PERU: SHINING PATH-SLOWLY REGROUPING

• Document Type: FOIA
• Keywords: SHINING PATH PERU
• Collection: FOIA Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 0005537273
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: June 24, 2015
• Document Release Date: August 6, 2010
• Case Number: F-2010-01232
• Publication Date: February 6, 2003

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FOR RELEASED
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Peru: Shinin
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DATE: 08-03-2010
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Slowly Regrouping
Key Points
Peru's Shining Path, Sendero Luminoso (SL), is attempting to regroup and
strengthen its meager forces, in part with funds from the drug trade. The group does
not have broad popular support and remains in its traditional rural operating areas and
in a few major cities.
? SL does not appear to have a unified strategy. A majority faction focuses on non-
violent political propaganda operations, and a small minority of hard-core members
pursues a violent path. SL regional leaders appear to adopt strategies that best fit
their operating region and personal desires.
A bombing in Lima on the eve of President Bush's visit in March 2002-
widely attributed to SL-has stimulated greater government attention to SL. President
Toledo has publicly expressed concern, and his administration is drafting an anti-
terrorist decree that presages a stronger government effort.
? The government response nevertheless will continue to be hindered by low fund-
ing, low morale in the security forces, and poor intelligence capabilities. Rooting
out abuses of the Fujimori regime is discouraging bold action against SL.
SL is not likely to expand its capabilities significantly over the next two years
and appears unlikely to pose a serious threat to the stability of the Toledo government
in urban areas. Left unchecked, however, it will gradually undermine Peruvian gov-
ernment presence in the countryside. It will continue to carry out sporadic political and
violent activities.
? The group's activities represent a potential physical threat to US personnel in Peru,
especially those working on counter-narcotics and alternative development pro-
grams in the areas east of the Andes and US Embassy personnel.
(U) This memorandum was prepared under the auspices of the National
Intelligence Officer for Latin America and coordinated with CIA, INR,
DIA, NSA, NIMA and the Southern Command. It is based in part on a
N1C-sponsored workshop on the topic.
ICB 2003-05
6 February 2003
(1)
(3)
 SECRE1
Making a Modest Comeback
Shining Path (SL) today is a shadow of
the terrorist organization that menaced Peru in
the mid- I990s but slowly is making a come-
back. The US Embassy in Lima reports that SL
over the past several years has increased its
level of activity. We have little reliable report-
ing on SL's precise size and organization, but
available evidence indicates that it has 400-500
combatants scattered throughout the country.
SL continues to be based principally in rural
areas east of the Andes, although it appears ac-
tive in the slum areas that surround Lima and
such other large cities as Huanuco. The gov-
ernment estimates that SL has three or four ter-
rorist cells in Lima, a figure that we are unable
to corroborate.
? The US Embassy reports that SL carried out
155 acts involving violence or threats of
violence in 2002, compared to 117 in 2001.
SL groups operating in the departments of
Junin and Ayacucho committed 128 of
those acts. About two-thirds involved in-
cursions into villages, and the rest included
roadblocks, attacks on military
bases/personnel, bombings, assassinations,
and forcible entries or thefts from personal
homes or businesses.
SL does not appear to be successful in
recruiting large numbers of new members. The
larger size of the cadre and increased level of
activity probably are the result of re-
incorporating past SL members who either have
been released from prison or were lying low.
? Various reporting indicates that SL has little
popular support in Peru and is despised by
many peasants, who remember past abuses
they suffered at the hands of SL operatives.
? SL has attempted to recruit students from
Lima's National University but on at least
one occasion was rebuffed,
A Confused Strategy
Most SL actions are ad hoc and unco-
or mated, with limited damage resulting. It
does not appear to have an overall, unified
strategy. We believe that individual SL re-
gional leaders largely are adopting their own
strategy and tactics in their respective areas of
operation with minimal coordination among
themselves.
? Peruvian officials claim that incarcerated
SL founder Abimael Guzman is using law-
yers, friends, and family to smuggle docu-
ments directing SL activity from his jail
cell. We are unable to confirm the sub-
stance of such communications.
Nongovernmental experts assess that
most SL commanders are trying to establish the
organization as a political movement with the
eventual goal of becoming a legitimate player
in the political system. We cannot confirm this,
but we note SL political themes strongly seek to
improve the group's image.
