asia and Africa. RPP uses the technical facilities of
Radio Moscow, although the Soviet Government dis-
claims any responsibility for the content of the trans-
missions.
RPP currently produces 161 hours per week in 13
languages. Although the themes addressed are stan-
dard ones that follow the official line, RPP broadcasts
are sometimes notably more tendentious and outspo-
ken than those of Radio Moscow, purveying propa-
ganda lines for which the Soviet Government might
wish to disclaim responsibility. RPP programing is
customarily tailored for individual target audiences.
The propaganda is often directed at countries with
which the Soviet Union maintains friendly relations.
India's Government and press.
Radio Magallanes. A Chilean radio station that
operated in Santiago until the fall of Allende, Radio
Magallanes was offered airtime by RPP and has
broadcast from the USSR since January 1977. The
station broadcasts in Spanish to Chile seven hours per
week and is shrill in its hostility toward the Pinochet
regime.
Clandestine Broadcasting.` The USSR has engaged
in extensive clandestine radiobroadcasting since
World War II. Most clandestine radio stations dis-
seminate antiregime material to target countries.
Many of them work for the cause of a local, pro-
Soviet Communist party and therefore probably are
managed by the International Department of the
CPSU Central Committee. Over the past two de-
cades, new stations have appeared and old ones have
disappeared as political changes have occurred. Two
clandestine radio stations currently operate from the
Soviet Union: Radio Ba Yi (or 1 August) and the
National Voice of Iran.
Since its initiation in April 1979, Ba Yi has cast its
commentaries to suggest that it represents the views
of dissidents in the Chinese armed forces. Technical
observations, however, indicate that the transmitter is
located in the Soviet Far East. Ba Yi attempts to
foment disaffection with the policies of the Govern-
ment of the People's Republic of China and indirectly
encourages support for Soviet positions. Its broadcasts
are irregular and in the past have been suspended for
varying lengths of time for technical and, possibly,
political reasons. For example, during the summer of
1985 Ba Yi shut down briefly during a period when
negative commentary on the PRC in the Soviet media
was substantially reduced. This shutdown, apparently
a political gesture to the Chinese, lasted only about six
weeks.
Founded in 1959, the National Voice of Iran began
broadcasting in Persian, and since at least 1967 it has
also broadcast in Azerbaijani. It is believed to use
` Clandestine broadcasting is defined as that which does not admit
to, or attempts to mislead listeners about, the origin of transmission.
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Radio Baku's transmitter. The station's broadcasts
are vehemently anti-Khomeini and sometimes pro-
mote the Tudeh Party.
The Soviets apparently also support at least one and
possibly two other clandestine radio stations that
began broadcasting in Persian to Iran in 1984. F_
the Radio of
Iranian Toilers broadcasts 10 and a half hours per
week from a location in northwest Afghanistan, near
Herat. The program is designed to convey to Tudeh
members in Iran that the party is still functioning.
The Soviets probably also support another clandestine
broadcast-the Voice of the Iranian Communist Par-
ty-which is on the air 21 hours per week. It appears
to originate in either the USSR or Iraq.
We believe the USSR also supports the two clandes-
tine radio stations broadcasting to Turkey and the
Middle East from East Germany-Our Radio (Bizim
Radyo) and the Voice of the Turkish Communist
Party. The two stations portray themselves as indige-
nous voices of the Turkish people and working class.
In addition to their avid defense of Soviet policies, the
stations strike at the Evren regime and at Turkey's
ties to the West. the
Turkish Government approached the East German
Government in early 1982 and requested that it
terminate the broadcasts, but East Germany denied
knowledge of either the stations or their locations. At
that time, Our Radio was broadcasting about 21
hours per week and the Voice of the Turkish Commu-
nist Party about seven hours per week.
Television
The potential of television as a medium has long been
recognized by Soviet propagandists. A Soviet media
official stated that "public opinion is, in our day,
having an ever greater influence on world affairs. In
view of this, great efforts are being made by states to
shape public opinion on a worldwide scale, and the
mass media-especially television-are being used for
this purpose with increasing sophistication."
In a 1980 meeting between Vitaliy Kobysh, an official
of the International Information Department, and
Foreign Ministry officials, Kobysh called for diplo-
mats to make a major effort to exploit the medium of
television. He suggested using television to portray all
facets of Soviet life-politics, culture, trade, and
economics-anything, in fact, that would present the
Soviet Union in an attractive light.
programing abroad by Soviet representatives.
There are five means through which the Soviets can
have their television programs broadcast abroad: In-
tersputnik, a communications exchange with East
European and other friendly countries; Intervision, a
program exchange run by the International Organiza-
tion for Radio and Television; official agreements
between the Committee for Television and Radio
Broadcasting (Gosteleradio) and foreign information
agencies; Soviet domestic broadcasts transmitted via
communications satellite; and the placement of Soviet
Intersputnik 6 is an organization that leases capacity
on Soviet satellites for the exchange of television
programs and other communications among its mem-
ber and user countries. The programing is a combina-
tion of that provided by Intervision, Soviet domestic
The members and users of Intersputnik are the USSR, Bulgaria,
Czechoslovakia, Cuba, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Romania,
Mongolia, Vietnam, Laos, Afghanistan, South Yemen, North
Korea, Algeria, Iraq, Syria, Nicaragua, Libya, and Angola.F_~
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programing, programing from the individual user and
member countries, and, occasionally, West European
programs and some material from Western news
organizations.
Intersputnik provides the USSR with a number of
political and propaganda advantages. The organiza-
tion coordinates radio and television news, as well as
broader political information and cultural policies,
among Warsaw Pact broadcasters and their allies. All
Intersputnik communications must go through Mos-
cow, which ensures Soviet control over the system. F-
Intervision is a program exchange network under the
auspices of the International Organization for Radio
and Television.' It coordinates the daily exchange of
television programs among member stations, and the
USSR supplies about one-third of its programs. It
disseminates programing abroad through daily ex-
changes with its West European counterpart, Eurovi-
sion. This exchange is unequal, though; in 1984
Eurovision took only 388 news items from Intervision,
compared with over 7,000 news items that Intervision
took from Eurovision.
Many Soviet television programs are currently shown
abroad within the framework of bilateral agreements
worked out by Gosteleradio and foreign broadcasting
organs. For example, Gosteleradio and the Kuwaiti
Ministry of Information signed an agreement this
year whereby both parties will send each other televi-
sion features and documentaries about their own
countries as well as radio programs and recordings of
music. Similar agreements have been recently signed
with Finland, the Netherlands, and Sweden.
