BI-WEEKLY PROPAGANDA GUIDANCE NUMBER 84

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-03061A000100050010-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 31
• Document Creation Date: November 17, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 11, 1998
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: January 29, 1962
• Content Type: PERRPT

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ITALIAN COMMUNIST .PARTY COMMUNIQUEON THE CPSU CONGRESS
2:following is the translation of a document isr,ued by the
Secreta.Aat of the Italian Communist Party in tha Italian-
language daily newspaper l'Ul_Itta (Unity), No. 330, Rome,
28 November 1961, pages 1, 9-10. Part I deals uith the in-
ternational significance of the CPSU Program; Part II is con-
cerned with de-Stalinization and personality cunt; Part III
discusses the unity of the International Communist Movement,
the autonomy of individual Communist Parties, and ideological
development; and Part IV treats the preSent and future tasks
of the Italian Communist Party.,17
Rome, 27 November 1961 -- Following is the text of a docu.-.
ment approved by the Secretariat of the Italian Communist Party
on the instructions of the Party Directorate at the recent
meeting of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission.
The decisions adopted and the political and theoretical problems
raised by the 22nd CPSU Congress have given rise to thorough and lively de-
bates by party organizations and by the democratic movement.
Such debates are a proof of the significance of those decisions, of
the political interest sham by our comrades, of our Party's maturity, and
of its firm intention to become politically and ideologically stronger and
to march forward.
The basic. theses, subjects, and objectives of those debates are the
following
. 1) The need to fully understand and to explain to the popular
masses the meaning. and the significance of the decisions of the 22nd Con-
gress, and,. at the same time, rejecting all attacks by class enemies and
revisionists, by overcoming sectarian obstacles, and by linking ourselves .
to the positive expectation shown by public opinion and by large democratic
groups with regard to developments concerning the Communist Movement and
our Party line;
2) The effort which must be made to identify the new problems
that must be faced at present by the national and international democratic
and workers' movement;
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3) The need to achieve further progress in the fields of our
ideological and political outlook, of a united development of our Party in
the country at large, of an increase if its influence, and of a political
and organizational strengthening and regeneration.
The debates should therefore take place within the framework of open-
minded and concrete self-criticism which--- by using our past achievements
as a stepping stone -- will also be successful in identifying mistakes,
weaknesses, and deficiencies and in pointing out the right way to deal with
the new problems facing us today in a constructive and positive way. The
more we are able to reject firmly all defeatist and destructive influences,
all socialdemocratic tendencies, and all attempts to reject the basic
tenets which make up the unity, development, and active strength of our
Party, the more we will be able to achieve that result.
The Central Committee will hold a meeting in December to deal with
the problems of enlisting Party support and a noPmbership drive. One of the
tasks of the Central Committee at that meeting will be to draw preliminary
conclusions from the current debates insofar as our practical objectives
are coneerned.
"
1. The great significance of the 22nd CSU Congress lies above
all in the approval of the program concerning the establishment of a Com-
munist society.
Under the leadership of the Communist Party, the Soviet people have
been able -- by overcoming tremendous obstacles and by struggling against
powerful enemies -- to build a new Socialist society, to open the way for
the establishment Of a Socialist State system, thus affording powerful
assistance to the liberation movement of oppressed peoples. Today, and
during the next 20 years, the Soviet people will try t9 build the technical
and material foundations and the key features of a Communist society on the
basis of past victories and achievements.
In such a society, all men will be equal and free; each man will
give according to his ability, and will receive according to his need.
This is a hard task indeed, because an egalitarian society must be built
on a high standard of living, such as is demanded by a Communist society,.
To this end, a further steady and progressive development of productive
forces is of foremost 'importance.
During the next 20 years, industrial production should increase six-
fold above present levels which -- with the exception of the US -- already
are the highest in the world. In the area of agriculture, present ?beta.,
oles and delays should be overcome so as to guarantee an overall production
increase of 3.5 times compared to present production levels.
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This Program of economic development will be executed during the
present phase of the Soviet Socialist economy in an entirely new and more
complex fashion, namely by reducing costs and increasing productivity
through maximum 1183 of technical and scientific reauurcee and the inventive
and creative abilities of the working masses. At the same time, the work-
day will be reduced to six hours during the first decade of the Program's
operation and will be reduced further during the second decade.
The Program foresees a substantial increase of goods and services
for the next ten years, first of all in the housing ,construction field
which -- in spite of a great increase in the number of housing units built
during the last few years -- is still the moet backward. Wages willbe
increased swiftly so that -- within 20 years' the workers' real income
will be 3.5 times higher than their, present income.. Social security bene-
fits -- such as medical assistance, hospitalization, special institutions
for children, free communal services, etc. -- in one word, that part of
national income which is shared by all Members of society on the basis of
their needs and independently of the quality and vantity of their work,
will be extended progressively. New steps will be taken to achieve real
equality for women by simplifying their work and by better organizing
family life and children's edudation..
Undoubtedly, these and other objectives represent a big, complex and
difficult task'. Success in this area is subjectiiot'only to the preserva-
tion of peace, but to a new, original, and adequate development of political
and theoretical principles, to an increase of the creative initiative of
both the Party and the working masses, to the spreading of Socialist democ-
racy, to profound organizational changes and to a new and, Vigorous revolu-
tionary spirit..
During the first 60 years of this century, the CPSU and the Soviet
people have been able to achieve the goals they had set for themselves. In
particular, the progress achieved during the last few years in the economy,
in correcting errors, in overhauling the organizatien of production, and
in improving managerial and work methods represent a solid starting point
for such a demanding Program.