? Most SL actions have been non-violent in
nature and focused on political propaganda
operations, although operatives generally
are armed even when proselytizing. Avoid-
ing the heavy-handed tactics and pedantic
ideological messages of the past, SL cadre
freely admit their past errors of excessive
reliance on violence. In addressing gather-
ings of local peasants, they claim to be a
"new" SL committed to fighting on behalf
of the poor. A common theme is protecting
the poor from the corruption and greed of
the government, especially from human
rights abuses committed by the police and
military. SL generally pays for provisions
rather than stealing them as it did in the
past.
A smaller, more militant wing of the
SL, however, appears to want to return to the
past, using acts of violence and intimation to
achieve its goals. Sporadic reports indicate that
SL columns enter rural hamlets and harass, rob,
and kill residents. We assess that SL has a
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 Sendero's Role, in :Drug Trade
Shining Patti appears to depend on finances gained from its linuted role in the local drug
d
e, S collects "taxes" from coca growers.and drug processors
tra
? SL members reportedl sell protection to drug producers in exchange for cash and weapons In
US Embassy and other-reporting-indicates that a few SL units east of
addition
,
the Andes facilitate processing of coca derivatives and help move the product downriver, where it
is sold to other trafficking groups.
? Press sources say that that SL members have beenlivingin base camps with traffickers in the
Ene Valley.
? SL has infiltrated associations of militant coca farmers in'traditional coca-growing regions ofthe
Upper Huallaga Valley to organize`resistance to, government coca eradication and alternative de-
velopment programs, according to US Embassy por g
The SL in Peiu's Southern coca grawmg aream the Ene and Apurimac nveir valley, s has re-
for edr had some contact witl- individual members of the FARO Aver tune, such contacts could
enable the SL to learn from FAR,nd adopt,some ofthe FARC's more
successful business practices.
The SL role in the thug trade will continue to increase slowly iin fhe ne t oup a yearsT
The.small size of the guerrilla movement, its light armament, ar-tl shallow leadership.pQo, proba-'
bly Will forestall a near-term surge in involvement. Ner!ertheles, SL influence. in drug crop-
growing areas could strengthen appreciably over the longer term.
limited operational capability in Lima and other
cities and is able to carry out isolated acts of
violence. The more militant SL leaders appear
to be located in Junin and Ayacucho Depart-
ments, where local government officials have
been harassed and even assassinated.
? Nongovernmental experts believe the gov-
ernment's continued focus on investigating
the past abuses of the Fujimori government
and its emphasis on increased transparency
in government has unduly distracted the at-
tention of senior security officials.
? Most observers attribute a car bombing near
the US Embassy in Lima on the eve of
President Bush's state visit in March 2002
to SL, although intelligence information is
inconclusive.
Government Response Weak
President Toledo has begun to show
increased concern regarding a possible resur-
gence of SL activity. Faced with a number of
competing priorities, the government has failed
to develop a coherent strategy to confront the
SL.
The Peruvian Constitutional Tribunal
hates urthier stymied the Toledo government,
ordering new trials for hundreds of incarcerated
terrorists who it judged did not receive due
process. The Embassy reports that government
prosecutors are concerned that relying on evi-
dence over ten years old in new trials closely
monitored by the international community will
result in the release of many mid-level, hard-
core SL members who are likely to rejoin their
comrades.
 ? To counter the ruling, the government is
drafting a new anti-terrorist decree. It will
give the government new legal tools to con-
duct the new trials while bringing the coun-
try's anti-terrorism laws up to international
standards.
Demoralized Security Forces. Budget
cuts implemented early on by the Toledo gov-
ernment have severely damaged the capabilities
of Peru's security forces. The Peruvian Na-
tional Police (PNP) has the lead on counterin-
surgency operations, and the military has been
relegated to playing a supporting role. The
Embassy reports that the PNP are demoralized,
under-funded, and corrupt. On the few occa-
sions when the police carried out aggressive
operations against the SL, the operations re-
sulted from US pressure and funding.
? Nongovernmental experts say that the
PNP's budget has been reduced to such a
level that many police officers work second
jobs to augment their meager salaries. They
also lack equipment and training.
? The police reportedly are reluctant to adopt
an aggressive posture against SL, fearing
that they later will be accused of repressive
actions against the peasants.
? A decline in police intelligence operations
has been particularly harmful. The lack of
credible information on SL activities keeps
the government largely in the dark about
SL strength, leadership, capabilities, and
level of activity.
