WHAT REALLY HAPPENED TO KAL FLIGHT 007

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00552R000100490002-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 22, 2010
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: January 1, 1984
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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~:.~ F jP ~~ ~~P~,RED ~,
:~~~ ~hE~ ~a -.t
January 1984
What Really Happened'.
to KAL Flight 007
At 6:~6 a.m. on September t, t983, a Soviet Su-15 int~rccptor aircraft
fired taro missiles at a Korean Airlines Boeing 747 near the Soviet island
of Sakhalin, north ofJapan. Momrnts later, Japanese air controllers heard
a faint, frantic message from the airliner: :911 engines .. rapid
decompression." Poem gone, fuselage punctured, the huge 747 spun
uncontrollably downward for tZ minutes. At b: j8 a.m., KAL Flight 007
disappeared from Japanese radar screens. Everyone on board-Z6cj men,
women and children-perished.
Ever since this atrocity, the Soviet Union has labored to confuse and
deceive the world about what actually happrned. 'The Soviet pilou, in
stopping the actions of the intruder lane, could not 1~now that it was a
civilian aircraft,': declared the o~ictal news agrnry, Tars. "It was fl ing
without navigation lights, at the height of night, in conditions ofYbad
viribility, and was not answering signals.' Bessdes, claimed the Soviets,
the Korean airliner really was a CIA spy plane.
This massive ~ropa anda effort has succeeded in implanting ~rnuine
doubu in she minds o~millions. Could the Soviets have misidrnt~ed the
airliner? Did thry try to warn it? Was it rngagcd, in a spy miss:on?
Nobody in the West is better uah cd to answer these questions than
former Sovies L.t. Viktor Bclrn~o. Before his daring escape to Japan in ~
1976 in a MiG-25, ? Bclrnko flew the Su-1 S interceptor and served in the
same Far East Air Defense Command whose radar and planes tracked
and pursued the doomed airliner. He knows the mentality of Soviet
commanders, pilou and ground controllers, as well as the fears and secret
orders that govern them. Since his escape, he has aced as a consultant to
the U.S. A:r Force and American aircraft companies, and has thus bern
kept informed about the latest developments inside the Soviet air force.
Also, at the request of the U.S. governmrnt, he has carcf~lly listrne to the
voices of Soviet pilots recorded as thry stalked and destroyed KAL 007.
Here is his revealing analysis of how and why the tragedy took place.
'See "MiG Pilot: The Final F-xape of Lt. Belenko," Reader's Digest. January 'So.
HENEVER radar screens
~~~reveal an unidentified air- ~,
YY craft within ioo kilomc- ',
tern of Soviet borders, its position is
immediately reported to the Na-
tional Command Center at Kali-
nin, northwest of Moscow. So long
as the aircraft remains in the too-
kilometer zone, its course, speed
and altitude are shown on a gigan-
tic screen at the Command Center,
where a general officer always is on
duty.
In the early hours of September t,
Soviet radar spotted an American
RC-135 reconnaissance plane in in-
ternational airspace over the Ber-ng
Sca, cast of the Kamchatka Pcnin-
?There is nothing secret, sinister or illegal !~'
akaut these patrols. They are conducted in ac-
cordance with the Strategic Arms Limitation
Treaty, which specifies that the United States
and the Soviet Union will verify compliance by
the other through their respcaive "national tech-
nipl means of verifir~tion"-which means re-
connaissance by aircraft and satellites.
sula. Subsequently, KAL 007 flew
past the general vicinity where the
U.S. plane had been earlier. The STAT
Soviets have tried to persuade the
world that their air defenses mis-
took the civilian airliner for the U.S.
military plane. Such a mistake is ut- ',
terly impossible. I will tell you why.
Because Kamchatka is an im-
portant Soviet missile-testing site,
RC-135s almost daily patrol over
international waters off the pen-
insula.' So Soviet air-defense per-
sonnel, in both the Far East and
Moscow, arc very familiar with the
RC-135 and its distinctive charac-
teristics. Amodified Boeing 707,
the RC-135 is heavily laden with
external antennas and electronic
gear, which drastically reduce its
speed. Moreover, once the RC-135
arrives in its patrol area, it circles
lazily downward, flying as slowly
as it can to conserve fuel and re-
main on station as long as possible.
