TERRORISM REVIEW

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84-00893R000100040001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 5, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 26, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
,Review
Terrorism
26 November 19,82
DO NOT ply., UT
Secret
GI TR 82-004
26 November 1982
MASTER FILE COPY
34.7
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Secret
Review
iii Overview
(OGI)
1 Hijacking of Soviet Plane to Turkey Could Create Problems for the United
States 25X1
(OGI)
3 Abu Nidal Attempting To Negotiate With European Government
(OGI)
5 Cache and Catch Successes Against West German Terrorists
(OGI)
Spain's Socialist Victory Prompts Shift in Terrorist Strategies
(OGI)
9 Terrorists Use of Armor-Piercing Ammunition
OGI)
13 PLO: Impact of the Lebanese Incursion
Special Analysis-Peru: Counterterrorist Capabilities of Civilian SPo,ir;+y Forces
ALA) 25X1
25X1
25X6
Comments and queries regarding this publication may be directed to the Research
Director, Instability and Insurgency Center, Office of Global Issues, telephone
25X1
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Terrorism
Review F_
Europe for at least the next few months.
Recent law enforcement successes and local accommodations are likely, in our
view, to result in overall reduced levels of activity by major terrorist groups in
We believe the arrest by West German authorities of Red Army Faction (RAF)
leaders Klar, Mohnhaupt, and Schulz is a significant setback for the RAF and will
disrupt plans for major operations for an indefinite period. In our opinion,
however, remaining RAF operatives may attempt an attack, probably requiring
minimal logistic support, to restore RAF credibility. Attacks by fringe and
sympathizer groups are likely to continue, but their tactical skill may be limited.
Over the long term, the RAF is likely to reconstitute its leadership core and
rebuild its operational capabilities as it has following other personnel losses.
Italian authorities have apprehended over 20 Red Brigades members and suspects
since early October; the most recent arrests were in the Rome area and in northern
Italy. We concur with the view of Italian officials that the Brigades have been
thrown into disarray. 25X1
French authorities of Basque terrorist leaders in France, we believe, have raised
Basque uncertainties regarding the durability of the French-Basque accommoda-
tion, which has provided Basque terrorists sanctuary in southern France. F__1
While overtures to the Socialists by Spain's prominent terrorist groups-the
Basque ETA/M (Fatherland and Liberty/Military) and the Communist GRAPO
(First of October Antifascist Resistance Group)-are unlikely to produce a durable
accord with the incoming government, they probably will be accompanied by a
reduction of terrorist activity, at least by GRAPO. Moreover, recent arrests by
25X1
25X1
one of the most active radical Palestinian terrorist
reduce their terrorist activities.
groups, Black June, is attempting to work out accommodations with the French
and British Governments that would result in a halt to Black June operations in
those countries. If these accommodations reflect pressure on Black June from Iraq
to curb terrorist activities, as the evidence indicates, other radical Palestinian
groups over which Baghdad exercises influence are also likely to be pressed to
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Hijacking of Soviet Plane
to Turkey Could Create Problems
for the United States
A hijacking incident involving a Soviet airliner-
similar to a previous incident involving the United
States-could give Moscow the opportunity to depict
the West as inconsistent in opposing terrorism
On 9 November three Soviet citizens hijacked an
Aeroflot AN-24 on a domestic flight and forced it to
fly to Sinop, Turkey, where the hijackers surrendered
to police and requested political asylum. Reports vary,
but the pilot and at least one passenger were stabbed,
although not seriously, during a scuffle with the
hijackers who carried a Beretta pistol, pocketknives,
and screwdrivers. The plane with 40 passengers and
crew returned the next day to the USSR
Moscow has demanded the immediate extradition of
the hijackers. Turkish officials, however, note that a
1977 provisional extradition accord between Ankara
and Moscow remains unratified. The Turks may
judge that, in accordance with the Hague Convention,
the laws of the country in which a hijacked aircraft
lands are applicable. The hijackers have been charged
with air piracy, assault, and battery.
The case is reminiscent of a still unresolved hijacking
incident involving the United States and the Soviet
Union. In 1970, two Lithuanians landed in Turkey
after seizing a Soviet plane on a domestic flight. A
stewardess was killed during the incident. The two
hijackers were convicted of manslaughter and de-
tained in Turkey until 1976, when they went to the
United States.