By the adoption of such a Program -- which represents an original
development with the. 20th Congress -- Communist society's objective is linked
to present-day work, struggles, and conditions by means of intermediate and
planned Stages and goals. By this method the final end of a Communist so-
ciety can be, progressively realized. In such a society, there will be a
gradual elimination of conflicts between classes and nations, between city
and countryside, between physical and intellectual mork, and between the
social position of man and woman. In Such a society, war will be banished
forever from the life of mankind, and the State as a constrictivecorganiza-
tion will gradually wither away. This will transcend Utopian dreams and
scientific: speculation and will enter the world of politics, i.e., of feasi-
ble and practical realizations.
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2. A policy of peace and maintaining peace is obviously linked
to such a program to the end of preventing an outbreak of war which would
destroy human civilization. Today, the only way to achieve such an ob-
jective lies in a profound change of the present international situation
by the establishment of a,system of peaceful coexistence.
This system of peaceful coexistence must be founded on the princi.,
plea of mutual respect and cooperation, nonintervention in the internal af-
fairs of other countries, full acknowledgement of and respect for the sov-
ereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of all States, and re-
pudiation of, war as a means of settlement of international disputes. A
stable peace can most effectively be guaranteed by complete and general dis-
armament under international control, and, in particular, by the outlawing
and destruction of all atomic weapons.
The 22nd Congress has reaffirmed the basic theoretical thesis ad-
vanced by the 20th Congress, namely that the' main problem of the contempo-
rary era is the_problem of war and peace, and that todu war is no longer
Today, the concerted efforts of the powerful Socialist camp,
the peaceful non-Socialist States, the international working class, and all
those who are fighting for peace are able to prevent anew world war against
a kind of imperialism which is by nature aggressive, which threatens man-
kind with a thermonuclear war, but which at the same time is no longer the
predominant world force and can no longer do whatever it pleases.
. The growing superiority of the forces of Socialism over the forces
of imperialism and of the forces of peace over the forces of war creates
a situation which implies the real possibility of eliminating open warfare
from the life of society in spite of the survival of the capitalist system
in one part of the world and in spite of the fact that Socialism has not
been successful as yet in establishing itself all over the planet. The
worldwide victory of Socialism will ultimately eliminate the reasons for
war. OC?arn'shitoi....P.--------it'icaln-'sanelgaziall
an everlasting peace in the worli.
The 22nd Congress has reaffirmed that coexistence is the basis for
peaceful competition between Socialism and capitalism on a global scale,
and that coexistence brings about more favorable conditions for political
and economic construction in Socialist countries, working class struggles
in capitalistic countries, and struggles for liberation and independence
in colonial countries. The struggle for peace and the conditions of peace-
ful coexistence and compatitiOn affords the possibility of making distinc-
tions within the bourgeoisie and the imperialist world and isolating and
defeating the most aggressive, reactionary, and war-minded extremist forces.
The 22nd Congress has also contributed to an immediate relaxation of
tensions in the international arena by advancing objective proposals whibh
offer the great Western powers an opportunity to solve the most serious and
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urgent problems through acceptable compromises. Problems such as the Ger-
man situation, in fact, are the reason for the present dangerous interna-
tional tension.
While the insoluble and organic Contradictions of capitalism and im-
perialism are becoming more pevere, and the capitalistic world is unable to
solve the probleMS concerning economic development, democracy, social prog-
ress and peace, the 22nd CPSU Congress has advanced a program and a policy
of peace, justice and freedom, social and democratic progress, and brother-
hood among men and peoples.
3. The Program of the 22nd CPSU Congress is not a list of at-
tractive utopian dreams. It is a program of practical struggle implying
further revolutionary developments.
, An integral pert of such revolutionary tension is represented by the
struggle inaugurated by the 20th Congress and reaffirmed by the 22nd Con-
gress against the errors made in the past in relation to Stalin's person-
ality cult, and against conservative and dogmatic obstacles raised against
the 20th Congress. -Such 'obstacles have hampered.? and are hampering -- a
full implementation of the decisions taken by that Congress. The fearless
condemnation of those errors ,and aberrations, and the severe and even ruth-
less criticism and self-criticism cannot be separated from the struggle for
peace and from the adoption of a line appropriate to the transition to
Communism.
4. ,PPre years ago the Italian Communist Party was one of the
first to greet the 20th Congress as a great event which would strengthen
and develop not only Soviet society but the International Workers' Movement
as well, The decisions taken by the 20th Congress implied a confirmation
of pur Party's policy and of our struggle for Socialism within the frame-
work of the objective situation of our country.
The 20th Congress also encouraged our Party to correct certain er-
rors, to formulate its own more appropriate political line, and to foster
activities leading to internal renovation And further strength. The Ital-
ian Communist Party has tried to offer an active contribution on the level
of international relations among Communist parties in favor of the sound-
ness and historical importance of the 20th Congress. Today, our Party ex-
presses its support of the decisions adopted by the 22nd Congress which re-
affirm and develop all the theses advanced by the 20th Congress and repre-
sent a further contribution to the progress of the International Communist
Movement.
