ELECTRON TUBE RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCTION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00047R000400270004-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 1, 2009
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: April 5, 1954
• Content Type: REPORT

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THIN DOCUY[NT CONTAINS IMFOSYATION AFF[CTIN. TN1 NATIONAL OSPINSI
OF TN1 UNITID ITAT[I~ NITMIX TAO Y[ANINN DI TITL[ IS, 110TIOAI 7.~
LOTION OF ITS 00NTINTI TO 00 1101117 SY AN ONAOTNONIIIO POISON If
110NISITID IT LAN. TN[ 111N0000TION OF TNII F01Y If TSONIIITIO.
THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATIO 25X1
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Electron Tube Research, Development and Production
A. Vacuum Tubes (Background)
1. Foreign Influences
2. Vacuum Tub Activities in the USSR (General)
3. Svetlana C}, oup (Leningrad)
4. Institute 6O-Fryaz:ino (Moscow)
5. Political Ideology and Tube Research
B. Vacuum Tube Techniques, Production and Materials
1. General Assessment
2. Production
3. Materials and Techniques
!~. Research
General Tubes
1. Mass Bulb
2. Metal-ceramic
D. Special Tubes
1. Cathode Ray
2. Modulator
T-R
Subminiature
5. Image Converters
COUNTRY USSR
NO. OF PAGES
SUBJECT Electron Tube Research, Development
and Production
PLACE
ACQUIRED
NO. OF ENCLS. 1 (5 pages)
(LISTED BELOW)
DATE
ACQUIRED
DATE OF
CLASSIFICATION
Nav
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INFORMATION REPORT
DATE DISTR. S" f3/oQ 54
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E. Magnetrons
1. Basic Data
2. Magnetron #10 (German RM 4032)
3. Magnetron #8 (Early warning?)
4. 'Rising Sun'
5. Magnetrons in 40-150 MC Region
6. Techniques
Tables I and II (Magnetrons)
F. Klystrons
1. General,',Description of Klystrons
Table III (Klystron$ )
G: Transistors and Crystal Detectors
1. Transistors
2. Crystal Detectors
Appendix
#1
through #6
A. Vacuum Tubes* (Background)
1. Foreign Influences on Vacuum Tube Technology.
In'the immediate post-World War II period Soviet activities
in vacuum tube technology were influenced very strongly by
the German developments, methods, techniques and personnel.
the original Soviet idea might have been to
development.
testing and production tools. They had the German ,specialists
in the USSR survey and analyze their war-time and pest-war
research and development, and were willing to adopt; those
that fitted their plans and requirements. They used Germans
to design and build new devices, testing tools and equipment
and to establish several well-organized modern vacuum tube
institutes and plants. It was, however, the American
methodology that the Soviets were impressed by, and tried
to master. One of the important continuing jobs that the
German specialists were expected to perform for the So,.riets
was to elucidate the USA vacuum tube technology and itks
developments. It got to the point that the best way fcor? a
German to convince the Soviets of the merits of his
proposal was to claim that it was based upon an American
t e
guided flans and programs muc more stirongl;y by
the USA developments than by the German recommendations.
They continued to exploit fully the German technolic1gical
know-how their shop and production techniques and their
did not progress very far
experience and know-how. If such were the case.,, t,ne ?-iuear
pattern their vacuum tube build-up in accord with the German
Note: The term 'vacuum tubes' is commonly
used to include a wide variety of electronic
devices, as well as transistors which'replace
vacuum 'tuber . 'Electron tubes,' , a, generic, term
used in the' title' of;; this'. report' ;is coming
Into more widespread use 'to cover this wide
'
~,~~ ;~
~raa~ge~ of ~Qir~cutti~components~
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b.l Ithe Soviets
believe that American methods as a whole are better suited
to their purposes than the German, and that the American
products lend themselves to much easier production processes
in the USSR than the German. The second reason is that the
.American high-frequency technique is greatly superior to
the German. Thirdly, American electronics progress in
World War Il was exceedingly well reviewed, analyzed and
described in readily available publications of MIT, Bell
Telephone Laboratories, RCA, etc, and that these develop-
meflts were kept up to date by the US open technical
literature' also readily available to the Soviets. These
books and publications which were translated by the Soviets,
as well as the US Joint Army-Navy specifications and RCA
Blue Books, were available to the Soviet engineers in all
institutes It is much easier and more
satisfying to the Soviet engineer to be able to read books
at home and keep informed than to ask questions in the
office and show his ignorance, particularly to the Germans.
That this view was shared b the higher authorities in the
USSR can be seen from the fact that all senior
Soviet electronics spec a s s have dollar funds assigned
for purchases of foreign literature and can use these
funds at their discretion.
