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WASHINGTON TIMES
30 September 1985
Defection
reopening
search for
CIA `mole'
By Bill Gertz
Reports that a former CIA operative has fled
to avoid arrest as a Soviet spy have rekindled a
long-standing dispute over CIA counterintelli-
gence policy that began nearly 20 years ago dur-
ing a search for a Soviet "mole" within the
agency, intelligence experts say.
"The only question is whether the occasion is
for the good of counterintelligence or for the
NEWS ANALYSLS
detriment of it," intelligence analyst Angelo
Codevilla said of reports that a top Soviet official
had defected.
It might still be too soon to determine the
credibility of the defector, he said. Mr. Codevilla
suggested the defection might be an attempt to
confound the CIA and to distract attention from
the loss of a key Soviet KGB officer in Great
Britain.
STAT
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In any case, he said the defector
would still provide valuable infor-
mation on Soviet activities to try to
establish his credibility with the CIA
and FBI.
Officials in Washington have
placed a tight veil of secrecy over
the Aug. 1 defection in Rome of
Vitaly S. Yurchenko, the KGB's No.
5 man, believed to be in charge of the
Line KR counterintelligence section
and the bureau that handles pen-
etration of Western intelligence ser-
vices.
Mr. Yurchenko's defection
reportedly caused the recent depar-
ture of "several" middle-level CIA
operations officers, according to
U.S. government sources.
Congressional sources said one of
the CIA defectors was in a position
to cause serious damage to U.S.
national security and recently left
the United States, the Associated
Press reported Saturday.
Three former CIA employees are
suspected of spying for the Soviets,
but Mr. Yurchenko's ongoing interro-
gation was expected to lead to fur-
ther revelations of KG.B
penetrations, CIA sources said.
Since he defected, Mr. Yurchenko
has been under interrogation by CIA
and FBI counterintelligence offi-
cials at an undisclosed location.
Experts say that if the debriefing
began in August, other suspected
Soviet agents will be revealed in the
coming months and a "damage
will take place.
Sen. Malcom Wallop, D-Wyo., a
former Senate Intelligence Commit-
tee member and an outspoken advo-
cate of tougher CIA
counterintelligence measures, said
he believed Soviet penetrations of
the CIA were not limited to former
agency employees.
"I'm very suspect of the fact that
its only former CIA employees;' Sen.
Wallop said in an interview.
Mr. Wallop said he had no direct
knowledge of the Yurchenko case
but stated "the only thing I have
direct knowledge of is that we still
don't have internal counterintelli-
gence capabilities."
Mr. Wallop criticized former CIA
director Stansfield Turner who
assured the senator in the past it was
"impossible there was a Soviet
mole" in the CIA, he said.
"You have to view that with
extreme skepticism," Mr. Wallop
said.
Adm. Turner could not be reached
for comment.
Since Western intelligence agen-
cies have succeeded in penetrating
the KGB and GRU intelligence ser-
vices in the past, "it's inconceivable
that after all those years of confron-
tation between East and West ... that
only penetrated us with past people, ing to published accounts.
Mr. Wallop said. After Mr. Angleton left the
Justice Department and CIA offi- agency in 1974, the CIA's counter-
cials on Friday denied news reports
that Mr. Yurchenko had identified
"several" CIA employees as Soviet
agents.
The denial provided the first offi-
cial confirmation that Mr. Yur-
chenko was in American hands.
The fact that former CIA officials
are suspected of operating as Soviet
spies or have defected supports the
long-held suspicions of many former
CIA counterintelligence officials
who believe the CIA has been pen-
etrated by an deep cover agent, or
"mole;' working for Moscow.
Soviet defector Anatoliy Golitsyn,
the only KGB defector to have
attended the Soviets' higher intelli-
gence academy, told CIA counterin-
telligence officials when he defected
in 1961 that the Soviets controlled a
mole in the senior levels of the CIA,
according to published accounts.
