THE CONTRA CRACK-UP

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000403540002-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 12, 2012
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: March 9, 1987
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

ST Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/12 : CIA-RDP90-00965R000403540002-7
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r! ARTICLE APP ED
ON PAGE._.._
NEW REPUBLIC
9 March 1987
Can the U.S. put the pieces together?
THE CONTRA CRACK-UP
F ROM THE FRONT pages, it's looks as if the Nicara-
guan contras have been fighting among themselves
more than with the Sandinistas. Actually, they seem to be
making progress on two vital fronts. On the ground, since
early January about 7,000 contras have moved from Hondu-
ras into Nicaragua, for a total of 12,000. By spring the entire
:ontra force of 20,000 men should be engaged in guerrilla
combat with the vastly superior Soviet- and Cuban-
backed Sandinista army.
On the equally perilous Washington political front, if all
goes according to the Reagan administration's plans, just
enough of the stain of the Iranamok affair will soon be
washed away to inspire Congress to vote favorably on
s40 million in contra funding for the remainder of this fis-
cal year.
Imagery is the most immediately important aspect of
the fight between Arturo Cruz and Adolfo Calero for the
role of the contra movement's top civilian. Calero, the
gruff former Coca-Cola manager in Managua, is the contra
~- leader most closely associated with ex-CIA director Wilms
Liam Casey and Lt. Col. Oliver North. Ever since Irana-
mok broke, it's been his task to explain-or avoid ex-
plaining-what U.S. aid reached the contras after Congress
supposedly cut it off. The. contras are bound to suffer as
one investigating committee after another delves into the
scandal; with Calero as the leading spokesman, it would
be all the worse.
I F CRUZ takes over as leader of a reformed United Nica-
raguan Opposition, as the Reagan administration has
tried to arrange, the contras will acquire a new and more
attractive face. Cruz is comparatively innocent of Irana-
mok goings-on. He has spent much of his time with politi-
cians in Washington, and very little with the contras in
Honduras. Ever since he threatened to resign, so many
members of Congress have declared him indispensable to
continued contra funding that it will be hard for a majority
to vote no when the s40 million comes up for a vote,
probably in March. If a majority vote yes, the administra-
tion thinks it has a chance to get the s105 million it is
seeking for fiscal 1988 and to keep the contras fighting till
the eve of the U.S. presidential election.
But public relations is only a part of the Calero-Cruz
contretemps. There are also ideological and cultural ele-
ments, plus Washington interagency maneuvering. If Cruz
does announce on February 19 that he's not resigning, it
will be a victory not only for him, but for "liberals" against
"conservatives," "politicians" against the "military" and
the State Department over the CIA.
Contrary to many reports, though, the basic difference
between Cruz and Calero is not one of "willingness to
negotiate with the Sandinistas" versus "determination to
win a military victory." Cruz may be somewhat more
open to a negotiated settlement, but neither would accept
a formula-such as Democratic Senator Christopher
Dodd is trying to put into legislation-that would cut off
U.S. aid to the contras without a guarantee of free elections
In Nicaragua. A democratic future for Nicaragua is also
the key ingredient missing from the Contadora initiative.
It is the centerpiece of the proposal just put forward by
Costa Rican president Oscar Arias, but it's too new to
have been carefully considered by all sides.
Fundamentally, the reformed UNO under Cruz's chair-
manship is designed to appeal to a Democratic Congress, if
any contra arrangement can. After a transition period, the
existing military coalition, the Nicaraguan Democratic
Force (FDN), is to be dissolved and replaced by a new,
unified national army operating under civilian control.
Calero, currently head of the FDN, would be out, and the
top contra military commander, Enrique Bermudez, would
report to UNO, which would be expanded to represent
Nicaragua's four traditional political parties-Liberals,
Conservatives, Social Democrats, and Christian Demo-
crats-plus labor, business, and the anti-Sandinista resis-
tance operating out of Costa Rica.
Culturally and politically, Cruz and his ally from the old
UNO triumvirate, Alfonso Robelo, are also far more com-
patible with American liberals than Calero is. All three
spent time in jail for opposing Somoza, but Calero, a leader
of the Conservative Party, left Nicaragua after the Sandi-
nistas came to power in 1979 Robelo, a Social Democrat,
and Cruz. a Christian Democrat, served on the revolution-
ary junta, and Cruz also was the Sandinista regime's am-
bassador to Washington. Both broke with the Sandinistas
over the issues of Cuban influence and Marxist-Leninist
oppression in 1982. "The fundamental cleavage is not real-
ly 'liberal versus conservative,' but between those who
were Sandinistas and those who weren't," according to an
administration official. "One side says, 'You guys were
fooled before, so why should we trust you?' The other side
says, 'You have no sensitivity for our people, or you would
have joined the revolution.' "
Continued
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Culturally, says one contra supporter, "The Cruzes and
Robelos represent the part of Nicaraguan society that were
always notables and dignitaries-not oligarchs, but 'the
good people'-lawyers, diplomats, and novelists. The FDN
people are lower-middle-class-'7-Eleven managers,'
somebody on the other side called them. Cruz was a blue-
chip international civil servant [with the Inter-American
Development Bank] before the revolution. He's a thor-
oughly decent man, but he seems almost incensed that the
FDN people took the initiative and weren't coming to him."