2. Vacuum Tube, Activities in the USSR.
a. "Alai vacuum tube institutes of MCEI (the Ministry of
Communications Equipment Industry) are directed by the
Second 'Main-Administration Group (for vacuum tubes), the
Chief Engineer of which is /F`nu7 Sorokin
Each of these institutes is heade by a
Technical Director, all of whom are very
capable administrators and high cal men.
Each institute has also a political commissar, who,
however, do not interfere in technical matters.
b. "In addition to MCEI vacuum tube institutes there are some
vacuum tube capabilities in other institutes of MCEI
(ie, Radar Institute in Moscow) and in the institutes of
other ministries. Of these the best are those
of the Soviet Navv. Air Force and MG-
c. "A.11 Soviet institutes are organized to be fully self-
e3.ufficient, and in theory at least capable of all
'activities required to support their operations. All
main vacuum tube institutes have their independent
research and development facilities, they design and
produce their own testing'equipment, they have their own
workshops, they produce their own raw material and also
do their own metallurgical and chemical work as required.
Three reasons for this Soviet procedure which is quite
foreign to the normal German procedure are: (1) reliance
upon a host of suppliers located frequently at great
distances from the vacuum tube plants in laboratories,
the tremendous distances in the USSR coupled with poor
transportation make .the flow ,of material slow and
hazardous; (2) the specialized needs of the vacuum
tube institutes for relatively small quantities of high`.
quality material not generally produced elsewhere, and
(3) the desire of the Soviets to have as many operating
units as possible in any eventuality similar to the
invasion of the USSR by the Germans in World War II.
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d. "In order to eliminate unnecessary duplication of effort and .t
keep each institute informed on the progress and problems of
all others biannual meetings are held of representatives of all
such meetingsvandl~they are considered very effective. At
these meetings communa problems are discussed and recommendations
are made for assignment of problems to one or more qualified
organizations. When the project is assigned to one institute, a
special-committee is selected from members of other institutes
to pass1on the progress and outcome. At times the same project
is given to several institutes and the best solution is accepted
for all. this method works very satisfactorily
in the USSR.
3. Svetlana Group (Leningrad)
a. Svetlana Institute occupies a position in
the USSR in the field of vacuum tubes not unlike that in the USA
of MIT in the field of radar, or the Bell Telephone Laboratories
in the field of telecommunications.
b. "The Svetlana Institute grew out of the old Marconi plant in
Svetlana which manufactured transmitter tubes. It is one of the
oldest and best electronics groups in the USSR; it is here that
some or the best Soviet electronics specialists at present were
trained. (Zuzmanovskiy is one of them.) Svetlana men are not
only considered goo engineers., they are regarded as an outstand-
ing lot of people and are welcomed in any other plant or
institute. All new vacuum tube institutes in the USSR have
se'veral Svetlana men assigned to them to serve as a core in
technical administration and activities. There were four or
five Svetlana men in Fryazino, and the same number in Novosibirsk
and Tashkent where some Svetlana people were stationed even
during the war.
c. Svetlana engineers are not influenced by the
t are
Communist Party ideology, are quite independent and ye
left unmolested because of their technical superiority. For
example, there was the instance of the former leader of Svetlana
being imprisoned for political unreliability in 1947 without any
detrimental effect upon Svetlana personnel.
d. "There is also another facet of the special position of.the
Svetlana group: it is a'closed fraternity and its influence can
be just as strong in support of progress as against it.
interesting case to support this opinion occurred in 1939/40.
A Soviet article was published on magnetrons* in which the
author, N F Alekse ev, appears to have made the basic discovery
of the use of resonant cavities in connection with magnetrons.
It is known that this article had some influence on German
magnetron developments during 1941/42
influence ' was not greater because the Germans at that time were
primarily interested in tunable magnetrons and missed fully
the potentialities of the fixed magnetron technique so well
recognized by the British[]. In the USSR Alekseyev's work was
wholly disregarded by the Svetlana people, responsible for this
field of activity, because Alekseyev was not one of the Svetlana
group and worked with Kapitza in another institute.
Note: This might refer to an article appear-
ing in e rnal of Technical sics, Vol 10,1940,.
which Urn
l
i
ote The fact that the Soviets ignored this development is one
of the most significant factors in the history of Soviet micro-
w"& t be development The Soviets missed a major discovery
a
rov,
a
pp 1297-13O0, by N a seyev an a
translated and published in March 1944 issue of IRE Proceedings-7
u
and exploited only one part of magnetron technique--- continuous
wave generation'
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Instit to 160 Fryazino (Moscow)
a Institute 160 is the biggest and'most important 2bX1
presenc,e there of the largest group of German specialists.
