THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 12 AUGUST 1975

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006014873
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: August 12, 1975

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The President's Daily Brief
August 12, 1975
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Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652
exemption category, 5B( !LIAM
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
August 12, 1975
Table of Contents
Portugal: The conciliatory tone of Communist leader
Cunhal's statement Sunday shows a growing con-
cern over violence and the increasing politi-
cal isolation of the Communists. (Page 1)
Egypt:
because of low stockpiles and lack
of spare parts, Egypt cannot sustain a mili-
tary offensive for more than six days.
(Page 3)
Jordan-Syria: King Husayn may sign further agree-
ments strengthening economic, as well as mil-
itary cooperation, with Syria when he visits
Damascus next week. (Page 4)
Portuguese Timor:
(Page 5)
Azores: We present our principal judgments on the
prospects for Azorean independence. (Page 6)
Notes: USSR; Cambodia; Laos; India (Pages 7 and 8)
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PORTUGAL
The conciliatory tone of Communist
leader Cunhal's statement Sunday
shows a growing
concern over the increased violence in
northern Portugal and over the increas-
ing political isolation of the Communists.
Cunhal called for changes in the govern-
ment to broaden its support and improve
its efficiency. He also stressed a need
to overcome widening rifts between civil-
ian organizations and within the military.
The Communist leader appeared to back away
from his previous tough positions, renewing an
earlier Communist theme that his party is willing
to work with all groups that "cooperate with the
goals of the revolution." Cunhal also mentioned
the need for Portugal to maintain close relations
with capitalist countries--especially those in the
EC.
A softer Communist line is also evidenced by
renewed Soviet interest in a broadly based leftist
coalition in Lisbon. The Soviet press has in re-
cent weeks treated the Portuguese Socialists harshly,
but in reporting on a recent meeting between Soviet
and Italian Communist delegations Pravda noted that
both sides "advocated unity of action" by all forces
of the left, including the Socialists.
Cunhal's remarks had no immediate effect on
anti-Communist activity in northern Portugal. In
Braga, violence continued for a second day. Dem-
onstrators there burned down the party's headquar-
ters and destroyed the offices of the Communist-
dominated Portuguese Democratic Movement and the
Communist-controlled labor confederation.
General Pinto Soares has resigned from the
Revolutionary Council and from his post as head
of the military academy to protest the way deci-
sions are made in the Armed Forces Movement and
the continuing radicalization of the military. He
voiced even stronger opposition to the dissidents'
document drafted by former foreign minister Antunes,
which he labeled "divisionist" and "opportunistic."
(continued)
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sources told the US embassy that they
still hope to avoid the use of force to remove
Goncalves. They expect to demonstrate so much sup-
port within the military that President Costa Gomes
will have no alternative but to dismiss Goncalves
and his newly formed government. President Costa
Gomes' performance to date, however, has raised
speculation in Lisbon that he may be reluctant to
move against Goncalves because of the close ties
between their families or because he is being black-
mailed by radical officers for alleged cooperation
with the Caetano regime.
Antunes' group claims to have the backing of
most enlisted men and presumably thinks it can
count on them for a show of force. The dissidents
may be overestimating their support, however, be-
cause the men have been subjected to considerable
Communist and extreme left-wing propaganda.
Goncalves is unlikely to relinquish power
without a struggle, and he still has considerable
backing. Despite Cunhal's more conciliatory tone,
Communists in the unions and the media would prob-
ably lend their support to an effort to maintain
Goncalves in office.
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EGYPT
President Sadat received a pessi-
mistic assessment from the
Egyptian military on its capability to
sustain an offensive
because of low stock-
piles and the lack of spares from the
Soviets, Egypt faces a choice of either
going to war by the end of this year or
"forgetting all about it" for at least
three and one half uears until resupply
could be effectivel
absorbed. Egypt's options.
could be improved only by major
reequipment across the board from elec-
tronics to tank parts, presumably from
the Soviets.
if an offensive
were launched before the end of the year, it could
be sustained for no more than six days and would
achieve no more than "40 percent" of the accom-
plishments of the October 1973 war.
Despite these shortages, Egypt's forces
appear to be continuing their training without ma-
jor restrictions. The need for supplies during
intensive fighting, however, would be many times
greater than during a peacetime training program.
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JORDAN-SYRIA
King Husayn may sign further
agreements strengthening economic,
as well as military cooperation, with
Syria when he visits Damascus next
week.