In expanding their broadcasting capabilities to cover
the USSR, the Soviets have created a technical
infrastructure that allows them to send their domestic
television beyond their borders. They can beam televi-
sion signals to virtually any place on earth with their
satellites. However, special, expensive equipment
must be used to receive the signals from their satel-
lites. Even with the new Ekran series satellites, special
antennas and signal converters are necessary.
' Organization members include Afghanistan, Algeria, Bulgaria,
Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Finland, East Germany, Hungary,
Iraq, Cambodia, North Korea, Laos, Mali, Mongolia, Nicaragua,
Poland, Romania, Sudan, the USSR, Vietnam, and South Yemen.
With the proper equipment, stations and/or receivers
beyond the borders of the USSR can pick up Soviet
television "live." The legality of individual receiving
installations is in question in most European coun-
tries; they are illegal in West Germany and the
Netherlands and are heavily restricted in most other
countries. There appears to be a market, however, for
Soviet television on cable and subscription TV sys-
tems, which are usually approved by the government
in most countries. A cable television system in the
Netherlands carries a very limited amount of Soviet
programing. In Sweden, where the government is
testing cable television as part of an evaluation of
alternatives to state-run television, Soviet programing
is readily available and free for the cable companies.
The Soviet channel (in Russian) received in Sweden,
TV-1, has more than double the daily broadcast time
of either of the two Swedish channels and provides a
good mix of programing, including news, the arts,
children's programs, and documentaries.
The Soviets have had some success in placing their
television programs abroad outside of official agree-
ments. Representatives from APN, Gosteleradio, and
Soviet embassies play a major role in providing
television materials, particularly to commercial out-
lets. The type of programing provided varies from
country to country. It almost always includes cultural
films and programs and often also includes children's
programs, documentaries, and international news
items. Soviet efforts in this area in the early 1980s
were limited by the unattractiveness of Soviet materi-
al in competition with that of the rest of the world--a
frequent complaint has been that it was too propagan-
distic-and a scarcity or lack of television sets and/or
television equipment and networks in the developing
countries. As with the news services, however, Soviet
television broadcasts are often provided at low or no
cost, and the media in some developing countries have
few alternatives.
The Soviets recently have made great progress in
improving the quality of their television broadcasts,
which have been widely known for their dull format,
poor sound and photography, and "talking heads"
news with no live footage. The Soviets are improving
the format, presentation, technical quality, and pro-
gram mix of their broadcasts. News broadcasts in
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particular appear to have been modeled after Western
television and have included some US footage of US
troops training in Central America. Despite these
changes, however, Soviet television broadcasts remain
well below the standard of those of the West.
Aside from the format and content shortcomings,
Soviet television broadcasting suffers from a major
problem for foreign audiences-it is in Russian. The
Soviets may begin to tailor television broadcasts for
foreign audiences in the future, but we are currently
seeing no indications that they intend to do so. It is
possible the Soviets feel the expense of improving
their television broadcasting and tailoring it for for-
eign audiences outweighs the potential benefits of
such an effort. Television equipment is still scarce in
most developing countries, a major target of Soviet
propaganda. Moreover, to compete effectively with
the West in the area, the Soviets would have to make
substantial improvements in both their broadcasting
capabilities and their programing. More likely, the
Soviets will continue efforts to get coverage on foreign
television, rather than revising their own for foreign
broadcasting.
Cultural Activities
The Soviet Union maintains cultural relations with
140 countries worldwide. Unlike other forms of propa-
ganda, cultural activities do not usually contain a
specific political message. Most seek to instill in the
viewer or participant a general feeling of admiration
or good will for the Soviet Union. For the Soviets,
"cultural relations" is a broad concept that includes
such activities as science, education, literature, the
graphic arts, music, public health, sports, tourism,
and disaster relief.
Soviet cultural contacts are extensive in scope and
diversity, and they are growing-in 1975 they were
two and a half times their 1965 level, according to
Soviet statements. The Soviets offer something for
just about everyone, from sports to the fine arts, and
there is virtually no aspect of culture or art that has
not been utilized by the Soviets for purposes of
international contacts. According to a Soviet cultural
official, the Soviets expect their cultural relations "to
influence the audience's mind, to direct it in a certain
direction."
Soviet Cultural Agreement With Uganda
The cultural agreement between Uganda and the
USSR for 1985-86 calls for:
? Educational exchanges consisting of 50 undergrad-
uate and 15 postgraduate scholarships in the USSR
for Ugandans and, at the same time, the assignment
of Soviet lecturers to work at Makerere University.
? Health exchanges that include Soviet Ministry of
Health officials visiting Uganda and Soviet medical
specialists continuing their work in Uganda.
? Cultural exchanges, including Ugandan cinemato-
graphic participation in two film festivals in the
USSR and Soviet film weeks in Uganda.
? Sports exchanges, including a visit by Soviet foot-
ball teams and a basketball coach as well as
unnamed exchanges of sports teams.
? Cooperation in the field of information, including
cooperation between Gosteleradio and the Ugandan
Information Ministry based on the 1978 agreement,
continued TASS cooperation in the field of infor-
mation exchange, and strengthening cooperation in
the field of book exchanges.
The Soviet Union prefers to conduct its cultural
relations on a planned basis through cultural agree-
ments. As of this year, it had intergovernmental
agreements and programs with 120 countries,
Cultural agreements are
negotiated and directed by the Cultural Relations
Department of the Foreign Ministry, headed by Yuriy
Kirichenko since 1982. They usually fall into two
categories: general, which are usually with socialist
countries and include the two parties pledging to
support each other in virtually every area, and restric-
tive-agreements with mostly non-Bloc countries that
detail carefully each area of cooperation. Some of the
activities often provided for in bilateral cultural
agreements are detailed below.
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in 1984 more than 100 artistic collec-
tives, over 400 soloists, and 40 exhibitions were sent
by the USSR Ministry of Culture to West European
countries alone. Soviet cultural presentations world-
wide consist of Soviet artistic touring groups, such as
ballet companies, symphonies, dance groups, and
smaller musical groups; exhibits of photographs,
books, and art; and the circus. Although the quality
and renown of a touring group often depends on the
competition it faces in various countries and the
potential commercial rewards for the Soviets, they
manage to send groups to all of the countries that
want or agree to have them. According to a study by
the USIA in 1983, Soviet cultural presentations, even
in developing countries where the Soviets normally
send "lesser" artistic groups and companies, were well
received worldwide. This was particularly true in
Latin America and Western Europe, where the com-
panies often performed for large and diverse crowds.