Since that time the Soviet Union has regularly but
unsuccessfully demanded their return. It is likely, in
our view, that the 9 November incident may renew
Soviet interest in this unresolved problem and could
result in Soviet attempts to use international coopera-
tion against terrorists as a propaganda issue
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Secret
Abu Nidal Attempting
To Negotiate With
European Governments
the radical
Palestinian Black June Organization (BJO) is at-
tempting to arrange accommodations with France and
the United Kingdom to cease terrorist activities in
those countries.
Abu Nidal, leader of the group, which operates out of
both Syria and Iraq, claims that he is on the verge of a
deal with the French
Abu Nidal said that he would seek Algerian
assistance in the negotiations, which would result in a
halt to BJO terrorist activity on French soil in return
for an unspecified French gesture.
A French Government official recently informed the
United States that the chief of the French General
Directorate for External Security (DGSE) held secret
talks in mid-September with Rifaat Assad, brother of
the President of Syria. During the talks Rifaat agreed
to order Abu Nidal to refrain from carrying out
terrorist attacks in France, and the French have
confirmed that Rifaat did, in fact, issue the order.
in September BJO
attempted to arrange a similar accommodation with
the British. BJO offered to
cease terrorist operations in the United Kingdom in
exchange for release of BJO members imprisoned in
June for the assassination of Israeli Ambassador
Argov.
The Iraqis, under US pressure to halt support to
terrorist groups, may also have pressed BJO to cease
terrorist operations. If so, Abu Nidal probably decid-
ed that, since he is under Syrian and Iraqi pressure to
quit operations, he should try to obtain some conces-
sions from European governments. Abu Nidal un-
doubtedly has heard claims by the Armenian Secret
Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) that
they had a truce with the French for over a year.
25X1
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Cache and Catch Successes
Against West German Terrorists
25X1 25X1
The recent capture in West Germany of three of the
most wanted hardcore terrorists of the Red Army
Faction will set back the RAF for the short term but
is not likely to destroy the group
The three arrests, following more than a year and a
half of frustrated efforts to capture RAF activists,
provide counterterrorist officials a needed boost. All
three captured terrorists are suspected of participation
in the attacks on General Kroesen in September 1981,
General Haig in June 1979, and in the assassinations
of three prominent Germans in 1977.
The arrests were the indirect result of the accidental
discovery by mushroom pickers of an RAF storage
depot buried in the woods near Frankfurt. According
to German officials, the cache contained weapons,
cash, documentation paraphernalia, targeting infor-
mation, and a code leading to other storage depots
throughout West Germany. Most of these depots were
concentrated in the Hannover-Hamburg area and in
Land Hesse
In a well-planned and professionally executed opera-
tion, German counterterrorist officials baited the trap
and ordered contingents of police to stake out cache
sites in wooded areas throughout Germany. On 11
November Brigitte Mohnhaupt and Adelheid Schulz,
both fugitives for years, were arrested as they started
to dig up the main cache. Five days later, Christian
Klar, probably the most important male leader of the
RAF, walked into a similar trap in the vicinity of
Hamburg.
By 15 November, West German authorities had
located 13 separate RAF caches and were searching
for another; they believe, moreover, that still unidenti-
fied caches exist.
The location of the storage depots and the arrests of
Mohnhaupt, Schulz, and Klar represent a significant,
but probably not lethal, setback for the RAF, in our
view. Other RAF leaders still at large possess organi-
zational and operational skills and are trained lieuten-
ants for the captured leaders. Moreover, the size of
the operational cadre is uncertain-new activists, who
have moved from a support into an operational role,
may not yet have been identified. The history of the
RAF indicates that heavy personnel and logistic losses
have never permanently deterred terrorist activity._
While the RAF is binding its wounds, the resurgence
of terrorist activity against US interests, especially
military targets in West Germany, persists, as evi-
denced by an attempted bombing of a US housing
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25X1
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facility near Frankfurt within three days of the
capture of Mohnhaupt and Schulz. Members of vari-
ous RAF supporter groups, the Revolutionary Cells,
and possibly new and unidentified groups carried out
a campaign against US military housing facilities in
West Germany during the fall. The RAF arrests
probably will result in sympathetic terrorist attacks
by such groups
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Secret
Spain's Socialist Victory
Prompts Shift in
Terrorist Strategies
Probes by Spain's two major terrorist organizations
are unlikely to result in an accord with the new
Socialist government.
The two groups appear to view the election of the
Socialist Party (PSOE) as a unique opportunity to
press for their political objectives. The overwhelming
Socialist vote may have been erroneously perceived by
the terrorists as reflecting popular support for their
positions. Recent indications of incipient French-
Spanish cooperation on terrorism may also have
prompted overtures to the Spanish Government to
inhibit the authorities from further damaging terrorist
support organizations.