Two-thirds, of the German specialists were well-trained in
radar and ,high-frequency work andl 2bX1
all were very keenly aware of the importance 25X1
of measuring and testing techniques and instruments. The .
Soviets apparently recognized their potential in testing
techniques and most of the German specialists there were
assigned to this field, not only to meet the needs of the
Fryazino Institute but for the general benefit of all vacuum'
tube institutes. The Insti actically all its
measuring devices and these ere better than 25X1
those produced in Germany.
b. "Once the Soviets recognized the importance of laboratory
equipment,, the German engineers received considerable assis-'
tance in their work on such equipment. They were in a
position to obtain the necessary materials, even those other-
wise not obtainable because of scarcity and were encouraged
to initiate,, through their Soviet superiors,. requests for
foreign-made equipment of specialized design or performance
characteristics. Other Germans and myself in Fryazino asked
on many occasions for the purchase abroad of American-made
laboratory equipment advertised in USA technical periodicals
and dot them.
5. PolitiQ.al Ideology and Tube Research.
"No hindering effects were evidenced in the whole field of
:electronics and in the specialized field of vacuum tubes
by the Soviet Communist ideology or the demands for Party
:Line purity. There are many Party members among Soviet
vacuum tube specialists. There are many more who are not!.
Among'those in responsible positions there are men who not
only are not members of the Party, but are quite outspoken
in their non-Party views without any apparent penalties.
b. "Although there are such cases as a past scientific leader
of Svetlana who was imprisoned for his political views and
,[fnu7 Katzmann who, as a Jew, was not considered reliable
and removed. From Moscow to Novosibirsk;, however' there are other
cases such as that of Maj Che_1_etnn who 25X1
was caught in an attempt to desert to a west an who
was not punished (in the USSR the penalty for his act is
death) but, in addition, was placed in charge of sub-
miniature tube development and production in Kalinin and
was permitted to-travel frequently to Leningrad which is
in the zone of severe security restrictions, and of ZTnu7.
Zuzmanovskiy who was quite candid in his views of the
highest Soviet officials without any detrimental effect
upon his professional position.
c. "In Institute 160, as in all others, there was a political
commissar. He was totally ignorant in technical matters
and had nothing to lido with sdientif c activities 25X1
of personnel of the'Ins u e, ut handled such matters as
procurement of materiel. This, I believe, is indicative of
the general situation in the USSR in regard to the vacuum
tube and electronics fields. The Soviets are too anxious
to use all their capabilities in.building up their potential
to permit their political views'to interfere with this goal,
at least at present.
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d.
the Soviets have solved fully or
satisfactorily the problem of the use of thorium oxide
in cathodes.
At that time some thorium oxide material was
available in Fryazino wh b was removed by the Soviets
from the Heyden'Plant in'tresden,When this supply was
exhausted work was initiated at Fryazino on developing
substitute materials and on the production of thorium
oxide. Serious difficulties were encounters
unsolved in the z SR
gcod 'ahough, the problem is still
~t,he,only good thorium oxide in the USSR
is..tbat, supplied by the He den 'Plant; others were not
the-quality of thorium oxide is a matter of luck-
and the success of Heyden is due to such luck and the
characteristics of the raw material used,
e, "The Soviet mica was of poor quality., This is based upon
the fact that it does not last,. particularly under con`
ditj.ons'of over and under heating. Operating conditions
in the USSR are very hard on tubes as line voltage
fluctuates widely -25% to +15%, Mica was carefully handled
by the Soviets and was graded into three classes: (a) for
hi h-frequency technique; (b) for use in power tubes and
(c for general purpose tubes. The only source of mica in
the. USSR is in Zhitomir in the Ukraine, there
are some'de osits of mica in Northern iber
Although cons era ewor
was, done by the Germans on synthetic mica: no
knowledge of similar work ' by the Soviets In the 'summer j:of
1951 an important request came from MCEI.to a German
specialist to study.the replacement of mica by ceramic
~c- do not know the present status of this project -
Note:' Analysis of Soviet general purpose'
tuba y ATIC indicates that the quality of mica used
in,,;these tubes is very good and in fact somewhat superior
'
quality to ours.. It is therefore possible that
in:
was not familiar with the mica situation in the USSR or
that mica supplied to the development institutes in the
USSR was,of poorer quality than that available to the
production plants'
f.