Cultural exhibits, including those of art, books, and
photographs, were also often popular but normally
drew smaller crowds. Contrary to the purpose of most
cultural and information activities, some of those
exhibits focused on political themes, emphasizing
topics such as the arms race. In Nicaragua, Soviet
books and photos emphasized propaganda against
capitalism, imperialism, and US "interventionist"
activities.
Trade and Technical Exhibits. Through their partici-
pation in trade exhibits, the Soviets seek to portray
their industrial achievements, progress, and power; to
present the USSR as a model for economic and
industrial development; to display Soviet industrial
items, machinery, and tools for export; and to provide
an opportunity to pass out literature and show films.
Soviet participation in trade and technical exhibits is
a comparatively minor effort compared with other
cultural and information activities-the Soviets par-
ticipated in or sponsored fairs in only 42 countries in
1983. However, as the fairs and exhibits undoubtedly
reach a different audience from most cultural activi-
ties, they provide a good complement.
.1J;1 1 J J'J1;
no noticeable increase in Soviet participation in trade
fairs worldwide except in Latin America, where,
between 1982 and 1983, the Soviets increased their
participation in fairs and exhibits from five to nine
countries.
Cultural and Information Centers. The Soviets utilize
cultural and information centers, libraries, and read-
ing rooms abroad as centers for short- and long-range
programs to disseminate Marxist-Leninist ideology; to
expose urban audiences to selected aspects of Soviet
culture and achievements; and to induce sympathy,
understanding, and support for Soviet policies and
programs. Russian-language training is usually pro-
vided at these centers because of the potential use of
local citizens trained in Russian for Soviet aid projects
and the long-term potential of such training as a
vehicle for indoctrination.
The cultural facilities of the USSR abroad range
from small reading rooms to two- to three-story
centers that may contain a library, a theater, an
exhibit area, and classrooms. They may be part of the
diplomatic mission, separate from the mission but run
by diplomatic "cultural" officers, or they may be run
by local Soviet friendship societies or sympathetic
political parties. As of 1983 the Soviets supported in
some fashion at least 97 facilities in 56 countries.
When Soviet participation in trade exhibits is not part
of bilateral cultural agreements, it is coordinated by
the USSR Chamber of Commerce, which also man-
ages the Soviet exhibits. In the early 1980s there was
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Figure 4. A group of Indian
students studying in Moscow to
be subway drivers
Operational responsibility for stocking Soviet libraries
abroad, and probably for the overall physical arrange-
ment of the centers, rests in the Ministry of Culture.
The activities of the facilities usually include semi-
nars, lectures, films, exhibitions, language instruction,
and cultural programs, and many have libraries
stocked with books in Russian and the local language
or languages. The target audiences are primarily
students, younger members of the working class, and
dissatisfied members of the intelligentsia. The degree
to which polemical literature is stocked depends upon
local conditions.
Information from USIA officials abroad suggests that
the impact of the facilities can be significant in some
countries. The library-cultural center is a point at
which the direct dissemination of Soviet propaganda
and information can be accomplished, questions can
be answered, and attitudes favorable to the Soviet
Union can be fostered. Where authorized, these cen-
ters provide legal public meeting places where like-
minded individuals and groups can get together.
Although a cultural center is too public and too
obvious to be used for clandestine meetings, it can
help identify potential sympathizers. In short, the
assets that the centers provide the Soviets far out-
weigh the sometimes small number of individuals who
use them.
Soviet foreign educational activi-
ties sponsored by this ministry are concentrated in the
developing countries. As of December 1984, there
were approximately 57,485 students from less devel-
oped countries studying in the USSR, and an addi-
tional 3,000 left their countries for technical training
in the USSR in 1984. The Soviets hope that many in
this group will return home as potential leaders
sympathetic to Soviet causes. Educational exchanges
with the developed countries, on the other hand, are
used by the Soviets primarily to collect scientific and
industrial information. The number of students from
the West in the Soviet Union is believed to be less
than 8,000.
Most student exchanges with the USSR are arranged
through bilateral cultural agreements. However, some
scholarships are provided through Soviet embassies
and consulates, foreign Communist parties, and "pub-
lic" organizations, such as friendship societies and
front groups. The Soviets have been known to recruit
students without the permission of the local govern-
ment. For example, according to an article that
appeared in the Thai daily, The Nation, in 1979 the
Soviet Embassy staff in Bangkok decided to recruit
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Thai students without the approval of the Thai au-
thorities. The article reported that the Thai Foreign
Ministry estimated about 200 students left, undetect-
agronomists in some African countries, and a few
have even risen to high government posts. Moreover,
the Soviets have recently made attempts to organize
their "alumni" in some African countries, a program
ed, for the USSR.
There is apparently a great deal of difference in the
extent and impact of educational exchanges from
region to region. According to information from
USIA officials stationed abroad, as of 1983, Soviet
educational exchanges were virtually nonexistent in
East Asian and Pacific countries, and in Western
Europe were limited to a small number of countries.
However, educational exchanges were judged to be
one of the most significant of the Soviets' cultural and
informational activities in Latin America, the Near
East, and Africa. In the period from 1979 to 1983,
they increased more than 40 percent in Sub-Saharan
Africa and more than doubled in the other two
regions.
For undergraduates, the scholarships generally cover
expenses for four to six years' study plus transporta-
tion (there are no tuition fees for higher education in
the USSR). Additionally, students were receiving a
stipend of 90 rubles per month in 1984. Similar
arrangements are made for graduate students and
technical trainees.
Although the Soviets place a great deal of emphasis
on their program, it is not without flaws. Many
countries do not recognize Soviet degrees-a major
problem for graduates seeking employment upon re-
turning home. In many countries where the degrees
are accepted, they are often not highly regarded.
Many students do not find their experiences in the
USSR rewarding and return with a dislike for the
country, bitter complaints of racial discrimination (by
Africans in particular), resentment at having to learn
Russian and sit through tiresome Soviet propaganda
sessions, and a growing understanding of the limita-
tions of the Soviet system. Thus it is not surprising
that not all of the Soviet scholarships available in
some countries are taken.
On the other hand, many foreign students find the
experience a positive one. Soviet-trained graduates
provide a large contingent of doctors, engineers, and
that could be of propaganda value to them.
Sports. Like trade fairs, Soviet sports activities attract
foreign audiences that may not be drawn by other
forms of Soviet propaganda, and they often get wide
media coverage. The Soviets send teams abroad for a
wide variety of sports, including basketball, gymnas-
tics, table tennis, soccer, and ice hockey. They also
send coaches and trainers to train teams in other
countries, and they occasionally donate sports equip-
ment. Moscow values these activities because they
provide exposure, help build good will and contacts,
and supply the opportunity to create audiences more
favorable to the USSR, particularly among the
young.