The First of October Antifascist Group (GRAPO), the
terrorist arm of the illegal Reconstituted Communist
Party (PCE-R), declared a unilateral moratorium on
illegal activities to demonstrate good faith. In a
communique on 6 November, GRAPO proposed to
dissolve itself if the new government removes Spain
from NATO, frees all leftist political prisoners, and
meets aspirations of national groups currently
"oppressed by the Spanish state."
The Herri Batasuna political party linked to Spain's
most powerful terrorist group the Basque separatist
organization, Fatherland and Liberty/ Military Wing
(ETA/M), has formally offered to negotiate with the
Socialists on behalf of ETA/M. In a separate move,
ETA/M leaders in France have asked the French
Socialist Party to act as intermediary between
ETA/M and the Gonzalez government
We believe that continuing ETA/M attacks are in-
tended to demonstrate the group's strength prior to
any negotiations. The preelection spate of bombings
and the spectacular assassination of a high-ranking
Spanish general in Madrid on 4 November also
25X1
appear designed to reverse the public's view that
actions by the Spanish and French police have crip-
pled the organization. ETA/M also suffered a critical
setback with the dissolution of the ETA/Political-
Military Wing VII Assembly (ETA/PM), which pub-
licly rejected violence for participation in the political
process. ETA/PM's secret negotiations with the
Spanish Government resulted in an agreement in
September 1982 pardoning VII Assembly members
who abandoned violence. These secret negotiations
marked a significant milestone in relations between
the Spanish Government and the Basque separatists
and may have contributed to. current ETA/M at- 25X1
tempts to open a dialogue. 25X1
We suspect the Gonzalez government will reject the
ETA/M negotiation offer because of the 4 November
assassination and that the record of assassinations will
preclude amnesty for Basque terrorists. The vague-
ness of some GRAPO demands and the group's
unilateral truce may permit the government to offer
minor concessions in return for a continuation of the
truce. A general amnesty for lesser crimes might 25X1
allow some GRAPO members a face-saving avenue
for rejecting terrorism. Dissolution of a violence-prone
group such as GRAPO would be a victory for the new
Socialist government and would weaken remaining
terrorist groups, in our view
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Terrorist Use of
Armor-Piercing Ammunition
25X1 25X1
Since 1977 West German and Italian terrorists have
made limited but effective use of various armor-
piercing ammunition, which permits the targeting of
personnel in hardened vehicles
15 rounds of teflon-coated
ammunition manufactured in the United States by
KTW, Inc., have been recovered during investigations
of three assassinations conducted by the Red Army
Faction (RAF) in 1977 and in 1979. Thirteen addi-
tional KTW cartridges were discovered in 1980 at the
scene of two separate car accidents in which four
RAF members were killed and at the scene of the
attempted murder of a French policeman by RAF
terrorist Inge Viett.
The RAF may have access to a greater supply of
KTW ammunition than is suggested by the limited
quantity discovered to date. West German authorities
report that the 28 rounds found include cartridges in
three different pistol calibers and that no distinction
had been made in the past between confiscated KTW
rounds and conventional ammunition. Developed over
12 years ago for the military and police, KTW
ammunition has long been available in Europe. Ac-
cording to the manufacturer, most production has
been sold to foreign governments for use in their
police forces, and there have been large-scale thefts of
KTW ammunition shipments abroad.
Luau wiivcuuvuai aull11u1 mun. %-VIlllary w pupuiar
opinion, the teflon coating on such bullets does little
more than lubricate their path down the barrel
According to Italian authorities, members of the Red
Brigade (BR) Naples Column used military-issue 25X1
7.62-mm armor-piercing ammunition to breach the
bulletproof glass of an armored car in April 1982. The
ammunition and weapons used in this attack-in
which a labor official and his driver were killed-had
been stolen from a military barracks earlier in 1982.
