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The President's Daily Brief
26 August 1968
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THE PRESIDENT'S
'DAILY BRIEF
26.AUGUST 1968
1. Czechoslovakia -
Soviet Union
There is little hard information
on the talks in Moscow, which have en-
tered their fourth day and continue to
be described by the Soviets as "frank
and comradely." The reported arrival
in .Moscow of Ulbricht, Gomulka, Kadar,
and Zilivkov suggests that an agreement
is neatly ready for them to endorse.
Unconfirmed press reports claim
that the major elements of an agree-
ment have been worked out and include
the release of all Czechoslovaks under
arrest, an enforced limit on the free-
dom of the press and radio, and the
maintenance of some Warsaw Pact forces
in Czechoslovakia for an indefinite
period.
The situation in Prague and
throughout the country remains tense,
with the populace becoming gloomier
and the occupiers growing edgier. So-
viet troops--some new ones were brought
in Saturday night--are dealing more
roughly with the populace, and there
were several incidents of violence yes-
terday.
Nonetheless, the people of Prague
continue to show their nonacceptance
of the occupation in unmistakable and
sometimes ingenious ways. On Friday
night in the main business district
there was suddenly a new neon sign read-
ing simply, "Dubcek." Another sign--
honored only in the breach--appeals for
a ban on miniskirts during the occupa-
tion, obviously to deprive the Soviet
troops of one of the glories of Prague.
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t.))(1
2. Yugoslavia-
Rumania
3. South Vietnam
Relations between Eastern Europe's
independent-minded and orthodox Commu-
nist regimes have been severely damaged
by the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Tito
told Ambassador Elbrick on 23 August
that Yugoslav-Soviet relations from now
on would be devoid of the trust and con-
fidence that had been slowly building
up.
Rumanian leader Ceausescu has for
the first time been attacked by name
by the Soviet and Hungarian press.
Mostly low-level Soviet bloc types
showed up for Rumanian National Day cele-
brations at various diplomatic posts
last Friday.
Tito and Ceausescu met Saturday at
a Yugoslav border town, presumably to
coordinate contingency plans concerning
the Czech crisis. They will probably
not risk provoking the Soviets by over-
dramatizing their position. Rumanian
Premier Maurer does not see any "imme-
diate" danger of Soviet armed interven-
tion. There is, in fact, still no hard
evidence that the Soviets intend to
carry their intervention in Eastern Eu-
rope beyond Czechoslovakia.
The Communists appear to be in the
initial phase of their long-expected
"third general offensive." Over the
weekend, there were widespread ground
assaults and shellings throughout much
of South Vietnam. The tactical empha-
sis continued to be on secondary allied
targets, suggesting that the main event
is yet to come--an all-out thrust against
Saigon, Ban Me Thuot, Da Nang, the Tam
Ky-Chu Lai area, and Hue.
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4. Soviet Union
5. France
6. Australia
An SS-9 ICBM launched from Tyura-
tam last Friday may have had four sep-
arate re-entry vehicles.
We expect to have more data on
this event in a few days.
The French detonated their first
thermonuclear device on 24 August at
the Pacific test site and probably are
now capable of developing thermonuclear
warheads for their ballistic missile
systems. The device had a yield of
about 2.3 megatons.
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may be planned for mid-to-late Septem-
ber. The tests are extremely expen-
sive, however, and another may not be
necessary in view of the success the
French have already had.
This test series, begun on 7 July,
has included the explosion of three nu-
clear devices ranging in yield from 150
to 530 kilotons. These were probably
the prototype submarine-launched ballis-
tic missile warhead.
In the Cabinet's forthcoming re-
view of Australian defense policy, De-
fense Minister Fairhall will come down
hard against Gorton's "fortress Austra-
lia" concept. Fairhall wants to keep at
least air and naval units in the Malay-
sian and Singapore areas as long as there
is trouble on the Asian mainland. Em-
bassy Canberra believes that the Cabinet
still works largely by consensus, and
that Gorton's defense views may yet be
brought closer to US interests.
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Top Secret
FOR THE PRESII3ENT'S EYES ONLY
1.) Special Daily RePort on North Vietnam
2.) North Vietnamese Reflections of U S
Political Attitudes
Top Secret
16
26 August 1968
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Special Daily Report on North Vietnam
for the President's Eyes Only
26 August 1968
I. NOTES ON THE SITUATION
French Diplomat in Mongolia Talks to North Viet-
namese: The French ambassador to Mongolia, Georges
Perruche, talked with a US official in Paris on 23
August. He said he had recently asked the North
Vietnamese ambassador in Ulan Bator and his deputy
chief of mission flatly if the North Vietnamese were
serious in their negotiations in Paris and wanted
the talks to make progress. He was assured that
they did. He claims that he then defended the reason-
ableness of the US position and urged the Vietnamese
to meet the obviously reasonable requirement for reci-
procity.
about the possibility of a dangerous flood.
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* * *
* * *
II. NORTH VIETNAMESE REFLECTIONS OF US POLITICAL
ATTITUDES ON THE WAR
There is nothing of significance to report today.
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Top Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2015/07/24 : CIA-RDP79T00936A006300330001-1