ETHIOPIA: INSTITUTIONALIZING A MARXIST-LENINIST STATE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88T00768R000100110001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 4, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 1, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
Marxist-Leninist State
Ethiopia: Institutionalizing a
-
St-ALA 86-10011
April 1986
384
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Marxist-Leninist State
Ethiopia: Institutionalizing a
the Directorate of Operations.
biographic contributions by
This paper was prepared by
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed to the Chief, Africa Division, ALAO
Secret
ALA 86-10011
April 1986
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Ethiopia: Institutionalizing a
Marxist-Leninist State
Key Judgments Chairman Mengistu has evolved since the 1974 revolution from an
Information available opportunistic young military officer bent on seizing absolute political
as of 4 March 1986 power into a dedicated Marxist-Leninist who has made Ethiopia one of the
was used in this report.
Soviet Union's staunchest Third World clients. To facilitate the formation
of a full-fledged Marxist regime, he has created a vanguard Workers
Party, launched an ambitious program of agricultural collectivization, and
expanded the role of the state and the party across the spectrum of
political, economic, and social institutions.
Although Addis Ababa remains heavily dependent on Western economic
aid and famine assistance, we believe efforts by the United States and
other Western nations to reverse this political process and reduce the
dominant Soviet influence in Ethiopia will have little success as long as
Mengistu remains in power. Reporting from the US Embassy
leads us to believe that Mengistu and most senior
Ethiopian military and party leaders harbor a deep distrust of the West
and believe the United States in particular is actively involved in subvert-
ing the regime. We expect the government to continue its efforts to weaken
remaining Western influence by shifting its bilateral economic and trade
ties to the Communist Bloc-as evidenced by Ethiopia's unsuccessful effort
to join the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA) last year-
and will remain impervious to Western charges of human rights abuse. We
believe Mengistu also will attempt to take a more active role in African af-
fairs so as to enhance his image as an African spokesman, cultivate his role
as a Marxist leader, and prove his value to Moscow while attempting to
frustrate US policy goals.
We believe the centerpiece of Mengistu's program to transform Ethiopia
into a Marxist-Leninist state is the Ethiopian Workers Party (WPE),
established in September 1984. Its structure is clearly modeled after the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Moscow played a key role in
creating its structure and policies, according to US Embassy reporting. The
Embassy further reports, and we agree, that the WPE has increased its
power over the past year, and has assumed the role of watchdog in all gov-
ernment ministries and political institutions. Party officials, for example,
dominate famine relief operations and the resettlement program, which are
key to Mengistu's drive to collectivize agriculture.
In addition to the WPE, Mengistu continues to rely on other institutions to
facilitate the transformation of the country and to strengthen his personal
control. For example, he employs a pervasive military commissar system
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both to help indoctrinate troops in Marxism and to watch for signs of
disloyalty. the commissars have
significant power and even have been known to interfere in military
operations. In the urban areas, the regime uses a system of neighborhood
associations, called kebeles, to organize, politicize, and control the popula-
tion. Although the kebeles predate Mengistu's assumption of power, he has
expanded their powers, and, together with party cadres, they now have
wide-ranging political and security functions.
Addis Ababa has seized upon the recent famine and drought crises to
accelerate the collectivization of agriculture. In our view, this program is
one of Mengistu's highest priorities in institutionalizing the revolution.
According to the US Embassy, he considers it the only way both to improve
agricultural production and to control the independent-minded peasantry.
Despite the use of seed, fertilizer, and mechanization as inducements, the
tradition-bound Ethiopian peasantry continues to resist the collectivization
drive. Six years after the introduction of collectivization, approximately 90
percent of Ethiopia's agriculture remains in private hands.
We believe that in the near term Marxism-Leninism is likely to remain a
fragile and alien system in Ethiopia. The population at large remains
unreceptive to indoctrination and, as the US Embassy
note, shows little enthusiasm for the regime, its Marxist-Leninist policies
and institutions, and its Soviet patrons.
The coup in South Yemen and the resultant strains in Ethiopian-Soviet
relations probably will set back efforts by radical ideologues, long support-
ed by the Soviet Union within the WPE and its Politburo, to play a more
active role in formulating and implementing policy. US Embassy reporting
indicates that Mengistu strongly resents Moscow's pressure on him to cease
his support to former PDRY President Hasani, a longtime ally and friend,
and the coup renewed his concern over the threat the radicals pose to him.
Mengistu probably believes Moscow had some hand in the coup, and he
can be expected to monitor closely the ideologues within his regime, limit
their contacts with the Soviets, and rely more on his military to protect him
from any plots. In our opinion, however, Mengistu is unlikely to alter his
efforts to install Marxism-Leninism in the country because of his deep
belief in its benefits.
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In the unlikely event Mengistu were overthrown by the Army, we believe a
successor military regime might move to eliminate or at least reduce the in-
fluence of Marxist-Leninist institutions in an effort to attract Western
economic support, and to rally domestic political support. In this case, we
think Moscow would probably have to acquiesce to these moves in the short
term-especially if Mengistu were killed-while calculating that it could
gradually win over the new regime through the provision of military
equipment. In our view, Ethiopian security interests, real and perceived,
will all but guarantee Moscow a high degree of political leverage with
almost any new regime that wields power in Addis Ababa.