Italian authorities have also stated that, despite police
counterterrorist actions, the BR Naples Column re-
tains more than 20 rifles, 13 submachineguns, 44
pistols, and 5,000 rounds of ammunition as a result of
raids on two military installations, an Italian Army 25X1
convoy, and a Calabrian gunshop since February
1982. 25X1
Although we are unaware of what percentage of the
stolen ammunition is armor piercing, the ordnance
captured by the BR this year provides its local
columns with the means to strike at targeted person-
nel traveling in hardened vehicles. The armor on such
vehicles is rated by the number of impacts that can be
sustained in a given area. Although most commercial-
ly hardened vehicles can withstand three impacts in
an 8-inch square, concentrated fire in a small area can
defeat this armor. Eyewitness reports of the vehicle25X1
attack in April suggest that the BR is aware of this
technique. 25X1
Such ammunition is well suited for assaults on hard-
ened vehicles. Unlike conventional lead slugs, these
bullets do not deform on impact and can penetrate the
engine block of a car, one and three-fourths inches of
cold-rolled steel, or 72 layers of Kevlar soft body
armor. This penetration capability stems from hotter
powder loads and machined brass cores, which pro-
vide a greater muzzle velocity, mass, and hardness
In addition to the limited use of armor-piercing 25X1
ammunition by West German and Italian terrorists,
the Libyans have sought to obtain large quantities of
ultrahigh-penetrating Arcane ammunition.
the (jovern-
ment of Libya attempted to purchase 1 million rounds
each of 7.62 x 39-mm assault rifle and 9 x 18-mm
pistol ammunition from Fabrice Bodet, an indepen-
dent French arms dealer. Developed by Bodet and 25X1
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similar to KTW rounds, Arcane ammunition is made
of a solid electrolytic copper alloy and in range tests
demonstrated exceedingly high penetration by passing
through 20 layers of standard Kevlar soft body armor,
or through a 3-centimeter-thick block of Lexgard
bulletproof glass.) 25X1
The acquisition of such ammunition by Libya would
significantly enhance the capabilities of terrorist
groups in the Middle East and Europe. The deal has
not yet been completed, however, and, according to a
source of the US Defense Attache's office in Paris,
Bodet claims he has not yet found a manufacturer to
fill the Libyan contract. Once a manufacturer is
found, however, Bodet plans to develop a round with a
depleted uranium core, which in principal would
provide even greater penetration. 25X1
Armor-piercing ammunition has no special utility
beyond the purpose for which it was designed-that
is, to penetrate hardened targets. A person shot with
such a round may, in fact, stand a better chance of
survival than if shot with conventional ammunition.
Because of its higher velocity and resistance to defor-
mation, an armor-piercing round could punch a rela-
tively small, clean hole through its victim-imparting
less kinetic energy and leaving a smaller entrance and
exit wound than, for example, a jacketed hollow-point
lead slug that mushrooms on impact or a modern
subcaliber hypervelocity assault rifle bullet that tum- 25X1
bles on impact and causes extensive tissue damage. 0
Perhaps the worst case scenario would be one in which
terrorists load a large-clip capacity weapon with both
armor-piercing and conventional ammunition. The
attackers could first use the armor-piercing rounds to
breach the bulletproof glass of a hardened vehicle,
and then kill the occupants with the remaining con-
ventional ammunition. We have no information that a
terrorist group has employed this technique to date,
but it is within the ability of many to do so.~ 25X1
Secret 10
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Secret
PLO: Impact of the
Lebanese Incursion
The Palestine Liberation Organization scored tempo-
rary political gains during the Lebanese crisis by
winning an improved international image and focus-
ing attention on the broader Palestinian issue. Its
long-term political position, however, is weaker than
before the Israeli invasion because it lost its independ-
ent base of operation and is more dependent on the
Arab states.
The PLO will remain organizationally intact for at
least the next year, but political divisions between the
moderate and radical wings are increasing over the
moderate majority's efforts to involve the organiza-
tion in Middle East negotiations.
The PLO evacuated about 8,500 personnel from
Beirut. The bulk of the PLO's fighting forces re-
mained behind in northern and eastern Lebanon.
They now number approximately 13,000,2 including
1,000 or more reinfiltrated via Syria. Most evacuated
personnel outside Syria are likely to stay put for the
next several months, barring dramatic Middle East
political developments or a sharp decline in PLO
morale.
The host governments are keeping the dispersed PLO
units under tight security, and the Palestinians have
so far had little effect on the hosts' domestic situation.
Serious problems could develop if PLO morale and
discipline decline.
The member groups are unlikely to countenance the
transformation of the PLO into a strictly political
movement. Whether they turn to violence on a large
paramilitary units theoretically under the control of the military
commander for the area. It does not include irregular militia forces
scale will depend on the progress of diplomatic efforts
to find a solution to the Palestinian problem.
Arafat's leadership within the PLO and his influence
in Arab councils is temporarily stronger than ever. He
faces a greater challenge, however, from the radical
PLO groups committed in varying degrees to leftist
ideologies and more militant hostility toward Israel.