The USSR Committee for Physical Culture and
Sports has control over athletes and athletics in the
Soviet Union and supervises participation in interna-
tional and binational competitions and other
activities.
Front Organizations
The Soviet Union directs, and heavily subsidizes,
about a dozen major international front organizations
as well as several hundred minor front and friendship
organizations. Although they strive to appear inde-
pendent and democratic, they are widely known to be
instruments of Soviet foreign policy. Front organiza-
tions are commonly grouped with Soviet active mea-
sures because their association with the USSR is not
acknowledged by the Soviet Union. However, they are
controlled propaganda organs that strive to rally
world opinion to Soviet causes. Among their numer-
ous activities, most of which get wide media coverage,
are meetings, rallies, conferences, and demonstra-
tions. Additionally, all of the major front organiza-
tions issue a regular publication and ad hoc writings
that tout the Soviet line.
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Figure 5
Main Soviet Organizations
Concerned With Foreign Propaganda
International Propaganda
Department Department
International
Information
Department
The major front organizations were created to appeal
to a variety of audiences. The largest organization is
the World Peace Council, and others are the Wo-
men's International Democratic Federation, the
World Federation of Trade Unions, and the Christian
Peace Conference. One of particular value to the
USSR in its media activities worldwide is the Interna-
tional Organization of Journalists, which has five
schools in the Eastern Bloc and Cuba that it uses to
train developing-country journalists. 6
The Soviet propaganda management apparatus is a
large, highly centralized structure. Propaganda policy
is formulated by the same bodies that create Soviet
' Other major international Communist front organizations are: the
World Federation of Democratic Youth, the Afro-Asian People's
Solidarity Organization, the International Association of Demo-
cratic Lawyers, the Women's International League for Peace and
Freedom, the World Federation of Scientific Workers, the World
Federation of Teachers Unions, and the Asian Buddhist Conference
Foreign Ministry Various State
Committees
? Goskomizdat
? Glavlit
? Gosteleradio
? Goskino
foreign policy, thus ensuring that propaganda sup-
ports policy. Moreover, the centralization of the appa-
ratus means that propaganda can be flexible-lines
can be changed whenever policy requires it. However,
another consequence of that centralization is that the
propaganda effort breaks down quickly when instruc-
tions from the top are slow or nonexistent.
The ultimate authority for propaganda policy is the
CPSU Politburo, presided over by General Secretary
Mikhail Gorbachev. There are also three CPSU
secretaries with responsibility for propaganda issues:
senior secretary Yegor Ligachev and junior secretar-
ies Aleksandr Yakovlev and Mikhail Zimyanin. The
responsibility for developing, coordinating, and imple-
menting foreign propaganda within the framework
established by the Politburo rests largely in the
International, International Information, Propaganda,
and Bloc Relations Departments of the CPSU Central
Committee and with the Foreign Ministry
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Has been "unofficial" second secretary and Politburo
member since April 1985... secretary, CPSU Cen-
tral Committee, since December 1983... believed to
have close personal and professional relationship
with Gorbachev ... chief party ideologue with general
oversight for propaganda-related activities ... also
supervises cadres policy ... playing major role in
current party personnel changes, including those in
the propaganda apparatus ... engineer by training ...
deputy chief, Russian Republic section, Central Com-
mittee Agitation and Propaganda Department in ear-
ly 1960s ... first secretary of Tomsk Obkom during
1965-83 ... age 65.
International Department
The International Department (ID) reportedly plays a
major role in the formulation of Soviet foreign policy.
It coordinates and reviews inputs on Soviet foreign
policy matters from the Foreign Ministry,
the military, and the various research institutes, and
apparently from those inputs develops policy proposals
that go to the Politburo. It has special responsibility
for overseeing CPSU relations with nonruling Com-
munist parties and other foreign leftists and front
groups.
in the propaganda process.
ideas for propaganda and
active measures campaigns originate in the ID, as well
as in the Politburo After ideas surface,
Party secretary since 1976 ... responsible for internal
ideology, propaganda, and counterpropaganda-an
increasingly important area as Soviets try to "neutra-
lize" Western effects on Soviet society ... spent early
career in Belorussian party ranks as an apparent
protege of then secret police chief Lavrentiy Beria ...
moved to foreign service after Stalin's and Beria's
deaths in 1953... served as Ambassador to North
Vietnam and Czechoslavakia and briefly as deputy
foreign minister ... brought back to party work by
General Secretary Brezhnev ... in 1965 became chief
editor of Pravda and in 1966 a full member of CPSU
Central Committee ... age 71.
the department has the job of developing them into
decision memorandums-general plans of action-
which are then either approved or disapproved by the
Politburo. Additionally, whenever an article appears
in either the foreign or domestic press that pertains to
nonruling Communist or leftist parties, the ID report-
edly must approve it. this
was the case with articles in Literaturnaya Gazeta.
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In addition to its role in the formulation and coordina-
tion of propaganda campaigns, the ID contributes to
the propaganda effort by working with the groups it
oversees to promote, coordinate, and fund propaganda
campaigns. Through its International Social Organi-
zations Sector, the ID controls the activities of the
international front organizations. Control runs from
this sector through the Soviet affiliate of the front to a
Soviet representative at the front's headquarters. The
International Organizations Sector apparently con-
trols "friendship" organizations in a similar manner.
The International Department is also responsible for
the publication of a monthly journal, Problems of
Peace and Socialism, known in English as the World
Marxist Review. Although ostensibly an international
publication edited in Prague, the editorial board of
the Review is controlled by the ID. Through this
publication the department openly communicates pol-
icy lines to foreign groups.
The ID has a staff of about 200 officials working in
about 20 geographic and functional sectors, and was
headed until March 1986 by former candidate Polit-
buro member and Central Committee secretary Boris
Ponomarev. Ponomarev was forced to retire at 81
after more than 30 years in the post. Anatoliy Do-
brynin, longtime Ambassador to the United States,
was recently named party secretary and apparently
took over the ID position.
International Information Department
The International Information Department (IID) was
established in early 1978 to improve the effectiveness
of Soviet propaganda activities abroad and of domes-
tic propaganda on foreign affairs. It has been headed
since its inception by Leonid Zamyatin, former direc-
tor of the Soviet news agency TASS. Its primary
responsibilities appear to be coordinating and oversee-
ing the activities of the media involved in propaganda
on Soviet foreign policy and international issues, and
advising the Soviet leadership on world events.
In a June 1983 plenum speech, then Politburo mem-
ber Konstantin Chernenko stated that the III) coordi-
nates the work of TASS, APN, Gosteleradio, and
"other departments concerned with foreign policy
propaganda." Although those organizations function
as separate entities, they reportedly rely on the III)
for guidance on sensitive subjects and the most impor-
tant propaganda themes.
