ETHIOPIA: THE MENGISTU REGIME AND ITS RELATIONS WITH MOSCOW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85S00317R000200070003-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 22
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 3, 2010
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: August 1, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of et
Intelligence
With Moscow
Ethiopia: The Mengistui Regime
and Its Relations
Seeret
ALA 84-10084X
SOV 84-10137X
August 1984
Copy 3 6 6
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Ethiopia: The Mengistu Regime
and Its Relations
With Moscow
This paper was prepared by
of African and Latin American Analysis, and
Office of Soviet Analysis, with a
contribution by Office of Central
Reference. It was coordinated with the Directorate
of Operations.
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, African Division, ALA, on
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Secret
ALA 84-10084X
SOV 84-10137X
August 1984
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Secret
Ethiopia: The Mengistu Regime
and Its Relations
With Moscow
Key Judgments The Ethiopian Revolution of 1974 destroyed the centers of power of the old
Information available regime-the imperial court, the landed aristocracy, and the Coptic Chris-
as of I August 1984 tian Church-but the country's new military rulers have been slow to
was used in this report.
establish the Communist party that they have long promised would replace
these institutions. The party will finally be formally launched on the 10th
anniversary of the overthrow of Haile Selassie in September. Contrary to
preferred Communist theory and practice, the Ethiopians intend to keep
the party subordinate to the government. We also expect the regime to
change the name of the government to something like "The People's
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia."
Since Mengistu Haile-Mariam emerged seven years ago as the Chairman
of the Provisional Military'Administrative Council (PMAC) that has
governed Ethiopia since the revolution, he has ruled in the style of a
traditional Ethiopian autocrat-concentrating power in his own hands. In
our view, he is using the establishment of the party and other Marxist-
Leninist institutions to extend the military's control throughout Ethiopian
society and to enhance his personal authority. 25X1
Mengistu's military and economic policies have generated growin dissatis-
faction with the regime, His 25X1
insistence on a strategy of military victory in Addis Ababa's longstanding
struggle against Eritrean and Tigrean insurgents in northern Ethiopia has
cost him support within the Army, which has suffered heavy casualties,
and among urban civilians, who oppose conscription. His attempt to
socialize the Ethiopian economy has damaged productivity and been
resisted by the country's peasants-who make up more than 80 percent of
the population-forcing him to back off at least temporarily by tolerating
some free market practices. Urban workers are also discontented because
the government's austerity program has increased unemployment and
limited the availability of consumer goods, but the working class is
relatively small and lacks political clout. We do not expect Mengistu to
change his goals, but we believe he will continue to be pragmatic-
particularly in the economic sphere--when he thinks the country's national
interest 'demands a nondoctrinaire approach.
In our judgment, Mengistu is likely to remain in power for the next few
years at least, barring an assassination, an incapacitating accident or
illness, or-less probable-a successful coup. Most potential coup plotters
probably will be intimidated by Mengistu's willingness and ability to use
ruthless measures to crush opposition. Mengistu's extensive security net-
work gives him a good chance to learn of plots before they become a threat.
iii Secret
ALA 84-10084X
SOV 84-10137X
August 1984
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Junior military personnel-suffering from the effects of endless fighting
and continuing economic decline-pose the greatest potential threat.
Senior officers are more insulated from economic and military hardships
and have less incentive to mount a coup. Moreover, Mengistu's recent
moves to assure his high command of its continued key role in the
government have further reduced the likelihood that senior officers would
participate in a coup attempt.
We believe that Addis Ababa's alliance with Moscow will survive at least
as long as Mengistu remains in power, and probably beyond. Ethiopia
values the relationship primarily because it ensures the supply of large
amounts of military equipment needed to fight the insurgents. For
Moscow, the relationship provides access to facilities useful in supporting
Soviet naval operations in the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf and
enhances Moscow's capability to project Soviet air and naval power in the
region. Moscow also uses Ethiopia as a model for demonstrating to other
Third World states the benefits of allying with the Soviets.
Thus, while we believe the relationship is mutually beneficial, we think that
Ethiopia's growing problems could increase Moscow's leverage with Addis
Ababa. The lack of success with the insurgents, the continuing need for
arms, the growing arms debt to the Soviets, and the absence of alternative
sources of arms probably will increase Mengistu's dependence on Moscow
and could lead him to grant the Soviets additional concessions.
In any event, we expect that there will continue to be frictions. Moscow, for
example, has pressed Mengistu to create a Communist party since the late
1970s in an effort to institutionalize Soviet influence. While grudgingly
tolerant of Mengistu's intention to pack the new party leadership with
members of his military clique, the Soviets probably believe the party will
allow them to identify and cultivate young cadre who will help guide
Ethiopia along a pro-Soviet course in the long term. Moscow undoubtedly
also is identifying sympathizers among senior Ethiopian military personnel,
but it is not trying actively to strengthen such individuals because it fears
arousing Mengistu's suspicions and thus creating new tensions. For his
part, Mengistu probably will remain dissatisfied with the level and quality
of Soviet military and economic aid but probably will grant the Soviets
partial concessions on such issues as greater access to Ethiopian naval
facilities.
Finally, in our view, a significant improvement in US-Ethiopian relations is
unlikely not only because of Mengistu's dependence on the Soviets but
because of his deep suspicion of US intentions. He is convinced that
Washington is encouraging Somalia and Sudan to support the insurgents in
Ethiopia. Although Mengistu probably will avoid direct, unprovoked
attacks on Somalia and Sudan, we believe he will continue to work with
Libya in assisting Somali and Sudanese dissidents.