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Key Judgments
The Development of an Ideologue
I
Creating a New State
The Ethiopian Workers Party
2
Politicizing the Military
5
Collectivization of Agriculture
5
Heavy Soviet Involvement
Opposition to the Regime
Military Opposition
Outlook and Implications for the United States
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Ethiopia: Institutionalizing a
Marxist-Leninist State F_
Ethiopia has become one of the Soviet Union's staun-
chest Third World allies under the one-man rule of
Chairman Mengistu Haile-Mariam-a principal fig-
ure in the ousting of Emperor Haile Selassie in 1974.
The record to date shows that Mengistu has evolved
into a dedicated Marxist, who embraces the Soviet
model and is convinced that it is the key to ending
Ethiopia's backwardness as well as a means to solidify
his personal power. Among the five self-professed
Marxist states in Sub-Saharan Africa, Ethiopia under
Mengistu has gone furthest in pursuing Marxist
ideological goals, even at times when it has threatened
to undermine Mengistu's hold on power. This Intelli-
gence Assessment examines structures already in
place and those being planned as Mengistu moves
toward institutionalizing a Marxist-Leninist regime.
The paper briefly evaluates the widespread but frag-
mented opposition to the regime and examines Soviet
attitudes toward its steadfast client state. Finally, this
assessment addresses prospects for Mengistu's effort
to copy the Soviet model and weighs implications of
these developments for the United States.
Since the 1974 Ethiopian revolution that overthrew
Emperor Haile Selassie, we have become more con-
vinced that Mengistu Haile-Mariam has moved from
a leftist opportunist intent only on acquiring power, to
a committed Marxist and one of the Soviet Union's
most loyal Third World clients. This transformation,
in our view, accelerated after he became the undisput-
ed head of the military government in February 1977
by purging and outmaneuvering his political oppo-
Mengistu's political transfor-
mation was hastened by the appeal of a readymade
and clear-cut ideology, the influence wielded on him
by a coterie of Ethiopian civilian Marxists, and Soviet
efforts to court the Ethiopian leader.
An analysis of Mengistu's career indicates that his
strong attraction to Marxism developed in late 1975,
when he formed a close relationship with the French-
educated Marxist intellectual Haile Fida, one of the
civilian advisers to the revolutionary military council.
In April 1976, Mengistu publicly proclaimed himself
a Marxist and called for "the complete elimination of
feudalism, bureaucratic capitalism, and imperialism
from the country ... and for a transition toward
socialism." By 1978, he began identifying himself as a
Communist in his speeches and called for the creation
of a Communist society within Ethiopia.
We believe Mengistu's devotion to Marxism is reflect-
ed in and demonstrated by the many Soviet-style
political and economic policies his government has
pursued:
? Political commissars have been imposed on the
Ethiopian military at all levels, despite opposition
from most field commanders.
? Mengistu formed a Marxist-Leninist workers party
over considerable opposition from many senior mili-
tary officers who view it as a threat to their power.
? Mengistu continues to pursue agricultural collectiv-
ization and resettlement programs despite signifi-
cant human costs and adverse international reac-
tions.
Mengistu shows little inclination to alter these poli-
cies, despite evidence that several of them have not
worked and instead have fanned domestic opposition.
Recent US Embassy reporting indicates that Men-
gistu now plans to hasten the introduction of Marxist
policies into other areas of public life over the next
two to three years.
Chairman Mengistu, in our view, remains committed
to creating a Marxist society in Ethiopia and intends
drastically to alter the country's political, economic,
and social institutions. According to US Embassy
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analysis and Mengistu's speeches, he believes the
Soviet system provides a model for Ethiopia to over-
come its backwardness, end its endemic insurgencies,
and, at the same time, justify the concentration of
power in Addis Ababa
US Embassy reporting suggests Mengistu is intent on
aligning the country's economy with the Soviet Bloc,
while loosening bilateral economic and trade ties to
the West. Last summer, according to US Embassy
sources, he made a determined effort to join the
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CEMA)
despite the prospect of losing badly needed Western
economic aid, which
totaled roughly $1.5 billion over the past 10 years. In
our view, Mengistu probably calculated that political
as well as economic gains from joining CEMA would
compensate for lost Western assistance, as well as
allow him to do away with what he views as Western
interference in his efforts to revamp the Ethiopian
economy.
The Ethiopian Workers Party
The formation of the Ethiopian Workers Party (WPE)
in September 1984 capped a 10-year debate over the
need for and composition of a political party in
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Ethiopia. According to US Embassy reporting and ? Many of these nationalistic senior military and
several academic studies, many members of the mili- security officers also feared that a civilian party
tary council-including initially Mengistu-and other could be more readily subverted by the Soviet
senior officers opposed the creation of a civilian-based Union, allowing Moscow to further strengthen its
Marxist-Leninist party: hold on Ethiopia.
? Many officers viewed the revolution as their own Soon after Mengistu consolidated his position in 1977,
and themselves as the vanguard of social change; US Embassy and academic sources indicated that the
they believed that a civilian party would not only Soviets stepped up the pressure on him to create a
force the military out of politics but also jeopardize
revolutionary gains that had been made.