The one bright spot has been the gov-
ernment's increased support to the PNP's
counter-terrorist unit, the Directorate of Coun-
terterrorism (DIRCOTE). While a far cry from
its former self, DIRCOTE probably has the
best intelligence unit and carries. out the most
effective counter-terrorist operations in Peru.
The Peruvian military appears to be
worse off than the police. Budget cuts, person-
nel reductions, and fear of being accused of
human rights abuses largely have removed the
military from engaging SL. In the wake of in-
vestigations into wrongdoing during the Fuji-
mori era, the military intelligence apparatus has
been severely curtailed and remains largely in-
effective.
? Government efforts to enhance military ca-
pabilities have been modest. The Embassy
reports that Peruvian defense and security
spending increased 3.2 percent in 2003, but
that figure still accounts for only 2.1 per-
cent of GDP-a lower proportion than
many other countries in the region.
? the
Peruvian Army troop strength is at ap-
proximately 30 percent and that helicopter
lift and transport operational rates are ex-
tremely low and rapidly declining.
? SL columns that often travel with civilian
non-combatants concern the Army because
if a soldier accidentally kills a civilian
amidst a confrontation the incident may
give rise to human rights inquiries
? These weaknesses essentially cede regions
east of the Andes to SL. The PNP main-
tains a presence in rural Peru, but the small
size of the police stations and their poor lo-
gistical support make them vulnerable to SL
attacks and incapable of maintaining secu-
rity.
Nongovernmental observers believe
that the continued strength and vitality of local
civic action groups in the rural towns and vil-
lages of Peru remain one of the government's
more successful tools against the SL. The ron-
dos campesinas, created during the Fujimori
government, interface with other civic organi-
zations, work on community projects, and
maintain contact with Peruvian security forces.
Outlook
We expect SL will not expand its ca-
pabilities or operating areas significantly during
_SE
 the next year or two. Sporadic acts of violence
almost certainly will continue and possibly in-
crease, with the organization taking advantage
of key events such as anniversary dates and
high-level foreign visits to carry out symbolic
attacks. Most SL activities are likely to con-
tinue to focus on non-violent, political propa-
ganda operations.
? SL appears likely to continue expanding
incrementally its role in the drug trade to
fund its operations. Deep involvement
along the lines of the FARC in Colombia
will not be possible for several years, how-
ever, even if SL pursues it vigorously.
President Toledo probably will take
the SL threat more seriously over time and ap-
pears prepared to adopt a more forceful posture
if SL escalates terrorist attacks rapidly.
? Budgetary constraints preclude a rapid
injection of resources into the PNP and the
military, but the reluctance of the security
forces to adopt an aggressive posture
probably will erode as national attention
shifts away from abuses during the Fuji-
mori government.
Alternative Scenario
In a, less likely, scenario, the SL would
a more serious threat tolithe government if.
The government failed to implement the
anti-terrorism measure.
The work of Truth Commissions dragged
on, further eroding morale in:the security
A serious economic downturnforced the'
government to cut back security an`d`social
budgets further.
Organized protests against coca eradication
grew, providing SL additional opportunities
to recruit'and organize.
? The government's new anti-terrorism
measure should provide considerable relief
from the Constitutional Tribunal rulings
and ease the ability of the government to
keep dangerous SL militants behind bars.
Jmplications for the United States
SL activities most directly affect US
counter-narcotics personnel and programs.
? US personnel in rural Peru on counter-
narcotics missions, especially east of the
Andes, face particular risks, although we
have no evidence that SL is specifically tar-
geting them. Armed SL members will seek
to thwart eradication of drug crops and in-
terdiction of drug shipments. US antidrug
personnel in the field could become subject
to harassment, kidnapping, or even assassi-
nation by SL members or affiliated armed
militants.
? SL activity also threatens to disrupt US sup-
port to Toledo's alternative development
projects. We expect SL to try to organize
coca farmers to oppose programs that en-
courage switching from illicit coca to legal
crops. The cocaleros could provide the SL
an expanded base for recruitment.
The March 2002 bombing in Lima un-
s the ability of SL or other violent
groups to threaten the US Embassy and person-
nel with direct attacks.
? The bombers have not struck again, sug-
gesting that that the organization's ability to
operate in the capital is limited.
Regardless of the actual threat to the
Peruvian government, we expect Toledo to seek
more US assistance to combat the SL. He is
aware of US interest in both counternarcotics
and counterterrorism and almost certainly will
emphasize his partnership with Washington in
both efforts.
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