NIO MEMO: DOES IRAQ COVET KUWAIT? (SANITIZED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90G01353R001200150001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 5, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 25, 1988
• Content Type: MEMO

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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: Deane E. Hoffmann
National Intelligence Officer for Economics
SUBJECT: Does Iraq Covet Kuwait?
NIC 03266-88
7 November 1988
1. Action: None; this is for your information.
2. The brief Iraqi incursion into Kuwait mentioned in the attached
cable should act as a reminder that a state of economic warfare exists
pitting Saudi Arabia and Kuwait against Iran and Iraq. The Saudis and
Kuwaits are producing oil significantly above quota to drive prices down and
to obtain agreement between Iran and Iraq on production quotas. While it is
likely that some agreement on quotas can be reached, perhaps in a matter of
weeks, such an agreement will address only short-term issues. It will not
settle the greater problem of how to make room for added Iraqi exports as
that country's production capacity increases and new export facilities are
built. In essence, the Iraqis and Saudis still have to settle the issue of
whether Iraq will remain subservient to Saudi Arabia in the OPEC hierarchy.
3. The Iraqi incursion should be seen in a broader context of Gulf
politics rather than as a simple message to Kuwait. During the war, Iran
used Kuwait as a vehicle threaten the Saudis, reminding the Saudis of their
military vulnerability. This incursion, thus, reminds both Kuwait and Saudi
Arabia that there is a danger in challenging Iraq, whether on the issue of
relations with Iran or on oil matters.
4. In strategic terms, the Iraqis have significant interests in
Kuwait. On most Iraqi maps, the territory of Kuwait is shown as the
southern province of Basrah, not as a separate entity. As a short-term
objective, Iraq would like to control the Kuwaiti islands of Bubiyan and
Warbah in order to open up a more westerly channel to the Persian Gulf well
away from Iran. The,least confrontational way to do this would be to
"negotiate" a long-term lease for the islands. Baghdad is not blessed with
an excess of diplomatic patience, however, and it could decide to take the
islands militarily if Kuwait proves stubborn in negotiations.
CL BY SIGNER
DECL OADR
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C 3o5G--it
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SECRET
5. Over the longer-haul, Kuwait itself is a very desirable economic
objective. A military takeover of Kuwait would be a simple affair. No nation
would rise to strongly defend Kuwai t' s interests. The added oil resources
would overnight put Iraq nearly on a par with Saudi Arabia in terms of
productive capacity and would give Iraq a financial position sufficiently
strong to ensure dominance over Iran for years to come. Iraq and Saudi Arabia
together would be the masters of world oil policy.
6. We do not know how Baghdad views the diplomatic costs of such an
adventure. For now they seem content to behave relatively well and vie for
world opinion as they negotiate with Iran. Should Iraq decide to take
Kuwait's offshore islands by force, Arab and Western reaction will, no doubt,
be viewed as a gauge to the level of response to any larger operation against
mainland Kuwait. A muted response could be an invitation to disaster. In any
case, we should remember that the Iraqis are very unpredictable and could move
into Kuwait quite unexpectedly.
Attachment:
Di stri buti on:
DCI
DDCI
D/NESA (w/o Attach C)
D/OGI
C/NIC
VC/NIC
NIO/NESA
NIO/W
NIO/GPF
SECRET
Deane E. Hoffmann
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Al Ba?rah 48
KUWAIT
K o a s ahr
International boundary
National capital
- Railroad
Road
0 25 Miles
"
0 25 Kilometers
r Zubayr
m Clasr
WARBAH
4;5
Al Faw
BOB/VAN
Kuwait Bay
Al Jahrah
KUWAIT
Ash Sh yah
Al Maqwa'
Al A
walli
0MASKAN
YLAKAH
AWHAH
Al Fuhayhil
Ash Shu'aybah
29
Persian Guff
30
Al Ad'ami
Khawr al Mufattah
SAUDI
ARABIA
502915 3-76
Names and boundary representation
4 are not necessarily authoritative
48
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