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The President's Daily Brief
17 March 1973
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Exempt froni general
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652
exemption category 50( I
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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EYES ONLY FOR THE PRESIDENT
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
IGPECflT
17 March 1973
EYES ONLY FOR THE PRESIDENT
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LATE ITEM
Cambodia: A T-28 aircraft, piloted by a
Cambodian Air Force officer, dropped two bombs
within the compound of the Presidential Palace in
the early afternoon of 17 March in Phnom Penh.
Cambodian officials have told the US Embassy that
Lon Nol and his staff were unharmed. According
to Western press reports, however, there were
several casualties in army barracks and munition
storage areas of the compound.
Cambodian officials have moved quickly to
scotch speculation that the attack was part of .a
wider operation planned against the Lon Nol gov-
ernment. They have indicated that the pilot, who
had been grounded recently for disciplinary rea-
sons, acted alone.
that there are no indications that an a
tempt to overthrow Lon Nol is under way.
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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF
17 March 1973
PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS
North Vietnam's intensified dry season transporta-
tion campaign is now focusing on moving supplies
toward and into South Vietnam. (Page 1)
The Vietnamese Communists seem increasingly pessi-
mistic about prospects for competing politically
with Saigon. (Page 2)
In Laos, there has been some forward movement in
the talks on implementing the peace agreement.
(Page 3)
Sudanese President Numayri seems to be wavering on
whether or not to execute the Black September ter-
rorists. (Page 4)
The Turkish Parliament has again failed to elect
a president. (Page 4)
The North Koreans were unusually tough at the most
recent round of talks with Seoul. (Page 4)
Peru's President Velasco is recovering from his re-
cent operations more quickly than suits the mili-
tary. (Page 5)
In the Philippines, intensified fighting between
government forces and Muslim dissidents is compound-
ing an already serious refugee problem. (Page 5)
Factionalism within Chile's government coalition
has increased since the election. (Page 5)
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VIETNAM
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THAILAND
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554232 3-73 CIA
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INDOCHINA
North Vietnam's dry season transportation cam-
paign has entered a new phase, emphasizing movement
of supplies toward and into South Vietnam.
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Hanoi's plans for a "large transpOrtation
effort" in northern South Vietnam and
southern Laos this spring. This new:
drive represents.the third phase of the
Communists' dry season effort.
From October through January, Hanoi gave
priority to moving supplies through the
North Vietnam panhandle. By February
the emphasis had shifted to corridors
leading into Laos. A message intercepted
on 12 March, for example, revealed that
over 2,300 vehicles moved south through
the Ban Karai Pass between 1 February and
9 March, about half of them since 23
February. Vehicle activity west of the
DMZ into Laos added to the stocks there.
The level of activity on the main road
corridors into southern Laos now appears
to be subsiding, as the Communists con-
centrate on moving supplies closer to
South Vietnam.
This pattern is typical of past years,
when the locus of Communist supply activ-
ity moved progressively south during the
dry season.
Recently intercepted communications from north-
eastern Quang Tri Province also reflect record
levels of vehicle activity, and probably supply
flow, across the DMZ. One logistic unit reported
on 15 March that it had "handled" 2,450 vehicles
between 8 and 14 March. Some 615 of the vehicles
moved south and they could have carried more than
2,000 tons of supplies.
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SOUTH VIETNAM
Vietnamese Communists appear to be growing
more pessimistic about prospects for com-
peting politically with Saigon. Current
reporting suggests that the Communists are
giving more serious consideration to the
use of military force after US forces have
withdrawn than they were a few weeks ago.
At a meeting last month in Tay Ninh
for example, Communist officials
expressed concern over the "desultory" attitude
of many political cadre. They noted "little prog-
ress" in developing Viet Cong political assets and
criticized cadre for not adjusting to the "new sit-
uation" and for remaining distant from the masses.
The officials concluded that the political struggle
would not be completed quickly, and that it would be
necessary "at times" to attack with main forces.