Soviet air defenses also arc very
familiar with the Boeing 747. Every
day, 747s belonging to different
foreign airlines fly along interna-
tional route R-20, which passes
close to the southern tip of Kam-
chatka. Having tracked both types
of aircraft daily for many years, the
Soviets well know that the 747
cruises at Least t~5 knots faster than
the RC-135 flies. So the speed alone
of KAL 007 unmistakably told the
Soviets that it was not an RC-135.
And Soviet radar stations recorded
and reported this speed for more
than two hours.
A secret standing order, issued
by the Soviet Ministry of Defense
and sanctioned by the Politburo,
dictates that once an alien aircraft
ventures into Soviet airspace it
must not be allowed to escape: Sovi-
~~TT'J1v ~yY
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et pilots arc supposed to fly ahead of
the foreign plane, attract attention
by firing tracers, rocking wings
and, if it is dark, by flashing their
navigational lights. If the foreign
plane dots not signal willingness to
follow the interceptors, then Soviet
pilots arc to shoot it down. ,
Thus, as KAL 007, now disas-
trously off course, came within 25
kilometers of Kamchatka, local
commanders launched intercep-
tors.. But the Soviet fighters failed
co catch KAL 007. They did not
even come close enough to warn the
airliner or to fire at it successfully.
Perhaps the ground commander
was slow in scrambling his planes.
Perhaps ground controllers were
inept in vectoring them. Whatever,
the standing order was unfulfilled;
an unauthorized aircraft had trans-
gressed Soviet airspace and been
allowed to escape.
As KAL 007 flew blithely on-
ward, its cxccutioncr sat in a Ready
Room at the Dolinsk-Sokol air base
on southern Sakhalin. I know the
scene well.
The pilot reports at dusk, under-
goes acursory physical examina-
uon,and has a big meal followed by
another at t r p.m. Throughout the
' night he must wear his pressure
suit, which is tight and uncomfort-
able. He may read and play chess;
he is not supposed to sleep. Parked
about 3o feet outside the Ready
Room, all set for a quick takeoff, is
the Su-I5.
The wail of a siren shortly before
Ei a.m. suddenly ended the boredom
of the veteran pilot and summoned
him to a mission, a real one. Within
five minutes he was airborne. And
now two (cars preoccupied him:
Will 1 execute properly? During
all of his career, a Soviet pilot is
taught: You may not think. You may
neuver arc dictated by ground; bly see shells which spent themselves
control. Over water, the pilot con- ~ and fell earthward five kilometers
tinually worries about whether ~ behind and below them.
the controllers will guide him so far Ordered to close upon the "tar-
from land, or keep him airborne so get," the Su-IS overshot and for a
long, that he will have to ditch at I few seconds was ahead of .the 747
sea. Unlike American pilots, he before falling back alongside it.
does not wear an insulated, water- Had the pilot during those fleeting
proof suit that would help him ~ moments fired tracers or flashed his
survive in frigid waters. So ditching lights, he would have reported Bo-
at sea means death. ing so. He made no such report.
Because of an incessant stream of Neither did he mention any effort
orders from the ground, the Su-15 to contact KAL 007 by radio. And ',
pilot replied almost continuously to I the transmissions from the Korean
his controllers. The Japanese and ; airliner after the interceptor fired
Americans recorded his every ; its cannon clearly show that its crew
word, and I have listened to the ' had neither seen nor heard any-
tape again and again. The tape I ', thing to suggest that there was a
analyzed did not include transmis- ! problem.
sions from ground control. But the i From the outset, the Soviet inter-
pilot's own words, frequently spo- ceptor~ew to attack, not to warn. At
ken in a tremulous voice that be-' E):20 a.m., the pilot positioned the
trays extreme tension, prove many Su-15, not ahead of the airliner
important and telling' points: where he could signal it, but below
The visibility above Sakhalin was ~~ and behind it-the attack position.
very good. At 6:06 a.m., while the ~ Then the pilot, manifestly in obedi-
pilot was many kilomctcrs away' cncc to orders from the ground, j
from KAL 007, he reported seeing : reported that his missiles were
it. At 6:iz, while still far away, he' locked on the airliner and ready to
reported, "I sec it visually and on strike.