TASS director general
the III) on media policy questions.
The coordination of propaganda campaigns with the
other major Soviet party and government organiza-
tions,
The III) does not have responsibility for the domestic
press organs such as Pravda and Izvestiya; they fall
under the Propaganda Department's purview. Howev-
er, it appears that, possibly because of the IID's
expertise in foreign policy propaganda, it is consulted
on foreign policy issues portrayed to domestic audi-
ences.
although the chief of the III) had no authority over
the newspaper, Zamyatin occasionally called Pravda
editors. Zamyatin has stated that the IID's responsi-
bilities include "internal and external propaganda,
with the accent on external." Moreover, III) officials
frequently appear on Soviet television and write arti-
cles and columns in the Soviet domestic press.
The IID appears to be the office responsible for the
overall tone and style of Soviet foreign propaganda. In
addition to their tasking and oversight responsibilities,
III) officials often prepare articles and scripts that are
then parceled out to media outlets and information
offices abroad. III) officials are also frequent actors
on the Soviet propaganda stage. They give interviews,
deliver lectures, and speak at meetings during their
frequent trips to the West. Their "freewheeling" style
has increased the flair and sophistication of the
products of the Soviet media.
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Leonid Mitrofanovich Zamyatin has been Chief, In-
ternational Information Department, CPSU Central
Committee, since 1978... age 64 ... key foreign
press spokesman for the Kremlin ... plays major role
in tightly controlling the public image the Soviets
want to project abroad ... believes it is important to
counter what he claims is the increased antisocialist
propaganda generated by the Reagan administra-
tion ... helps orchestrate Gorbachev's public rela-
tions campaign at home and abroad ... career foreign
service officer; headed the Foreign Ministry Press
Department until 1970... served as director general
of TASS ... speaks English and German.
because of bureaucratic rivalries with other Central
Committee departments or with the Foreign Minis-
try, the future of the IID and its chief have been the
subject of speculation since Brezhnev's death in No-
vember 1982. After the Andropov succession, rumors
circulated in Moscow that Zamyatin was to be
removed and the IID either scrapped or merged with
other departments.
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Gorbachev regarded Zamyatin highly and that 25X1
1 after the Gorbachev succession,
Zamyatin's position was assured. Moreover, Zamya-
tin has maintained a high profile since Gorbachev's
succession, reflected in his presence at Gorbachev's
September 1985 Time interview and with the General
Secretary on his trips to Britain in 1984 and to
France and the Reagan-Gorbachev meeting in 1985.
the chief of the Central Committee
Propaganda Department, Aleksandr Yakovlev-not
Zamyatin-reportedly was given the responsibility
for much of the propaganda activity during the
November 1985 Reagan-Gorbachev meeting, possibly
indicating that Zamyatin is being eclipsed by him.
Zamyatin reportedly convinced General Secretary
Brezhnev of the need to create the IID and, either
because of Zamyatin's close ties to Brezhnev or
Other changes in the Soviet media have also been
directly attributed to the IID. They include the
introduction of Radio Moscow's World Service in
English in 1978 and the introduction of two Soviet
domestic television programs that offer commentary
on international developments. Both programs, The
World Today and Studio Nine, attempt to provide
lively, sophisticated, and persuasive discussion of for-
eign policy issues.
The III) has played a role in providing information to
the Soviet leadership on international affairs.
Zamyatin used to brief General
Secretary Brezhnev on world events early in the
morning while Brezhnev shaved. In a meeting in April
1983, General Staff official Nikolay Chervov told US
officials that Zamyatin's office had prepared the
background materials for a press conference given by
then Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko.
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Propaganda Department
Before 1978 the Propaganda Department was the
principal CPSU organ overseeing media operations
both at home and abroad. The foreign aspect of the
Propaganda Department's job has been assumed by
the International Information Department, and the
Propaganda Department's concerns now are domestic
indoctrination and ideological work directed at Soviet
citizens. As noted, it probably shares responsibility for
propaganda on international subjects going to the
domestic audience with the International, Interna-
tional Information, and Bloc Relations Departments.
The department, the largest in the Central Commit-
tee, is currently headed by Aleksandr Yakovlev-
reportedly an ally of Gorbachev's.
Bloc Relations Department
Formally known as the Department for Liaison with
Communist and Workers' Parties of Socialist Coun-
tries, this department is responsible for the coordina-
tion of CPSU relations with ruling socialist parties. It
apparently must coordinate on any press item or
broadcast involving the Bloc countries. No replace-
ment has yet been identified for Konstantin Rusakov,
who headed the department from 1977 until he was
removed at the recent party Congress.
Cadres Abroad Department
The Cadres Abroad Department, headed by Stepan
Chervonenko, is responsible for the administrative
supervision of all Soviet personnel abroad. It is also
responsible for the processing and approval of travel
abroad by Soviet citizens. During the past few years,
possibly in connection with increased attention to
defections and counterpropaganda, the Cadres
Abroad Department appears to have assumed a more
active role in foreign propaganda operations at over-
seas missions.
Chief, Propaganda Department, CPSU Central Com-
mittee, since August 1985... age 62 ... veteran
propagandist and international affairs specialist ...
close adviser to Gorbachev ... promoted to party
secretary at recent Congress ... responsible for pro-
moting ideology in all party, government, and other
Soviet organizations ... defines and communicates
the leadership's main policies and concerns to the
Soviet public ... has written some harsh anti-US
propaganda in recent years,
studied at Columbia University (1959-60) ...
e
uty chief of Propaganda Department during the
early years of the Brezhnev regime ...
to Canada (1973-83) ... director of Institute of
World Economic and International Relations (Sep-
tember 1983-August 1985) ... has written at least
two books about the United States.
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Ministry of Foreign Affairs
The Foreign Ministry can play a role in the key
decisions on propaganda campaigns through its head,
Politburo member Eduard Shevardnadze. At a lower
level, the Ministry has a role in the coordination of
propaganda. According to a number of
[::::najor articles and books on foreign affairs-
particularly those on diplomatic affairs-require For-
eign Ministry clearance. The Press Department reads
the articles and the regional and area departments
clear book manuscripts in their specialties.
The Foreign Ministry also has a prominent role in the
implementation of propaganda campaigns. The Press
Department in Moscow serves as a major outlet for
propaganda on international issues. In 1984 it started
a regular press briefing, usually conducted by Press
Department chief Vladimir Lomeyko. Using a "Wes-
tern" format, Lomeyko fields questions from both
Soviet and Western reporters. In addition, the press
departments of Soviet embassies overseas often issue
written policy statements and, more recently, have
been conducting their own press briefings.