The basic Soviet requirements for copper for
tubes (including magnetrons) were (a) suitable electrical
characteristics (b) easy machining. The Soviets have had
no trouble with copper and they have had enough experience'
with copper in other industrial uses so that normal quality
copper was considered by the Soviets to be good enough for
magnetrons..
g. "In general, the Soviets are quite familiar with all modern
problems. and progress in vacuum tube techniques and methods
and have proven capable of adapting the foreign develop-
ments and ideas to their purposes. The Soviets are
presently doing very capable research in the vacuum tube
field,.,. They are capable of originality although not adverse
to. borrowing ideas from abroad. Older specialists, such as
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Svetlana engineers are being augmented in this regard by
very capable young engineers fully comparable if riot better
than young German engineers; for example, Zuzmanovskiy
and Alekseyev's work on magnetrons, Zeitlin's work on
klystrons, Vogelsohn's work on gas tube technique. The
Soviets are very imaginative and stubborn people-and
permit experimental work, at times very costly; onprob-
lems which would not be tolerated in Germany or the USA;
ie:, 'Samovar' which would have been abandoned
elsewhere, intense work on-10 megawatt and higher
magnetrons.
h. "The following sketch ZF-ig 1 Lis of the e device
reported, previously The
%t~e'vice `consists of two sets of electrodes at right angles
to each other. These were used in the electrolytic
trough to obtain two right-angle..gomponents of the
magnetic field. The device was of considerable laboratory
use at Fryazino.
KREUZSONOE (FIG 1)
Research.
a. "All research in the USSR, including the work on vacuum
-tubes was centered in and coordinated by the Academy of
Sciences in Moscow and by biannual meetings of the
research leaders of the important tube institutes
.Liee par 2d above7. Some of the tube research was
centered in an institute in Kharkov, presumably for the
Ukraine although the good work done there
was felt in all institutes.
b. "Special problems relating to cathode problems were
centered in Kiev
C. General Tubes.
1. Glass Bulb.
2. Metal-Ceramic
a. "The metal-ceramic tubes made at OSW were of the World War II
type and construction; ie, LD-9, LD-11 and LD-12.
Considerable development work was done on the LD-15
b. "Metal-ceramic tubes were produced at Novosibirsk. The
LD-12 grid was in the form of a woven mesh see Appendix
Fig 2a and 2. this grid is inferior to
the German grid due to wider variations in grid-to-cathode
spacing.
C, "In the summer of 1946 the German group at OSW experimented
with a new form of grid to reduce the grid-to-cathode
spacing and improve high-frequency cut-off characteristics.
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A,glass form was stamped in the form of a cathode and a'
grid mesh was machine-engraved on it. The grooves of the
mesh were filled with carbon and a copper grid was
produced by electrolysis. The_ w r was stopped when. the
Germans were moved to the USSR.
D. Special.. Tubes
1. Cathode Ra Tubes
a.
Ithe
tube might have been used in a spec al computer then under
development, most probably for a ballistic computer, is
based on the type of special accuracy requirements supplied
to the Cathode Ray Department at Fryazino and on special
work on testing devices which the Germans were asked to
undertake for the pro ect.
b. "Dr Roethe worked on dark trace tubes at OSW. Development
work on these tubes was continued in the,,U SR., In 1950
the Work was considered so secret that the Germans were
not permitted to work on it.
ote: In line with repeated
eliminate Germans from the classified projects whenever
statements that the normal Soviet procedure was to
development was completed or proceeded to the
,point that it could be completed by the Soviets,. it is,
possible that Oreference to the elimination of the
German specialists from further work on dark trace tubes
might have meant that the Soviets considered the project
sufficient) advanced for production or pre-production
engineering
c. "There was a special development in 19+6 at 0SW on a
high-.speed writing cathode ray,tube. The principle used
in these tubes was the same as in the USA and a micro-
~notl )any connection between this
Work, and Geiger coup -ter tubes or high rise-time counters,
At Fryazino a special oscilloscope was built to study the
build-up time of magnetrons.
2. Modulator-Tubes.
At'first the Soviets tried spark gap modulators for high
efficiency gobs but the methodswere given up. when they
later developed high efficiency hydrogen thyratrons and
hard tube modulators Their a nce with hydrogen
th-vratrons 'was
od
25X1
25X1
Of special interest was the Soviet use o the
ec n que to maintain the hydrogen pressure at constant
level by using silver cathode in an iron sponge.; .This
was tried in 1951/52 and 0 not know whether the 25X1
development was completed. The Soviet work on iron sponge
was very good and the pore-volume was about 50%. The
5 AC-21 tube was an interesting one developed and produced
at Fryazino. This is a half-me awatt tube using-plate-
anode voltage of 35000 volts.. no trouble 25X1
was experienced with this tube.