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5. The 22nd CPSU Congress bas leveled,. Precise accusations
against a group of old and conservative Par tY and State leaders who had
rejected the policy of regeneration adopted by the 20th Congress, who had
tried to prevent its implementation, and who, finally organized themselVes
in a factional,group.and,tried to take over the Party leadership by sur-
prise and to nullify the decisions reached by the Congress. The 22nd Con-
gress has justly condemned the activities undertaken by that group against
the Party. The political significance of the attacks leveled during the
Congress at this group is, clear and we support it without reservations, ,
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From a more general viewpoint, it must be .said that it is impossible
to set for oneself tasks such ap those con0erning the transition to
Com-
munism without changing at the same time part of the previous structure and
hethods. This means that there must be a change and an adaptation of the
work methods by the Party, the trade union, the eoviets, and all agencies
of soviet 'democracy. There' Must be 4 change in the relationship between
? the Party and the masses, in .the way the party fulfills its leadership role
vis-a-vis State andaOpial organizations and cultural undertakings, at a
time when Socialist democracy and the Creative initiative of the masses
Will be in full development. All this implies by 'necessity a firm struggle
against the heavy burden of dogmatism, existing bureaucratic methods, and
political obstacles, and bakes a clear-cut break with the past a sine Qua
zza for the astablishment.of a new process of regeneration.
The harsh condemnation of governmental and administrative methods
Which flourished under Stalin, i.e., methods which eliminated the principle
of collective leadership and made Stalin the sole authority not only in the
political but alim in the theoretiCal field with all the attendant abuses
and tragic violations of Socialist legality -"- should be viewed, and there-
fore justified, from the viewpoint of that urgent need to open up a new
road. Those evil and unacceptable methods had brought about an increas-
ingly more serious contradiction between the basically democratic substance
of the new society grounded on a Socialist type of economy and on the power
Of the soviets, on the one hand, and an authoritarian and constrictive type
of leadership coming from the very top of both Party and State on the other
hand, which prevented the development of Socialist democracy and ideological
and cultural innovations, and which made the buildings of a new society in-
,
, creasingly more difficult.
The denunciation and condemnation of such errors and methods is
needed not only to raise an impregnable wall against them, but above all
to break the fetters which are jeopardizing the process of development of
Soviet society.
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It must, however, be said that the problems does not consist simply
" of a denunciation of Stalin's errors and negative qualities together
with an acknowledgement of his undeniable merits. The problem is much
mote complex. Above all, it roiseS the question of how it was iossible for
Such errors and distortions to take place during the construction of a So-
cialist society And of how a repetition of the same mistakes tan*be avoided.
' To be able to answer such a question it is necessary to undertake a
more thorough study to investigate (1) the objective conditions and proc-
esses
related to the construttion of the first Socialist society in a coun-
try such as Russia, (2) the circumstances and situations 'under which such
abuses could take place, and (3) the methods and procedures that were fol-
lowed during the establishment of Socialism in a single country. The need
for a thorough historical investigation is based not only on reasons of
historical interest, but also and above all on concrete political reasons,
namely on the fact that the masses Of Communists, workers, and democrats
who have been shocked by the gravity of those revelations are asking for
, ,
more satisfactory answers.
On the other hand, the fact that such errors and distortions could
..be placed within the framework of a particular historical Period -- which
has also been an era of great struggles, of heroic deeds and of very im-
portant victories for the defense and progress of human civilization --
cannot be accepted as a satisfactory justification. Those errors and dis-
tortions, in fact, have nothing to do with the unavoidable harshness of a
revolutionary process. Indeed, they have 'hampered the development of the
revolution,
6. It is certain that a thorough examination of those'problems
would imply a careful study of the situations and methods under which the
building of the foundations of Socialism took place during the first few
years; this is a task toward the achievement of which our Soviet comrades
could contribute significantly. Some general -- but cautious -- remarks,
however, can be made already.
Under Lenin's and Stalin's leadership, the CPSU made some great his-
torical choices and drew the main, lines of action which were of key im-
portance for the construction and the victories of Socialism, for the de-
feat of Fascism, and for Maintaining peace. -History has already witnessed
the soundness of those choices and basic trends, such as the revolution and
the taking of power; the soviets as the foundation of the new State, and
the success of Socialism in a single country after the defeat of the revo-
.1lations that were either carried out or atteMpted in Central and Western
,Europe, and so on.
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A siriegi of events,brought,abput by the harshness of the class strug-
gle on,the internal and,international level required the centralization of
, deoisieh!laking'in the hands of the Polshevik Party to enable its leaders,
.first, to deal with the,reaction?civilwarv:and imperialist intervention,
,and, second,.-- folloWing the New conemic,,Policy, which implied the need
to approach a more advanced stage of the class struggle -- to prevent a
resurgence 44,9Apitalism and-te,start the reconstruption work on new, So-
? cialist foundations. This meant the need .for the development of.Socialist
heavy industry, collectivization ofagriculture, and th9 ezeention and im-
, plementation.of the early Five-Year Plans, All of that made it , necessary
to fight deviations of the left and right :and -r due.to Lenin's Premature
death -- to undertake a difficult, struggle to guarantee a unity of goals,
leadership, and action.
Accurate an thprough,research, would be required to determine whe-
ther the, first signs. of -a tendency that evolved into the predominance of
top-heavy bureaucratic party and State apparatus. due to. the peculiar, fea-
tures of Stalin's personality could be detected at that early stage. It
is certain, however, that most problems solved, not hY,following the usual
,practices of proletarian democracy, but hY the imposition from the top of
decisions which were being taken ,an increasingly more -restricted group
of leaders.,
It must be acknowledged that thosegreat and just political choices
by necessity Put a,tremendous pressure Op all proletarian, popular, and na-
tional energies, and brought about a high degree of power concentration in
a country which found itself in the unique situation of being the first and
only country infIhS wprld.where Socialism was being built.. The key mistake
made at the,time.wae Probably the failure in the part of the Soviet leaders
to recognize that tha need to centralize decision-making implied a concomi-
tant need,te_develop.proletarian democracy; that is to say, that democracy
and centraliPation are not contradictory, terms for a revolutionary movement,
but, on the contrary, they are closely interrelated and complementary,
What happened was that -- once the more difficult stages of Social-
ist construction had been overcome -r those unusual leadership methods were
not only retained, but were rationalized, extended, and even given thee-
rstical justification. ,.Thus, the just, and well-motivated fight against
Trotskyite and rightist,opposition degenerated into the impossibility for
any members to offer any new political theses. A disproportionate praise
for the successes achieved, a formalistic idea of Party "monolithism," and
the practice of .the personality cult became increasingly more important.
