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The President's Daily Brief
April 6, 1976
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Exempt from general
declassification schedule of ED. 11652
exemption category, 5B(1),(2),(3)
. declassified only on approval of
the Director of Central Intelligence
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April 6, 1976
Table of Contents
USSR: Satellite photography shows that the Soviets
have made little effort since January to meet
the requirements for dismantling older ICBM
launchers. (Page 1)
Lebanon: The politicians continued to argue today
over the timing, venue, and security arrange-
ments for convening parliament. (Page 3)
China: The pro - Chou En-lai demonstrations in
Peking on Monday appear to be part of an or-
chestrated campaign against party leftists who
have been working to oust Teng Hsiao-ping.
(Page 5)
Notes: USSR; Cuba-Angola; USSR-Egypt; Tanzania-
Mozambique-Rhodesia (Pages 7 and 8)
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USSR
A review of satellite photography
taken between
shows that the Soviets have made 11,ttle
effort since January to meet the require-
ments for dismantling older ICBM launch-
ers. Indeed, no activity has been evi-
dent at most of the partially dismantled
launchers for several months or more.
The only dismantling activity observed since
January has been the removal of some of the inter-
nal components from nine SS-7 silos. Under the
terms of the Interim Agreement the Soviets should
have had 23 older ICBM or submarine-launched bal-
listic-missile launchers fully dismantled by Janu-
ary 23, and 51 dismantled by about March 1.
Initially they appeared to be complying with
the agreement. By late December they had begun to
dismantle 51 SS-7 above-ground and silo launchers.
The work lagged, however, and we can only confirm
that eight launchers are fully dismantled. The So-
viets themselves admitted on March 30 that they had
fully dismantled only 10 older ICBM launchers.
All of the 209 original SS-7 and SS-8 launch-
ers were photographed on several occasions during
the mission, and nearly all were seen at least
once since about mid-March. No additional SS-7
launchers were observed being dismantled nor were
there any indications that the Soviets had started
dismantling any SS-8 ICBM launchers or older SLBM
launchers.
The two additional launchers counted by the
Soviets as fully dismantled may be at the Yoshkar-
Ola complex. At one of the SS-7 sites the control
bunker has been dismantled, and the two launch pads
have been partially excavated. The propellant
tanks at these facilities also must be removed,
however, to comply with the dismantling require-
ments. The propellant facilities appeared intact
(continued)
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The reasons given last week by the Soviets for
not fully dismantling all 51 launchers are not com-
pelling. They said that they have encountered dif-
ficulties and implied that they could not use explo-
sives because nearby buildings might be damaged.
The photography, however, shows that the nearest
buildings are too far away to be damaged.
The level of activity in other areas at the
complexes containing the partially dismantled SS-7
launchers suggests that weather and manpower were
not major factors in the slowdown of dismantling.
The Soviets continue to build new launch control
silos or to modify SS-11 silos for new missiles at
many of the complexes containing partially dis-
mantled SS-7 silos, and an exercise was noted at
an operational SS-7 site, at the Kostroma complex.
The lack of activity at the partially dis-
mantled sites makes it impossible to project when
work on all 51 launchers might be completed. The
Soviets probably could fully dismantle an SS-7
site containing two above-ground launchers or three
silos within about four to six weeks. With a con-
certed effort, they probably could complete the
dismantlement of all 43 partially dismantled
launchers in two to three months.
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MEDITERRANEAN
SEA
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LEBANON
Sporadic fighting flared up yester-
day in the mountains east of Beirut
where leftist and Christian militiamen
resumed their struggle for control over
the Christian villages of Aynturah and
Al Mutayn. Leaders on both sides seem
willing to tolerate breaches of the
truce in outlying areas as long as the
capital remains relatively calm.
some Syrian reservists have been recalled to active
duty over the last several weeks and others noti-
fied of a possible recall. The attache reports
that there are no signs of a general mobilization
or an imminent move by Syrian forces.
No Syrian patrol boats were detected operating
in Lebanese waters off Tripoli yesterday, although
it is not clear whether Damascus has totally lifted
its blockade of the Lebanese port.
Muslim and Christian politicians continued
their strident public debate over the timing,
venue, and security arrangements for convening
parliament, but they may have reached some points
of tentative agreement--at least on an acceptable
(continued)
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site for the session. The Muslim-controlled radio
in Beirut states that major Christian leaders--
including Interior Minister Shamun--have agreed to
hold the meeting in a so-called neutral area of
Beirut.
The more controversial question of which force
will protect the assembly apparently has not been
resolved. Jumblatt's recent accusations against
Syria almost certainly mean he will not accept
Syrian-controlled Palestinian forces as the sole
guardians of the parliament.
