GUIDE TO THE ANALYSIS OF INSURGENCY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T01127R000300220005-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 20, 2011
• Sequence Number: 5
• Content Type: REPORT

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Scope Note
Insurgency Defined
Common Insurgent Objectives
Stages of an Insurgency
Types of Insurgency
Incipient Insurgency
Determinants of Control in Insurgency
Late-Stage Indicators of Successful Insurgencies
Effective Counterinsurgency
Analyzing an Insurgency: A Net Assessment
Contents
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Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency
This pamphlet contains key definitions and analytic guides applicable to any
insurgency. Analysts with knowledge of the political, military, and socioeco-
nomic characteristics of a specific insurgency will find these definitions and
frameworks helpful in evaluating the major components of the conflict. Among
other things, this guide is designed to assist in conducting a net assessment of
the overall status or progress of a specific conflict.
Scope Note
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Insurgency Defined
Common Insurgent
Objectives
Insurgency is a protracted political-military activity directed toward completely
or partially controlling the resources of a country through the use of irregular
military forces and illegal political organizations. Insurgent activity-including
guerrilla warfare, terrorism, and political mobilization, for example, propagan-
da, recruitment, front and covert party organization, and international activi-
ty-is designed to weaken government control and legitimacy while increasing
insurgent control and legitimacy. The common denominator of most insurgent
groups is their desire to control a particular area. This objective differentiates
insurgent groups from purely terrorist organizations, whose objectives do not
include the creation of an alternative government capable of controlling a given
area or country.
Most insurgent groups have the same intermediate objectives designed to help
them achieve eventual domination of a country. Although both military and
political means are used to achieve these intermediate objectives, the objectives
themselves are essentially political:
? Limit the ability of the government and enhance the capability of the
insurgents to provide public services.
? Obtain the support or neutrality of critical segments of the population.
? Isolate the government from international diplomatic and material support
and increase international support for the insurgents.
? Increase domestic and international legitimacy of the insurgent organization
at the expense of the government.
? Destroy the self-confidence of government leaders and cadres, causing their
abdication or withdrawal.
? Reduce and, if possible, neutralize government coercive power while
strengthening insurgent coercive capabilities.
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Successful insurgencies usually pass through certain common stages of develop-
ment. Not all insurgencies, however, experience every stage; the sequence may
not be the same in all cases; and the evolution of any stage may extend over a
long period of time. An insurgency may take decades to start, mature, and
finally succeed. The stages of an insurgency are:
Preinsurgency Leadership emerges in response to domes- Minimal.
tic grievances or outside influences.
Organizational Infrastructure built, guerrillas recruited Counterinsurgency organization
and trained, supplies acquired, and domes- created.
tic and international support sought.
Guerrilla warfare Hit-and-run tactics used to attack govern- Low-level military action initiated. Po-
ment. Extensive insurgent political litical, social, and economic reforms:
activity-both domestic and inter- civic action programs; psychological
national may also occur simultaneously operations; and amnesty programs may
during this stage. also be initiated to counteract the in-
surgents' political activities.
Mobile conven- Larger units used in conventional warfare Conventional military operations
tional warfare mode. Many insurgencies never reach this implemented.
stage.
Stages of an Insurgency
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Types of Insurgency
Insurgencies generally fall into one of four broad categories-politically orga-
nized, militarily organized, traditionally organized, or urban-although some
insurgencies have characteristics of more than one type. The defining quality of
each category is the group's organizational strategy. Differences in organization-
al approach, in turn, produce differences in the military and political strategies
employed by the insurgents at the international, national, provincial, and village
levels of the conflict.
Organizational strategy is determined primarily by the group's operational
environment and by the training of its leaders. The operational environment
includes the sociocultural makeup of the target population; the economic,
political, and geographic characteristics of the area of operations; the insurgents'
initial strength; the role of outside parties; and government capabilities. These
factors frequently override training and ideology as a determinant of strategy in
successful insurgencies; guerrillas who cannot adjust their strategy to suit local
conditions rarely survive.