The Foreign Ministry's Department for Foreign Cul-
tural Relations negotiates and directs Soviet cultural
agreements. Moreover, through its embassies and
consulates, the Ministry organizes and supervises
many of the cultural and information activities
abroad.
State Committees
Four state committees are heavily involved in the
propaganda apparatus: Goskomizdat, Glavlit, Goste-
leradio, and Goskino. Although they are ostensibly
independent organizations, they effectively operate as
extensions of the party apparatus in administering the
day-to-day affairs of many of the propaganda outlets.
Goskomizdat. All publication activities in the Soviet
Union, including those involving foreign dissemina-
tion, are controlled by Goskomizdat-the State Com-
mittee for Publishing Houses, Printing Plants, and the
Book Trade. Goskomizdat, established in 1972 as a
continuation of the Committee on the Press, super-
vises the publishing and printing industry and exer-
cises national control over the thematic trend and
content of literature. A "superconglomerate," as of
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Chief of the Foreign Ministry Press Department since
November 1984... age 50 ... deputy chief of the
press department from August until November
1984... rapid promotion to chief indicates his suc-
cess as spokesman for the Soviet Union ... in the
press entourage for the November 1985 Reagan-
Gorbachev meeting ... considered to be a competent
foreign policy technician who knows what is expected
worked in youth organizations during 1962-66 ...
was in the now extinct CPSU Central Committee
Information Department in 1966... chief of the APN
bureau in West Germany, 1970-72 ... deputy chief
editor (1968-70) and chief editor (1972-84) of the
main editorial staff for Western Europe ... speaks
German and several Scandinavian languages and is
studying English in his spare time.
1978 Goskomizdat supervised 200 publishers, 60,000
bookshops and kiosks, 360,000 libraries, and all print-
ing establishments in all Soviet republics.
Glavlit. Officially attached to the USSR Council of
Ministers, Glavlit, or the Main Administration for
Safeguarding State Secrets in the Press,
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censors, estimated to number at least 70,000. Al-
though the agency's title invokes only the written
word, its responsibilities also include radio and televi-
sion broadcasts. Located at printing plants, editorial
offices, and broadcasting studios, Glavlit censors scru-
tinize all media material before stamping it for public
release. Its mission is to ensure that no information
affecting the security of the Soviet state appears in
censor's Index, a classified handbook on "state se-
crets" that may not be disclosed in the media. The
Index also incorporates Defense Ministry instructions.
Gosteleradio. In 1957, radio and television operations
were removed from the Ministry of Culture's jurisdic-
tion and placed under a separate entity. It was
formally established as a committee of the USSR
Council of Ministers in 1962 and elevated to state
committee status in 1970. Now, the State Committee
for Television and Radio Broadcasting, known in the
Soviet Union as Gosteleradio, is responsible for orga-
nizing the internal and external broadcasting activi-
ties of the Soviet Union and directing all domestic
recording activities in the country,
The Ministry of Communications is respon-
sible for the facilities and personnel used to transmit,
relay, and broadcast radio and television signals.F_
Goskino. The State Committee for Cinematography,
headed by Filipp Yermash since 1972, plans and
directs all activities concerning the making and distri-
bution of Soviet films as well as international contacts
in the area of cinematography.
The party maintains control of the propaganda appa-
ratus by issuing general policy guidance and appoint-
ing personnel to key positions. Broad policy guidance
on the direction of Soviet propaganda is given in
occasional speeches or messages by the party officials
responsible for ideology and propaganda-General
Secretary Gorbachev and secretaries Ligachev, Ya-
kovlev, and Zimyanin.
for propaganda campaigns in support of Soviet poli-
cies can originate in the Politburo, or the
International Department; reportedly the III) plays a
minor role in the early formulation phase. Once an
idea is generated, the ID creates a plan of action that
is approved or disapproved by the Politburo. After the
Politburo makes its decision, it issues a directive to the
organizations involved in the propaganda campaign.
This directive, which is evidently signed by either the
general secretary or the senior ideology secretary,
calls for the various agencies to take whatever mea-
sures are needed to fulfill it.
there are also regular
meetings of the heads of the major media organs and
representatives from the ID, IID, Foreign Ministry,
where guidance is given, apparently based
on the directives. These instructions are thorough-
they include not only the general line on major issues
but also, for example, suggestions on the type of
articles to be written.
these meetings were once chaired by Zimyanin but
have probably been chaired by Ligachev since he
assumed responsibility for propaganda.
Ithe coordination of
foreign propaganda campaigns outside of the planning
meetings is largely the responsibility of the IID,
working on instructions from the ideology secretaries
and the Politburo. The III) tasks the media to write
specific articles and also oversees production to assure
that the items adhere to the official line. The other
Central Committee de artments, as well as the For-
eign Ministry apparently a rove
articles involving their areas of interest. ~~
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Delays in Propaganda Responses
The Soviet propaganda apparatus has been unable to
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as bureaucratic coordination and logistic require-
Leadership Dissatisfaction
The Soviet propaganda apparatus has long been the
subject of leadership concern and criticism because of
its perceived inability to compete effectively with
other foreign media. In the early 1970s the Brezhnev
regime resorted to a series of personnel and organiza-
tional changes in an effort to improve the perfor-
mance of Soviet media organizations. In spite of those
efforts, the various media services continued to dem-
onstrate serious coordination problems and failed to
tailor their output for maximum effect on foreign and
domestic audiences through the 1970s.
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The IID publicly
received its charter at the Central Committee plenum
in November 1978. General Secretary Brezhnev told
the Central Committee that the propaganda media
had been ineffective in dealing with economic and
social life and in the treatment of international events.
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Stressing that the media relied too much on "accepted
truths" in interpreting international events, Brezhnev
called for reports that were more prompt and factual
and better analyzed. He betrayed the seriousness of
Soviet concern by announcing that the Politburo had
set up a special commission to study ways to analyze
the problems he had outlined and to improve "ideolog-
ical, mass-political work."
Brezhnev's criticisms were apparently directed at the
Propaganda and International Departments, which
had borne most of the responsibility for international
propaganda before the formation of the IID. His
charges were probably intended to clear the way for
Zamyatin to take control of foreign propaganda.
the III) (and its chief, Zamyatin) were disliked
within the Central Committee because they detracted
from the authority of the Propaganda Department.
Criticism of the apparatus continued in 1979, when
the Central Committee issued a decree calling for an
increase in the "party-minded zealousness" of media.