Although his advantage over other PLO leaders is
likely to diminish during the next year, Arafat will
remain the dominant figure in the PLO.
The PLO power balance favors the moderates. Arafat
and other moderate leaders believe President
Reagan's Middle East initiative contains positive ele-
ments, but they are not wiling to give it unqualified
endorsement. Progress toward a compromise solution
of the Palestinian issue would strengthen the moder-
ates' willingness to confront the radicals. Stalemate
will continue to work to the advantage of the radicals.
Even among the moderates, however, there is skepti-
cism about US resolve to remain committed to the
plan in the face of Israeli opposition. Arafat will
probably claim that the PLO cannot make additional
concessions without a demonstration of Israeli willing-
ness to compromise or further indications of US
intentions, such as sanctions against Israel if settle-
ment activity on the West Bank continues.
Arafat knows that recognition of Israel would irrevo-
cably split the PLO. His need to seek PLO consensus,
his conviction that Israel will reject all compromise,
and his wariness concerning US intentions will rein-
force his inherent reluctance to make any but minor
and incremental diplomatic moves. Arafat, in fact, is
more likely to err on the side of caution than to risk
splitting the PLO.
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Syrian President Assad's increased influence over the
PLO radicals improves his ability to prevent the PLO
from adopting policies he dislikes. Arafat, however, is
less dependent on Syria and more willing to take
stands independent of Damascus, but he is unlikely to
agree to any Middle East settlement that Syria
rejects.
The Arab states seem prepared to continue financing
the PLO at roughly the same level as before the
Beirut evacuation. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait appar-
ently provide the bulk of the aid received by Fatah
and the Fatah-dominated central PLO treasury.
Libya is the main source of the radicals' funds.
The PLO in the near term is likely to preserve its
enhanced position in Arab councils. The moderate
Arab states and the PLO will work to keep their
policies from diverging.
If Arafat can maintain his influence over PLO radi-
cals, he is likely during the next year to agree in
principle to some form of Palestinian affiliation with
Jordan and to give Jordan a qualified mandate to
explore Middle East peace initiatives. Most Palestin-
ians in the West Bank and Gaza will continue to
accept the PLO as their representative, unless a
breakthrough in the peace process convinces them the
PLO is missing a real chance for an advantageous
agreement with Israel.
The PLO mainstream would welcome a dialogue with
the United States but it is unlikely to pay the price of
unconditional recognition of Israel.
The USSR's ineffective response to the Israeli inva-
sion of Lebanon severely strained relations between
the PLO and Moscow. The Palestinians are muting
their dissatisfaction, however, because they value the
Soviet connection as a vital source of arms and
potential leverage on the United States and the Arabs.
Moscow will attempt to disrupt efforts to establish a
PLO-US dialogue, knowing that PLO participation in
a US-sponsored peace initiative would severely dimin-
ish Soviet influence. The Soviets will try to reconcile
differences between Arafat and Syrian President
Assad. The widening rift between them complicates
Moscow's efforts to stay on good terms with both.
As long as Arafat can credibly hold out prospects for
progress in the diplomatic arena and maintain PLO
discipline, the PLO groups will probably forgo inter-
national terrorism. Radical elements will be harder to
control in the present circumstances, however, and
even the moderate leaders may be forced to approve
limited attacks to maintain their leadership if diplo-
matic successes are not forthcoming.
Non-PLO Palestinian extremists and sympathetic
non-Palestinian terrorist groups have already stepped
up terrorist attacks as a result of the Israeli invasion.
Their plans increasingly include US and moderate
Arab targets along with the traditional Jewish and
Israeli interests.
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Secret
Special Analysis
Peru:
Counterterrorist Capabilities
of Civilian Security ForcesF
Peru's civilian security forces are hampered in their
struggle against the Maoist terrorist group Sendero
Luminoso (SL) by aged or inadequate equipment,
interagency rivalry, and problems of intelligence orga-
nization and dissemination. These deficiencies-un-
likely to be overcome in the short term-have contrib-
uted to the apparent success of SL and have made the
terrorist threat appear more serious than it probably
We estimate that the SL has approximately 500
active members, although it can probably call on
three to four times that number for support activities
and occasional acts of violence. The group is concen-
trated in the rural Andean department of Ayacucho,
where it enjoys most of its popular support, but there
are also small cells in Lima and other metropolitan
areas. The US Embassy reports that members are
armed with rifles and submachine guns purchased in
Peru or stolen from police posts.
sol iers
deserting with their weapons from units in
Ayacucho have joined the terrorists. Explosives are
stolen by SL from mines and construction sites.