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b. "bamovar'- The Soviets spent five or six years in the
eve opment of a five-megawatt hard tube known as
'Samovaree Appendix Fig 7. It was based on an RCA
idea for, a tube (and according seen in RCA.bY 25X1
ferred
n
t
s
ra
the-Soviet engineers) for other purposes and
by the. Soviets to a modulator tube. The tube consists'of:
13 cathodes-arranged outside with the anode in the:center.,
with the grids as shown. 1the tube extremely 25X1
complicated and very bad. in such a tube
the electron scattering angle must be small to be effective,
and such is the case only when the anode and cathode
occupy conventional positions. With the reversed position
of Samovar-the scattering angle is much greater than the
.optimum.. Nevertheless, the Soviets produced these tubes
at the rate of 30 to 40 per month, in spite of its poor'
performance and. complexities and in spite of0 arguments 25X1
with which the Soviet engineers.were inclined to agree.
in some high-priority equipment available in sufficient
quantities to require 30 to 40-tube production per month.
believe the tubes were for use in early warning 25X1
equipment.
C1,11 D-21.21.- This tube was copied originally. at OSW and later
re-developed by' the Soviets in Fryazino and perhaps
elsewhere. The tube developed at Fryazino has two to
four: times the. capacity'Qf,the American 5D-21.... This ..was_
accomplished by increasing the cathodes,raising the anode
voitage'(35,000) and inserting an electrostatic shield
at the end of the screens. The development work took
about six months and the tubes were uniform and good
a schematic drawing of the tube developed at Fryazino
,.,s shown in the Appendix;, Figures 4a and LIb7. This
type usCs"two pairs of cathodes instead of four, cathodes
eta -1 ," 4-.1nes dmwri r!an 50-.21. the Soviets. 25X1
find this design 'easier to manuiacvu.L?t, Lem I
the Soviets continue.to manufacture the four-cathode
25X1
American 't a also.
Note.: Reports from OSW indicate that
lties with this tube. 25X1
ffic
l
u
e di
there were considerab
he difficulty was most probably due to the fact that
T
the war-time 5D-21 was too small for the power and
voltage requirements.. It is, therefore, very interesting
that O did not point out any special difficulties. 25X1
with this tube in the USSR beyond estimate of the 25X1
of the
alit
'th
y
e qu
six-months development time and
products r ,...,
T-R Tubes.
b. "Much discussion took-place in the USSR in regard to
wide-band T-R tubes and..that the problem was considered
very important. The problem was. not handled in Fryazino
but elsewhere.
c. "Later in Fryazino the problem' of a_ very ,fa t recove T-R
t
82
e
Q,uesviVfl
6" .-If Thus
primarily on measuring techniques for such tubes.
1..n r ., r7.crj.1 nnmPnt
_ ..---
the
work on'sucituunes was carried on under high priority.
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the basic development was done at Svetlana
M. sS` v'ogelson is a Svetlana engineer) and the reason for
5.
high importance was to equip their night=fighter"s;with'
3.-crn equipment,. The short recovery there might be
im.nort,ant in -some sort of short-range (intercept) radar...,
Note;' In spite of additional efforts no more s.pecifi'c '~
reformation was. obtained from source. If the `above
opinion is,, be taken seriously this is the first reference
to Sovi.e.t research'and development work, which goes back to
1950/51' :on' night :interceptor radars
Subminiature.Tubes.
the Kalinin plant was
completed for production in 1949/50. This pZ.ant,.under the
general guidance of Major Cheletnin, is the production-
center'for'subminiature tubes and proximity, fuses and
the output of this plant.is very sizeable (no,estimates
of output
Image Converters
e ov e s remove , among o her~~
plants, an OSW plant for image converters to the USSR
and the plant was dismantled with special care and shipped
to the. USSR without'any German specialists. The-Soviets
claimed that they knew a great deal on this'subject and
did not need German specialists, but wanted the German
production facilities only to increase their total output
capacity of these tubes.
E. Magnetrons..
1. "The: .nform.ation 'on Soviet work on basic types of magnetrons,
aVaailable to source, is summarized in Tab 1 (general
description and comments), in Tab 2 (te'c'hnical'-data) and
in the Appendix, Fig 5, 6, and 7. In discussion.,
additional projects on magnetrons were mentioned. These
were either in the nature of general laboratory work,, or
were abandoned as unprofitable or else the, amount of
information available was insufficient to clearly
formulate the extent of Soviet activities or interest'.
2. "German magnetron developments have influenced the Soviets
inMagnetron #10, which is essentially the same as the
German RM 40 2, developed at 0berpfaffenhofen in World War II.
Magnetrons #4 and 7 are similar to the German LMS.,16 and 25X1
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3. "'The`-_Zoviet magnetron developments were also strongly
influenced by the'US developments. The MIT series was
the - sounce of a ' number of designs, and particularly of
Magnetron #8 See Appendix, Fig 7 , which was assigned
great'importance.by the Soviets perhaps for use with
token radars2.
4+. "Rising Sun" Magnetron.
The technical data on this magnetron (#5) is given in.