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Secret
Mengistu's Use of Marxist-Leninist Institutions 1
Military Policies and Problems 5
Growing Discontent 6
Foreign Relations
With Washington and the West
For Mengistu
For the Ethiopian-Soviet Alliance
For a Successor Regime
Implications for the United States
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Figure 1
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702172(544695)4-84
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Secret
Ethiopia: The Mengistu Regime
and Its Relations
With Moscow
Mengistu's Use of Marxist-Leninist Institutions
Mengistu Haile-Mariam has ruled Ethiopia ruthlessly
since he emerged seven years ago as Chairman of the
Provisional Military Administrative Council (PMAC),
which has governed the country since the overthrow of
Emperor Haile Selassie in September 1974.
he was personally re-
sponsible for the murder of his predecessor as Chair-
man of the PMAC in 1977. Since then, he has
intimidated or eliminated all important rivals. He is a
skillful politician, playing off potentially powerful
individuals, groups, and organizations against one
another. Rather than revolutionary, his style is char-
acteristic of a traditional Ethiopian autocrat. His
strategy has been to concentrate power in his own
hands and to rely on the country's military and
security apparatus to maintain control and to crush
dissent.'
Although we believe that Mengistu is first and fore-
most a pragmatist and an Ethiopian nationalist, we
also believe that he is firmly committed to radical
policies such as those designed to socialize the Ethio-
pian economy. He began advocating radical programs
even before he became Ethiopia's unchallenged lead-
er. In our view, he is using the establishment of
Marxist-Leninist institutions throughout Ethiopian
society both to enhance his own power and to trans-
form the economic, social, and political order.
A Communist Party. Despite pressure from Moscow
and from Ethiopian radicals to develop Soviet-style
institutions in Ethiopia, Mengistu has been slow to
move in that direction. Although the new government
destroyed the centers of power of the old regime-the
imperial court, the landed aristocracy, and the Coptic
' While both Mengistu and Haile Selassie sought to concentrate
power in their own hands, Mengistu has gone beyond what
Ethiopia's emperors were able to achieve. Like Haile Selassie,
Mengistu is skillful at outmaneuvering and playing off internal
rivals against one another, but unlike the emperor, he has broken
the independent authority of local potentates. Haile Selassie ruled
through a fief and vassal system that allowed considerable local
autonomy, but Mengistu has established a direct-rule, unitary
Christian Church-Mengistu delayed for several
years the creation of a Communist party. We believe
that until recently he feared that the military would
lose control of the government to civilian Marxist
ideologues once a Communist party was established,
thereby undermining his own power.
Mengistu will use the occasion of the 10th anniversary
of the overthrow of Haile Selassie this September to
establish the Ethiopian Workers' Party (EWP)-a
Communist party in structure if not in name, accord-
ing to the US Embassy in Addis Ababa. The EWP
will be considered a "vanguard" party, a "Leninist
Party of the new type," according to the Ethiopian
Herald, larger than an elitist, conspiratorial party but
smaller than a mass party of millions.
Mengistu has taken pains over a period of years to
ensure that he and his trusted colleagues' will control
the party apparatus, contrary to the preferred Com-
munist theory and practice of government subordina-
tion to the ;party. When he created the Commission to
Organize the Party of the Working People of Ethiopia
(COPWE) in 1979, he made up its Executive Commit-
tee of himself and the same six colleagues who
constitute the PMAC Standing Committee-the re-
gime's highest level organ. According to the US
Embassy in Addis Ababa, most of the 91 members of
COPWE's Central Committee are former military
officers, although only 19 are active duty personnel.
COPWE had about 20,000 members as of early this
year,
o w is 3 percent were peasants, 21 percent
workers, and 76 percent bureaucrats and military
personnel. We expect that the creation of the EWP
will simply entail renaming COPWE and retaining, at
least initially, its structure and leadership.
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Communist-Style Institutions. The party will com-
plement other institutions that the regime is using to
impose a Soviet-style political and social system and
to indoctrinate the population on Marxist-Leninist
ideology. Although associations of urban residents,
peasants, trade union members, youth, and women
have fallen short of stimulating broad popular support
for the regime, they provide an effective network for
surveillance and control,
The organizations are staffed by thousands of rela-
tively well paid political cadres, highly motivated to
teach the people about Communism, to keep watch on
the Marxist school curriculum-ensuring that teach-
ers adhere to the official line-and to be alert for
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signs of dissent, according to the US Embassy in
Addis Ababa. A special school, partially staffed by
Soviets and East Europeans, trains these cadres as
well as government officials in Marxist-Leninist ideol-
ogy. In addition, the official press, radio, and televi-
sion also are used extensively for propaganda and for
agricultural cooperatives in the provision of machin-
ery and fertilizer, many are poorly managed, short of
skilled personnel and funds, and lack incentives to
increase production.
promoting Communist ideology.
The military receives systematic political indoctrina-
tion from political commissars in each military unit.
The commissars also keep track of the loyalty of the
officer corps. Although commissars are frequently
low-ranking personnel, they can bypass the military
chain of command to report directly to the Ministry of
Interior, according to the US Embassy. Some com-
missars occasionally have even delayed or overruled
planned military operations by calling mandatory
political indoctrination sessions for their troops.
We expect the regime to make additional semantic
changes-some in September and others as soon as a
new constitution outlining the structure of the Soviet-
style state is formally enacted. According to the US
Embassy, the name of the government will change
from "the Provisional Military Government of Social-
ist Ethiopia" to something like the government of
"The People's Democratic Republic of Ethiopia"-
and Mengistu's new title will be "President."
Economic Policies and Problems
Mengistu's Marxist-Leninist economic policies have
more equitably distributed the country's limited
wealth, but Ethiopia remains one of the poorest
countries in the world with a per capita income of
about $140, according to data compiled by the IMF.