Many politically, militarily, and traditionally organized insurgencies have urban
components despite their rural concentration. Insurgent cadres often have
strong ties to the cities, and many opposition leaders have attempted city-based
revolts before adopting rural-based strategies. An urban component aids a rural-
based insurgency by tying up government forces and providing financial,
intelligence, and logistic services. Additionally, insurgent "armed propaganda"
in urban areas usually receives better media coverage than that perpetrated in
the countryside.
Insurgencies of several types may occur simultaneously within the same
country. However, differences in organizational strategy, as well as differences
in ideology, motivation, leadership, and cadre background, make unification of
insurgencies of different types difficult.
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Politically organized insurgency
Extensive, complex political struc-
ture developed before military opera-
tions are initiated.
Militarily organized insurgency
Small, decentralized structure of
armed insurgents serving as a cata-
lyst for mobilizing opposition against
existing regime.
Shadow government created to un- Vulnerable to concentrated effort Protracted warfare; tendency toward ex-
dermine authority of existing regime; aimed at neutralizing the infrastruc- cessive revolutionary zeal.
political consolidation precedes mili- ture and establishing administrative
tary consolidation of contested areas. control in contested areas.
Insurgent groups hope to form focus Vulnerable to aggressive military ac- Hope to demoralize regime and attain
for disaffected population; destruc- tion during early stages of rebellion power without extensive conventional
tion of regime legitimacy by military because of undeveloped political warfare.
action; military consolidation pre- structure, relatively vulnerable logis-
cedes political consolidation of con- tics and communications networks,
tested areas. and lack of clandestine networks
among local populations.
Traditionally organized insurgency
Existing tribal or religious organiza- No unique strategy common to all; Limited capacity for absorbing eco- Recruitment on basis of ethnic
tional structure. will adopt strategy of one of the other nomic and military punishment; exclusivity.
types. leadership conflicts are common;
leaders often lack sufficient motiva-
tion, experience as insurgents, and
political discipline.
Urban insurgency
Cellular structure in urban environ- Threaten regime legitimacy through Restricted to small area and must Often in support of wider insurgency
ment. urban disruption. hide within population; attrition re- waged in rural area.
sulting from military/police pressure
and the psychological stress of clan-
destinity.
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Incipient Insurgency
The concept incipient insurgency-which encompasses the preinsurgency and
organizational stages of an insurgent conflict-refers to situations ranging from
those in which subversive activity by an inchoate insurgent group is but a
potential threat to those in which antigovernment incidents occur frequently
and display organization and forethought. Yet not all incipient insurgencies
pose a serious challenge to a government. Determining which evolving insurgen-
cies constitute a serious threat involves evaluating a range of signs associated
with the development of an insurgency.
A revolutionary group seeking to mount an insurgency must, at a minimum,
build an organization, recruit and train people, acquire supplies, and broadcast
beliefs and goals. It may also choose to incite riots or work stoppages, infiltrate
the legitimate political apparatus, and engage in terrorism-the more numerous
the signs that a group is engaging in these activities, and the greater the
magnitude of each sign, the more serious the threat.
The most alarming signs-those that almost certainly would signal the begin-
nings of a serious insurgent threat-involve substantial foreign assistance, either
from governments or experienced insurgents; extensive guerrilla training; the
acquisition of large quantities of guerrilla resources; and the creation of an
organization (with both a political and military arm) capable of substantially
increasing its membership. The signs associated with the development of an
insurgency fall within the following six categories:
Organization and recruitment:
? Sudden departure of large numbers of young or skilled people for some form
of training or indoctrination.
? Defection of a noticeable number of members, especially leaders, from one
political party or organization to a more radical party.
? Measurable increase in ideological proselytizing in rural areas.
? Increase of "visitors" from proinsurgency countries or the return of exiles.
? Reports of "cells" in urban areas.
? Press "leaks" on guerrilla plans or programs to change the country.
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Note: Well-developed and successful insurgent groups will be organized and
divided along functional lines. Their ideology will be well developed, and their
goals will be well defined, obtainable, and will reflect long-range planning.