Tab 1 and.2 A schematic sketch of the cross section
of the magnetron is shown in the Appendix, Fig 5.
b.0 information on the Rising Sun magnetron came from
25X1
Zuzmanovskiy who was responsi
ment in general and for work
particular. The basic data
ble for th
on the Ris
ma
this mag
e magnetron develop-
ing Sun in
netron was known
to Zuzmanovskiy in 1946?, and
was not obtained
25X1
directly from Japan* but probably from RCA in the'USA.
The. active development on the Rising Sun magnetron was
initiated;~in 4 b an all-Soviet group under Zuzmanovskiy's
25X1
~he project was
considered very important and was primed by high.
security restrictions.
On the basin `remarks of the Soviet engineers-
of
and rumors of other German special
some channels might have existed.
In general the Soviets-were very active an
successful in getting basic and detailed technical informa-
tion and equipment from the USA. They attached highs
importance to US developments, techniques and methods
and used all methods (covert and overt) to ' procure. them.
While, in the USSR became more familiar with the US'
electronics post-World War II activities than with.the'
German
5. Magnetrons in the 140 - 150 MC Region.
a. "The Soviet work on magnetrons in this frequency region
was top secret, was done by the Soviets only and thus
no Germans knew exactly what the Soviet program or
progress was. It was known that a group of Fryazin.o
SECRET,
.25X1
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OzurLI _r
-1k-
Soviet engineers worked on the project under the direct
'supervision of Zuzmanovskiy. Additional work might have
been done'elsewhere (Leningrad or Moscow). Some German
specialists worked on specialized problems believed to
b.e rel:ated.to this project (such as pulse technique) and
in the course of conversation with Zuzmanovskiy (in 1950?)
told about a top-secret project on high-power, high-
25X1
efficiency magnetrons which Zuzmanovskiy believed would
oquire a new and different principle of magnetron con-
st'uction,..The. idea Lee Appendix, Fig 9 was to use not
one central cathode, but several individual. cathodes located
in. individual cavities. The Soviet goal apparently was to
produce a very high-power magnetron, perhaps 10 megawatts
or more, operating at high efficiency (80% or more). 0
25X1
-x ri -ntal magnet _-_s -_ e developed
25X1
for this frequency range with output of over one megawatt,
by Zuzmanovskiy and his people. =do not know whether these 25X1
were normal t
e sin
le cathode ma
netro
aled
f
yp
g
ns sc
g
up
or
their frequency range, or prototype models incorporating 25X1
Zuzmanovskivls ideas.,
b. "Magnetron #9 could be used-for only two purposes; as a
linear accelerator in atomic physics, or in radar...
Since it is not'likely that the narrow frequency band of
such.magnetrons would be of use in the linear accelerator
application, present opinion is that the magnetron.was 25X1
developed eit er for high-power early warning radar against
missiles at distances of 300 to 400 miles or for missile
control roblems of intense interest to Capt Shokin*
phonetic.) who was in the position to. 25X1
vitiate t =. jecry or evelopmentof such magnetrons
,
, to guide it, and with the help of Zuzman'ovskiy, to solve
the problem.
6. Magnetron Techniques
"The problem of magnetron strapping was studied by.the
Soviets very intensely and all outside work was thoroughly
investigated. The Soviets reached a point of a-reasonably
good understanding of the problem and?of applications.
b. "Much work was done on this at Fryazino under Zuzmanovskiyts
direction, who also contributed some capable and original
research work on the problem. Both single and double
strapping were used. The Soviets also used the method of
accurately controlling the frequency of magnetrons by
carefully.adjusting the distance between the strapping rings.
o. "The Soviets used spiral. cathodes for wide-frequency modula-
tions in magnetrons as follows:
1 r
The nature of, modulation by such a cathode is such that a
very wide frequency band can be prodiced by the use of
the very high frequencies used for heating of the cathode.
this was used by the Soviets as a simple
method to produce wide-frequency band magnetrons for use
in jamming, The work wasp tested at Institute 108 on
jamming magnetrons and proved successful. Also noise
frequency modulation was tested on jamming magnetrons
with this cathode and believed to be successful..'"
SECRET
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-15-
TABLE I
MAGNETRONS
Magnetron No ,l. &a netrons',were numbered for ease of discussion. during
According to the source, the 0.,8 cm tube is only in the
experimental stage., and possibly in development in Xnst 108, Moscow.
This is-in contrast to information. obtained from other German
returnees,who stated that" there was a.large.production of this
tube already in effect.
Magnetron No.2
This tube is in the planning stage only, and is designed'. for
1 cm operation (30,000 Mc/S)-.. The roposed construction would
follow the wartime Telefunken LMS-14 tube.