We believe prospects for significant improvement are
bleak. The economy is heavily dependent on agricul-
ture, which-despite chronic drought-generates
nearly 45 percent of GDP. Although the abolition of
the feudal system has benefited peasants, who are no
longer forced to give a portion of their crops to
landlords, Mengistu's policies have been less success-
ful in ensuring that adequate food supplies are pro-
duced and sent to market in the cities.
Agriculture. Mengistu's attempts to centralize state
control of agriculture have not succeeded in boosting
production, according to the US Embassy. Although
the regime has given preference to state farms and
Ethiopia was self-sufficient in food production before
Mengistu came to power; we estimate that food now
accounts for more than 10 percent of the country's
total imports. The prices set by the government for
food crops are too low to provide peasants with an
incentive to produce a surplus. Food shortages also
have been caused by periodic drought, soil depletion
resulting from poor farming practices, and food distri-
bution problems arising from an antiquated transpor-
tation system, according to the US Embassy. In
northern Ethiopia, these problems have been exacer-
bated by the increased fighting between the Army
and insurgent groups. 25X1
Although we doubt that Mengistu will give up his
long-term goal of state-controlled agriculture, the
failure of his Marxist policies has left him no choice
but to tolerate private enterprise or to court economic
disaster. As a result, small, individually farmed plots
still account for 90 percent of the country's agricul-
tural production.' Moreover, according to the US 25X1
Embassy, the government may extend some new
credits to peasants, reduce charges for fertilizer, and
pay higher ;prices for food crops.
Industry. Mengistu also is taking a more pragmatic
approach toward Ethiopia's fledgling modern indus-
trial sector because a more doctrinaire approach
would also be disastrous. Although the regime has
nationalized most large-scale businesses, Mengistu
has publicly indicated that he does not plan many
more business takeovers, apparently in part because
the government knows it cannot manage thousands of
small firms efficiently. We believe that the national-
izations and the close government regulation of small
private firms have caused most of the fall in industrial
growth from about 10 percent annually in the late
1970s to less than 6 percent in the early 1980s.
Mengistu's apparent flexibility on ownership, howev-
er, is unlikely to offset the depressing effect of
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Figure 2
Ethiopia: Economic Indicators
.Major Trading Partners, 19838
Eastern Europe 5.2
Composition-of Gross Domestic Product, 19846
' Trade is derived from official recorded trade figures,
January-September. Soviet military equipment sales are not
included.
b Fiscal year ending 6 July.
persistent shortages of raw materials and weak de-
mand for Ethiopia's exports. Moreover, price controls,
a shrinking market, and difficulties in importing
machinery and raw materials have discouraged do-
mestic private investment, while many potential for-
eign investors are holding back because of government
restrictions on profit repatriation.
Economic Decline and Financial Squeeze. Mengis-
tu's tolerance of some free market practices probably
is only a temporary expedient to counter the econo-
my's serious decline. Since 1980, low world prices for
coffee, drought, poor management, and the low pro-
ductivity of collectivized agriculture and nationalized
businesses have caused average annual GNP growth
barely to exceed Ethiopia's annual increase in popula-
tion of 2.3 percent.
The price of coffee, which accounts for nearly two-
thirds of Ethiopia's export revenues, has been low
since 1977, and Addis Ababa has not been able to
increase exports enough to make up the loss. The
resulting decline in revenues has caused foreign ex-
change reserves to fall to a level sufficient to finance
imports for only one month, according to data com-
piled by the IMF.
Embassy reporting.
Addis Ababa's budget deficit has increased sharply
because of growing development spending and rising
military expenditures to combat the insurgencies.
Development spending, concentrated in sectors such
as agriculture, industry, mining, water resources, and
road construction, has more than doubled over the
past four years according to IMF data. Military
spending now accounts for some 40 percent of the
government's recurrent expenditures, according to US
The government has responded to the shortage of
funds with austerity measures, which have increased
unemplo ment and limited the availability of consum-
er goods.
Addis Ababa reduced by 10 percent the budgets of all
ministries except defense for the 1983-84 fiscal year.
It also cut crude oil imports by about 15 percent or
about $30 million, according to IMF data, reduced
imports of consumer goods, and slashed development
spending by more than 20 percent.
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a Estimated.
b End of year.
Does not include debt to the Soviet Union for military equip-
ment-with an estimated value of over $3 billion-delivered since
1977.
d End of June 1984.
Military Policies and Problems
Mengistu's military policies are motivated essentially
by a traditional Ethiopian commitment to maintain-
ing the country's territorial integrity. Mengistu has
concentrated most of his troops in the two areas where
armed insurgents have sizable forces: the Ogaden
region of eastern Ethiopia and Eritrea and Tigray
Provinces in the north.4 Although we believe that the
insurgents do not pose a direct threat to Mengistu's
control in Addis Ababa, they are draining the govern-
ment of money and manpower and, in our view, are
strong enough to withstand the Ethiopian Army's
efforts to defeat them.
the Ogaden in recent years,
but the more than 60,000 Ethiopian
troops in the region are spread thinly and cannot
Million US S
(except where noted)
prevent attacks by guerrilla units of the Western
Somali Liberation Front (WSLF)-the ethnic Somali
insurgent group supported by the government in
Mogadishu. We judge that Mengistu believes he must
maintain a considerable military presence in the
Ogaden to ensure against another Somali invasion. 25X1
local population.