This was very serious because it was taking place at a time when --
in spite of mistakes and undue haste -- the First Five-Year Plan had
achieved extraordinary results by establishing Socialist heavy industry and
by changing the social make-up of the countryside. A new era had been in-
augurated! New and unavoidable contradictions and difficulties were the
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? logical result ot those changes. They should' have been acknowledged openly
in order to summon the working masses to deal with them more effectively
through their conscious cooperation.
-
The consequences of those. errors are well known; The tendency to
consider any and all difficulties as the result of sabotage by class enemies
or counterrevolutionists was of particular gravity. Stalin rationalized
this tendency and developed it into the well-known mistaken thesis that the
further Socialism progresses, the harsher the class struggle becomes.
. Hence, La reacting against the sabotage that was being carried on by
real enemies', any ability to discriminate and separate the gbod from the
bad was lost. A comrade and an honest citizen could not be distinguished
from a real enemy and saboteur, and objective work mistakes, contradictions,
and obstacles could not be distinguished from truly hostile actions. Un-
heard-of violations of Socialist legality followed; these finally took the -
tom of criminal and repulsive actions. Thus, serious damage was done to
the entire revolutionary movement and to. the Marxist-Leninist theory, above
all in the USSR; but also on a worldwide scale.
And yet -- atr the same time the movement achieved victories of
truly historical importance. The structure of old Russia was changed rad-
ically. Tremendous progress was achieved in all mass economic, technical,
and cultural fields. In spite of all the mistakes made, anew force acti-
vated numberless masses of men, created new productive forces and brought
about a new consciousness by releasing latent powerful human energies.
The years which witnessed the most serious manifestationa of errors,
repressions, and distortions were also the years which saw the Seventh Com-
munist International Congress condemn severely all sectarian tendencies
and adopt a united,democratic-platform against Fascism. At the same time,
the Soviet Union was developing its policy of peace and laying the founda-
tions of the great anti-Fascist front. Later on, during the Great Patriotic
War 5orld War If,. thanks to the .heroism and to the moral and political
unity rallied around the Party and Government banner on the social founda-
tion of Socialism, the Soviet peoples repulsed the aggression and struck a
deadly blow at Nazism, thus gaining the admiration and the gratitude of all
progressive people.
Following the war, the conflict between the masses' initiative and
spirit and bureaucratic and constrictive practices grew even more serious
at a time when heavy sacrifices were required by the struggle to maintain
peace against an aggresSive imperialism which had a monopoly on atomic
weapons. It was also a new era characterized by the formation of a number
of Socialist states, the victory of the great Chinese revolution, the liqui-
dation of colonialism, and the enthusiasm and self-assurance of Communists
and the Soviet people who had won the war.
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Errors and distortions, however -- no matter how serious -- have not
ieoPardized or damaged heavily, the Prof9undlY.democratic substance and
foundations of Socialist,eociety. In factt the forces that,brought about
the turns of the 20th and 22nd Congresees sprang forth from the very bosom
of that society and of t46 Communist Party.
7. The problem concerning safeguards for the future was debated
amply, at the last Congrese. A number of steps intended to expand and
guarantee democracy at all levelsof,Soviet organization have been-proposed,
adopted, and partly realized. The Party, statutes have been amended, re-
? forms have been adopted IA the field of econsemic, planning by expanding the
functions. of the soviets, tradeUnions, and the ether workers' organize- .
tions, and by devising new legal sefeguards to,ensure personal freedom.
? .
When the State power is in the hands of the work.ing class, the best
guarantee for freedom lies in the development of a democratic life in all
its organizations, in economic and social progress, and in the development
of culture, education and the political and civic activities of all citi-
zens.
The problem of institutional safeguards of Socialist legality and
of development of democracy must be, placed within this framework. In deal-
ing"with this fundamental problem, one should realize the real developments
Made by democracy in the Soviet Union, and also realize that democracy in
" the Soviet thliOn cannot possibly develop -- aeourantagonists and certain
Socialist leaders would eeem to. think -- in a fashion similar to bourgeois
?democracy, but that it must be realized within the mainstream of soviet
democracy.
At the same time, it should be acknowledged that this problem eannot
be settled once and for all. Due to its institutions, contents, and ob-
jectives, Socialist democracy is profoundly different from bourgeois de-
mocracy, not simply from the viewpoint of its historical developments in
the Soviet Union and in the other Socialist countries, but also from the
viewpoint of its future possible developments in new countries, even though
it may follow patterns and forms which today are typical of bourgeois de-
mocracy, such as the parliamentary system, party pluralism, the existence
of a majority and a minority, etc.
This is so because Socialist democracy -- in spite of the different
forms it may.take--- must always be based on real and direct participation
by the workers and the people in the study and solution of all problems
related to their life and future, starting from the basic production trends
and advancing toward an ever greater improvement of the cultural and ma-
terial conditions of workers, of their human and professional dignity, and
of their place within society.