Training:
? Reports of people training with arms or the identification of nongovernment
military training sites.
? Reports of people receiving training outside the country or of travelers to
countries sympathetic to insurgents.
Acquiring resources:
? Discovery of arms and materiel caches, collections of police uniforms or
military clothing, stockpiles of explosives.
? Evidence of multiple thefts of weapons.
? Evidence that a group has access to or has stolen special or sophisticated
equipment-for example, multiple thefts of amateur band transceivers,
hand-held VHF/UHF radios, directional antennas, cassette recorders, calcu-
lators, typewriters, and printing presses.
? Evidence of robberies, kidnap ransoms, narcotics income, or protection
rackets linked to a radical group.
Outside support:
? Evidence of money, training, arms, and materiel provided by foreign
governments.
? Evidence of assistance or cooperation with foreign insurgent groups.
Popular support:
? Evidence that insurgents have connections with legitimate groups-political
parties, labor unions, the church.
? Growing media coverage of insurgent activities.
? Evidence that the number of sympathizers is growing-for example, people
who are not formal members but support demonstrations.
? Indications that the insurgents are increasingly sensitive to public attitudes
and reactions.
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Determinants of Control
in Insurgency
Actions/use of violence:
? Emergence of radical violence, including bombings and attacks against
government personnel and buildings, essential utilities, symbolic targets, or
foreign-owned properties.
? Reports of infiltration into the government, labor unions, political parties.
? Overzealous support of land reform, including non-government-sponsored
expropriation of land or the establishment of squatters' encampments.
? Sightings of armed people in rural areas.
? Reports of meetings at which discussions center on initiating violence.
? Discovery of the capability to produce counterfeit documents.
? Assassination of authority figures or religious leaders.
? Violence in foreign countries directed against the diplomatic community of
the country of concern.
? Production and circulation of large quantities of radical propaganda.
? Establishment of front organizations.
The ability to measure or assess who has control over an area and its
population-the insurgents or the government-is an important element in an
insurgency or counterinsurgency effort. Who has control is determined not
merely by who has more guns and firepower but primarily by who has more
sympathizers-informers, food suppliers, messengers, and taxpayers-and com-
mitted supporters-cadres, soldiers, tax collectors, and risk takers. Support of
the people is vital to the survival of the insurgents who depend on them for
food, shelter, recruits, and intelligence. The government's challenge is to regain
the allegiance of a population already alienated by government failures to
address basic grievances. Poor peasants and farmers are, however, seldom
motivated by abstractions or vague promises. Their willingness to provide
support hinges on concrete incentives-material benefits or demonstrable
threats.
Three factors-attitudes, organization, and security-are critical to establishing
control. One is best able to analyze the contest for control by answering several
questions related to each of these factors.
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Attitudes
Neither the government nor the insurgents can control an area without the
sympathetic support of part of the local population, including at least a small
core of individuals willing to undertake risks.
Favorable attitudes among the local populace:
? Is the rural population highly receptive to government/insurgent
propaganda?
? Are acts of government repression/guerrilla terrorism perceived locally as
indiscriminate or discriminate?
? Do government/guerrilla combat operations have exclusively military goals?
Or, do combat operations consider the psychological and political impact on
the local population?
? Are there government/insurgent policies that the peasants feel are particular-
ly unfair?
Ability to motivate individuals to take risks:
? Are local government officials/guerrilla leaders drawn mainly from the local
population, or are they outsiders?
? Are civilian militias/guerrilla bands composed mainly of local residents, or
are they outsiders?
? What percentage of households in a community have members in the local
civilian militia?
Organization
The organizational capabilities exhibited by each side at the local level are vital
to mobilizing and utilizing local resources, orchestrating propaganda activities,
and ensuring the effectiveness of local security forces.
Ability of organizations to mobilize and organize people locally:
? Do the villagers participate in government- or insurgent-sponsored civilian
activities? Is participation voluntary?
? Are local government/insurgent leaders dynamic personalities capable of
injecting vigor into their organizations?