The Northern Insurgencies. Reports from the US
Embassy indicate that the
100,000 Ethiopian army troops in northern Ethiopia
have made almost no headway in defeating the insur-
gents of the Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front (EPLF)
and its ally, the Tigrean Peoples Liberation Front
(TPLF). We estimate that the Army has suffered
about 35,000 casualties in its two major northern
campaigns over the past two years, reducing the
combat effectiveness of some units and undermining
morale generally. EPLF and TPLF guerrilla units,
although relatively small, operate effectively in the
region's mountainous terrain and dominate the coun-
tryside in part because they have the support of the
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Although the Ethiopian Government holds discussions
periodically with the EPLF and smaller Eritrean
groups on the possibility of a settlement, neither side
is willing to compromise,
The government's vague offers of
autonomy have not gone down well with the EPLF,
which says it will not be satisfied with anything less
than full independence
The government may use the occasion of the 10th
anniversary celebrations in September to proclaim
"autonomy" on the Soviet model-for Eritrea, but we
doubt that this will pacify the Eritreans or divert
Mengistu from the pursuit of a military solution.
Mengistu's uncompromising refusal to grant any real
autonomy suggests that he believes he will be able
eventually to wear down the insurgents because of the
regime's advantages in military hardware and sheer
manpower. Moreover, his own rise to power was at
least partly based on the appeal he made to Ethiopian
nationalism by demanding that the country become a
unitary state. We believe he has locked himself into
this position and will pursue a military victory so long
as the Soviets provide the wherewithal. Although the
government has recently instituted a system of nation-
al military service for all Ethiopians between the ages
of 18 and 30, we doubt that conscription will have a
major impact on the fighting any time soon.
Growing Discontent
Urban Unrest. There have been signs recently of rising
urban discontent over the government's security and
economic policies. Many residents of Addis Ababa
have complained about conscription and the use of
press gangs to round up youths to fight the insurgents.
Others have expressed dismay, according to US Em-
bassy officers, about the steady decline in real wages.
urban
workers have received no general wage increase since
before the revolution.
The unveiling of a large statue of Lenin in Addis
Ababa brought discontent to the surface last fall,
according to the US Embassy. Some Ethiopians
stoned or attempted to deface the statue, which many
regarded as an affront to Ethiopia's national tradition.
This prompted the government to station guards to
protect the statue, an admission of the lack of trust
that exists between the regime and many citizens.
Most members of Ethiopia's relatively small educated
middle class are hostile to Mengistu's attempts to
impose Marxist-Leninist institutions and to his ties
have long been alienated because their expectations of
controlling the government after Haile Selassie's oust-
er were never realized.
On balance, however, we do not believe that urban
unrest is a serious threat to Mengistu. Almost all
critics are cowed by the government's willingness to
use firm measures to squelch dissent. The regime
virtually eliminated organized opposition by civilian
leftists in Addis Ababa and other cities during the late
1970s through a massive campaign of repression.
Many of the former activists who were not killed or
jailed went into exile, and the sympathizers who
remain in urban areas generally refrain from overt
political activity.
Rural Unrest. Mengistu must also be wary of the
potential for rural unrest. Although the peasants-
who make up more than 80 percent of the popula-
tion-had enthusiastically supported the revolution
because it broke the power of the landlords, Mengis-
tu's initial attempts at collectivization in the late
1970s provoked resistance. The peasants generally
viewed collectivization as a scheme to take away their
newly won rights. We believe that Mengistu's con-
tinuing reluctance over the last several years to force
peasants into agricultural cooperatives reflects his
concern that such a move would trigger more wide-
spread peasant resistance and further impair food
supplies to urban areas.
DissafJection Within the Military. We believe that
disaffection in the military-Mengistu's principal
power base-is potentially a much more serious prob-
lem for the regime than either urban or rural unrest.
Discontent stems largely from a widespread belief
among both senior officers and the rank and file that
the war against the insurgents cannot be won,
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The discontent among the lower ranks centers mainly
on living conditions and the protracted fighting in
northern Ethiopia.
delegations of troops have petitioned Mengistu for pay
bonuses and shorter tours at the front, the withdrawal
from the front of all Soviet military advisers, and even
the replacement of the present regime by a civilian
government. In one incident in late 1982, a brigade in
Eritrea-mutinied briefly over living conditions
commanders persuaded it to return to action
Few senior officers disagree with Mengistu's policy of
fighting to maintain the country's territorial integrity.
Moreover, none is known to have an alternative
strategy that would be any more successful against
the insurgents. Nevertheless, many senior command-
ers dislike Mengistu's commitment to Marxist-Lenin-
ist institutions and economic policies and resent the
interference of political commissars in military mat-
Mengistu has effectively contained dissent within the
military by executing suspected ringleaders, intimi-
dating other malcontents, making concessions, and
dispensing favors, according to the US Embassy. He
has been flexible enough to acquiesce at times over
issues that do not directly threaten his authority, such
as demands for better pay and living conditions. He
also has taken several steps to appease his senior
officers, including reassuring them that the military
will continue to control the government, even after the
new party is launched.
With Moscow
In our judgment, Mengistu values his alliance with
Moscow primarily because it provides the military
equipment he regards as essential to pursue his goals
of military victory over the insurgents and countering
Somali irredentism. He almost certainly sees no alter-
native source of supply.
assistance.