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The transition from Socialism to Communism will afford the realiza-
tion of these goals at an even higher level by freeing man from future
needs and. fears and by freeing society from all limitations imposed from -
above. This is the meaning of the steps indicated by the 22nd Congress to
progressively reduce the State and to increase the role played by voluntary
associations of citizens.
The CPSU Program states that in this area the dictatorship of the
proletariat has already fulfilled its mission in the USSR and that during
the transition phase from Socialism to Communism the State will turn in-
creasingly into a State of all the people. 'Within such a State, the Com-
munist. Party will play the role of the leading organization in the social
and economic life of the country. Communist society, in fact, cannot be
an anarchistic society but -- on the contrary -- a highly organized so-
ciety based on a solid technical and economic foundation and on the spon-
taneous support of popular organizations by all citizens who will perform
directly the role which at present is performed by the State.
8. Following the 20th Congress and the denunciation of the
tragic mistakes of the Stalin era, the issue of the political responsibili-
ties of other Communist Parties, including our own Party, together with
the negative influences of the personality cult on their development, was
raised openly. With regard to this problem, we did not -- and will not --
simply reject our enemies' attacks by throwing back at them the dung with
which they are trying to cover the Italian Communist Party and its leaders.
That would be much too easy!
All attempts to defame the Italian Communist Party have always
achieved a result which has been the opposite to the one intended. The
Communist Party, in fact,- by its correct policy and Struggle and by its
belfeabrifiCe and honesty has always been a key force in the fight against
Fascism, for democracy and for the regeneration of the country.
However, while fighting against such attacks and, even more, against
the corrupting and insidious actions inspired by the Social-Democrats and
the petty bourgeoisie, we have also tried, following the 20th Congress, to
carry on a severe self-criticism and to correct our actions accordingly.
Our Party did not ignore but accepted the harshness of the revolu-
tionary process as it wne carried out in the Soviet Union and was aware in
part of the tense internal struggles of the Soviet Party and of certain
painful events.
What our Party did not know and did not realize was that some of
that harshness was in no way justified by the need to defend the revolution
from hostile activities, but on the contrary it was zimply the consequence
of errors and abuses. This was due to a large extent to cur lack of knowl-
edge of specific events, unavoidable under the very difficult and particular
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circumstances of the anti-Fascist struggle and conspiracy, political emi-
gration, the Spanish ear, and the need to face the Nazi aggression united.
On the other hand, the very system of government established by
Stalin made it impossible for all other parties to know exactly what was
going on within the CPSU. Our responsibility lies in two objective errors
which we were able to identify and acknowledge during our Seventh Congress.
The first error was the supine acceptance of Stalin's groundless thesis
concerning the unavoidable and ever-increasing harshness of class struggle
within the Soviet Union corresponding to an increasingly more solid estab-
lishment of Socialism. This thesis was based on a profoundly personal and
sectarian interest, but we were unable to identify and reject it. And yet,
it was that very thesis which made us accept and justify the huge repressive
actions such as the great purge trials, which had already been made public.
Our second error was that, following the USSR practice, we steadily
and unilaterally over-estimated our successes and went fzm an understand-
able acknowledgement of the ability and merit of a statesman and revolu-
tionist such as Stalin to an exaggerated exaltation of his personality and
role. Furthermore, we did ,not reject certain noneducational and rhetorical
forms of propaganda .which were opposed to the true nature of Socialism.
This took place in spite of the fact that the prevailing trend, mentality,
and attitude of our Party had always been oriented toward the goal of
equipping the party with the ability to carry out objective analyses and
to develop effective propaganda, free from rhetoric and superficiality.
Substantial progress has been achieved and new initiatives have been
undertaken since our Eighth Congress, such :as the tour of Socialist coun-
tries made by our research and study teams and the publication of books,
articles, and special reports leading to a more objective and rounded eval-
uation of problems and situations existing in Socialist countries. It
should be acknowledged, however, that the progress achieved in this area
is still unsatisfactory.
Yet the basic problem is a different one. It concerns the autonomy
which the Party must enjoy in its struggle in order to achieve Socialism
by an original, democratic, and national way, while practicing the kind of
international solidarity which has always existed between our Party, the
Soviet Union, and the International Communist Movement.
The bonds of proletarian internationalism were never imposed on us
by anybody. They are the natural expression of the class and international
character of our movement, of an identity of ideals and revolutionary prin-
ciples, of our great political goals, and of the enemies we have to fight.
This ideological and political interrelationship and solidarity with the
Soviet Union and the International Communist Movement has always been a
basic source of strength fpr the Italian workers' movement and for our Party,
and a key factor in achieving the right revolutionary posture.
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Pince October 1917, during the most trying moments of the struggle
against Fascism, during the war of liberation and the struggle for peace
and democracy in Italy, internationalism has helped our Party in the search
for a revolutionary road consistent with the national situation and with
the grand design of democratic unity against fascism and in favor of a
democratic and Socialist regeneration of the country. When we made a
choice based on our solidarity with the Soviet Union, throughout the vari-
ous stages of development of the international and soviet policy, we made
a conscious and political choice whose historical and political soundness
:we wish to reaffirm in full.
Proletarian internationalism is and will be one of the main pillars
of our policy, together with a profound attachment and adaptation to the
national situation and to. assarch.fer new methods grounded on the princi-
ples of Marxism-LeninisM.
It should, however, be acknowledged that our Party's autonomy --
which-no one has hampered intentionally -- was nevertheless limited by the
Supine adceptance:of,:the above-mentioned theses and propaganda methods and
by the fact that our original political experience and outlook was not al-
ways used in 4 logical and. consistent way, namely, in a way which could
have afforded our natty a Sounder perspective and greater spirit. The rec-
ognition on our part of. such defects is of basic importance for a more
creative political and theoretical search in order to carry on our struggle
with enthusiasm and: in order that our Party may contribute as much as
possible to a greater political and theoretical unity of the International
Communist and Workeril Movement.