The debate over a successor to President Fran-
jiyah is likely to remain deadlocked until the
Christian Phalanges Party and Jumblatt's leftist
coalition hold meetings later this week. The list
of possible compromise candidates is growing each
day; none of those mentioned, however, has gained
even tacit approval from the Syrians, the Chris-
tians, or the Muslim left.
4
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CHINA
The massive pro - Chou En-Zai demon-
strations in Peking on Monday, as well as
poster attacks elsewhere in China on un-
named but important persons who are said
to have denigrated Chou, appear to be part
of an orchestrated campaign against party
leftists who have been working to oust
Chou's chosen successor, Teng Hsiao-ping.
Moderate leaders, who seem to be trying to pro-
tect Teng and preserve the policies for which he and
Chou stood, apparently have seized on the highly
popular issue of paying tribute to the deceased pre-
mier as a vehicle to turn the attacks on Teng around.
The unruly behavior of the crowds in Peking, esti-
mated at over 100,000, is uncharacteristic of the
normally timid Peking residents and strongly sug-
gests that these people were given the green light
to hold demonstrations by important figures in the
leadership. The fact that security personnel and
unarmed military men did little to interfere with
the demonstrations itself implies official sanction.
The current defense of Chou contains thinly
veiled attacks on Mao's wife, Chiang Ching, and on
three members of the party's ruling Politburo who
hail from Shanghai. These four people, all members
of the party's left wing, undoubtedly are in the
forefront of the anti-Teng campaign. Unlike the
criticism of Teng, which has fallen short of call-
ing for his ouster, the current attacks on his de-
tractors call for "overthrowing" them. The fact
that these attacks are now appearing in east China
further points to orchestration of the "defense" of
Chou for political reasons.
Almost from the beginning of the anti-Teng
campaign, some Chinese seemed to interpret it as
indirect criticism of Chou En-lai--if only because
Teng was Chou's hand-picked successor and repre-
sented the continuation of the premier's popular
policies. The demonstrations may have been de-
signed to influence discussions in a major leader-
ship meeting currently in progress concerning the
future course of the campaign and Teng's ultimate
fate.
(continued)
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An editorial in today's People's Doily, pre-
sumably inspired by anti-Teng forces, says that the
campaign is not aimed at discrediting Chou and that
it will continue against Teng.
The shows of strength both by pro- and anti-
Teng forces suggest that the leadership in Peking
remains in deadlock.
6
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FEDERAL
REPUBLIC
OF
GERMANY
CZECH.
ATLANTIC OCEAN
PORTUGAL
SPAIN
Strait o
FRANCE
ROMANIA
ITALY
YUGOSLAVIA
Split
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Corsica
ALBANIA
ardemelles
TURKEY
Sardini
Sicily
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CYPRU
Tartus
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NOTES
The Soviet navy continues to shift its forces
in the Mediterranean, partly in response to US na-
val moves.
As of midday yesterday, the Soviets had two
cruisers, a destroyer, a frigate, and an intelli-
gence collector watching the 11-ship US force south-
east of Crete. One or more Soviet attack submarines
probably are also in the area.
Cuba
Angola
The Soviets, in talks with Westerners, con-
tinue to play down the significance of Egyptian
President Sadat's abrogation of the Soviet-Egyptian
friendship treaty.
A Soviet Foreign Ministry official responsible
for Middle East affairs told a British official
that the treaty abrogation only formalized the ex-
isting situation. He said relations might be sour
"for several years," but that the Soviets are con-
vinced they will eventually improve.
Soviet public comments, however, are designed
to stir Egyptian apprehensions about future Soviet
actions and to promote questioning about the wisdom
of Sadat's actions. The Soviets' formal protest
note to Cairo last week, in fact, has stirred an
outpouring of charges of Soviet meddling from the
Egyptian press and Egyptian public figures.
(continued)
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Tanzanian President Nyerere and Mozambican
President Machel are trying to tighten their con-
trol over outside aid to the Rhodesian nationalists.
Their intent is partly to limit non-African
involvement with the guerrillas. They are also
concerned that direct Soviet, Cuban, and Chinese
aid to the rival factions of the nationalist Afri-
can National Council could intensify internal divi-
sions and weaken the insurgency against the Smith
government.
Last week the Tanzanian foreign minister told
the ambassadors of a number of communist and West-
ern countries that, from now on, all outside sup-
port for the nationalists is to be channeled
through Tanzania and Mozambique by the African
Liberation Committee of the Organization of African
Unity.
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Top Secret
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