Military and Economic Aid. The Soviets have agreed
to supply Addis Ababa with a total of roughly $4
billion in military assistance since 1976, of which over
$3 billion has been delivered-the largest amount
Moscow has committed to any state in Sub-Saharan
Africa.' Soviet military aid includes MIG-23 and
MIG-21 fighter aircraft, MI-24 helicopter gunships,
T-54/55 tanks, armored personnel vehicles, surface-
to-air missiles, Osa-II attack boats and other patrol
vessels, air defense equipment, artillery, mortars, and
small arms. In addition, we estimate that there are
about 1,700 Soviet military advisers and 1,000 Soviet
civilian technicians in the country, and Moscow al-
most certainly largely subsidizes the approximately
6,500 Cuban military personnel-reduced from
11,000 since late 1983-that are stationed in Ethio-
pia. The Cuban forces had been largely a strategic
reserve and have not engaged in military activity since
the hostilities with Somalia ended in 1978. In our
judgment, the reduction in Cuba's troop presence
should not diminish Soviet influence because Addis
Ababa is still heavily in debt for Soviet military
equipment and is dependent on Moscow for continued
Moscow also has extended to Ethiopia some $550
million in financial assistance since 1974, half of
which was in the form of commodity credits and oil
subsidies. Such subsidies represent an unusual conces-
sion by Moscow in dealing with a Third World ally.
Although the Soviets have met all of Ethiopia's oil
needs since 1980, they have insisted on increasingly
tougher terms during renegotiations each year, ac-
cording to US Embassy reporting
Aims and .Instruments of Soviet Policy. In our judg-
ment, Moscow values. its relationship with the Men-
gistu regime for several reasons. Militarily, the alli-
ance provides the Soviets access to facilities useful in
supporting their naval forces in the Indian Ocean and
the Persian Gulf and enhances Moscow's capability to
project air and naval power in the region and beyond.
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In a broader political and ideological context, a
successful socialist revolution in Ethiopia would dem-
onstrate the value of the Soviet alliance to other Third
World states and lend credence to Moscow's claims of
a pro-Soviet tilt in the "world correlation of forces."
Moreover, the Soviets presumably see utility in having
access to Ethiopia as a potential springboard from
which to support or promote other leftist movements
in Africa.
Moscow has exploited Mengistu's perceived "vulnera-
bilities" to establish a strong position in Ethiopia. The
USSR has played upon Mengistu's security concerns
over US-backed adversaries in Somalia and Sudan as
well as the internal threat posed by the Eritrean
insurgents. The Soviets have also offered the ambi-
tious Mengistu an organizational model to consolidate
his political power.
The Soviets have a number of tools at their disposal
with which to secure their position in Ethiopia over
the long term. Moscow's main source of influence is
its role as Addis Ababa's principal arms supplier. The
Soviets also can use their advisers to gain influence;
Soviet military advisers are attached to each Ethiopi-
an division headquarters and to most brigades as well.
Since 1981, the Soviet role in planning military
operations has grown; General Petrov, Commander of
Soviet Ground Forces, directly advised Ethiopian
commanders for two-month periods in each of the last
establish a joint military academy in Ethiopia-
presumably to identify and cultivate links to the
coming generation of military leaders. F_
Soviet academic and training programs also afford
Moscow opportunities to cultivate new supporters and
to enhance influence. In 1983, for example, there
were some 3,350 Ethiopian students and 100 technical
trainees in the USSR. An additional 1,800 Ethiopians
were enrolled in programs in Eastern Europe.
6 The Soviets have periodically suggested that Ethiopia consider a
negotiated settlement to resolve the Eritrean problem, most recent-
ly during Mengistu's visit to Moscow in March, according to US
Embassy sources in Addis Ababa. Mengistu has persisted, never-
The establishment of an Ethiopian Communist party
has long been a key goal in Moscow's efforts to
develop the Ethiopian revolution along Marxist-
Leninist lines and to institutionalize Soviet influence
with and access to the ruling elite in Addis Ababa.
Soviet media commentary in 1976-77 frequently
questioned the Ethiopian regime's ability to "secure
the gains of the revolution" without a party.
Moscow has frequently pressed the Ethiopians on this
During the visit of t en
Soviet Premier Kosygin to Addis Ababa in September
1979, Mengistu said that a commission to study the
party question would soon be formed. The formal
announcement launching the Commission to Organize
the Party of the Working People of Ethiopia
(COP WE) followed in December 1979.
COPWE held its first congress in the summer of 1981
and a cooperation accord between COPWE and the
Soviet Communist Party was concluded during Men-
gistu's visit to Moscow in November 1982. The
Soviets subsequently increased the number of party-
to-party exchanges, with COPWE delegations visiting
Moscow to gain insights on how to build a party. This
increased contact probably was designed to keep the
party issue alive and to underscore Moscow's intent
to hold Mengistu to his word. The Soviets probably
also viewed the exchanges as an opportunity to
strengthen their ties with Ethiopia's political leaders.
Sources of Friction. Moscow almost certainly sees
few alternatives to Mengistu within the current Ethio-
pian leadership. The only two pro-Soviet figures in the
ruling military council do not have broad power bases
or strong support within the military,
While Moscow presumably
has identified and cultivated sympathizers among
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senior Ethiopian military personnel, we do not believe
the Soviets are actively trying to promote or strength-
en these individuals. Moscow probably realizes that
such activity would arouse Mengistu's suspicions and
thus create new tensions.
We believe that longstanding Soviet pressure on
Mengistu to create a Communist party in Ethiopia
stems from Moscow's desire to institutionalize its
influence in the country over the long term. While
unhappy that the new party probably will be dominat-
ed by Mengistu's military clique, Moscow probably
believes the party will nonetheless allow it to identify
and cultivate young, ideologically oriented cadres who
over the long term will guide Ethiopia along a pro-
Soviet course. The Soviets are still haggling, however,
over the composition of the party. According to
Embassy sources in Addis Ababa, the Soviets told
Mengistu during his visit to Moscow in March that
there should be more civilians in the party leadership.
experience in Egypt and Somalia, the Soviets proba-
bly recognize that an arms dependency relationship is
no guarantee of long-term influence.