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Ability of organizations to provide material benefits to supporters at the local
level:
? Does membership in government/insurgent organizations provide an oppor-
tunity for upward mobility or economic reward?
? Do government programs or guerrilla recruitment significantly improve
employment opportunities at the local level?
? Are government services perceived locally as adequate? Or, are there
generalized complaints condemning bureaucratic incompetence, redtape, or
corruption?
? Is the rural population supportive of government/insurgent programs de-
signed for its benefit (such as land reform, rent control, cooperatives, and
credit)?
Ability of organizations to exploit local resources:
? How successful are government officials/insurgents in collecting taxes and
receiving services and recruits from the local population?
? Do government officials/insurgent leaders implement national govern-
ment/insurgent directives inflexibly or do they adapt them to local
conditions?
Security
It is essential that each side be capable of protecting its local political apparatus,
cadres, and supporters from enemy forces and assassins. Failure to perform this
function is usually accompanied by a breakdown in morale and discipline, and
occasionally by a complete collapse of one's entire organization.
Ability to protect supporters and local population:
? Do government/guerrilla forces adequately protect local supporters on a 24-
hour basis?
? Do national army "reaction forces" respond quickly and effectively to reports
of guerrilla attacks on local civilian militias or progovernment communities?
? Do local government officials/insurgent cadres sleep in villages, or do they
seek protection of armed camps?
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? Are national army troops/guerrillas viewed locally as threatening outsiders or
as helpful allies?
? Is the local militia seen as a source of protection by the rural population or as
merely another distrusted police force?
Local military effectiveness:
? Are local civilian militias aggressive in small-unit, day and night patrolling, or
do they avoid contact with the enemy?
? Do government/guerrilla forces have an effective intelligence network at the
local level?
? How disciplined are government/insurgent forces in combat? Do they usually
recover the weapons and bodies of fallen comrades before retreating?
? Are local government/insurgent forces capable of executing coordinated
attacks against nearby enemy strongpoints?
An analysis of historical cases indicates that a common pattern of behavior and
events characterizes the defeat of a government battling an insurgency. This
pattern comprises four categories of developments:
? Progressive withdrawal of domestic support for the government.
? Progressive withdrawal of international support for the government.
? Progressive loss of government control over population and territory.
? Progressive loss of government coercive power.
These categories include a total of 14 interrelated and mutually reinforcing
indicators of prospective insurgent victory. Historically, the indicators have not
appeared in any single order. Moreover, while no single indicator can be
considered conclusive evidence of insurgent victory, all indicators need not be
present for a government defeat to be in progress. While the indicators are
designed to identify a progression of events typical of the final stages of a
successful insurgency, this progression is not inevitable. Effective government
countermeasures can block the evolution of an insurgency and shift its momen-
tum. Within the four categories, the indicators are:
Late-Stage Indicators of
Successful Insurgencies
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Effective
Counterinsurgency
Progressive withdrawal of domestic support for the
government:
? Withdrawal of support by specific, critical segments of the population.
? Growing popular perception of regime illegitimacy.
? Popular perception of insurgents as leading nationalists.
? Insurgent co-optation, incorporation, or elimination of other major opposi-
tion groups to the government.
Progressive withdrawal of international support for the
government:
? Withdrawal of foreign support by specific, critical allies.
? Increasing international support for the insurgents.
Progressive loss of government control over population
and territory:
? Significant expansion of territory under insurgent control.
? Escalation of guerrilla/terrorist violence.
? Increasing inability of government to protect supporters/officials from
attack.
? National economy increasingly weakened by insurgent activity.
Progressive loss of government coercive power:
? Military plots or coups against the government.
? Armed guerrilla forces multiplying in size.
? Lack of sufficient government troops for counterinsurgency.
? Government seriously negotiating sharing of power with rebels.
A country faces or soon may face an insurgency. Can its government wage a suc-
cessful counterinsurgency campaign? What variables should be evaluated? At
least 14 factors-seven military and seven nonmilitary-are critical to a
government's counterinsurgency effort. Virtually all of these factors influence
popular support for the government's cause. They also affect the government's
ability to employ the various combinations of persuasion and coercion that are
essential to successful counterinsurgency.