Mr. Golitsyn provided leads that
uncovered Soviet agents in the
French, Swedish and British govern-
ments, including the notorious
Soviet spy Harold "Kim"Philby, who
operated as double agent in the Brit-
ish intelligence service MI6.
The search for a mole in the CIA
proved fruitless.
But Mr. Golitsyn, who holds unor-
thodox views on Soviet policy, was
challenged by another defector, Yuri
Nosenko, whom many intelligence
officials believed to be a provocateur
sent by Moscow to distract U.S. offi-
cials from finding a Soviet mole in
the CIA.
"Here was a fella who came over
fin 19641 and flunks every one of his
polygraph tests... and nevertheless
is believed because it would be
inconvenient not to believe him;' Mr.
Codevilla said of Mr. Nosenko.
A recent CIA report on Soviet
deception described Mr. Nosenko
and another Soviet agent code-
named Fedora as "good" defectors
contrary to FBI evidence that .dir.
Codevilla said proved the two Sovi-
ets were loyal to Moscow while pre-
tending to supply secrets to the
United States.
Mr. Nosenko was later hired as an
agency counterintelligence lecturer
by Adm. Turner in a drastic reversal
of the CIAs policy of doubt toward
the defector, according to published
accounts.
Mr. Wallop said a discovery that
former CIA operatives worked for
the KGB could vindicate former CIA
counterintelligence chief James
Angleton.
Mr. Angleton and his counterintel-
ligence section led the investigation
of possible Soviet penetration of the
CIA during the early 1960s based on
information supplied by Mr.
Golitsyn and other defectors.
The mole hunt led to internal
political disputes between the CIAs
counterintelligence section and its
intelligence section was gutted
through transfers and forced retire-
ments, and a Soviet division official
took over the post of counterintel-
ligence chief.
Adm. Turner, in memoirs released
earlier this year, criticized Mr.
Angleton's counterintelligence sec-
tion for disrupting the agency dur-
ing the search for Soviet
penetrations of the CIA.
The CIA's present deputy director,
John McMahon, was appointed by
Adm. Turner to a senior operational
post and has been known to oppose
past counterintelligence policies as
well as policies formulated by the
present CIA director, William Casey.
Mr. McMahon lobbied on Capitol
Hill against covert assistance to the
Nicaraguan resistance, intelligence
sources said.
Mr. Yurchenko defected while
investigating the disappearance of a
Soviet scientist who had vanished
earlier this summer, intelligence
sources said.
Before defecting, Mr. Yurchenko
was the fifth ranking KGB official
and has also been identified as a
senior Communist Party official
responsible for overseeing the KGB,
a Soviet Foreign Ministry official,
and the KGB's chief of operations in
the United States between 1975 and
1980.
As the official in charge of the
KGB's American operations, 'Mr.
Yurchenko would have directed the
estimated 4,000 Soviet bloc intelli-
gence officials. A network of
American agents working under for
the Soviets could number in the
thousands, experts say.
The only recent CIA operatives
linked to the Soviet Union are David
Barnet and Philip Agee. A former
CIA operative in Asia, Barnet was
caught spying for the Soviets, and
former CIA officer Agee has
acknowledged publicly that he coop-
erated with the Cuban authorities
that are closely tied to the Soviet
Union in writing exposes of CIA
operations and agents.
Soviet Embassy press spokesman
Boris Malakhov would not comment
on reports of Mr. Yurchenko's defec-
tion.
But Soviet Foreign Ministry press
spokesman Vladimir Lomeiko,
asked if the Yurchenko defection
would affect the arms talks in
Geneva, told reporters Friday ',it
would be inappropriate to link these
two things."
Asked if Mr. Lomeiko meant to
confirm Mr. Yurchenko's defection,
Mr. Malakhov would not elaborate
on Mr. Lomeiko's remark. He would
not say whether the Soviet Embassy
in Washington had inquired about
Mr. Yurchenko with the State
Department.
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