The record shows that Mengistu has sought to bal-
ance the need to cooperate with his patron against his
desire to retain a large degree of autonomy and
flexibility to govern Ethiopia as he chooses. He has
largely succeeded in this endeavor, assuaging his
Soviet patrons with partial concessions and compro-
mises on such issues as the creation of a Marxist-
Leninist party and Soviet access to Ethiopian facilities
in order to obtain Soviet military aid. Mengistu
almost certainly realizes, however, that some of Mos-
cow's proposals-if fully implemented-could limit
his maneuverability or even threaten his leadership. 25X1
Men- 25X1
gistu and his advisers have been dissatisfied with
Moscow's failure to give them even greater supplies of
The Soviets also have sought to shape the broad
outlines of Ethiopia's long-term economic policies.
According to the US Embassy in Addis Ababa,
Moscow has suggested that Ethiopia reorient its
economy to resemble the Soviet economy and urged
Ethiopia to avoid any new debts to Western countries
because of the need to pay off its large outstanding
obligation to the Soviet Union.
Moscow is trying to maintain a
direct involvement in economic planning over the long
term by sending advisers to analyze and refine Ethio-
pia's investment program.
Soviet advisers have been attached
to ministries that deal with the economy and to each
of seven recently established centers created to over-
see Ethiopian economic development projects at the
regional level.
A persistent "tug of war" aspect to Ethiopian-Soviet
dealings reflects, in our view, the tension that charac-
terizes most patron-client relationships. In its efforts
to assure a long-term role for itself, the Soviet Union
has pressed for concessions and changes in Ethiopia
that Moscow believes will institutionalize Soviet influ-
ence. Moscow has been careful not to push Mengistu
too hard and has tolerated his foot-dragging on
various Soviet requests. No doubt mindful of their
weapons, to offer more generous repayment terms on
their military debt to the Soviet Union, or to provide
greater economic assistance. We believe Addis Ababa
will not be able to meet its military debt repayment
schedule, which requires annual payments of $200
million beginning this year-equivalent to almost one-
half of what we estimate will be Ethiopia's total
foreign exchange earnings.
Mengistu informed the
Soviets during his visit to Moscow in March that
Ethiopia could not begin such payments. Several
sources of the US Embassy in Addis Ababa report
that the Soviets subsequently agreed to postpone
repayment of the military debt until April 1986.
there is a great deal of resentment within the Ethiopi-
an military against Soviet influence, and particularly
against the arrogance of Soviet advisers. Some Ethio-
pian commanders claim their battlefield failures re-
sult from bad advice by Soviet officers and from
Moscow's unwillingness to provide more and better
arms. We believe military dissatisfaction with Men-
gistu has been fueled by the regime's perceived close
identification with Moscow and the increased Soviet
advisory and planning role in military operations over
the past three years.
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Soviet access to naval and air facilities in Ethiopia
has been an issue in the bilateral relationship ever
since Somalia's expulsion of the Soviets in November
1977. The Soviets did not immediately press for such
facilities, however, at least in part because of their
location in northern Ethiopia where Soviet personnel
would be vulnerable to Eritrean insurgents.
In April 1978 the Soviets began developing a fairly
modest facility on one of Ethiopia's isolated islands
in the Dahlak archipelago. After transferring a 7,700-
metric-ton floating drydock-which had been in So-
malia prior to 1977-to Dahlak, the Soviets im-
proved the facility, adding housing for some 200
personnel, two floating piers, petroleum storage
tanks, helicopter pads, and other necessities. In recent
years, the Soviets have averaged some 80 to 100 ship
visits a year to Dahlak, largely by vessels of the
Indian Ocean squadron. We believe Moscow and
Addis Ababa have an unwritten understanding that
gives the Soviets nearly exclusive use of this facility.
Ethiopia's dependence on Soviet arms, Mengistu's
apparent decision to assuage Moscow on the party
question, Addis Ababa's inability to meet its first
major military debt payment, and Moscow's concern
over increased US naval activity in the region may
have combined to persuade the Soviets to renew
requests for expanded naval access. The record
strongly suggests that Mengistu's need for aid has
prompted him to accede to at least some of Moscow's
requests but that he is reluctant to agree to proposals
that would entail Soviet control over Ethiopian facili-
ties. We believe Mengistu's stand stems largely from
his sensitivity to the potential for infringements on
Ethiopian sovereignty and that his acquiescence to a
substantial Soviet presence at Dahlak, an isolated
island-while opposing a similar Soviet role at the
ports of Massawa and Assab-reflects his desire to
The Soviets have not obtained the same degree of
access to the ports of Assab and Massawa, which
have larger and better facilities than Dahlak. Inas-
much as Soviet naval practice emphasizes reliance on
auxiliary ships and minimizes dependence on foreign
facilities, access to Massawa and Assab is not essen-
tial to Soviet naval operations in the Indian Ocean
and the Persian Gulf. Soviet ships nonetheless have
called infrequently at both ports.
since 1978 of Soviet pressure
to construct private facilities in or near these ports,
but Mengistu has resisted such efforts.
the airfield in Asmara in May.
Since 1980, the Soviets have periodically deployed
two IL-38 MAY maritime patrol and antisubmarine
warfare aircraft to Yohannes IV airfield in Asmara;
these are supported by a pair of AN-12 CUB aircraft.
The IL-38s are used primarily for reconnaissance
missions against Western ships in the Northwest
Indian Ocean. We believe the Soviets intend to contin-
ue such deployments despite an insurgent attack on
keep Soviet personnel away from populated areas.