The more we, are able to react against any kind of Social-Democratic
and antagonistic influence, the more we will be able to achieve full and
concrete autonomy, to strengthen the international consciousness of our
Party, and to disseminate among popular and working masses more knowledge
of, and support for, the Soviet Union.
III
9. The 22nd CPSU Congress has also dealt with the problem of
guaranteeing -- in the present stage of development -- the unity of the
International Communist Movement. Attention was focused on this problem
by conflicts that broke out openly between many parties and the Chinese
Communist.Party with regard to the just and severe public condemnation of
Albania's trend toward 4 kind of degenerate authoritarianism which implies
serious violations of democracy and international solidarity.
It.would be a serious mistake to interpret such contrasts and other
differences of, opinions that have taken place or may take place on other
occasions between Communist arid Workers' Parties as a sign of lack of unity
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and solidarity on a worldwide basis of the tommpnist Movement, or to see
in such contrasts the start of a series of serious splits and conflicts.
In spite of all contrasts and differences even on important prob-
lems concerning the strategy and tactics of the workers! movement and the
overall evaluation of the international situation, there is among all Com-
munist Parties a basic identity of common principles and objectives. If
such a common basis were to breakup, there would be very serious conse-
quences for the movement as a whole and for the development of its individ-
ual member-parties. .No party can therefore shun the responsibility and the
fundamental duty of defending and strengthening the international solidarity
and unity of our movement.
Yet, it should be realized that today this problem presents profoundly
new aspects and characteristics. In particular, it should be kept in mind
that:
a) At present, the Communist Movement has reached an unprece-
dented expansion and includes branches in all parts of the world which
operate under sharply differing conditions. There are parties that are
leading the Socialist and Communist construction in a hest of countries hav-
ing very different historical traditions ,and socio-economic levels of de-
velopment. Two consequences of this situation should be emphasized.
First of all, there must be a ohoice of the most appropriate way to
Socialism in the various countries. Second, there must be a gradual elim-
ination of objective contrasts and differences, even of national Character,
which still exist and will unavoidably persist for a long time during the
political and economic phase of construction, Even in capitalistic coun-
tries there are great differences of objective situations and in the de-
velopment of Communist Parties.
Side by side with some great and politically advanced mass parties
there are other parties which, due to objective and subjective reasons,
have thus far been unable to play an important role in the political life
of the workers' movement .and of their countries.
Finally, there is an ever inereasing number of young parties which
have been organized during the last few years in colonial countries and in
countries which have achieved their independence only recently. These
parties find themselves at the very outset of an autonomous political and
ideological development. This peculiarity of the present situation of the
Communist Movement-makes the existence of a single guide-party or State, or
of a heavily centralized direction of the World Communist Movement, impossi-
ble -- as we have stated several times.
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The present situation calls for an,increasingly greater adaptation,
of our movement to, individual situations and for a full _autonomy of in-
dividual parties. This is the only way for individual parties to mold
their ideological principles, political objectives, and external organiza-
tion to different national situatibue:and to gain the ideological and po-
litical strength to achieve a position of political significance in their
countries.
b) There are,today)as there were in the past (and, in so= in-
stances, more than thereyere,in-the past), certain problems and needs which
are commonly shared by the entire Communist Movement. . ,Their solution calls
for the cooperation and aupPart:b7.41.part4s. Problems such as the strug-
gle against imperialism and reaction, for peace and coexistence, freedom
for all peoples, and further development of the workers' Socialist and demo-
cratic struggle which will be more in keeping with the conditions of capi-
talist countries are no doubt probaems which eachllarty.ehould pursue in
accordance with specific national situational, tet they also demand that
every effort be made to overagae,contrasta,.t0 agree on and strengthen a
cannon evaluation of the internati,onal situation and a common strategy of
the workers' movement at large.
? ,
, .
10. At present, a very serious problem shared by the whole move-
ment consists of the need to insure new creative developments in Communist
ideology and of its ability to cope with the new problems created by the
profound and complex changes of the world structure and of class struggle,
both on a national and international level.
It must .be_acknowiedgedopenly that the great expansion undergone bY
our movement during the last 10-15 years, the great successes achieved, and
the growing influence of Communist policies and ideals on contemporary life
have not been. paralleled by a similar progress and expansion of our ide-
ology. This serious delay is mainly due, to the dogmatic fetters and dis-
tortions introduced by personality-cult practices into many phases of
Marxism-Leninism. Together with other objective reasons base& on thede-
velopment of European and world history of the last decades and on the con-
ditions of the workers' movement in Europe and in other countries, this
has slowed down and hampered the creative development and adaptation of
'Marxism-Leninism.
. Even from this viewpoint we considered the 20th cpsu Congress an
event of international significanoe and the beginning of a new turn for the
Communist Movement as a whole. . Our Party has already progressed along the
road which was opened by that Congress, and has redefined its positions,and
adapted its relations with other parties accordingly.
It shouldbe,sai4 however, that the ,international meetings of 1957
and of 1961 Sip" did not entirely meet the need for a, further developwent
of our theoretical and political positions. It is therefore necessary to
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march forward and to eliminate all dormatic influences, so that the work
for ideological and political research may advance. In particular, it is
necessary to carry on the struggle for a greater role and influence of the
Workerst democratic movement in Europe and in the capitalist West.