PROVING THIS thesis, one of Cruz's associates de-
scribed the Calero "clique" as "businessmen who
weren't interested in politics until the Sandinistas forced
them into it, who have no political culture, no political
agility, nothing in common with the new young cadres
who were Sandinistas, or with the young men in the camps
who are doing the fighting." Most of the fighters, in fact,
are peasant kids who have little in common with either
Calero's businessmen or Cruz's educated elites.
Probably the most important difference between the
Cruz and Calero groups is the role they've played in the
contra movement so far. "The FDN people have been en-
tirely focused on the war for eight years," said one Ameri-
can contra supporter. "They are fearful that politics some-
how weakens the effort to get something going on the
ground. On the other side," he said, "you have people with
a good sense of the political problems-legitimacy, the lack
of moderate and liberal support, the taint of past associa-
tions with Somocistas and the Argentines, the lack of the
decent opinion of mankind. But, aware as they are, Cruz
and Robelo are not very effective. They haven't accom-
plished very much. They claim they have always been
frustrated by Calero."
The Cruz-Calero split has a parallel among American
backers in and out of the government, some of whom are as
suspicious of their adversaries as the Nicaraguans are. On
Cruz's side are the State Department's Central American
public liaison officer, Robert Kagan, and his boss, Assis-
tant Secretary Elliott Abrams; moderates in Congress; and
liberal Latin American specialists Robert Leiken and Bruce
Cameron.
Calerohas lost his key backers, Casey and North. He
suffered a decisive blow when Frank Carlucci, the new
White House national security adviser, decided it was nec-
essary to opt for the "political approach" to save contra
funding. Professionals at the CIA who formerly helped
Calero freeze out Cruz now are obeying orders to accept
State Department direction in contra leadership matters.
Calero's last-ditch defender is Senator Jesse Helms of
North Carolina, and the State Department hopes that his
railing will help win Democratic votes.
The Cruz takeover will be the latest in a series of contra
reforms engineered in Washington. As U.S. officials ex-
plain it, the CIA set up the contras first as an army in 1981.
Thoughts about a political agenda came afterward. In
1983, at the insistence of Congress and the State Depart-
ment, the FDN was purged of its most notorious Somo-
cista cutthroats. UNO was set up in 1985 to provide a
political front, and last year, when Congress resumed
military aid, its hand was supposed to be strengthened.
But that didn't really happen because supplies inevitably
went to the FDN and because the FDN didn't respect
UNO authority.
The FDN formed a Council of Comandantes, some of
whose members supposedly treated Cruz like an enemy
spy on a trip to Honduras in December. He was denied the
right to inspect contra books. And, when contra officers
returned from military and human rights training in the
United States wearing UNO arm patches, they were told to
take them off. Cruz got fed up and decided to quit.
APARENTLY HE really meant to leave, but during the
first two weeks of February, his intention turned
into a power play to force changes in contra management.
Supporters say he began to reconsider leaving after a group
of comandantes pledged support, members of Congress in-
sisted on his staying, and Robelo implored him not to quit.
Meanwhile Abrams, pushing hard for civilian dominance
of the contras and his own dominance of administration
policy, got the specific new reform package developed. On
February 12, he held separate private meetings with Cruz
and Calero. After a weekend round of telephone calls,
Calero announced he was resigning from UNO, but not the
FDN, and Cruz's supporters indicated he might be staying.
The last requirement was a telegram from the FDN direc-
torate, including Bermudez, supporting the reforms and,
implicitly, undercutting Calero.
, Assuming maximum success for all these stratagems, a
vast amount of work has yet to be done. Cruz has got to
make himself the true leader of the contra movement, not
just Washington's figurehead. The contras have got to show
that they can fight the Sandinistas and still respect the
human rights of civilians. Cruz has to inspire hope for
democracy-and, perhaps, evidence of resistance against
Sandinista rule-among the Nicaraguan population. And
he has to develop the missing decent opinion of mankind.
Can he do it' Congress certainly ought to give him a fair
chance.
MORTON KoNDR1CKE
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/12 : CIA-RDP90-00965R000403540002-7
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