THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF 3 SEPTEMBER 1976

• Document Type: FOIA
• Collection: President's Daily Brief 1969-1977
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0006466830
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: August 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 24, 2016
• Publication Date: September 3, 1976

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The President's Daily Brief
September 3, 1976
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Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E 0 11652
exemption category 513(1),(2),(3)
declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
September 3, 1976
Table of Contents
USSR: The appointment of Nikolay Tikhonov as first deputy pre-
mier is an initial step to deal organizationally with what
has been confirmed to be the serious illness of Premier
Kosygin. (Page 1)
USSR:
(Page 2)
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Lebanon: The lack of comments from Lebanese president-elect Sar-
kis and President Asad after their recent meeting has
prompted speculation in Beirut that the two had serious
differences. (Page 3)
Egypt-Israel: Israeli Defense Minister Peres has said that Egypt
has withdrawn three battalions of troops from the east bank
of the Suez Canal. (Page 5)
Tanzania: President Nyerere fears that the factionalism among
Rhodesian black nationalists may preclude bringing them to
the bargaining table. (Page 5)
Guinea: Guinean officials have confirmed their government's de-
cision to halt Soviet TU-95 naval reconnaissance deployments
from Guinea. (Page 6)
Cuba-Angola: We present the key points of an Interagency Intel-
ligence Memorandum, "Angola: Cuban Intentions and Changes
in Cuban Personnel Strength." (Page 7)
Notes: North Korea; UN (Page 9)
FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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USSR: The appointment
of Nikolay Tikhonov as
first deputy premier is
an initial step to deal
organizationally with
what has been confirmed
to be the serious ill-
ness of Premier Kosygin.
The Soviet ambassador
to Czechoslovakia told
Ambassador Byrne on
Wednesday that Kosygin,
72, had suffered a
heart attack.
The leadership has be-
haved routinely in re-
cent weeks and has given
no sign that Kosygin's
illness, which probably
struck in early August,
raised the question of
replacing him.
If Kosygin's "heart attack" was
a true myocardial infarction, he
has survived the most life-threat-
ening phase of his illness. Kosy-
gin has not been well for some
time, however, and his prospects
for regaining sufficient strength
to resume a vigorous schedule are
not good. His convalescence from
a heart attack would in any event
probably extend into at least an-
other month.
Tikhonov becomes the second "first"
deputy premier, along with Kirill
Mazurov, who has held the post
since 1965. Tikhonov, 71, is Gen-
eral Secretary Brezhnev's protege
and is one of many officials with
career ties to Brezhnev's region
in the Ukraine. He made his early
career in metallurgy and continued
to be responsible for that field
and the coal industry as deputy
premier.
The leadership may have promoted
Tikhonov to help take on the work-
load that Kosygin, at least tem-
porarily, must be spared. Brezh-
nev undoubtedly welcomed the op-
portunity to place an ally that
high in the government as a counter-
weight to the more independent
Mazurov. Tikhonov could also be
elected to the Politburo, since
Mazurov is a member, as was former
first deputy premier Polyansky.
If Kosygin should retire or die,
his succession appears to be an
open question. Mazurov has the
clearest claim to the job. Brezh-
nev may have wanted to ensure that
his man, Tikhonov served as first
deputy in such an eventuality.
--continued
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
USSR:
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Mazurov, 62, is in indifferent
health, however, and was absent
from public view all summer. His
promotion would break the hold on
the top leadership posts of the
still older generation of Soviet
leaders.
Tikhonov could conceivably replace
Kosygin, but probably only after
serving a period on the Politburo,
and his close association with
Brezhnev would probably offend
Kosygin and other members of the
collective. With his age making
him a member of the elder genera-
tion, he could not be expected to
be a long-term premier.
* * *
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--continued
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*
LEBANON: The apparent
refusal of Lebanese
president-elect Sarkis
and President Asad to
comment on the results
of their private meet-
ing Tuesday has prompted
speculation in Beirut
that the two leaders
had major disagreements.
Palestinian sources are
saying that Sarkis
failed to reach an un-
derstanding with Asad
on the issue of Syrian
troops in Lebanon.
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*
*
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--continued
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
Lebanese leftist sources
charged yesterday that
Israeli troops and ar-
mored units had crossed
the border in large num-
bers. We have no in-
formation of this, and
the Israelis so far
probably have provided
Christian troops in the
south only limited sup-
port.
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The Palestinians' failure to un-
dertake any new negotiating ini-
tiatives with the Syrians probably
has also been a major factor in
Asad's thinking.
The military situation remains rel-
atively calm.
Israeli units have for some time
conducted patrols along well-known
Palestinian access routes on both
sides of the border. The Israelis
also have occupied observation
posts during daylight hours in
southern Lebanon to prevent terror-
ist intimidation of Lebanese vil-
lagers in the area and renewed
cross-border terrorist raids. This
patrolling probably has been stepped
up in recent days. Earlier this
week, Israeli artillery units also
are said to have shelled suspected
Palestinian positions located near
the border.
Israeli Foreign Minister Allon re-
iterated on Tuesday that his gov-
ernment would not tolerate a re-
sumption of Palestinian terrorist
attacks against northern Israel
from bases in southern Lebanon.
