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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
INFORMATION REPORT
COUNTRY Germany (Soviet Zone)
25X1A SUBJECT East German Alert Police
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1. Q. What is the attitude of the Soviets to East German rearmament?
A. Few Soviet officers or soldiers know what is afoot. Most think that the
Alert Police is in fact a police force. Those who are aware of its true
nature fall into two groups: those who play a part in the training of the
East German .I.rmy, and those to whom knowledge has leaked out. Those who
play a part in training are very carefully selected, hard-core C-)mmunists,
.who follow orders unquestioningly. The others, mariy of whom fought against
the Germans in world War II, do not find the idea of East German rearmament
altogether appealing. Nevertheless, the general attitude is, "let them
catch it; fewer of us will clie." uue do feel, however, that East German
troops could not be counted on for reliability.
2 Q. 'What do you know of the East German Alert Police?
A. Very little, since I had nothing to do with that part of the Soviet Command
in East Germany responsible for the development of the Alert Police. My
knowledge of that group is second hand and is derived mainly from conversa-
tions with fellow-officers and deductions made from those conversations.
3. Q. What is the size of the Alcrt Police Force?
A. It consists of 25 divisions, of which 15 should be battle=ready by the
end of 1951. The strength of each division is likely close to 4,000 or
4,500. It is the skeleton of. an East German, army. and is said to be ex-
cellent, from the military point of view. note: There are25X1 A
24 Alert Units, not 25; the T/O strength of each is 1,800]
L.I.. Q. In view of its unreliability, what mission could the Alert Police have?
A. A repetition of what happened in China and Korea may have been planned.
Twenty five East German divisions would be quite adequate to take over
West Germany .without Soviet participation. Though they are unreliable,
they are very well paid, and all key positions are held by trusted Communists.
For a nationalistic purpose, such as the reunification of Germany, they would
be reliable enough.
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Since the Aestern Powers have'announced that any attack on West Germany will
be considered an act of war, is a purely East German attack, such as you
described, still likely?
A. It is understood that if East Germany attacked now, the war would involve
the USSR. A purely East German attack would, therefore, not occur., unless
Western occupation troops were withdrawn. If they were withdrawn, West
Germany would be done for; if they are not, war may begin in Germany, with
the Soviets "defending" East Germany. In such a situation, East German
troops would.be used in an essentially satellite role. East German divisions
would be integrated in Soviet higher commands., with Soviet formations on
either flank, and to their rear, to keep them from retreating.
Are there adequate stocks of Soviet heavy weapons in depots in East Germany
to equip the Alert Police fully .when the Soviet Control Commispion decides to
do so?
25X1A
A. Stocks in East Germany are not now adequate, and German production of weapons
goes mostly to the Soviets. Some stocks of weapons are available in East
Germany; the balance of what will be needed is now farther to the East. In
Brest-Litovsk, for example, there is a depot with thousands of pieces of
artillery, which will be brought to the guest at the appropriate time. At
the moment, the Soviets would consider it dangerous to equip the Alert Police
fully because of their unreliability. Each unit now has only enough heavy
weapons for training purposes--not more than five tanks, for example.
Q. Could German prisoners of war still in the USSR be used to reinforce the Alert
Police substantially?
A. Officially, all prisoners of war were repatriated by 199 except for a large
number of war criminals. It is possible that these are given favorable
treatment in return for promised cooperation. But they are basically anti-
Soviet and unreliable. In case of dire necessity, they might be used as
penal battalions.
8. Q. Are the East Germans likely to have tank and mechanized divisions,, or rifle
divisions only?
A. In my opinion, rifle division only. The Soviets would consider it dangerous
to give too much to the East Germans.
9. Q. Approximately how many interpreters would be' needed per German division, if
divisions were integrated into Soviet Corps and Armies?
A. It is difficult to estimate. In any case, many German officers do not
heed interpreters. Most of those of high rank were prisoners of war. and
learned to speak Russian. Also, there have been military courses for Germans
in the USSR since A'orld guar II, lasting for six months or a year, and
students study Russian.
10. Q. Again assuming integration, would the Soviets keep the supply services
in their own hands?
A. Absolutely. The same is true with the other Satellites. It is the best
means of retaining complete control. The only purpose of a German army
is to supply cannon-fodder. This is a part of Soviet policy m- to decimate
the population and wealth of the satellite countries so as to wear them away
as future, centers of resistance. In battle, the MGB would be behind German
troops with machine guns. The Germans will-fight for us only if they're
forced to. If the Soviet army had to retreat, every German with a gun
would shoot them in the back.
11. ? Q. dould joint maneuvers be essential before hostilities?
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A. Yes, but they will take place only just before hostilities begin. Meanwhile,
there may be joint command post exercises of higher staffs, but no
maneuvers with troops. That would be a tremendous political error, since it
would show East Germany;. or any other Satellite, to be nothing but a colony
of the Soviet Union. Of course they are colonies, but the Soviets, with
their legalistic minds, want to preserve the appearance that the Satellites
are independent.
12. Q. Have you heard of any joint exercises on a small scale?
A. I have heard of none. t .okossovski and members of his staff participated
in the maneuvers in East Germany in the summer of 1950, but no Germans,
25X1A Notes One joint exercise, involving about seventy Germans,,
has been confirmed-
13.. Q. Is the East German army; likely to expand beyond 25 divisions, or is that
the top limit the Soviets will let them have?
A. Since the East Germans are highly expendable, and their divisions would be
quickly chewed up, more divisions will have to be formed as replacements.
What do you consider the best indications of imminent hostility, as far
as the Alert Police are concerned?
A. The issuance of heavy weapons and equipment up to T/O and E, and the hold-
ing of joint maneuvers.
15- Q. Can you think of any circumstances under which Soviet troops might with-
draw from East Germany?
A. Withdrawal would be disastrous for the Soviets. The Germans would
immediately turn to the West, and the business of the Japanese Peace Treaty
would be repeated in short order. Any Satellite would go over to
the West if the Soviets w4thdrew. The only possible basis for withdrawal
would be a unified German Government in which the Soviets could maintain
control, and treaty limitations on German armaments. Under those cir-
cumstances, the Germans would be secretly trained in the USSR, as after
World War I.
16. Q.
What is the purpose of the "Unity Campaign"?
A. To get United States military installations as far as possible from the
borders of the USSR.
JECR`
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