Magnetron.No 3
This tube is a copy of US 725 magnetron which-was designed
for the H2X X-band.blind bombing radar. This is called "Meddo"
by both Germans and Soviets.
Magnetron No-_4
This tube., like magnetron No ,.7, is designed for jamming.y It
is a CW, mechanically tunable type similar in design to.:the Gerptian
LMS-32. A copper tuning ring is mechanically :moved tows and
away fr?m~ the. caviti:e's,
Magnetron No 5
The tube is ,a "Rising Sun," fixed tuning pulse type X-band
magnetron,. 'Development is not yet complete ,tee Appendix,-Fig 5j.
Magnetron No 6
This is a copy of a Canadian tube of the CV series, S-band.
Magnetron No 7
Thist;ube is,CW, mechanically tuned magnetron designed for
jamming. . ee Appendix, Fig 6, An inductive ring is used for
tuning in.a manner similar to Tube No 1, and German type LMS-326
Magnetron No-8
This tube is an S-band, pulse-type, fixed-tuning, 2-megawatt
peak power such as would be used for early warning. Its efficiency.
is about 60 - 70%, and frequency stability 1:5,000. The internal
structure,.coupling device and test equipment were designed by
Soviet engineers. The test equipment is reported to have filled
a room of about 300 sq ft floor area. The tube development took.
three years, requiring seven or eight Soviet engineers.,
Magnetron No 9
This tube was designed by the Soviets, without German assistance.
It was rumored to have 10 MW or larger power output by having the
equivalent of a number of two cavity magnetrons in parallel. The
tunin was accomplished by.wave guide techniques and had a range
from 140 to 150 cm. It is probably intended for early warning.
Magnetron No 10
This tube is a copy of the German RM 14032, called the "zero slot"
magnetron. It consisted of a ctvl..ndrical anode with axially centered
w re ca odes, s n a ice u e, here is a strong ax a magnetic
field. Two tubes are made--one of a range from 0.8.to 3 cm, another
from 3.0 cm to 12 cm. The main use of this tube is experimental.
25X1
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0
N
4-3
0
Where Developed
H
omenclature
+ Magnetron
Magnetron
Magnetron
Magnetron
Magnetron
Magnetron
Magnetron
Magnetron
Magnetron
Magnetron
PT
No 2
No3
R?
No 5
No 6
No 7
No 8**
No 9
No 10*
O
....
_..
_-_
_
-
d
~cm
avelea th
0
.8
3.2
3x2 3.5
9 10
9 - 10
10.0
40
150
Two Mo
els
.
0.8-3 cm
3 ca-12 em
Fixed or Tunable
Fixed
Tunable
Fixed
Fixed
Tunable
Fixed
Fixed
Tunable
wave guide
techniaues
Pulse or OW
CA
OW
Pulse
Pulse
CW
Pulse
Pulse
OAP
V
lt
20 000
2000-3000v
Q 0,000V
750 000Q
000 max
node
o
age
Anode Current
Duty cycle
300-400 ma
21 ma
1-1,000 or
eater Supply
Thor oxide
Dirpctl.y
Ba oxide
heater
heated
heater
cathode-
Tungsten
Output Power
---
---------
500-600 KW
80-1004
6001f Cii
2 MM Eff.
High. Eff
A few
60-70%
80%
milliwatts
Application
Meddo
Jamming
Radar
Radar
Jamming
Radar,EK?
Laboratory
Radar
Tests.
Development Data
Start
Similar to
Copy
1949
1947
Copy
1946
1946
Completion
Now in
Telefunken
Intermittent
Not corn-
1948-49
1949
Special remarks
experi-
LMS-14
In preprod.
plete
mental
stage
only in
planning
stage
stage
Production Data
/bass pro-
In 1949
100
duced in
several
1948
1nnv1ved
per month
Moscow
Fryazino
Fryazino
Fryazino
Regulator
108?
equipment
developed
in
.
ino
Where Produced
Saratov
Fryazino
In pro-
Special
duction
_
t
lf th
h
time
o
e
one'
a
t He war the Germazis took abou
* Comparable developmen uring
** Inside of magnetron was developed by Soviets coupling and external "plumbing" by Germans.
* Equals German RM-4032
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SECRET
-17-
Klystrons
1. "Soviet kl stron work was influenced 'hv both German and US 25X1
designs Liee Table III,page 18, made assistance,whieh
. summarizes knowledge of Soviet klystrons
following additional comments: 25X1
a. "Klystron #1 - the tube is a copy of a General Electric
.42 cm tube, scaled up. The Germans in Fryazino were
asked to produce such a klystron for use in testing gear
for 8 mm crystal detectors, but found it a hard job. In
order to speed their work, the Soviets supplied Fryazino
with this klystron, and some additional testing gear,
which was produced elsewhere.