In the decree, foreign policy information was found to
be particularly derelict in melding "persuasiveness
and concrete analysis with a forthright attitude to-
ward the ideological enemy." This decree, in particu-
lar, highlights the central dilemma facing the Soviet
propaganda apparatus: establishing credibility as a
source of information while supporting Soviet inter-
ests.
In the early 1980s, leadership concern over the effec-
tiveness of foreign propaganda seemed to focus on the
ability to respond quickly and flexibly to what Mos-
cow viewed as increasingly strident criticism in the
Western press. a
Soviet propaganda official stated in an address that
the West was mounting a massive propaganda effort
against the USSR, but the Soviet Union was unable
to respond in the same manner.
in late 1983, the Soviets set
up a counterpropaganda group to coordinate reaction
to hostile, anti-Soviet news items or trends and to
ensure that the reaction would be consistent and
timely.
Leadership criticism of foreign propaganda under-
went a subtle change in 1983. In addition to the now
standard calls for more substance and promptness in
Soviet propaganda, the leadership appeared con-
cerned about its style. In June 1983 Politburo member
Chernenko attacked the "cliche dispatches and com-
mentaries" appearing in Soviet media and criticized
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ciently "active and masterful" in combating the
West's "antisocialist bias." Without enhancing the
"appeal and journalistic qualities" of material ad-
dressed to foreign audiences, Chernenko said, the
USSR "cannot hope for success in foreign policy
propaganda in the long term."
predecessors.
Gorbachev, whose active role in Soviet propaganda
has been apparent in the stream of initiatives from the
Kremlin since he took office, is apparently taking a
more activist role in propaganda activities than his
Gorbachev is making major revisions of Soviet
propaganda activities and policy, which he described
as "obsolete." His changes include:
? Increasing the size of the propaganda effort.
? Improving the credibility of Soviet propaganda by
getting foreign journalists to report on the USSR
and Afghanistan and by gaining access to the
foreign media for Soviet spokesmen.
? Increasing the sophistication of Soviet propaganda
by differentiating for individual foreign audiences
and by toning down the Communist rhetoric.
? Improving the timeliness of Soviet propaganda with
more modern equipment.
Although all of these ideas have been brought up
before, either under previous general secretaries or by
Gorbachev, his personal involvement should help
speed improvements.
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To facilitate these improvements, Gorbachev is appar-
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would be merged with the ID. This reorganization
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would, presumably, be along substantive lines and
would put both the formulation and implementation
ideas across. Although the methods differ, the purpose
seems to be the same: to keep world attention focused
of foreign propaganda in one department.
Another possible reorganization of the apparatus-
along functional lines-was reported recently
the III) and another, unspecified, Central Committee
department might be put under the control of a new
culture-propaganda organization, which would com-
prise the Central Committee Culture and Propaganda
Departments and be headed by Yakovlev.
Zamyatin vigorously opposed the subordi-
nation, and the issue was, as yet, undecided. The
subordination of the III) to the Culture-Propaganda
Department would apparently mean that all media
organs directing propaganda to both domestic and
foreign audiences-including Pravda, Izvestiya,
TASS, and APN-would be overseen by one depart-
ment. Substantive approval for particular articles
would undoubtedly still have to be received from the
various offices responsible for the subject. However,
the new department would apparently have the re-
sponsibility for ensuring that articles on both domestic
and foreign issues contain the proper ideological
content and level of sophistication for their various
audiences.
Gorbachev is
also trying to root out corruption and inefficiency in
the propaganda apparatus. Gosteleradio chairman
Sergey Lapin, who was recently replaced, was appar-
ently a victim of this purge.
Gorbachev is
unhappy with the process for foreign propaganda
implementation. At the very least, he appears set on
streamlining the process for coordinating propaganda
campaigns by subordinating the III) to a larger
organization.
In the past few years, and particularly since Gorba-
chev's appointment as General Secretary, the Soviets
have developed a variety of methods for getting their
on Soviet proposals, policies, and reactions.
The New General Secretary
The long period during which a string of ailing
Kremlin bosses and a heavyhanded Soviet propaganda
apparatus gave the West an advantage in internation-
al image making ended when Gorbachev became
General Secretary. The 55-year-old leader, along with
his wife Raisa, has shown a great deal of public
relations savvy. As a US official put it, "The Soviets
have been improving their propaganda skills in recent
years, but they've never had the talent to pull it off.
Now, they have the talent." The substance of the
Soviet message has not changed profoundly, but its
language and the way it is propagated are becoming
more flexible, modern, and "Western." Many of these
changes undoubtedly are attributable directly to the
new General Secretary.
In addition to his personal appeal, the Soviet leader is
probably responsible for a number of propaganda
initiatives from the Kremlin since his succession.
Moreover, his good health and personal style have led
to more traveling abroad than any general secretary
has done in some time-trips that receive wide media
coverage. For example, his four-day visit to Paris in
November 1985 received saturation coverage in the
major West European press, including front-page
editorials, commentaries, news analyses, and back-
grounders complemented with extensive reportage.
However, although there was extensive coverage, not
all of it was positive. Much of the press, although
lauding Gorbachev's "Western-style" handling of the
press, noted the "transparent propaganda" of the
succession of surprise arms control proposals before
and during the meeting.
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Figure 6. General Secretary
Gorbachev with French Presi-
Press Conferences
The practice of press conferences is not new in the
Soviet Union-Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev gave
a few-but their frequency and form are new. Soviet
spokesmen and now the General Secretary are regu-
larly fielding questions from reporters before a bat-
tery of television cameras. The Soviets value press
conferences as a chance to state, and thus promote,
Soviet positions to international audiences. Also,
Soviet leadership
believes that Gorbachev comes across well in press
conferences, particularly in the one he gave after his
meeting with President Reagan.
Gorbachev's news conferences in Geneva and Paris
highlight this trend. In addition, since inid-1984 press
briefings have been held in the Soviet Foreign Minis-
try at least once a month. Their increased frequency
appears to be related to Moscow's evident dismay at
the public relations debacle it suffered after the KAL
incident and the INF walkout, which coincided with
increasing concern on the part of the Soviet leadership
over Moscow's "counterpropaganda" capabilities.
An important factor in the leadership's appreciation
of the news conference is its credibility, achieved from
its similarity to its Western counterpart. There are,
however, some notable differences between the For-
eign Ministry press briefings and those of the West.
Although some questions are received orally, many
are submitted in writing and deposited in small boxes
at either side of the stage, where they are periodically
picked up by Soviet officials. This procedure assures
the briefers that the questions they want to answer
will get asked, and in a manner favorable to them.
Additionally, it gives officials a chance to consider an
answer before speaking or, perhaps more to the point,
not to answer the question at all.