Mengistu probably is concerned that a visible Soviet
presence at the ports could spark increased anti-Soviet
With Washington and the West
Mengistu and other key government officials are
deeply suspicious of US policies in the region, accord-
ing to US Embassy reporting
largely because of US military support for
Somalia and Sudan. Mengistu and his key advisers
believe Washington is behind their aid to insurgent
groups in Ethiopia. Moreover, Addis Ababa still
regards Mogadishu's forces as a potential direct mili-
tary threat and believes US assistance encourages
Somalia's designs on the Ogaden.
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Some Ethiopian officials occasionally have indicated
an interest in seeking better relations with the United
States, but nothing has come of these feelers. The
official Ethiopian media has continued virulent at-
tacks on the United States, and the regime expelled
four US diplomats in February. The US Embassy in
Addis Ababa believes that recent moves by some
Foreign Ministry officials to seek better ties were
made without Mengistu's approval.
Mengistu is less hostile toward most other Western
countries. He needs their economic assistance, and we
doubt he views them as a threat to Ethiopia because
most do not have a military presence in the region.
Mengistu's efforts to obtain Western economic aid
have gained him $50-100 million annually from the
European Economic Community and its member
countries as well as smaller amounts of bilateral aid
from a number of other Western countries, such as
Sweden, Canada, and Japan.
The World Bank is expanding its support for Ethio-
pia, and the IMF could be another source of funds.
The Bank approved loans totaling some $135 million
last year alone. Because Mengistu appears to regard
the IMF as an instrument of US policy, he has been
reluctant to ask it for additional funds. Nevertheless,
Ethiopia agreed to an IMF program in 1981 that
provided Addis Ababa some $100 million in balance-
of-payments support. Ethiopia informally approached
the Fund earlier this year regarding more financial
support.
Ethiopia probably would attract greater Western
assistance if it settled claims from Western businesses
that were nationalized during the revolution. Addis
Ababa recently reached a settlement with the largest
British claimant, but it generally moves very slowly on
such claims. Although Mengistu may not want to be
seen as knuckling under to Western "exploiters," we
believe his foot-dragging stems primarily from a lack
of funds to make substantial settlements.
Despite its Marxist practices, Mengistu's government
continues to do business with a number of Western
firms, including US companies. Addis Ababa has
been willing to make purchases from the West that it
considers important, such as US aircraft to modernize
the fleet of Ethiopian Airlines-an important source
of foreign exchange.
With Neighbors
The threat from Somalia-especially Mogadishu's
support for ethnic Somali dissidents in the Ogaden-
is, in our view, Ethiopia's greatest external concern. 25X1
We believe: that Ethiopia's relations with Mogadishu
will be strained for at least the next several years. We
see no sign that attacks on Ethiopian installations by
ethnic Somali insurgents based in Somalia will abate.
Mengistu's difficulties in combating insurgents in
northern Ethiopia have heightened tensions with Su-
dan. The Eritrean and Tigrean insurgents have their
headquarters in Khartoum and use Sudanese territory
for supply routes into areas they control inside Ethio-
pia, Mengistu
publicly blames aid to the insurgents from the US-
backed government in Khartoum and Sudan's Arab
friends for the failure of his northern military cam- 25X1
paigns. According to the US Embassy in Khartoum,
however, Sudan wants to avoid more serious trouble
with its militarily stronger neighbor and gives only
limited help directly to the rebels.
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gistu gives limited aid and training to Sudanese
dissidents. We believe he does not intend to engage in
large-scale attacks into Sudan because he wants to
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to Sudan. Moreover, the deteriorating security situa-
tion in northern Ethiopia leaves the Ethiopians with
only a limited capability to threaten the Sudanese by
moving troops to the border.
Ethiopia is cooperating with Libya in providing eco-
nomic and military assistance and training to Suda-
nese and Somali dissidents. Since Mengistu's alliance
with Libya and South Yemen in the Aden Pact in
1981, Ethiopia has received about $340 million in
economic aid from Libya out of more than $800
million that Tripoli has promised. The new tensions
between Ethiopia and Sudan have led to increased
Ethiopian-I.ib an coo eration in supporting Sudanese
dissidents, and could
prompt Libyan leader Qadhafi to provide more funds
to Ethiopia.
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For Mengistu
We believe Mengistu is likely to remain in power for
the next few years at least, barring an assassination,
an incapacitating accident or illness, or-less proba-
ble-a successful coup. He is only about 43 and
appears to be in good health.
We expect Mengistu to maintain his long-term com-
mitments to a military solution to Eritrea and Tigrey
and to the Marxist-Leninist course he has embarked
on economically and politically. Even after the Ethio-
pian Workers' Party is installed, Mengistu is certain
to manipulate Marxist-Leninist institutions to ensure
that he remains in control. We believe he will contin-
ue to be somewhat pragmatic and flexible on policy
matters-particularly in the economic sphere-when
he feels the country's national interest demands a
nondoctrinaire approach.
Although some civilians, particularly in urban areas,
will be increasingly unhappy as Mengistu moves
ahead in making Ethiopia a Soviet-style state, we see
no chance that civilians by themselves could pose a
serious threat to stability. Moreover, differing inter-
ests and grievances make it unlikely that civilians
would be able to forge an effective alliance with
disaffected military personnel.
Growing dissatisfaction within the military over basi-
cally intractable issues-chiefly the insurgencies and
the country's economic difficuties-have, however,
increased the chance of a coup attempt. We believe
junior military personnel constitute the greatest po-
tential threat because they suffer more than their
superiors from the effects of endless fighting and
continuing economic decline. Senior military com-
manders are more insulated from economic and mili-
tary hardships and, in our view, have less incentive to
mount a coup. Mengistu's recent moves to assure his
high command of its continued key role in the govern-
ment have further reduced the likelihood that senior
officers would participate in a coup attempt.