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civilian-based vanguard party in Ethiopia. For exam-
ple, several Soviet polemicists stressed the need for a
party in Ethiopia to institutionalize the gains of the
revolution and to provide proper guidance to the
population. US Embassy reporting indicated that
high-level Soviet visitors to Addis Ababa frequently
stressed in their speeches the need to create such an
institution and to bring civilians into Ethiopia's deci-
sionmaking bodies.
In December 1979, Mengistu-probably to deflect
Soviet criticism over the slow pace of organizing a
Marxist party-publicly announced the formation of
the Commission for Organizing the Party of the
Workers of Ethiopia (COPWE), a body that resem-
bled and functioned as a political party. COPWE was
basically an appendage of the ruling military council,
and a review of its leadership revealed that Mengistu
and his military supporters held every key position.
They skillfully used the organization to lay the foun-
dation for the future party. According to the US
Embassy and several academic works, membership in
COPWE was closely controlled and designed to en-
sure that the new party would pose little threat to the
regime.
The long-awaited Ethiopian Workers Party was an-
nounced in September 1984 after almost five years of
development. According to the Embassy, Mengistu
dominates the WPE through an 11-man Politburo
that includes six of his longtime military associates
and four civilians. Two of the officers and two of the
civilians on the Politburo are Marxist ideologues,
according to the US Embassy. Because Mengistu
believes that the military alone is capable of leading a
Marxist revolution, we believe the inclusion of the
civilians is an effort to appease the Soviets. Nonethe-
less, we believe that Mengistu focused on the concerns
of his military by allowing active duty or former
military officers who now hold senior government or
key party positions to dominate the WPE's 136-
member Central Committee. Ethiopian Government
statistics show that approximately 70 percent of the
estimated 15,000 party members now belong to the
military or are government employees, while only 20
percent are workers and 10 percent are peasants. To
date, deference to the military has continued and
several civilian officials speaking publicly at a party
congress last year affirmed that the military has a
crucial role to play in the "building of socialism" in
Ethiopia
Over the past year, however, Mengistu has taken
several steps to mold the WPE into a more Leninist
party Rules of
conduct for party members and the operating proce-
dures for the WPE closely parallel those of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Party mem-
bers are forbidden to
attend religious services, and strict controls are placed
over their personal lives. An examination of the party
rules of ethics reveals that the preamble pays homage
to the Russian Revolution and is filled with quotations
from Lenin.
The heart of the WPE is the political cadre, who has
been indoctrinated in the tenets of Marxism-Leninism
and carefully recruited or absorbed from other politi-
cal groups by the party, according to US Embassy
reporting. Although some Ethiopians probably have
joined the party for political or economic gain, the US
Embassy believes that most rank-and-file members-
especially the cadres in the field-are deeply motivat-
ed ideologically. Almost all of them have attended the
regime's Yekatit Political School and attended lec-
tures by Ethiopian, Soviet, and East European faculty
members. We estimate that approximately 15,000
students have undergone ideological training at Yeka-
tit since its formation in 1976. Almost none of the
party's political cadres have been exposed to the West,
according to US Embassy reporting.
The WPE cadre plays an important role in the
regime's efforts to indoctrinate the population. Ac-
cording to the US Embassy, they conduct discussion
clubs that meet at least weekly in all government
organizations and private concerns, with attendance
by employees mandatory. Cadres are assigned to
major secondary schools and the universities to con-
duct indoctrination and to monitor student conduct.
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By all accounts the party has acquired increased
political power over the past year, and party adminis-
trators or cadres frequently wield more control than
government bureaucrats. According to the US Em-
bassy, for example, the party is assuming an increas-
ingly visible role of watchdog in all ministries and
institutions. This is also the case in famine relief
operations, where party officials, according to the US
Embassy, are increasingly making the decisions that
previously were made by local or central government
relief administrators.
Politicizing the Military
Mengistu almost certainly realizes that military back-
ing is vital to his retention of power and is well aware
that it is the only institution capable of ousting him.
Based on the record to date, he has put considerable
effort into establishing institutions within the armed
forces to allow him to inculcate the troops with
Marxism-Leninism, build support for the regime and
its programs, and to weed out seditious activity. Every
military unit has a political commissar and,
individuals are junior officers or enlisted men who
have little formal training except for political indoctri-
nation. The commissar program, which was instituted
in the mid-1970s, closely resembles the system cur-
rently found in Soviet Bloc armies.
sars wield significant power, and have access to all
military communications and in some cases have the
authority to countermand the orders of unit com-
manders.
The commissars also play a politicizing role, and hold
frequent political meetings for the troops where the
tenets of Marxism-Leninism are taught, often using
techniques such as movies or "morality plays,"=
In addition to their train-
ing function, commissars also closely monitor the
political climate of the units.
they report signs of disloyalty to the regime and can
have a commander replaced or arrested.