Hence, the principle of autonomy of each party -- and of respect for
the autonomy of other parties -- .struld not in the least be understood as
national-minded indifference to the worldwide class struggles for problems
of ideological development concerning the movement as a whole. Only a mul-
tiplicity of ideological and political contributions can afford a positive
solution to these problems,. even though one should always avoid expressing
small-minded, hasty, and presumptuous opinions in public concerning the
complex life and policy of other parties, because such oninions.eannot possi-
bly be based on all of their experiences, nor On the circumstances under
which they must operate.
A new set of rules governing interrelationships among Communist
parties should be set up on the basis of those manifold and complex needs.
The new system should envisage, first of, all, bilateral contacts and meet-
ings between parties operating under similar circumstances, such as the
Rome meeting of November 1959 of 17 parties of capitalist gbrope and simi?
lar meetings which have taken place in other parts of the world.
General conferences of ,all parties will also be useful under certain
conditions to reach common evaluations on the international situation and
general agreements on the world Cemmunist policy line? We believe, however,
that it is not necessary-to reach an agreement every time on allproblems,
because such agreement would most likely be a formal agreement only. On
the contrary., within certain limits, one should allow for differences of
opinions which obviously should not develop into irreparable ,conflicts and
political breaks. Furthermore, insofar as the great problems concerning
the development of our ideological and political line are concerned, one
should. hope that our internal debates, opinions, and theses be Carried on
even in public within the framework of true spirit of brothethood and sense
of responsibility.
Our party will move forward by relying on these foundations. We are
conscious of the fact that we Should contribute as much as possible to the
progress of the movement as a whole and to the solution of present problems.
The more we contribute, the more we will be able to strengthen our own poli-
cies and activities in our country. But we also realize that our experi-
encs should be compared particularly with those of parties in western capi-
'talist countries so as to teach a. sounder and more general knowledge of
common problems.i
Finally, it is necessary that our party organizations be better in,-
formed on debates concerning the great ideological and. political issues of
the Communist Movement.
?16?
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Iv
11. Our present party, debate must keep in close touch with the
Italian political Situation, with the repercussions of the 22nd Congress
on various other political groUpe, and more generally'with preeent prob-'
lems and perspectives.
?
All reactionary and conservative forces are tying to use the criti-
cisms and denunciations made at the 22nd CPSV'COngress to discredit Social-
ises ideals and achievements. This attack is accompanied by an attempt --
made in a cunning way particularly by revisionists, pocial Democrats and
Others -- to infiltrate the workers' movement and even our Party with ideas
foreign to the proletariat's 'revolutionary ideology and principles. itis
essential to realize that such an attempt is linked to a more general ef-
fort to enlarge the breaks and conflicts existing Within the Italian workers'
Movement, and to increase Social Democracy's influence'.
It should not be forgotten, however, that those attacks and attempts
also reflect a number of democratic and regenerating efforts based on the
lively interest and positive expectation large. groups of. public opinion
and democratic people are showing with regard to the Communist Movement and
to our problems, as aresult of the 22nd Congress. Beth these aspects should
be kept in mind to avoid serious mistakes .on aur part.
? Therefore, our Party is faced with. the task of repul6ing the enemy's
political and'ideelogical attack and the infiltration of revisionist, So-.
cial-DeMocratic, and petty bourgeois ideas and influencei and at the
same time of overcoming sectarian and dogmatic obstacles. At the same
time, the Party must associate itself openly and effectively with democratic
efforts based on renewed interest in our policy by indreasing contacts and
relations with ether forces and by developing a united action and autonomous
initiative throughput the COuntrv.
v
Above arid beyond any impractical, mechanical, and unimaginative re-
lation between our Party and the 22nd Congress, our real task is utilize the
regenerating charge that the 22nd Congress has imparted to the whole Com-
munist Movement and the present political reawakening of our organizations
in order to insure further progress in every field without losing sight of
the situation of both party and country. The struggle will be carried on
two different fronts.
The chief problems and tasks that the Party will have to face today
And in the immediate future are, on the whole, the following:
1)-,I0 redefine the Patty politital line by relating it in a more
organic way to world ComMuniatetrategy, in particular in the more advanced
Western Capitalist countries.' At present, in fact, the problem of the
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?
advancement. of the working class and of its political alliances-in order to
defeat the great capitalist monopolies and to achieve new social and po-
litical institutionais,more acute than ever.
2) To insure a fuller and more consistent execution of our line
by all organizations, and therefore to emphasize the unity-minded position
of the Party on the great issues of peace, democratic development, and
struggle against monopolies and in favor of structural reforms.
,
3) To mobilize the Party for a vigorous and thorough Communist
.membership drive and to enlist new supporters.
4) To channel the present reawakening of interest in our ide-
ology and strategy in Italyand,in the world toward a study of the classical
works of Italian history and conditions, and the political
experience of Our Party.
5) TO proceed ,further on the road. leading to ,a renovation and
strengthening of the Partyin order to exert greater political influence
on our comrades and organizations; to extend and consolidate the concrete
unity of the Party around the Party line; to reach and define political
platforms which are more in keeping with the changes Italian society .is
presently undergoing; to adapt organizational structures and leadership and
work methods; to win the support of more workers,: young people, and women;
to promote new forces to leadership Positions in our organizations.
12. , The achievement of the above tasks calla for further de-
velopment of the Party's internal' democratic life.
To reach this goal any attempt leading to &change in the nature of
our Party as a Party based on active struggle, or implying an alteration
of the basic features acquired during many years of work, should be rejec-
ted firmly. Thought and action, political line, and practical organiza-
tion,are to us something which cannot be separated, but must be taken to-
gether as a whole. Furthermore, one should never forget that the starting
and ending point of all of our debates is the acknowledgement of a common
basis and the search for atheoretical and operational unity of the entire
Party. This implies the inadmissibility of organized factions and trends
within the Party which would bring about a progressive disintegration of
the Party's democratic life.