Province,
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LAOS
A government spokesman told the press in Vien-
tiane yesterday that both sides in the joint polit-
ical group agreed to form a new government by 23
March as required by the agreement. The joint mil-
itary group reportedly also made some headway.
Despite these stirrings, no decisions ap-
pear to have been made on basic issues,
such as who gets which portfolios. These
will require negotiations between Prime
Minister Souvanna and senior Lao Commu-
nist envoys. Souvanna will also have to
negotiate basic issues with leaders of
the Lao right wing who will object
strongly to any attempt to give major
portfolios to the Communists.
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NOTES
Sudan: President Numayri seems to be wavering
on whether or not to execute the Black September
terrorists. Although Sudanese officials continue
to insist that he will deal with the group severely,
they will not say when the eight men will be brought
to trial. Officials close to Numayri are apparently
giving him conflicting advice. The Sudanese Presi-
dent himself has said nothing since his initial
hard-line speech on the murders. There are some
tenuous signs of a softening in his attitude, how-
ever, and the longer he vacillates the more likely
he is to spare the terrorists' lives.
Turkey: Parliament has again failed to elect
a president. Two more inconclusive ballots--the
?fifth and sixth since the presidential election be-
gan on 13 March--were cast yesterday. Voting will
resume early next week. Justice Party candidate
Tekin Ariburun increased his commanding lead over
former general staff chief Faruk Gurler, the mili-
tary's candidate, in yesterday's voting. Neverthe-
less, the military may be able to prevent Ariburun
from getting the majority needed to win. The search
continues for a compromise candidate acceptable to
both the politicians and the generals. Serious
consideration is apparently also being given to a
proposal to amend the constitution in order to ex-
tend the term of incumbent President Cevdet Sunay.
Korea: The latest round of North-South talks
ended in a stalemate when Pyongyang demanded--and
Seoul refused to agree to--a peace treaty and a
mutual reduction in arms as prerequisites for prog-
ress in negotiations. Although these issues have
been part of North Korean propaganda for some time,
they have never been central to the negotiations.
Their introduction underscores the importance Pyong-
yang attaches to the withdrawal of US and UN forces
from the South and to curbing the expansion and
modernization of the South Korean military. The
North Koreans are not prepared to see the talks
break down. They may be willing, however, to
lengthen the interval between sessions and to es-
calate tensions in an effort to increase pressure
on Seoul.
(continued)
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Peru: President Velasco has recovered enough
from his recentoperations to sign a decree termi-
nating, as of 31 March, Prime Minister Mercado's
mandate for limited executive powers. If his health
continues to improve at the present rate, Velasco
could soon attempt a temporary return to duty. If
he tries to return permanently, military officers,
who feel he should retire gracefully because of
his health problems, will probably oppose him.
Philippines: Intensified fighting between
government forces and Muslim dissidents, particu-
larly in agricultural areas around Cotabato City,
is compounding an already sizable refugee problem.
Whenever violence occurs in the south, numbers of
Muslims flee to Malaysian Borneo while Christians
crowd into government-controlled urban areas. The
Philippine Government estimates that current fight-
ing has displaced some 300,000 to 500,000 persons
throughout the Mindanao-Sulu area. The military
also reports that local food stocks are being de-
pleted and that military operations are hampered
by refugee-clogged roads. Although the reports,
and particularly the figures, are probably exagger-
ated, the problem is significant and the government
will be hard pressed to provide adequate assistance.
Chile: Bitter fighting within the government
coalition is overshadowing its good election show-
ing. The basic struggle is between Socialist Party
leaders, who are increasingly determined to radi-
calize the Chilean revolution, and the more cautious
Communists, who want to root out this extremism as
dangerous to their own interests. President Allende
is playing both sides, although he leans toward
the Communist course as the safer one. He hopes
to displace the radicals in the Socialist Party
leadership with men of his own persuasion. Compe-
tition is now focused on factionalism in a coali-
tion mini-party which was nearly extinguished in
the elections. Its respective factions are manipu-
lated by Communists and Socialists who are using
this arena to force all government supporters to
take a stand on ?the problem.
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