The Kebeles
The regime exercises political control in Ethiopian
cities and towns through neighborhood associations
called kebeles. Membership by the residents is man-
datory, according to US Embassy and academic
reporting. Kebeles were first established by the mili-
tary regime in 1975 to carry out its political and
economic reform policies in the urban areas and to
strengthen control over the population. According to
the US Embassy, its leaders are elected by the
residents of the neighborhoods, although all candi-
dates are selected by the government.
The associations are responsible, according to a US
Embassy study, for food distribution, security, and
political indoctrination. Kebele officials have the pow-
er of arrest and certain other limited judicial powers,
maintain armed patrols within their areas of jurisdic-
tion, control rationing, and can approve or deny travel
requests. Although the kebeles are not under party
control, they hold periodic meetings where party
cadres provide political indoctrination for adults and
youths, and attendance is closely monitored.
many
Kebele officials probably serve as an effective deter-
rent to antiregime sentiment in the cities. The US
Embassy reports that armed kebele security forces
augment government police in putting down local
disturbances, tracking down dissidents, and, in some
locations, are used to prevent peasants from leaving
resettlement camps.
Collectivization of Agriculture
Mengistu believes, according to US Embassy report-
ing, that collectivization of agriculture is an important
step in bringing the Ethiopian economy under state
control. He therefore made this his first major eco-
nomic goal after seizing power. In the initial stages
the regime moved slowly in its efforts to collectivize
the peasantry, especially in the conservative northern
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provinces. We agree with several academic authors 25X1
who state that Mengistu was concerned that forceful
collectivization at the outset would fuel the insurgen-
cies and drastically reduce agricultural production.
According to a government edict published in 1979,
the collectivization procedure was to be accomplished
gradually, with peasant associations converting into
collectives by amalgamating land and giving up old
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The regime has made significant strides in restructur-
ing the economy along socialist lines since the mili-
tary takeover in 1974. Public utilities, banking,finan-
cial institutions, and industry in the relatively small
modern industrial sector are under government con-
trol. In addition, all rural and urban land as well as
housing were nationalized at the time of the an-
nouncement of an extensive land reform program in
1975. Collectivization of agriculture was introduced
in 1979, and the Embassy estimates that 5 percent of
the farms are now collective.
The US Embassy reports that over 90 percent of
major industrial output now comes from the public
sector, including textiles, oil refining, food process-
ing, and cement. Freight forwarding has been nation-
alized and the export trade brought under national
control. The government's Agricultural Marketing
Corporation will handle approximately 40 percent of
all grain sales during the present Ethiopian fiscal
year. In addition, the regime's coffee marketing firm
controls over 70 percent of total registered coffee
sales. The majority of other export commodities,
such as hides, skins, and oilseed, are also under
government control.
the government to nationalize any joint venture in the
event that such a move is deemed in the national
interest. As a result of this and the clear intention of
the government to eventually abolish the private
sector, long-term investment is almost nonexistent,
according to the US Embassy.
Ethiopia's adherence to Marxist ideology, which has
wreaked havoc with its economy, will impede its
ability to bounce back from the severe drought and
famine. The US Embassy reports that while Addis
Ababa's balance-of-payments situation-in decline in
recent years-has improved, this is a result of the
amount of goods and services purchased by the
foreign community engaged in relief operations and is
only a temporary situation. At the same time, it
masks preliminary reports that indicate a significant
decline in agriculture-including coffee, the major
export; a small drop in industrial production; and a
small growth in the services sector. We believe, based
upon US Embassy reporting, that the regime is
unlikely to take the measures necessary to revitalize
the economy, such as increased price supports to
farmers or programs designed to draw more assis-
tance to the private sector.
In January 1983, Addis Ababa issued a joint-venture
proclamation in an effort to stimulate foreign invest-
ment. A section of the proclamation, however, allows
farming implements in favor of mechanization. Cur-
rent government policy dictates, according to the US
Embassy, that collective and state farms receive
priority for all government services, including the
distribution of fertilizer, improved seeds, extension
services, and credit. As a result, we judge government
services are not reaching the vast majority of farmers
who have not agreed to collectivize. According to
government figures and several academic studies,
however, this approach has met with limited success
and, because of peasant resistance, approximately 90
percent of agriculture remains in private hands. In
fact, the regime's own statistics indicate that collec-
tive farms are a rarity in the northern provinces of
Ethiopia, which account for a substantial amount of
the country's agricultural production.
We believe Addis Ababa has seized upon the recent
famine and drought crisis to accelerate collectiviza-
tion. In general the government is attempting to break
peasant resistance through a two-prong approach.
Some people are being forced to move to newly
constructed resettlement camps in other regions of the
country-the so-called resettlement program-while
other peasants are being moved to newly constructed
villages within their regions-a policy referred to as
the "villagization" program. Under its resettlement
plan, some 1.2 million peasants are slated to be moved
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from the drought and famine ravaged northern prov-
inces to more fertile areas of western and southern
Ethiopia.' According to Ethiopian officials, the reset-
tlement camps are being organized as collective farms
although the settlers are allowed to maintain small
family plots. A variety of US Embassy reports leads
us to contend that Ethiopian authorities-who have
quotas to meet-frequently use force to procure "vo-
lunteers" for resettlement despite strong Western
objections to such human rights violations. According
to the US Embassy, over 600,000 people have been
resettled since October 1984.