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Military factors:
? Leadership. The degree of professionalism that characterizes a country's
military force.
? Tactics and strategy. The ability of counterinsurgent forces to employ the
various unconventional strategies and tactics required for combating insur-
gents in the field-tactics that deemphasize the concentration of forces and
firepower and emphasize constant patrolling by many small, lightly armed
units supported by larger backup forces.
? Military intelligence. The ability of the military intelligence apparatus to
collect, analyze, and exploit quality intelligence on guerrilla personnel,
modus operandi, and locations, not just on insurgent order of battle.
? Troop behavior and discipline. The quality of the relationship between
soldiers deployed in the field and the surrounding population.
? Air and naval operations. The quality of air and naval support to the
government's ground counterinsurgency forces-for example, fire support,
reconnaissance, supply transport, medevac.
? Civil-military relations. The ability of civilian authorities to influence
military operations, especially with regard to proper consideration for
political objectives.
? Popular militia. A government's ability to establish and maintain a popular
militia to assist regular forces in maintaining security.
Nonmilitary factors:
? Police operations. The ability of the police to maintain law and order and im-
plement population- and resources-control programs.
? Civilian intelligence. The ability of the civilian and police intelligence
organizations to collect, coordinate, evaluate, and exploit intelligence on the
insurgents and their political/military activities.
? Psychological operations. The quality of a government's psychological war-
fare effort, its information and media activities, and its ability to promote its
cause domestically and internationally.
? Unified management of counterinsurgency. The government's ability to
establish an organizational infrastructure capable of coordinating a coherent
counterinsurgency campaign.
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Analyzing an Insurgency.
A Net Assessment
? Political framework. The overall political form and appeal of the government
and the validity of its claim that it is the legitimate expression of the people's
aspirations and of the country's traditions and ethos.
? Improvement of rural conditions and administration. The ability of the
government to implement the programs and reforms necessary to gain
popular acquiescence in and support for the government's efforts against the
insurgents.
? Legal reform. The ability of the government to implement and administer
special laws and regulations specifically designed to counter and suppress the
insurgency.
Analyzing the status or progress of an insurgency-that is, conducting a net
assessment-involves a careful evaluation of the major factors determining
which protagonist has the advantage and why. It requires a clear understanding
of the conflict's setting and origins, an appreciation of each side's strategy for
victory, and an assessment of each side's political and military capabilities and
performance in light of their strategy. The definitions and other analytic
frameworks contained in this guide help array the building-block knowledge
necessary to conduct an overall assessment. The diagram that follows depicts
the flow of this analytic process when applied to a specific insurgency.
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? Goals
? Approach (political or
military)
? Location (urban or rural)
* Timing
Insurgent Military Performance
and Capabilities
Setting
? Historical context ? Nature of appeal
? Geography ? Size and composition of audience
? Societal, economic, and ? Leadership
political processes ? Intelligence/counterintelligence
? Stability of society ? Recruitment
? Training
? Mobilization of domestic support
? Foreign aid
? Rural administration
? Protection /security
? Reforms
? Justice
? Corruption
? Indiscriminate use of violence
? Order of battle
? Technological sophistication
? Command and control
? Lines of communication
? Military leadership
? Combatant proficiency
? Tactical intelligence
? Ability to protect operational hasc
? Scope and timing of operations
Overall Assessment
? Population and territory
controlled by each side
? Political and military
performance and suitability,
given overall strategy
? Judgment concerning who
holds the initiative
? Assessment of trends in
domestic and international
support for each side
? Judgment concerning who
is in the best position
to sustain a drive toward
they overall goal
Counterinsurgent Overall Counterinsurgent Political
Strategy Performance and Capabilities
? Goals
? Timing
? Attrition-dominated strategy
? Consolidation-dominated
strategy
Counterinsurgent Military
Performance and Capabilities
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Notes
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Notes
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Notes
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Notes
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Notes
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Notes
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