Allon's statement comes on the
heels of clashes between Christian
--continued
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EGYPT-ISRAEL: Israeli
Defense Minister Peres
told press sources
Wednesday that the
Egyptians have with-
drawn three battalions
of troops from the east
bank of the Suez Canal
over the past several
days. Peres went on
to say that Egypt now
has eight battalions
remaining in the
limited armaments
zone, the maximum num-
ber allowed under the
terms of the Sinai II
agreement.
TANZANIA: President
Nyerere is fearful that
the factionalism among
Rhodesian black nation-
alists may preclude
bringing them to the
bargaining table.
and Palestinian forces in the
southern Lebanese village of Ayn
Ibil where residents evidently
have requested Israeli military
protection.
* * *
If the units have in fact with-
drawn, this would be the first
appreciable change in the strength
of Egyptian infantry in the limited
armaments zone since May 31.
* * *
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--continued
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
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GUINEA: Guinean of-
ficials recently con-
firmed to Ambassador
Harrop their govern-
ment's decision to halt
Soviet TU-95 naval re-
connaissance deploy-
ments from Guinea be-
ginning this month.
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*
*
Two spokesmen for President Toure,
in separate meetings with the am-
bassador, also noted Guinea's
earlier request for a "US security
guarantee" to help protect the
regime against the alleged threat
posed by Guinean exiles. They
implied that the continuation of
the ban on Soviet reconnaissance
deployments may well depend on a
favorable US response to this re-
quest.
According to one of the spokesmen,
Soviet representatives in Conakry
have been told that no flights
would be authorized after Wednes-
day because they were being used
for surveillance in the Atlantic
rather than along Guinea's coast-
line as was originally agreed to
protect against the threat of in-
vasion by exiles.
The spokesman asserted that Guinea
had granted Soviet requests for
reconnaissance deployments on a
month-to-month basis. He implied
that the Soviets might propose a
deployment for October.
--continued
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FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY
The last TU-95 deploy-
ment to Guinea--the
16th since the opera-
tions began in mid-
1973--ended on July 22,
when the two aircraft
involved returned to
the USSR.
CUBA-ANGOLA: We pre-
sent here the key
points of an Inter-
agency Intelligence
Memorandum, "Angola:
Cuban Intentions and
Changes in Cuban Person-
nel Strength."
We have no evidence that another
flight to Guinea is planned in
the near future, but this is not
unusual. Following the deployment
of TU-95s in July last year, the
Soviets waited until October 10
before they sent another flight.
The loss of air facilities at
Conakry would make it very dif-
ficult for the Soviets to conduct
open-ocean reconnaissance in the
Atlantic south of the equator.
* * *
Cuba almost certainly will keep a
large number of military and ci-
vilian personnel--probably on the
order of 10,000--in the Angolan
area for at least the next several
years. For both military and eco-
nomic reasons, Angola will need
foreign personnel on this scale,
and Havana has clearly indicated
that it will do all it can to
meet this need.
Although our information is in-
complete and imprecise, we estimate
the number of Cuban personnel pres-
ently in the Angolan area (includ-
ing neighboring Congo) to be over
10,000 and it may be as high as
14,500. The net reduction since
March 15, 1976 of Cubans in the
Angolan area has probably been on
the order of 2,500 to 5,000.
Some 1,000 to 2,000 of the Cubans
who had been in Angola earlier this
year have apparently moved to Congo
in recent months. Since one of
their tasks is to help assure An-
golan control over Cabinda, they
should be considered part of the
Cuban force in the Angolan area.
--continued
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In addition to regarding their in-
terests in Angola as long range,
the Cubans appear to see Angola
as a base from which to increase
their influence elsewhere in south-
ern Africa. Castro would probably
respond favorably to a request for
additional assistance to Mozambique
should the latter's position in
the conflict with Rhodesia deter-
iorate further.
Cuba will of necessity be con-
strained by its own relative lack
of resources beyond those which
it must expend in Angola to pre-
serve its investment there. Its
actions will also be heavily in-
fluenced by the willingness--or
lack of willingness--of the Soviet
Union to support Havana.
Finally, Cuba's policies will be
affected in varying degrees by
such factors as the sentiment of
black African leaders, concern
over its relations with Western
Europe, Japan and Latin American
states, and internal developments
in Cuba.
Nevertheless, given Fidel Castro's
urge to play a major role on the
world stage, he will not easily be
dissuaded from further involvement
in Africa.
--continued
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North Korea has re-
sponded with unusual
swiftness and modera-
tion to inquiries from
the South regarding the
fate of the South Ko-
rean fishing boat that
strayed into Northern
waters earlier this
week.
UN Secretary General
Kurt Waldheim will ac-
cept another five-year
term if there is sup-
port for his re-election
when his current term
expires at the end of
this year.
NOTES
North Korea's statement on the
boat incident indicated that it is
prepared to cooperate in arranging
an early release provided South
Korea confirms the identity of the
boat and crew. This suggests North
Korea wishes to avoid any steps
that might complicate the negotia-
tions on its proposal for new se-
curity arrangements in the Panmun-
jom Joint Security Area.
Since the Panmunjom incident on
August 18, North Korea has at-
tempted to portray itself as the
responsible party advancing con-
structive proposals for easing
tensions provoked by the US and
South Korea.
The Mexicans apparently are still
pushing President Echeverria's
candidacy for the UN job,/
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Mexican strategy for securing Eche-
verria's election seems to be based
in part on a claim that China would
veto Waldheim. China,
not made its position
however,
has
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known;
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Open support for Echeverria from
the third world states has been
noticeably lacking.
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Top Secret
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