"Klystron #2 is a copy from a US prototype as copied by
the Soviets from a 1949 or 1950 IRE publication. The''
tuning range was claimed to be 2.5 to 12 cm, and the
tuning was accomplished by mechanical control. of the
cavity jee Appendix, Fig #97.
"Klystron #3 and #4 were copied from the US Western
Electric 725 klystron and German LD-20,ywhich was a copy
of the same prototype. Klystron #3 was tuned around 3.2
cm and used for 'Meddo' radar; # was tunable from 28,- 29
cm and represents a variation of #4.
d. "Klystron #5 is the same as the British tube,. which was
.copied by the Germans during the war, known as LD-25,
or klystron 1 (Siemens-Halske).
"Klystron #6 is a shortened version of #5. Both these
tubes .have a glass envelope and use an external tuning
cavity.
Transistors and Crystal Detectors.
1. The USSR work on crystal detectors was based upon the German
developments in OSW. In 1950 a plant was established in
Fryazino to manufacture silicon detectors following OSW
procedures.. Attempts were made in Moscow to manufacture
these detectors following the American procedure. Results
were rumored not to be very good and best work was done
,with the German method. The second step was the intro-
duction of ermanium"detectors. These were first made in
Institute 28 in Moscow but with relatively little success
and in 1950 Fryazino started to produce germanium detectors
in small quantities on,''experimental basis. Some production
was.done at Fryazino, primarily for Institute 160's require-
ments.. The main work of production of crystal detectors,
must have been done elsewhere,
"It was only in 195'that basic 25X1
development and research work was n a ed the Soviets
.on transistors. The background of knowledge was available
to the Soviets in American publications. There was a book
,by William Shockley which became available in the USSR in
January 1952. A special committee was established in MCEI,
consisting of the best specialists in the Soviet Union, to
work out the fundamental o
very optimistic 25X1
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Nomenclature
Klystron No 1
Klystron No 2
Klystron No 3
Klystron No 4
Klystron No 5
,
Klystron No 6
US Type
K 10-1
K 10-2
No 725
Wavelength. cm
0,8
205 - 12
3 cm
2,8 - 2.9
10 cm
fixed or Tunable
Fixed
Tunable
Tunable
Pulge-or r CN '
aN(
(see sketch)
CW
ode Voltage
2 00Q
Anode Current
220 ma
eater Su 1
tput Power
milliwatt
Same as
Same as
pplication
Measuring
Experimental
English and
K 10-1 but
device
German Pro=
modified in
evelopment Data
totypes
shape
Start
1949
1 year
1951
Completion
1952
At 0S (LD-20
Variation
of 725
Special remarks
Copy of US type
oduction Data
Schedule, etc.
here Developed
Moscow
Fryazino and-
(Inst 10$7)
Svetlana
ere Produced
Moscow
Svetlana
Svetlana.in
(presently
production
believed to
be in pro-
duration in
Saratov
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Page 1
-J~119M
LD 12 GRID
CROSS SECTION
Fig. 2a and 2b - Details of Metal-Ceramic Tube LD-12
ANODE
Fig. 3 - Modulator Tube 'Samovars
ELEMENTS (I)
CATHODE (2)
GRID-OV- (3)
GRID 2000 (4)
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VARIATION OF 5D2I
CATHODE
HEATER
ENVELOPE
I METALLIC SHIELD
2 GRID I
3 GRID 2
4 ANODE
5 CATHODE
6 ENVELOPE
Rig.. 4a and 4b - 5D-2. Cathode Ray Tube
r'ig. 4b
LATER MODEL OF ABOVE TUBE
CATHODES IN-LINE AS IN 5D21
Fig. 5 - 'Rising Sun' Type X -Band Magnetron
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Fig. 4a
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Page 3
MAGNETRON NO. 7
CAVITY (1)
VANES (2)
STRAPS (3)
(4) TUNING
RING
Fig. 6 - Magnetron No. 7 - Jamming
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Page 4
MAGNETRON NO.8
A-A' OPENING FOR OUTPUT COUPLING TO
THE WAVE GUIDE (I)
(2) CAVITIES
(3) STRAPS
(4) VANES
(4)
Fig. 7 - Magnetron No. 8 - Radar, Early Warning?
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DIAGRAM APPROX. 10 " NO. 9
ARRANGEMENT OF CATHODES (I)
IN SEVERAL CAVITIES (2)
Fig. 8 - Magnetron No. 9
I TUNING SLUGS
2 OUTPUT COUPLING TO WAVE GUIDE
3 REPELLER
4 ELECTRON GUN
Fig. 9 - Klystron No. 2 - Tuneable
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