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The President's Daily Brief
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Czechoslovakia -
Soviet Union
LATE ITEM
The loyalist radio in Prague,
quoting "military circles of the
Soviet occupation army," reported
this morning that a new government
was to be formed at the Soviet Em-
bassy in Prague between 040.0 and
0500 EDT. We have no further word
on this.
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THE PRESIDENT'S
DAILY BRIEF
22 AUGUST 1968
1. Czechoslovakia -
Soviet Union
2. South Vietnam
Soviet military control of Czecho-
slovakia is virtually unchallenged, and
prominent Czechoslovak reformers includ-
ing Dubcek are in Soviet custody.
The Soviet strategy clearly is to
salvage some of the more conservative
members of the existing regime as the
nucleus for anew, more malleable gov-
ernment. To this end, Pravda this morn-
ing charged that Dubcek was the leader
of a minority faction which supported
counterrevolution. Czechoslovak offi-
cials met yesterday with unidentified
Soviets in Prague, and another meeting
is scheduled for this morning.
As 'part of this strategy the Soviets
have tried to maintain a low profile,
They have permitted the important organs
of government to function, and all day
yesterday they allowed the Czechoslovak
media to put out commentary hostile to
Moscow. (The flow has since diminished,
but several independent radio'stations
are still functioning.)
Any government the Soviets put to-
gether will need their military backing
for .some time. The Czech populace is al-
most uniformly behind Dubcek.
?The Communists resumed the bombard-
ment of Saigon yesterday. They are keep-
ing up the pressure throughout III Corps
and initiated several hit-and-run at-
tacks in the delta. There have been
scattered engagements elsewhere in South
Vietnam, and indications continue to
pile up that more attacks are set for
the near future. The situation in I
Corps is particularly ominous.
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Huge Soviet Space Booster Erected on Launch Pad at Tyuratam
16 March 1968?Pad Nearing Completion 50X1
91776 8-68 CIA TCS 2605/68
11 August 1968?Missile In.Place
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3, Israel -
Arab States
4, Soviet Union
5. India
Although we have little specific
evidence, we are concerned that there
could soon be more Israeli military
action against the Arabs.
In addition,
the newest and biggest Soviet space
booster--seen erected on its pad in re-
cent satellite photography--may be due
for its first flight test.
Deputy Prime Minister Desai, long
Mrs. Gandhi's chief rival, now says an
open split with her is fast approach-
ing. He and the ambitious home minis-
ter, Y. B. Chavan, apparently are wait-
ing for an opportune moment for a cabi-
net showdown with her.
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6. Egypt
7. Mexico
8. Bolivia
Barrientos apparently has foiled
the coup attempt by former army chief
? of staff Vasquez. Vasquez himself is
still at large in the La Paz area, but
the security forces have rounded up
most of his followers.
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Top Secret
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Top Secret
FOR THE PRESIDENT'S EYES ONLY
1.) Special Daily Report on North Vietnam
2.) North Vietnamese Reflections of U S
Political Attitudes
Top Secret
16
22 August 1968
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Special Daily Report on North Vietnam
for the President's Eyes Only
22 August 1968
I. NOTES ON THE SITUATION
Hanoi Promptly Supports Soviet Invasion: Hanoi
has provided strong propaganda support for the Soviet
military action in Czechoslovakia. ?A statement broad-
cast on the domestic radio service on 21 August is an
unequivocal and unusually prompt endorsement, de-
scribing the Soviet move as a "noble effort" in re-
sponse to a request from the "party faithful" in
Czechoslovakia. Hanoi says the action is sanctioned
by recent agreements among the six Communist coun-
tries (USSR, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Bulgaria, East
Germany, and Hungary) at Bratislava, and was necessi-
tated by domestically inspired "counterrevolutionary"
activities in Czechoslovakia.
Hanoi's prompt reaction is in marked contrast to
its propaganda treatment of Soviet-Czech differences
before they reached the point of military interven-
tion. Although North Vietnamese authorities have mani-
fested an extreme interest in keeping abreast of de-
velopments, there has been little significant public
commentary and no previous gesture of support to
either side.
The war in Vietnam dictates Hanoi's attitude on
any issue, including those involving relations be-
tween Communist countries. The North Vietnamese look
askance at any development which tends to erode Commu-
nist unity and which may deflect Communist attention
from support of their war effort. Any sympathy the
North Vietnamese may have for Czech aspirations for
independence has been muffled by concern that trouble
in East Europe might lessen Soviet interest and ability
to back up the Communist effort in Vietnam.
New Polish ICC Member Comments on ?Hanoi: The new
Polish member of the International Control Commission,
Ambassador Dobrowlski, paid his courtesy call on Ambas-
sador Bunker on 21 August. He said he had been in
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Vietnam about a month and had visited Hanoi. He said
the prime minister had impressed him as a "very intel-
ligent and able man" and the North Vietnamese leaders
as "practical, just like the.Poles."
Dobrowlski found in Hanoi a "genuine desire" for
peace, but an absolute unwillingness to engage in any
discussions in Paris until all bombing stopped. He
said the North Vietnamese had stopped the shelling of
Saigon and he was puzzled as to why we had failed to
recognize this as a sign. The Pole added that Hanoi
had had "two successes this year," but even so, was
seeking a political settlement in order to end the war.
* * *
Heavy Weather in North Vietnam: Heavy rains and
storms since mid-August have combined to cause floods
in scattered areas of North Vietnam. Seasonally heavy
rains--up to seven inches in three days--were reported
falling in several districts of Son La Province and
along the Song Ma River in neighboring Thanh Hoa Prov-
ince. Moreover, tropical storms off the Coast of
southern North Vietnam in mid-August have moved inland
bringing heavy rains and flood conditions to that area.
Pilot reports during the past week have indi-
cated muddy roads and flooding throughout southern
North Vietnam. The number of truck sightings was also
greatly reduced, probably because of the poor weather.
The effects of the weather on logistic activities, how-
ever, should be only temporary.
,It is still too early to determine the impact of
the past weeks of heavy rains on the important tenth-
month rice crops, which may be as much as a month be-
hind schedule because of delays in the harvesting of
the spring rice crop caused by cold weather. The
tenth-month crop is about two-thirds of the average
4.5-million-ton yearly harvest, and is usually har-
vested about mid-November.
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II. NORTH VIETNAMESE REFLECTIONS OF US POLITICAL ?
ATTITUDES ON. THE WAR ?
There is nothing of significance to report today.
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Top Secret
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