Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/19: CIA-RDP90-00965R000100540001-4
THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
Mossad-CIA Ties
Legacy of Casey
1sr g mourn-
eli intelligence officials are
ing the deaths in recent weeks of Central
A intelligence -- Agency Dtrector....J pim_
C v and James Jesus Angleton, the lcg-
19 endary chier ee at the
CIA. Both men were great friends of Is-
rael.
Mr. Angleton, who died of cancer May
11 at age 69, almost single-handedly ran
the Israeli account" at the CIA unW 1974.
when he was forced out by a new CIA
director, William Colby. During his many
years on the job, Mr. Angleton was instru-
mental in dramatically strengthening U.S.-
Israeli intelligence cooperation in a host of
areas. His legacy continues despite the
very serious setback suffered during the
Jonathan Jay Pollard spy scandal.
Mr. Angleton's counterparts at the Mos-
sad. Israel's external intelligence service,
were deeply disappointed when Mr. Angle?
ton retired, and suspected that Mr. Angle-
ton's extraordinarily close connection to
the Mossad was one reason Mr. Colby
wanted him out. But even after retiring,
Mr. Angleton retained his personal ties to
some of Israel's best intelligence agents.
They often visited him at his suburban Vir-
ginia home and dined with him at local
Chinese restaurants.
Like Mr. Angleton, Mr. Casey, who died
May 6 at age 73, was a frequent-though
secret-visitor to Israel.
Mr. Casey in the '80s and Mr. Angleton
in the '505, '60s and '70$ would often travel
there to meet the head of the Mossad. to
exchange information and to plan covert
operations. There was an incredible degree
of mutual trust, built on unique personal
relationships that had been established and
proven over time.
Mr. Angleton, in fact, had a very dra?
matic impact on his counterparts in Israel
in persuading them to take the necessary
precautions to make certain that the Soviet
Union could not penetrate the Israeli intel?
ligence community. He was always suspi-
rinnt of Soviet operations. and is credited
with being the first to recognize the dan-
gers of the Soviet Union's "disinforma.
tion" campaign to subvert the West. Israel
learned much from him.
Mr. Casey, for his part, was seen as the
most pro-Israeli director of the CIA ever.
He made previously restricted informa-
tion, including satellite photography, rou-
tinely available to Israel.
And Angleton
t' if By Wou Bui'zea V
One incident in 1964 helped cement Mr.
Casey's appreciative attitude toward the
Israeli intelligence community. A top CIA
operative had been kidnapped by a pro-So-
viet group in Ethiopia- He was being tor?
tured during 'l arrogation. The U.S. could
not locate him, let alone get him out. Mr.
Casey appealed to Israel for assistance.
at great personal risk
Mossad agents
,
,
managed to locate the agent. leading to
a dramatic rescue operation. It was an ex-
ample of CIA-Mossad cooperation at its
finest.
The effort was repeated a few months
later as both groups tried to find and free
William Buckley, the CIA's station chief In
Beirut. CIA an Mo~ssad agents went into
Lebanon. But that operation failed. Mr.
Buckley, one of the CIA's experts on coun-
terterrortsm, was killed after extended In-
terrogation and torture.
There is no doubt that that kind of very
close U.S.-Israeli intelligence cooperation
set In motion a mindset in Washington
that resulted in the Iran arms affair. Ironi-
cally, the Pollard scandal exploded just as
U.S.-Israeli intelligence cooperation was at
its best, with Mr. Casey setting the tone.
Some Israeli sources in Washington fear
that the tenure of the new CIA director,
William Webster, may be a throwback to
the times of Mr. Colby and Adm. Stansfield
Turner, who served during the Carter ad-
ministration. But top CIA professionals
recognize that the U.S. has too much at
stake to allow its intelligence-sharing coop-
eration with Israel to overly suffer. In this
area, according to American experts, the
U.S. has gained as much as Israel-if not
more. This Is true in combating terrorism,
in learning about Soviet weapons sytems.
and in planning covert operations.
In 1978, for example, the former chief of
U.S. Air Force intelligence. Maj. Gen.
George F. Keegan, said: "Today, the abil-
ity of the U.S. Air Force In particular,
and the Army In general, to defend what-
ever position it has in NATO owes more to
the Israeli intelligence input than it does to
any other single source of Intelligence, be
it satellite reconnaissance, be it technology
intercept, or what have you." Other U.S.
specialists agree.
Messrs. Angleton and Casey appreci-
ated Israel as a reliable and democratic
friend and as a strategic ally. They also
had a very high regard for Israel's techni-
cal capabilities In the area of human Intel.
!)gene. And they admired Israel's ''tacti-
cal flexibility" in doing whatever was nec-
essary to get a job done.
It was this general attitude that helped
set the stage for the ill-fated U.S.-Israeli
collaboration in the Iran arms initiative.
Former National Security adviser Robert
McFarlane and retired U.S. Air Force
Maj. Gen. Richard Secord, during their ap-
pearances before the joint House-Senate
panel investigating that affair, have said
as much.
MA
Mr. McFarlane referred to this aspect
of Israel. "Now, it may not always be
arms, it may not be preemptive attack,"
he said. "It may be negotiating, it may be
bribing. But you can be goddamn sure if
any Israeli's caught, he's going to have his
government going after the people who did
It.,,
U.S. intelligence on Iran was virtually
nonexistent, Mr. McFarlane and Gen. Se-
cord noted. As a result, they explained, the
administration was prepared to rely on Is-
rael's intelligence.
As far as Israel was concerned, Mr.
Angleton set the standard. Mr. Casey met
that standard. They will both be missed by
their friends In Israel.
Mr. Blitzer, Washington correspondent
for the Jerusalem Post, is author of "Be-
tween Washington and Jerusalem: A Re-
porter's Notebook" (Oxford University
Press, 1985).
STAT
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/19: CIA-RDP90-00965R000100540001-4