Information on conditions in the resettlement camps
is spotty, but US Embassy reporting indicates that
severe health and logistic problems exist. Western
relief and government officials who have visited reset-
tlement areas report that armed guards are used to
keep the settlers from leaving and that party cadres
closely control visitor access. According to Western
observers, many sites are poorly located and lack
adequate facilities, logistic support, and health care.
the initial crop harvest in
some camps has been small, raising the prospect of
malnutrition, disease, and starvation. We believe the
regime has attempted to address some of these issues
by slowing the pace of resettlement and sending
several thousand students and faculty to the camps to
construct housing last summer, but the government
has been unable to marshal sufficient resources to
support adequately Mengistu's hasty and ill-conceived
resettlement plan.
Mengistu plans to
move at least 350,000 peasants into over 2,000 new
villages during the next two years, and ultimately
convert them into collective farms. The "villagiza-
tion" campaign is intended,
to move rural inhabitants into newly con-
structed villages in eastern and central Ethiopia,
ostensibly to provide them with better health and
educational services. The US Embassy reports, how-
ever, that many of the new villages lack basic necessi-
ties and suffer from a lack of personnel and equip-
ment to support the new programs "villagization" is
intended to provide.
Mengistu's continued pursuit of collectivization de-
spite its serious problems and bleak prospects for
improving Ethiopia's agricultural production is, in our
view, another example of his commitment to what he
considers Marxist dogma. Although the Soviet Union
continues to provide substantial logistic assistance to
the resettlement effort and some medical aid in the
camps, the US Embassy reports that several Soviet
Bloc officials have criticized the program. We believe,
based on Mengistu's efforts to develop collective
farms exclusively in the resettlement areas, that he
continues to believe that agricultural production can
only increase through collectivization, where he con-
tends resources can be concentrated and the peasants
reeducated both technically and ideologically. The US
Embassy notes that to further these goals, as many as
2,000 party cadres are involved in the resettlement
program.
The Soviet Union-despite some concern about con-
tinued military domination of Ethiopia's political in-
stitutions and the regime's misapplication of Marxist-
Leninist dogma-continues to make substantial
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creating Marxist-Leninist institutions as well as bol-
stering Mengistu's position in Ethiopia.
Moscow played a major role
in the establishment of the WPE, aiding Addis Ababa
in creating the party structure and drawing up its
rules and regulations. US Embassy reporting 0
indicate that the Soviets
are continuing to encourage Mengistu to bring civil-
ians into his ruling circle and expand his support base
outside the military. In the same vein, a recent article
in a Soviet journal stressed that the creation of a
"peoples republic" in Ethiopia is necessary now to
enhance the role of the WPE and ostensibly to give
more Ethiopians a stake in the political system. In our
opinion, this step is intended to provide the veneer of
civilian rule and to establish an electoral process in
Ethiopia, neither of which have occurred under mili-
tary rule.
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Relations between Addis Ababa and Moscow have
expanded dramatically since early 1977, when Men-
gistu Haile-Mariam became Chairman of the ruling
military council. A prominent symbol of their rela-
tionship is the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation
that was signed in late 1978.
The Soviet Union is deeply involved in supporting the
Ethiopian military, especially Addis Ababa's efforts
to suppress the longstanding insurgencies in Eritrea
and Tigray Provinces. The two countries have signed
over $4 million in military aid agreements since
1976, of which approximately $3.1 billion in arms
have been delivered. There are an estimated 1,700
Soviet military advisers and technicians in Ethiopia.a
The Soviets are attached to all major military units
and are involved in planning most military cam-
paigns, especially in northern Ethiopia. Moscow's
presence is complemented by another 3,000 Cuban
and 200 East German advisers and 2,000 to 2,500
Cuban combat troops.
Ethiopia is the largest recipient of Soviet economic
aid to Sub-Saharan Africa. Moscow has disbursed
approximately $600 million out of $1.3 billion in
We believe Moscow is succeeding in its effort to have
pro-Western officials within the government bureau-
cracy gradually replaced with Soviet-educated offi-
cials. For example, the regime appointed an ideologue
critical of Western relief assistance as acting head of
the government's famine relief operations after its
former chief defected to the West. According to US
Embassy reporting this transition has moved apace,
especially in the foreign and economic ministries. As a
result of this process, we believe there continues to be
a steady erosion of Western viewpoints and influences
within the government.
pledges, primarily in commodity credits and oil sub-
sidies, according to our estimates. In addition, the
Soviets are financing oil and gas exploration in the
Ogaden Region and the construction of several small
factories and agricultural facilities. There are ap-
proximately 1,700 Soviet economic advisers in
Ethiopia.
liberation movements worldwide.