In our judgment, most potential coup plotters will
continue to be intimidated by Mengistu's willingness
and ability to use ruthless measures to crush opposi-
tion. Mengistu's extensive security network gives him
a good chance to learn of plots before they become a
threat.
For the Ethiopian-Soviet Alliance
In our view, there also is little chance of any serious
split between Addis Ababa and Moscow as long as
Mengistu remains in power. Their mutual needs are
likely to outweigh continuing friction between them.
The two sides probably will not let the debt repayment
issue become a major problem in relations, and
Moscow may back off temporarily on its requests for
naval access while still looking for opportunities to
press Mengistu on the issue. Moscow probably will
also reluctantly accept Mengistu's brand of Commu-
nism but will work discreetly to strengthen its ties
with other members of the party hierarchy.
Nevertheless, while we believe the relationship is
mutually beneficial, we think the Soviets could gain
increased leverage with Addis Ababa. The lack of
success with the insurgents, the continuing need for
arms, the growing arms debt to the Soviets, and the
absence of alternative sources of arms probably will
increase Mengistu's dependence on Moscow and could
lead him to grant the Soviets additional concessions.
In particular, we believe Mengistu could become even
more dependent on the Soviets if confronted with coup
plotting in the military. If Mengistu's government
were threatened, the Soviets probably would be quick
to demonstrate their support by extending intelligence
and personal security assistance and perhaps by pro-
viding additional arms and advisers. The Soviets could
then use Mengistu's increased dependence on them to
extract further concessions in areas such as naval
access. If Mengistu gave in on greater Soviet naval
access, however, we believe he could be faced with
even more opposition from the Ethiopian military.
Contingencies. We see several potential-although
less likely-developments that could precipitate a rift
between Mengistu and his allies. If Mengistu sees
Soviet attempts to cultivate other senior military and
civilian officials as part of a move to replace him with
someone more pliant, he might be tempted to throw
the Soviets out. We believe Mengistu realizes, how-
ever, that a break with Moscow without first finding
another source of arms probably would encourage the
northern insurgents and Somalia to take advantage of
Ethiopia's weakened military position.
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In the unlikely event that Mengistu's forces gain the
upper hand against the northern insurgents, his re-
duced need for military aid might lead him to distance
himself from Moscow. If the Soviets felt Mengistu
was moving to eliminate their influence, however,
they could use their arms supply leverage to persuade
sympathizers in the Ethiopian military to try to
replace him with someone more amenable to Soviet
interests. In our view, however, Mengistu's network of
informers and the considerable anti-Soviet sentiment
in the military would give him a good chance to
thwart such a coup backed by Moscow.
For a Successor Regime
We know of no strong figure waiting in the wings to
replace Mengistu in the event of his death or ouster.
We believe that a new leader almost certainly would
be selected through a power struggle in the military.
We doubt that any civilian in the new party would
have sufficient influence to contend for power.F_
We believe Ethiopia is likely to remain dependent on
Moscow whether or not Mengistu remains in power.
Insurgent military pressure and the difficulty of find-
ing a new arms supplier makes it unlikely that a new
regime in Addis Ababa would succeed in reducing the
need for Soviet military support. Moreover, Ethiopian
military leaders who experienced the transition from
Western to Soviet arms after Mengistu came to power
know that another such shift would compound their
military supply problems by requiring parts and serv-
icing for new equipment while they attempt to keep
Soviet equipment operational. They also would recall
that any weakening of the Armed Forces encourages
both the insurgents and Somalia to increase military
activities.
The Soviets almost certainly would move quickly to
prevent a new government in Addis Ababa from
eliminating its dependence on Moscow. At a mini-
mum, the Soviets would try to use their military
assistance role-and possibly the prospect of addition-
al assistance-as a lever to persuade Ethiopia to
maintain its alliance with Moscow. If its efforts were
unavailing, Moscow probably would encourage and
support pro-Soviet elements in the military in a
countercoup.
Thus, we doubt that a new government would be able
to make major changes in Mengistu's policies. The
probable weakness of a new Ethiopian leader would
reduce Addis Ababa's ability to withstand Soviet
pressure, however, such as for expanded naval access.
We believe Mengistu's deep suspicion of US inten-
tions makes a significant improvement in Ethiopian
relations with Washington highly unlikely. Men-
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States as long as he views US military aid as abetting
Somalia's designs on the Ogaden and US support for
Sudan as hindering his efforts against the northern 25X1
insurgents.
however, about using Ethiopia's superior military
strength vis-a-vis Somalia and Sudan for fear of
provoking the United States to increase its aid to
them and to support their efforts against Ethiopia.
Although we expect Mengistu to avoid attacking
Somalia and Sudan directly, he probably will continue
to work with Libya in assisting Somali and Sudanese
On the other hand, we expect that Mengistu will
continue to be pragmatic enough to seek help from the
West when he believes it is in Ethiopia's interest to do
so. He may even be willing to yield on relatively minor
points-such as Western demands for compensation
for nationalized businesses-in an effort to pry loose 25X1
some Western aid, although we doubt that he will
make major concessions such as significantly altering
Ethiopia's socialist economic policies.
We believe it highly unlikely that Addis Ababa can
forsake its alliance with Moscow in order to obtain
Western economic aid. Despite Mengistu's dissatis-
faction with the level of Soviet economic assistance,
therefore, we believe the United States and other
Western countries have little ability to change the
thrust of Ethiopian policies.
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