Husayn apparently has become convinced that
better relations with Syria will not only improve
Jordan's standing among the other Arabs--especially
vis-a-vis the Palestine Liberation Organization--
but will also yield substantial economic benefits.
The King probably has also concluded that staying
on the sidelines in October 1973 cost him his claims
to the West Bank.
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oINDANAO
PACIFIC
OCEAN
CELEBES SEA
Manado
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KF PULAUAN
9 ARU
Merauke
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TIMOR
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ARAFURA SEA
558324 8-75
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PORTUGUESE TIMOR
Information about the situation in Timor is
still sketchy. Initial reports, however, indicate
that members of the Timor Democratic Union Party,
an anti-communist, pro-independence group, occupied
communications centers, the airport, the police
station, and surrounded the Portuguese military
headquarters in Dili. It is not clear, however,
whether they were seeking to take full control of
the government from the Portuguese authorities.
There has been no reaction from the local
Portuguese troops, most of whom apparently were
out of the capital conducting education missions.
The Portuguese governor is reported to have met
with the dissidents, but there has been no word
on the meeting's outcome.
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President Suharto to this point has avoided
using force in the Timor situation because he was
concerned about Indonesia's international image
and particularly the reaction from Australia and
the US. The same considerations still apply and
his inclination, despite pressure from his mili-
tary to invade, may be to wait for further develop-
ments in Timor before commiting himself.
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AZORES
The following are our principal
judgments on the prospects for Azorean
independence.
The continued domination of Portugal by pro-
Communist and radical leftist factions is likely
to trigger a move for independence in the Azores
in the next few months.
For a variety of reasons, the present Portu-
guese leadership would experience great difficulty
in mobilizing the necessary forces to put down such
a rebellion.
With good timing and organization, a revolt
having the support of a majority of the island's
military commanders and soldiers would probably
succeed.
Should non-radicals come to power in Lisbon,
however, and take steps to grant additional auton-
omy and ameliorate the island's economic grievances,
sentiment for complete separation from the main-
land would decline.
An Azorean revolt at this time could jeopar-
dize present efforts by the anti-Communist forces
to return Portugal to a more democratic course,
particularly if the pro-Communist and radical
leftists could plausibly connect such a move with
conservative groups.
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NOTES
The Soviet F-class submarine which developed
problems in the Mediterranean last Wednesday entered
Alexandria harbor yesterday accompanied by a subma-
rine repair ship.
The F-class has been on the surface since Thurs-
day morning moving toward Alexandria under its own
power. Repair at Alexandria rather than by a repair
ship at sea suggests that the damage is serious. We
do not yet know the nature of the problem or whether
any of the crew was injured.
Prince Sihanouk is having second
thoughts about returning to Cambodia
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Sihanouk has received two or three invi- 25X1
tations to return to Cambodia and now believes he
can no longer postpone his decision. His delay
probably reflects his wariness at placing himself
even temporarily under the control of Phnom Penh's
communist authorities. The Khmer communists do have
some old scores to settle with the Prince, but they
may now view his international prestige as a useful
symbol of legitimacy. If the Prince decides to re-
turn, he will probably make a brief visit to Phnom
Penh next month, and then go on an official visit
to several friendly countries.
The Laotian communists are planning three to
five days of demonstrations in Vientiane this week
to formally end the city's neutrality.
Once the 1973 accords, which gave the responsi-
bility for security and other local functions to
joint communist and non-communist organizations, are
abrogated, the communists will assume direct control,
abolish joint governing bodies, and change local of-
ficials. Anti-US and anti-Thai demonstrations appar-
ently will be staged as offshoots of the main effort.
(continued)
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The Indian Supreme Court's decision to rule
on the constitutionality of last week's amendment
to the constitution that placed election of the
prime minister above challenge in the courts will
delay, but is unlikely to alter, a final outcome
favoring Gandhi.
Four of the five justices on the Supreme Court
panel that will begin hearing arguments on the case
on August 25 have been described by our embassy in
New Delhi as the "most committed" to Gandhi of the
13 on the court. A finding in her favor is there-
fore quite possible. Even if she were to lose on
the constitutional issue, the court may void her
June conviction by a lower court because of recent
changes in the electoral law by parliament. Fi-
nally, if the court procedure fails her, Gandhi can
use her overwhelming majority in parliament to help
her--possibly by creating a constituent assembly to
make basic changes in the constitution.
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