The Soviet Union also has reaped political benefits in
return for its aid to Ethiopia. The Mengistu regime is
one of Moscow's most supportive Third World cli-
ents. Addis Ababa, for example, supports Moscow on
Afghanistan in the United Nations and it was one of
the few African states to participate in the 1984
Soviet-led Olympic boycott. Ethiopia also strongly
backs SWAPO, the ANC, and other Soviet-supported
US Embassy reporting, training of many enlisted men
and junior officers is conducted in the Soviet Union
and other Communist Bloc states. It can last several
years and includes heavy doses of political indoctrina-
tion. many
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trainees are alienated by their indoctrination and
exposure to unpleasant experiences in the Soviet
Union (such as racism and Soviet feelings of cultural
superiority) the majority return home still relatively
well disposed toward the Soviet model. Many of the
personnel who are in these programs, according to the
US Embassy, are ashamed at the backwardness of
Ethiopia and are convinced-at least for the pre-
sent-that Communism is the only system that can
rapidly develop their country.
Moscow and Ethiopia also maintain extensive politi-
cal, military, and economic ties which we judge not
only bolster Mengistu but enhance Soviet influence as
well:
? Ethiopia is one of Moscow's largest Third World
recipients of military aid, with over $3 billion in
deliveries since 1977.
? Addis Ababa has received approximately $600 mil-
lion in Soviet economic assistance, more than any
other Sub-Saharan country.
? Various governmental and party delegations fre-
quently travel between the two countries; Mengistu
usually visits Moscow at least once a year; he went
to the Soviet Union in November 1985 and met with
General Secretary Gorbachev and other senior offi-
cials, and also attended the recent Soviet Party
Congress.
? The Soviet Ambassador meets with Mengistu and
other senior government officials frequently, accord-
ing to the US Embassy.
Soviet econo-
mists played an important role in developing Ethio-
pia's 10-year economic plan, and the Soviets are
assisting in drafting the Ethiopian constitution and
revising the country's legal system.
Soviet Concerns
Despite the establishment of the WPE and several
other trappings of a Communist state, we believe,
based on US Embassy reporting and Soviet academic
writings, that Moscow still harbors some reservations
about Mengistu's policies.
Impact of the South Yemeni Coup
At the outbreak of fighting in South Yemen between
rival Marxist factions, Chairman Mengistu moved to
provide political and military assistance to President
Hasani, his longtime friend and ally. Moscow, how-
ever, eventually backed the rebels and applied heavy-
handed pressure on the Ethiopians to end support to
Hasani. The US Embassy reports that Mengistu not
only resented the Soviet pressure but also may have
concluded that Moscow was behind the coup from the
start. In addition, the US Embassy reports that
Mengistu probably questions the loyalty of civilian
ideologues within his own government, some of whom
questioned his aid to Hasani.
Despite the tensions that developed between Ethiopia
and the Soviet Union, we agree with the US Embassy
that there probably will be little significant impact on
their relationship. Mengistu and other senior Ethiopi-
an officials realize that only Moscow is willing to
provide the large amounts of military assistance
needed by Addis Ababa to defend against the insur-
gent threat in the northern provinces. In addition,
Mengistu is deeply committed to the Marxist-Lenin-
ist system, in our opinion, and probably rejects any
potential return to the West on political grounds.
We believe, however, that Mengistu probably will
move to curtail the influence of civilian ideologues in
Ethiopia, some of whom have enhanced their power
over the past year. While he is unlikely to risk
offending the Soviet Union (which reportedly has
sponsored some of the individuals) by eliminating
them, we believe Mengistu will tighten his security
forces and move to ensure support from his military
to preclude any threat to his position from the
radicals. In addition, Mengistu probably will monitor
or attempt to hinder the access of ideologues to the
Soviets in an effort to prevent Moscow from cultivat-
ing a rival.
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Soviet officials are not pleased with Mengistu's stack-
ing of the WPE's leadership with his military cronies
and other officers with questionable Marxist creden-
tials. Soviet commentary in the years prior to the
formation of the WPE called for a civilian party in
Ethiopia and, according to the tenets of Leninism, the
subordination of the military. Moscow is almost cer-
tainly aware of the large numbers of nonideologues on
the party's Central Committee, and recent Soviet
political commentary continues to point out the need
to include more civilians in senior party positions and
in the membership of the party in general.
the Soviets would encourage a move against Mengistu
over these issues, and risk the outbreak of a violent
struggle for power in Ethiopia.
Opposition to the regime's efforts to implant Marxism
is found within civilian and military sectors, but it is
disorganized and held in check by repression and
skillful co-optation. An indication of the effectiveness
of the regime's security is the lack of an anti-Marxist
insurgency in Ethiopia of note, although the regime
faces a challenge from two Marxist northern insur-
An authoritative Soviet journal recently castigated
the Ethiopian leadership for its poor understanding
and misapplication of Marxism-Leninism on such key
issues as agriculture and the rights of ethnic minor-
ities. In general terms, the article blamed "faulty
assessments and hasty decisions" for the regime's
inability to improve agricultural production in recent
years. On the nationality question (clearly referring to
the Eritrean conflict) the journal criticized the politi-
cal and ideological immaturity of "certain" Ethiopian
leaders and their poor understanding and incorrect
application of Marxist-Leninist concepts to conditions
in Ethiopia. The article further stated that Addis
Ababa's ethnic problems were complicated by the
delay in forming a vanguard party and the govern-
ment's tendency to view ethnic problems from "non-
class positions."