Following Belaunde's inauguration in 1980, the SL
embarked on a campaign of low-risk, high-profile
terrorist attacks consisting primarily of dynamiting
electrical towers, public buildings, and police posts.
Within the past year, however, SL operations have
become more aggressive and have included an in-
creasing number of assassinations of local officials
and suspected police informants.
The memory of his ouster in 1968 by the military,
which had been politicized during an earlier counter-
insurgency campaign, has led Belaunde to rely almost
exclusively on civilian security forces to contain the
threat. To date, the results have been mixed. In recent
months, a number of midlevel members of the group
have been arrested or killed. Nevertheless, repeated
attacks on isolated police posts in Ayacucho have
forced the overextended civilian security forces to pull
back and consolidate in larger garrisons. Incidents
such as Sendero Luminoso's attack on Ayacucho
prison in March, which freed many terrorists, have
highlighted police weaknesses and increased pressure
on Belaunde to sanction the direct involvement of the
armed forces 25X1
Lack of Interagency Coordination and Cooperation
Peru's civilian police services lack the centralized 25X1
command and control of intelligence necessary for
successful operations against terrorists. Instead, au25X1
thority is split among four different agencies-the
National Intelligence Service, Civil Guard, Republi-
can Guard, and Peruvian Investigative Police-with
overlapping and ill-defined responsibilities and paro-
chial attitudes. 25X1 25X1
Although the National Intelligence Service was origi-
nally intended to act as an overall coordinating agen-
cy, it lacks the authority, budget, and staff to do so.
25X1 25X1
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Moreover, perhaps because many of its highest offi-
cials are military officers, it does not enjoy good
relations with the other three civilian services, which
are under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of the
Interior.
The Service's disdain for the Ministry of the In-
terior-as well as probable encouragement from the
military-have reportedly prompted it to ignore the
Ministry and initiate its own operations in Ayacucho,
including the dispatch of investigation teams. Addi-
tionally, an intelligence symposium held in March at
the Service's initiative recommended that it be given
the power to arrest and interrogate suspects. As long
as the Service is dominated by the Army, however,
Belaunde will probably be reluctant to grant it such
authority.
The three police services under the jurisdiction of the
Interior Ministry rarely share information or conduct
joint operations, largely because interagency rivalry
remains intense. Members of the Peruvian Investiga-
tive Police and the Civil Guard are known to have
clashed in gun battles.
Relations between the Ministry of the Interior and the
three police services apparently are as bad as they are
among the individual services. The police forces have
reportedly ignored useful information about the ter-
rorists provided by Interior Ministry personnel serving
in small towns in Ayacucho. Moreover, in early 1982
when the Ministry reportedly established an inter-
agency unit to analyze and act on collected informa-
tion, the three police services recalled their represen-
tatives within weeks of the unit's establishment, and it
was subsequently dissolved. Recent Embassy report-
ing indicates that the Ministry is planning to establish
another national-level antiterrorist intelligence unit,
but we doubt that it will receive much cooperation
from the three police services.
In addition, the intelligence services of the armed
forces are unwilling to cooperate closely with the
civilian agencies-except for the National Intelli-
gence Service, which appears to be controlled by the
military. On Belaunde's instructions, the military has
provided the civilian security forces with some logistic
support and training, but little else.
Equipment and Training Deficiencies
Other factors limiting police effectiveness include
insufficient funds, aged or ineffective equipment, of-
ten widely scattered deployments, and poor training.
The Civil Guard in particular suffers from these
deficiencies, which severely restrict its ability to oper-
ate in remote rural departments such as Ayacucho
According to a Defense Attache source of undeter-
mined reliability, Civil Guard and other police units
in Ayacucho-including members of the Civil
Guard's elite "Sinchi" counterterrorist unit-number
only 1,000 men. This is probably too small a force to
cover effectively a department as large and rugged as
Ayacucho, especially when the poor condition of
police equipment is considered. 25X1
Reliable small arms and sufficient ammunition are
often lacking, even among the Sinchis, according to
the Defense Attache and Embassy reporting. The
terrorists in Ayacucho are thus often better armed
than local police units.