The performances of Soviet officials thus far have
been fairly good; they have generally deflected hard
questions well and not allowed themselves to be drawn
into comments that go beyond stated policy.
Gaining Access to the Foreign Media
The Soviets are getting better at using the Western
media to their advantage. With increasing frequency,
the Soviet view of an international event or some
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aspect of Soviet foreign policy is being presented
abroad by Soviet spokesmen. It is now common to see
Soviet personalities such as Georgiy Arbatov, Leonid
Zamyatin, or Vladimir Pozner being interviewed by
Western TV commentators or press correspondents.
A recent example of the new "accessibility" of Soviet
spokesmen was the performance of Soviet officials in
Geneva in November 1985. Arriving well before the
summit, the Soviets deluged journalists with a series
of briefings, stacks of translated press releases and
Gorbachev speeches, and a press luncheon.
the information curtain that
separates normally tightlipped Soviet officials from
Western journalists in Moscow parted in Geneva, and
the Soviet spokesmen seemed eager to make them-
selves available.
Another Soviet method for gaining access to the
foreign media has been through the co-optation of
foreign journalists stationed in Moscow. For many
foreign journalists, reporting in a Soviet-biased or pro-
Soviet manner can result in gaining access to other-
wise inaccessible Soviet officials or receiving "inside
information." Moreover, if foreign journalists refuse
to cooperate, they may be the target of provocations,
and some journalists have been charged with "hooli-
ganism," espionage, or illicit behavior and have been
deported.
When the Soviets cannot get foreign journalists to
write their stories, they have another means of getting
foreign coverage: purchasing advertising space in
newspapers. The advertisements almost always carry
a political message and are usually purchased by the
Soviet embassy.
The Controlled Leak
Approved government leaks from official and unoffi-
cial sources help the Soviet Union gain access to the
foreign media with their "hot news" items. Soviet or
Soviet-backed sources occasionally provide informa-
tion to the Western press or Western officials on
Soviet affairs, particularly leadership issues. One
example is Viktor Louis, a KGB agent and mouth-
piece whose self-proclaimed occupation is that of a
Moscow correspondent for a British newspaper. Louis,
who has been a major source of information on Soviet
dissident Andrey Sakharov, provided Western corre-
spondents with a film of Sakharov in 1985. It was
intended to show Sakharov healthy and being well
cared for. Sakharov's wife, Yelena Bonner, has since
stated that the film was made up of clips taken by the
KGB before Sakharov's illness and misrepresented
the state of his health at the time it was released.
the Soviets developed interest in the United Nations
in 1954 when they saw some hope of winning suffi-
cient votes to make it a useful propaganda vehicle.
they have been suc-
cessful in using it to support their propaganda activi-
of the UN Secretariat's news service-the Political
Information and News Service (PINS). PINS was
established by the United Nations to provide the
Secretariat staff and member states with synopses of
media reports. A Soviet national, Vyacheslav Ustinov,
heads the office that supervises PINS. He has dele-
gated editorial responsibilities to his special assistant,
another Soviet. A review of PINS products indicates
an anti-US bias and an absence of unfavorable cover-
age of the USSR.
the UN Department
of Public Information (DPI) plays a crucial role in the
government's propaganda efforts, despite the fact that
the resolution that established the department decreed
that it should not engage in propaganda. The DPI
arranges for national and international media cover-
age of UN activities. The influence of Soviet officials
working in the department frequently results in the
presentation of a selective and distorted image of the
UN's activities. The DPI occasionally issues pam-
phlets, such as one in late 1984 on colonialism, which
are grossly biased against Western countries.
R
Soviets in the UN
Secretariat are instructed to arrange for the UN
Secretary General to make favorable references to the
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Secret
statements of Soviet leaders or announcements of the
Central Committee. The Soviets circulate these state-
ments as well as announcements of the Soviet Govern-
ment in UN documents. As a matter of practice, the
United Nations allows documents of any delegation to
be entered in the record and circulated as official UN
documents. The fact that they have been circulated in
the United Nations is used by the Soviet press and
other media in a way that gives the propaganda more
credibility.
We have no objective means for measuring the overall
effectiveness of Soviet propaganda in influencing poli-
cies abroad, but the huge investment the Soviet Union
has made in its propaganda effort-the radiobroad-
casting, news agencies, publications, and cultural and
information activities-attests to Moscow's high re-
gard for propaganda instruments as political tools.
In spite of this massive effort, Soviet leaders have
continually voiced concerns about the quality of their
foreign propaganda. Gorbachev is taking a more
activist role in the propaganda area and has ordered
changes that, if implemented, will increase the size of
the effort and possibly improve its credibility, sophis-
tication, and timeliness.
Improving the credibility of their news and informa-
tion is the most serious problem for the Soviets. They
combat this shortcoming in part through repetition,
by presenting their propaganda on a particular theme
through various media outlets, hoping that each will
add to the credibility of the other to produce a
convincing story. They also use the foreign media as a
vehicle for their propaganda, hoping that their ideas
will gain the Western media's credibility. Soviet
commentators, particularly since Gorbachev became
General Secretary, appear regularly in the Western
media to present the Soviet views on issues or events.
Timeliness is also a serious problem that, on major
issues, will not be solved easily by the Soviets. Various
incidents have shown that their propaganda effort
breaks down quickly when instructions from the top
are not forthcoming or when bureaucratic interests
conflict. Close party controls and inflexible bureau-
cratic procedures also contribute to inertia and delays.
Soviet leaders have acknowledged that these delays
mean their interpretation of events is not the first one
heard by foreign audiences, and its impact is reduced.
The presence of a strong leader may reduce some of
those delays. Even a reorganization of the apparatus,
however, is unlikely to resolve the conflicting bureau-
cratic interests that have caused problems in the past
on issues of major importance.
The Soviets are currently undertaking a massive new
effort to educate people around the world about Soviet
policies and proposals because they feel their ideas are
future the Soviets are likely to emphasize greater use
of radio and television and introduce additional clan-
destine radio stations targeted at Western Europe.
Additionally, Gorbachev himself has ordered the pro-
paganda apparatus to:
? Improve the supply of publications, especially books,
with most of the increase probably going to develop-
ing countries.
? Double the equipment budget of propaganda agen-
cies for the purchase of more sophisticated comput-
ers and radio, television, and other audiovisual
equipment.
? Tailor propaganda for individual countries and re-
gions.
In addition, TASS and APN will undoubtedly contin-
ue to increase the number of subscribers to their
services, offering them at low or no cost, and Soviet
commentators will make increasing use of the foreign
media as a propaganda outlet.
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