The Soviet Union also appears to believe that the
Ethiopians are trying to move too hastily in applying
Marxist economic measures and in eliminating the
private sector iven the underdeveloped state of its
economy. Soviet
economic advisers recently suggested price incentives
for farmers, a reform of the tax laws, and the
encouragement of private investment in small-scale
industries.
These issues, however, are basically minor irritants
that Moscow may believe will eventually die away as
Marxism becomes more entrenched in Ethiopia. In
fact, a review of open source Soviet commentary
indicates a general satisfaction with trends in Ethiopia
despite occasional criticism. We doubt, especially in
light of Moscow's predicament in South Yemen, that
gent groups
Civilian Disaffection
Opposition to the regime and its Marxist policies is
evident in both urban and rural areas. In the cities,
the US Embassy reports that the middle class and
student population have long been alienated from the
Mengistu government and most elements of the mid-
dle class detest the party, military rule, and the Soviet
presence. The declining economy, nationalization of
businesses, heavy taxes and special fees, the military
draft, as well as a host of other government measures
and restrictions also have demoralized and alienated
them.' Secondary and university students, according
to US Embassy sources, are disenchanted with the
lack of employment opportunities after graduation
and with tight restrictions on access to advanced
education overseas, and they hate the draft and resent
the academic disruption caused by pressures to partic-
ipate in various mass campaigns. The US Embassy
reports that government efforts to win the people over
through Marxist study clubs run by the WPE and
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In the countryside, based on reporting from the US
Embassy the peasants also
display little enthusiasm for the regime's Marxist
programs, and are especially unhappy with the collec-
tivization, resettlement, and "villagization" schemes.
Indeed, in many of the remote areas of Tigray,
Gonder, and Welo Provinces-where conservatism is
deeply rooted among the peasants-they continue to
resist any government attempt to impose its writ or to
introduce innovations that will disrupt their way of
life, according to several academic studies. Addis
Ababa generally has been careful in applying its
programs in the north for these reasons, although we
judge it has exploited the famine crises to force
peasants into collective farms in resettlement areas.4
Despite the simmering unrest and scattered spontane-
ous protests, especially in the urban areas, we believe
dissatisfied civilian factions are not likely to openly
challenge the regime. The government has demon-
strated a willingness and ability to suppress or intimi-
date most individuals and organizations capable of
leading protest movements. In its early years, the
military regime summarily eliminated civilian politi-
cal parties or organizations and suppressed the labor
unions, which played a key role in the 1974 revolu-
tion.
Moreover, many Ethiopians, especially in Addis Aba-
ba, probably recall the bloodletting that marked the
1976-78 period, when military and civilian factions
fought bitterly for control of the government. The US
Embassy estimated at the time that thousands of
supporters of both sides died nationwide, and we
believe many people still fear that the military
regime-now stronger and more firmly in control-
would again react forcefully in the face of open
defiance.
Ethiopian tradition also probably plays a role in
limiting civilian opposition to Mengistu. According to
an Embassy assessment, the majority of the Ethiopian
people have historically accepted authoritarian rule,
relying on a strong leader to protect the Christian
highlands from domination by their Islamic neigh-
bors, which many Ethiopians probably still judge to
be a far worse fate than anything imposed by Men-
gistu.
In addition, according to the US Embassy and several
scholars, Ethiopians by nature tend to be reserved and
suspicious of each other, with their society deeply
divided by ethnic, class, regional, and religious preju-
dices. Thus, many observers believe Ethiopians may
often condemn their government in discourse with
trusted foreigners or publish anonymous leaflets, but
they are unwilling to speak out critically, grumbling
in private while publicly bending before the prevailing
wind.
Military Opposition
According to US Embassy reporting
opposition to Mengistu-while manage-
able-exists below the surface at almost all levels of
the military, particularly among senior officers, and is
driven by:
? A strong distaste for the degree of Soviet influence
in Ethiopia and the large numbers of Soviet advisers
attached to the military.
? The threat to military rule posed by the WPE and
the growing influence of Marxist civilians within the
government.
? Distrust of Mengistu's judgment in mounting
successive large scale offensives in Eritrea and
Tigray, which resulted in heavy military casualties
and low morale.
military opposition, at least among the officer corps,
stems from strong Ethiopian nationalism rather than
ideological preference. To some extent, this may
reflect the massive xenophobia found among many
educated Ethiopians. Several Ethiopian officers now
in high positions, for example, also were critical of the
United States and its military and economic assis-
tance programs prior to their termination in 1977,
according to US Embassy re-
porting.
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We believe the Mengistu regime continues to rely on
a mix of measures to help keep the opposition weak
and off balance. In addition to a network of commis-
sars-who carry out political indoctrination within
the military and serve as his "eyes and ears"-
Mengistu is guarded by a special Ethiopian unit
commanded by a longtime political ally,
He also oversees an efficient
security organization, the Ministry for Public and
National Security, set up by the Soviets and East
Germans and commanded by officials who owe their
positions to him, according to the US Embassy.
Finally, in our judgment, order is maintained by the
knowledge that the regime will move quickly to
restore control when necessary and not hesitate to
execute troublemakers.