Obsolete Civil Guard communications equipment
hinders effective command and control of the scat-
tered posts in the province. The US Embassy reports,
for example, that several hours elapsed before Guard
headquarters in Ayacucho City learned of a recent
attack on a remote post because the batteries of the
radio at the post were not working. Moreover, police
radios are not compatible with those used in Air Force
helicopters.
his equipment
The police forces have no aircraft of their own, and
even modern vehicles are in short supply. The Defense
Attache and the US Embassy believe that the training
of the average Peruvian policeman is as inadequate as
25X1 25X1
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Poor training and equipment, together with the belief
that the government will not quickly rectify the
situation, have adversely affected morale. Rural per-
sonnel are sometimes reluctant to engage the terror-
ists aggressively. The US Embassy reports that the
Civil Guard is having difficulty finding officers will-
ing to assume the Ayacucho command, and a Defense
Attache source claims that the Guard Intelligence
Directorate recently recommended Army intervention
in the department
The Civil Guard's Sinchi counterterrorist force re-
mains a potent unit, however, despite the fact it
suffers from many of the same equipment deficiencies
as regular police units. The Sinchis have a standing
unit of approximately 300 men and as many as 2,000
personnel may have had Sinchi training. Sinchi train-
ing and morale is far superior to that of the average
Peruvian police unit, as demonstrated by the stout
resistance offered by 10 Sinchis when they were
attacked by an estimated 40 to 80 terrorists in the
village of Villaschumen last August. According to the
US Embassy, Sinchi-trained officers are currently
leading small detachments scattered around the coun-
try instead of being concentrated in Ayacucho. The
Interior Ministry is considering transferring all Sinchi
personnel and similarly trained Republican Guard
officers to provide the department with a large, highly
trained strike force
Lima may be planning to increase the budget of the
-police forces
n late August the government autho
rized up to $35 million for police equipment over the
next few years. Training assistance from abroad could
also be forthcoming. The Embassy reports that two
Civil Guard officers recently left for training in Spain,
and that West Germany and Canada might offer
antiterrorist assistance as well.
Outlook
Modernization of police training and equipment, com-
bined with improved coordination and centralization
of intelligence activities, would probably give the
civilian services all they need to cripple the Sendero
Luminoso. We believe the police will probably receive
some new equipment and more effective training, but
Belaunde could face opposition from the armed forces
if allocations for police modernization impinge on
military procurement plans. The current uncertain
state of the Peruvian economy could also delay im-
provements. In addition, at least over the short term,
the civilian services probably will fail to overcome
their chronic rivalries. Thus, unless tentative plans to
establish a new interagency unit eventually produce
an effective joint command, the Peruvian antiterrorist
effort will probably continue to prove inadequate. 25X1
Also, without a thorough overhaul of intelligence
collection, evaluation, and dissemination and a coordi-
nated intelligence effort capable of achieving and
exploiting penetrations of the terrorist group, poten-
tial gains resulting from improvement in equipment
and training would not be realized.
25X1
Military intervention remains a possibility if the
police cannot control the situation. The armed forces'
reluctance to support the police is probably motivated
by a belief that the civilian agencies are corrupt and
incompetent, but may also stem from a desire to see
the police fail, thereby forcing Belaunde to turn to the
military. Belaunde, on the other hand, hopes to avoid
an escalation of civil-military tensions and will prob,25X1
bly try to delay calling in the Army as long as
possible. Army Gener-
al Brush, the President's former military aide, is to 25X1
become Minister of War in January 1983. The Presi-
dent may hope that Brush, a longtime friend and
currently commander of the military region contain-25X1
ing Ayacucho, will be more amenable to increasing
military logistic support for the police and to sharing
intelligence with them, thus enabling the civilians to
remain in the forefront of the fight against the 25X1
Sendero Luminoso
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Statistical Overview
Type of Victim of International Terrorist Attacks, 1982
Jan
Feb
Mar
Apr
May
Jun
Jul
Aug
Sep
Oct
Total
Total
77
34
76
72
54
95
73
89
43
32
645
Government officials
7
1
3
1
4
0
4
5
1
0
26
Diplomats
40
13
47
40
33
40
36
46
28
23
346
Military
6
1
6
6
6
8
8
10
9
8
68
Business
11
12
11
13
9
35
13
13
2
0
119
Private parties, tourists,
missionaries, and students
8
5
3
9
2
5
7
2
3
1
45
5
2
6
3
0
7
5
13
0
0
41
Geographic Distribution of International Terrorist Attacks, 1982
Jan
Feb
Mar
Apr
May
Jun
Jul
Aug
Sep
Oct
Total
Total
77
34
76
71
54
95
73
89
43
32
645
North America
3
7
8
8
6
1
6
8
2
4
53
Latin America
10
6
22
20
21
11
17
11
7
9
134
Western Europe
42
9
25
25
17
65
25
36
24
14
282
USSR/Eastern Europe
1
2
0
1
0
0
1
2
2
2
11
Sub-Saharan Africa
0
3
1
2
0
2
1
2
0
0
11
Middle East and North Africa
16
4
12
15
9
11
13
24
5
1
110
Asia/other
5
3
8
0
1
5
10
6
3
2
44
Deaths and Injuries Due to International Terrorist Attacks,
1981 and 1982
Car bomb in Baghdad
killed 2, wounded 130;
Ankara airport attack
killed 9, wounded 70.