radar." Had the weather been bad, But suddenly, because of indeci-
the pilot could not have seen the lion on the ground-whether at
airliner from such distances. Sakhalin, the Regional Command
The lights of KAL 007 shone Center at Khabarovsk "or in Mos-
brightly. At 6: i o a.m,, apparently in ~ cow-the pilot was ordered to
response to a direct question from i break the missile lock-on and to j
ground control, the pilot answered, ~ move closer to KAL 007. His voice
"Roger. (The target's strobe] light i reflects disgust at the order.
is blinking." At 6: r 8 he reported, ! Soviet indecision ended about
"The A.N.O. (air navigational two minutes later, and the pilot
lights] are burning. The [strobe] received the fateful order. Obedi-
light is flashing." And at 6:Zr he cntly, he dropped back and beneath j
again volunteered, "The target's KAL 007, positioning himself to
(strobe] light is blinking." kill. At 6:z3 a.m. he said, "Now I
The Soviets made no realistic effort will try rockets." He flew very close
to warn KAL 007 or force it to land. ~ to the 747-probably within two
To support their claim that they 'i~ kilometers-and his panel lights
tried to warn the airliner, the Sovi- j signaled that the missile-guidance
._~ .-..- ~...-a-.
You ~ may only execute. Your com-
mander will think for you. The pilot,
of course, does think co himself: 1
must do exactly as 1 am told. 1 must
execute perfectly. If not, 1 and my
family will be ruined.
Will I have to ditch? From the
moment a Soviet interceptor pilot
rakes off, his every action and ma-
burst of cannon fire. At 6:~o a.m.
the pilot did indeed report, "I am
firing cannon bursts." But at this
time the interceptor was at least six ',
kilomctcrs behind and below KAL
007. The maximum range of an Su-
15 cannon is only one kilometer, i
Thus, the Korean pilots in their
cockpit atop the 747 could not possi-
systems were fixed on the airliner. ~,
At 6:~6 a.m. he reported, "I have '.
executed the launch." Two seconds
later he said, "The target is ~~
destroyed."
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THE Soviet Air Defense Command
had tracked and evaluated KAL
007 for almost ZI/z hours. The
familiar speed of the airliner, its
direct flight path, its distinctive
configuration-unlike any other
aircraft in the world-its gleam-
ing navigation lights and Bashing
strobe light all .identified KAL 007
as a civilian 747, not an RC-135.
Why then did the Soviets finally
make the calculated decision to
blow up the airliner and kill its
innocent passengers?
Certainly, KAL 007 was far off
course (see box, page 77). It violated
Soviet airspace for about t~ min-
utes over Kamchatka and again for
a shorter time over Sakhalin. This
was wrong. But when Soviet planes,
evefi military ones, have violated'
American sovereign airspace-as
they did at least twice in ty83-
they have not been shot down.
Typically, our interceptors warn
and lead straying aircraft away,
in accordance with international
agreements. Why could not the So-
viets have done the same?
The answer may be found
back in April t978, when a Korean .
Airlines 707, bound from Paris
to Seoul, suffered navigational-
equipment failure near the North
Pole and blundered into Soviet air-
space. Although fully aware that it
was .a civilian airliner, the Soviet',
Air Defense Command ordered it '~
shot down. Struck by cannon fire
from a Soviet interceptor, the trip- ',
pled 707 nevertheless flew over
Soviet territory for another go min-
utes before making an extraordi-
narycrash landing on a frozen lake.
Only two people wcrc killed and t3 ~
injured.
The Soviet military felt acute
embarrassment for having allowed
the airliner to fly aimlessly over
Russian territory for another qo
minutes unmolested. The Politbu-
ro demanded answers. If you can't
stop a civilian airliner from wan-
dering around our territory for so
long, they asked, how can we ex- .
peer you to cope with advanced
military aircraft? As a consc-
~. 77
Lured to Destruction?
THE LOST KOREAN AIRLINER pOSSeSSed [hrte separate computerized
navigational systems-the same systems that each day safely and unerr-
ingly guide commercial aircraft to their destinations throughout the
world. Additionally, there were radio beacons along the prescribed route
of KAL 007 by which its pilots could verify their position. Yet sometime
after the airliner passed beyond the range of radar in Alaska, it veered off
course. Transmissions from the aircraft to japan showed that the pilots
did not realize they had strayed.