Appreciable levels of discontent will persist in Ethio-
pia, but, in our view, Mengistu's ruthlessness, tradi-
tional Ethiopian passivity, the fragmented nature of
the opposition, continued (albeit grudging) support
from the military, the gradual expansion of a new,
party-oriented support base, and continued Soviet
assistance will allow Mengistu to remain in power for
the next few years. We believe Mengistu will be able
to maintain his tight hold on power in the near term
and continue his efforts to solidify his core of loyal
supporters within the WPE and other nonmilitary
groups to help institutionalize Marxism-Leninism.
The planned promulgation of a constitution and the
proclamation of a "people's democracy" later this
year will provide, in our view, a further veneer of
legitimacy to the Mengistu government and its politi-
cal ideology. While we believe support for Marxism-
Leninism will continue to grow at a gradual pace,
primarily in the urban areas where the regime's grip is
tightest, we also believe that the roots of the ideology
will remain shallow over the near term. We believe
most of society will continue to view Marxism-Lenin-
ism not only as a tool of Mengistu but also as an alien
concept forced upon it by the Soviet Union.
Mengistu's dogmatic approach to solving Ethiopia's
economic and political problems is unlikely to change
over the near term, although we believe tactical
adjustments will be made from time to time. We
expect his programs will lead to increased economic
hardship for most of the population, but Mengistu will
continue to insulate the urban areas and the military
from most of these problems.
withdrawn.
In our view, it is unlikely that the United States and
other Western nations-despite their significant food
aid donations-will be able to increase their influence
in Ethiopia given Mengistu's deep distrust of the
West, which is shared by several of his senior advisers.
Based upon US Embassy reporting and Mengistu's
actions to date, Addis Ababa will continue to turn a
deaf ear to Western efforts to modify its Marxist
policies and improve its poor human rights record,
calculating that Western relief assistance will not be
As Mengistu institutionalizes Communist ideology, he
is also likely to continue his efforts to undermine US
allies in the region such as Sudan and Somalia whom
he considers either inherently hostile or as staging
platforms for perceived US destabilization efforts.
Over the near term, we believe Mengistu also will be
tempted to play a more active role in regional and
continental politics in an effort to bolster his image as
an African spokesman, play on his role as leader of a
new Marxist-Leninist state, and enhance his position
with Moscow while attempting to frustrate US policy
goals. According to US Embassy reporting, Mengistu
in the past has encouraged several West African
states, such as Liberia and Ghana, to move closer to
the Soviet Bloc.
Alternate Scenarios
Despite the efforts being made to institutionalize
Marxism in Ethiopia, the concept so far has only
fragile roots, with Mengistu and a relatively small
clique of ideologues as its primary proponents. In the
unlikely event that Mengistu were removed from
office by a coup in the next year or two, we believe the
influence of Marxist institutions would be substantial-
ly reduced or eliminated in many sectors despite the
thousands of indoctrinated party cadres.
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Assassination
Mengistu has made many enemies over the years and
the threat of assassination is real. We believe such an
event would usher in a period of instability in Ethio-
pia, perhaps resembling the turbulence of the early
years of the Ethiopian revolution. No one individual
around Mengistu, military or civilian, has the support
or charisma that would allow him to assume leader-
ship unchallenged. Coalitions probably would be
formed to ensure continuity until a new strongman
stepped forward in Addis Ababa. We believe it is
unlikely that a leader fully capable of moving Ethio-
pia back toward the Western camp would emerge,
because Marxists will probably participate in any
coalition government. In addition, the Soviets could
have a say in. selecting Mengistu's successor, given
their present level of influence and Ethiopia's continu-
ing need for arms.
A Successful Coup
Military disgruntlement over the never-ending wars in
northern Ethiopia, the extent of Soviet influence in
the military and government, and the expanding role
of the WPE could embolden some factions in the
military to attempt a coup. While it would be difficult
to pull off a successful coup, given the tightly con-
trolled and politicized nature of the military, it is
conceivable that selected commanders of key units,
operating secretly, could succeed
Most of Mengistu's senior officers, who would be the
most likely coup leaders, have little use for domestic
Marxist programs or the new party. They probably
would prefer to dismantle Marxist institutions such as
the WPE and collective farms and formulate moder-
ate domestic programs. Such programs might attract
increased Western economic assistance, eliminate
threats to their position, and rally domestic support.
In such an event, Moscow initially would probably not
be able to prevent the dismantling of some Marxist
institutions, at least in the short term. It would
probably also wish to avoid a repetition of the South
Yemeni affair, especially if Mengistu were assassinat-
ed in the coup, preferring to bide its time and
gradually reinfiltrate the new regime with its support-
ers. We believe, however, that the intractable insur-
gencies eventually would undermine Ethiopian efforts
to place too much distance between themselves and
the Soviets. Addis Ababa probably would calculate
that the West would not match the massive amounts
of arms that Ethiopia currently receives from the
USSR; in any event, it lacks the foreign currency to
make any significant purchases. Because of these
military realities, we believe Moscow would be guar-
anteed a high degree of political leverage with almost
any new military regime, preventing a rupture in
Ethiopian-Soviet relations.
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