Assassination and bombing
in Greece killed 2, wounded
70; bombing in Central
African Republic killed 4,
wounded 100.
1981
1982
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Chronology
25X1
25X1
Mid-October
Qadhafi offered
nce in exchange for PFLP-GC assassinations of US
that attacks, unattributable to him, would bring about political pressures
to withdraw the Multinational Forces. 25X1 25X1
5 November 1982 Italy
The death of rightwing terrorist Pierluigi Pagliai in Rome deals a blow to
counterterrorist officials, who had hoped to determine the extent of his complicity
and the identity of other conspirators in the bombing of the Bologna train station
in 1980. Pagliai was shot during his capture in Bolivia in October
and never regained consciousness
25X1
6 November 1982 France
In Bayonne, .two important leaders of the ETA military wing are among four
people arrested by French police. The capture of ETA propagandist Carlos
Ibargurren and Peio Antxola Larranaga, allegedly in charge of finances, marks
the second major arrest of ETA members by French police in a month and may re-
flect the severity of police crackdown on Basque terrorists hiding in France.
Spain 25X1
In Madrid, the First of October Antifascist Group (GRAPO) announces a truce in
guerrilla activities against authorities following the Socialist victory in the 28
October national elections. GRAPO communique indicates willingness to hold a
dialogue with-incoming government and cites Spanish withdrawal from NATO as
one of the. conditions for GRAPO's eventual dissolution.
8 November 1982 Northern Ireland
US Consulate in Belfast is threatened by an apparent representative of the
Protestant Ulster Defense Force following the acquittal in the United States of five
Irish Republican Army gunrunners. The claim by the IRA defendants that their
operation was sanctioned by the CIA triggered the telephone threats
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9 November 1982 France
In Paris, eight leftists belonging to the Turkish extremist group Dev Sol briefly oc-
cupy the Turkish Airlines office, protesting the 7 November referendum that
approved Turkey's new constitution. 25X1
USSR
Three Soviets hijack an Aeroflot aircraft, fly to Turkey, and request political
asylum. Moscow demands extradition, and Turkey charges the three with piracy,
assault, and battery.
10 November 1982 Spain
In Pamplona, a grenade attack on the offices of a newspaper critical of Basque ter-
rorism is believed to be the work of ETA/M, which had previously attempted to
assassinate the editor for his strong antiterrorism stance. 25X1
11 November 1982
12 November 1982
13 November 1982
West Germany
Red Army Faction leaders Brigitte Mohnhaupt and Adelheid Schulz are arrested
at the site of an underground RAF cache near Frankfurt. 25X1
Italy
In Milan, the authorities raid a Red Brigades safehouse and arrest three
Brigadists. Large quantities of weapons, explosives, and intelligence files are
passing car. There is no damage or injuries, and no group is claiming credit.
Honduras
A homemade bomb is thrown at the San Pedro Sula offices of Air Florida from a
14 November 1982 Spain
In Zumarraga, ETA/PM Eighth Assembly is suspected of kidnaping a prominent
local industrialist. Since its split with the Seventh Assembly earlier this year, the
Eighth Assembly has developed a campaign to gain publicity and funds through
extortion. 25X1
15 November 1982 Honduras
A bomb is discovered in the Tegucigalpa offices of IBM. The offices are safely
evacuated and the device is defused. No group is claiming credit nor is the incident 25X1
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16 November 1982 West Germany
Near Hamburg, RAF operative Christian Mar is arrested near a RAF cache.
West German authorities have uncovered 13 separate cache sites throughout the
country. 25X1
19 November 1982 India
In New Delhi, Sikh extremists are suspected in the grenade attack on the Soviet
Embassy. Sikhs are becoming more militant in their political demands to the
Indian Government, but the motive behind the attack on the Embassy remains
unclear
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