Perhaps the pilots misprogrammed their computers before takeoff.
Perhaps in flight they set the wrong dial on the navigational control panel.
Perhaps, seeing a landmass on their weather radar, they confused Kam-
chatka with a Japanese _ island. Unless the airliner's flight recorder is
recovered from the ocean floor (now unlikely), the cause of their mistake
will remain unclear.
Could the Soviets have deliberately lured KAL 007 off course? While
no evidence to support such a charge has come to light, the possibility
cannot be discounted. According to the Defense Department, in each of
the past few years the Soviets have made dozens of electronic attempts to
dupe and confuse American pilots into flying over forbidden territory
where they could be shot at. The practice involves "meaconing"-the
sending of misleading navigational signals from powerful portable trans-
mitters-as well as radar and radio jamming. It continues today, and, in
fact, reports of mcaconing and jamming increased roughly so percent
in Ig83.
Sophisticated American countermeasures, coupled with special training
of air crews, have reduced the efTectiveness of this predatory deception.
Nevertheless, the Soviets keep trying, hoping to create international
incidents which their propagandists can exploit.
quence, several senior officers were
cashiered.
Now the National Command
Centcr? was aware that Soviet air
defenses at Kamchatka had failed
again. I suspect the Moscow com-
manders reasoned that the risks of
killing wcrc Icss than those of em-
barrassing the Politburo anew.
But the worldwide outrage that
the slaughter provoked embar-
rassed the Kremlin far more. Ex-
planations had to be contrived.
Initially, the Soviets refused even
to admit they had shot down KAL
007. Hours after its destruction,
Tass reported that an "unidentified
plant" had violated Soviet airspace
over Kamchatka and Sakhalin.
"The plane did not have navigation
lights, did not respond to queries
and did not enter into contact with
the dispatcher service," Tass said.
"Fighters of the anti-aircrak de-
fense, which wcrc sent aloft toward
the intruder plane, tried to give it
~N,fZNi:7ED
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assistance in directing it to the near-
est airfield. But the intruder plane
did not react to the signals and
warnings from the Soviet fighters
and continued its flight in the di-
rection of the Sea of Japan."?
The next day, Tass reiterated the
Soviet claim that the missing plant
Acw without lights and stated that
an interceptor fired warning shots
at it. On September 3, Tass pub-
lished an inordinately abusive dia-
tribe against the United States and
President Reagan, excoriating
them for saying the Soviets had
shot down KAL 007. This was fol-
lowed by the assertion of Soviet
Colonel-General Semyon Roma-
nov that KAL 007 had its lights off
and that in any case the "outlines"
of a Boeing 747 "resemble much
those of the American reconnais-
sance plant RC-135."
On September g, President Rea-
gan played the damning tape rcpro-
?In my time, there was no'dispatchcr service"
or ground~ontrol system on either Kamchatka
or Sakhalin apable of communiption with
foreign aircraft. Moreover, none of the half-
dozen commercial planes in the air or ground-
monitoring stations hard any warning over the
international emergency frequency.
ducing the voice of the Su-15 pilot
shooting down KAL 007. ,And fi-
nally, five days after the atrocity,
the Soviets admitted the undeni-
able. "Since the intruder plane did
not obey the demand to Ry to a
Soviet airfield and tried to evade
pursuit, the interceptor-fighter
plant of the anti-aircraft defenses
fulfilled the order of the command
post to stop the flight," Tass an-
nounced on September 6.
Ever since this confession, Soviet
propagandists have reiterated the ,
theme that KAL 007 was embarked
upon some kind of espionage mis-
sion. But they have never presented
any tangible evidence in support of
this claim. Indeed, almost every
substantive statement the Soviets
have made in justification of the
slaughter over Sakhalin is demon-
strably False.
Listening to all the bellicose So-
viet fabrications, I am reminded of
an old Russian adage: "I will uri- ,
Hate in your eyes, and you will say it
is Holy Water." That is the attitude
the Soviets have adopted in trying
to justify the slaughter of 26g inno-
cent men, women and children.
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