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The President's Daily Brief
--Thrrstc-r-4- 17 April 1968
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DAILY BRIEF
17 APRIL 1968
1, South Vietnam
2, Korea
Tran Van Huong, President Thieu's
choice to succeed Prime Minister Loc,
is apparently still undecided about
the offer.
Our analysts believe that Pyong-
yang may be planning a substantial in-
crease in its guerrilla activity against
the South. Unlike last year, when the
bulk of the North's agent activity was
in espionage and the establishment of
guerrilla bases, the Communists may now
focus on ambitious terrorist incidents
similar to the raid on the presidential
residence in January.
Prior to the ambush of US person-
nel near the Demilitarized Zone on
Sunday, the situation in that area had
been relatively quiet since the January
raid, The recent ambush was deliber-
ately planned; it was not a chance en-
counter between infiltrating agents and
security patrols. This suggests that
Pyongyang now sees less need for caution
and that, with the improvement in
weather, the level of guerrilla opera-
tions will probably rise.
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3, Thailand
4. West Berlin
5. West Germany
Prime Minister Thanom has told
Ambassador Unger he is worried that
the US will pull out of Vietnam and
Southeast Asia sooner than expected
and under circumstances which will
leave Thailand in a "precarious posi-
tion." Thanom is particularly worried
about Thailand's "profound commitment"
in letting the US use Thai airbases.
He is apparently convinced that even if
there is a successful conclusion to the
war, Thailand will soon bear the brunt
of Chinese and North Vietnamese aggres-
sion.
Thanom implied that he is not be-
ing cut in on Washington's position
regarding negotiations and on plans for
the ground war over the next few months.
He hopes to discuss these matters with
President Johnson when he visits Wash-
ington next month.
The students took a breather last
night--West German cities were quiet.
The prediction is that the demonstra-
tions will probably start up again to-
night.
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6. Egypt
Nasir says that his domestic prob?
lems rule out an real ne?otiations
with Israel.
Equally important in the back of
Nasir's mind is the fact that Saudi
Arabia will cut off its Egyptian subsi?
dies if Nasir agrees to negotiate.
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Top Secret
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Top Secret
FOR THE PRESIDENT'S EYES ONLY
1.) Special Daily Report on North Vietnam
2.) North Vietnamese Reflections of U S
Political Attitudes
Top Secret
c
17- April' Y968
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Special Daily Report on North Vietnam
for the President's Eyes Only
17 April 1968
I. NOTES ON THE SITUATION
New Appointments in Hanoi: Hanoi announced two
government appointments on 15 April, and one of them
may reflect preparations for possible talks. This
was the naming of a former foreign minister, Xuan
Thuy, as "minister in the North Vietnamese Govern-
ment" without a specific portfolio. Xuan Thuy
served as foreign minister from 1963 to April 1965,
when Hanoi announced that he was being replaced be-
cause of his health. He was then out of public view
for more than a year. He re-emerged as host for
foreign delegations visiting Hanoi. In some cases
he has been a member of the official North Vietnam-
ese delegation participating in talks with these
foreigners.
Xuan Thuy is a member of the second echelon of
the North Vietnamese Communist Party--a full Central
Committeeman. He is well traveled for a North Viet-
namese, having served as deputy head of the North
Vietnamese delegation to the Geneva Conference on
Laos in 1962. He would be a good candidate for Hanoi's
delegation in talks with the US, but probably only
after they became substantive discussions. Hanoi has
made clear that the initial "contact" is to be at the
ambassadorial level. Xuan Thuy's new government rank
suggests he would not be used for this preliminary
mission.
The second government appointment announced by
Hanoi on 15 April does not appear to be related to
the peace talk dialogue. Tran Quang Huy is a party
propaganda expert, whose foreign affairs experience
seems limited to relations with other Communist par-
ties. His new government job involves direction of
domestic "culture and education" programs. It ap-
pears to be a routine appointment to a previously va-
cant post.
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Extra International Control Commission Flights:
Hanoi may have asked the International Control Com-
mission if commission aircraft could be made avail-
able for special flights, presumably to transport a
North Vietnamese delegation to preliminary peace
talks. The commission's assistant secretary general
for administration in Saigon approached the US Em-
bassy on 15 April to ask how much advance notice
would be required to schedule extra flights from Hanoi
to Vientiane, "in case Hanoi might want to use the
ICC aircraft to transport their delegation to Vien-
tiane." He pointed out that Hanoi might want more
prompt service than was provided by the commission's
six regular flights per month. Although he did not
indicate that his request was prompted by any query
from Hanoi, the US Embassy is inclined to believe
that it might have been. The delegation could con-
ceivably proceed from Vientiane to other locations
by commercial transport.
* *
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II. NORTH VIETNAMESE REFLECTIONS OF US POLITICAL
ATTITUDES ON THE WAR
Liberation Front Letter: An official of the
Liberation Front has addressed a special letter to
"US writers, artists, and cultural workers" on the
occasion of a proposed 10-day "antiwar struggle" in
the US. The letter was broadcast over Liberation
radio on 15 April. It thanked the people of the US
for their opposition to the war and to official US
policy on Vietnam, and called President Johnson's
limitation of the bombing a "tricky peace" effort
designed to hide a new escalation of the war. The
Vietnamese people always make a clear distinction
between the American people as a whole and the war
planners in the Pentagon and the White House, said
the letter, and the Liberation Front hoped the
people would continue to support Communist terms
for a political settlement of the war.
* * *
Propaganda: Hanoi propaganda is losing no op-
portunity to score the US for "lack of good faith"
and "delaying tactics" in the selection of a site
for preliminary talks. This line is being put out
daily for the benefit of both domestic and foreign
audiences. North Vietnamese propagandists are
reaching back into the US press for early quotes
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on US willingness to meet with Hanoi and are rely-
ing primarily on non-Vietnamese criticism of the
President to reinforce their case.
A commentary on 15 April cited Senator McCarthy
and the influential Japanese newspaper Manichi as
typical of the widespread criticism of the US refusal
to accept Phnom Penh and Warsaw. In a Nhan Dan edi-
torial of the 16th, Hanoi claimed that EZIThWF-of
these cities represented any real difficulty for the
US, since both the Cambodian and the Polish govern-
ments had assured the US that "favorable conditions
would be created."
Domestic commentary highlights the assertion
that in addition to delaying on the issue of a site,
the US is "strengthening the war in the South" and
launching big military operations. A North Vietnam-
ese daily editorial on 15 April told the people that
now was the time for extra efforts. The "new situa-
tion" called for taking advantage of every opportunity,
according to the editorial; it opened up "bright pros-
pects" but required "every minute and every breath
to develop militant strength."
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Top Secret
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