The development of this 'democratic behavior does not exclude but
im-
plies a more extended and increasingly more conscious participation by the
Party members in the Party's political life, a free manifestation and ex-
pression of opinions and even contrasts during debates and votes which will
take place in accordance with the wording of our Party Statutes. The prac-
tice by all of an attitude based on understanding and tolerance must pre-
vent mere contrasts from developing into open breaks and disciplinary ac-
tions.
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After debating all problems freely, and agreeing on a given line,
there must be full support of the decisions taken, and of their fulfill?
ment, by all comrades and organizations.
The Leninist principle of democratic centralism which -- together
with all other rights and duties -- is embodied in our Party Statutes should
be held as a guarantee that the Party's internal democratic practices and
ability to function will be strengthened, and should be used as a means to
encourage an increasingly larger and more active participation by the mem?
bers in Party Life, and to correct bureaucratic distortions and small?
minded methods and procedures.
? END ?
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ithrouchtchev ne
rehabilitera ?as
Trotsky
AtN51 donc, peu ?od,.' Khrouchtchev
confirme touter les accusetions pollees
par teen Trotsky centre Steidle. Tau.
tefols, et cela est d'Importance, Khrouchtchev
prend blen loin de ne pas mama mention.
nor to nom du fondateur de l'Armee Rouge.
De tour les crimes de Staline ii Ignore ise?-
plus ignoble. Mats pe01-11 !Ignorer 7 Evi.
demment non.
Cele merde quelque reflexion.
Les 'unites de ia
destalinisation
II serolt stuplde de no pas apprecler a
as valeur ? mats a sa lunto valour -- l'of.
fort entrepris par Khroute tchev dans la vote
de la deitalinisation. En effet co (lull a sc.
comp?! ? le peu gull a accompli pour
rehabiliter quelques revolutIonnaires vic6.
men du regime stallnien n'a guere satin.
felt les hommet mtse en place par Stallne
at qua Khrouchtchev a conserves. On en
salt quelque chose en France pulsque Mate
rice Thorez est toujours le, au poste qui lel
a Ate affect6 per Staline lei-mama.
En U.R.S.S. une certaine -destalinisation
de Pepperell du Pesti a ete realisee. U no
po-uvait en etre eutrernent pulsqu'll s'agIss
salt pour Khrouchtchev et see amis d'une'
question de vie ou de mon. Cest-einsi qua
Berle, le principele creature de Staline (Be-
rta qui n'etalt manse pas membre du Pesti
Communtste), al ton err crolt les revelations
faites par Khrouchtchev mats qui devint to-
pendent to chef de !Inquisition) a 616 ell-
guide physiquement a et quelques autres
teasel. Mats la tate de taus les Partis Com.
Munition, dans les derriocratie populaires ou
allleurs, demeurent les autres creatures de
Stallne.? '
.DepUls les premieres accusations portees
per Khrouchtchev centre Staline, toes les
.Thorez de l'apparell s'etatent enfermds
dans on silence hostile. Or, depots to der-
Mos congres du P.C. de l'U.R.S.S., les horn-
mos de Sialine... destalinisent, Cost-a-dire
qu'lls deboulonnent quelques statues du
Chef genial no debaptisent des rues. Male
qu'ont-Ils chenge au fonctionnement des par.
tincornmunistes 7 lien.
II apparatt donc que Khrouchtchev a choisi
non pee' de nettoyer radicalement in mal-
son, en epurant Pepperell des complices
du bourreau, Male au contraire de convala-
eta ces dernters de la necessiie de 'aider
dans sa tackle. Et lie y out apparemment
consenti. Dans tee conditions, on pout no
demander quelles soft les limites de la
destalirdsation entreprlse par Khrouchtchev.
Et ces ilmites sont imposees per la neces-
site de smaintenir I tout , pries Peppered
actual en place. Et non seulement l'appa.
roil, male biers entendu les, methodes du
istalinisme en les reformant quelque peu,
en les a humanlsant e. eest sins! gull a
6t6 convene en U.R.S.S., d'apres les read.
latIons faites par a K a, que les minor!.
Anises du Bureau politlqya (les a devotion.
Metes e) ne seralent pips assassines. II fau-
dralt atm fou pour no pas reconnaitre que
cast ass progres. Male convient-II, pour des
revoludonnalres, Wen falici ter Khrovilit-
they 7 Assurement pas. ?
,S1 nous anions vecu on Made plus tat,
eurlonenous applaud! Napoleon III quoted
II conduislt le regime de l'EmPire Autord-
take a l'Empire Liberal 7 Nous aurions 6t6
evIdemment ,avec les Republiceins ? qui re-
deubtalent leers attaques pour false chan-
color l'Empire.
Pourquoi
Khrouchtehev
destatinise
Si Napoleon III a liberalised a l'Empire,
c'dtalt parco qu'il y Malt contralnt. Son
trans chancelait at il estimait qua seules
des concesalons pouvaient le sauver. Bien
entendu, II no fit pas appel aux Republi-
Caine pour cette a liberalisation e mats flex
Bonapartistes, ii s'agiasait de barrer la
route la Republique. Khroliehtchev ne de.
mande pas lo secoura des revoiutionnaires
pour 'a. destaliniser a mais des Stallniens
car il s'assit de harms la route a la Revo-
lution. Or, Is rehabilitation de Trotsky ai-
gnifiereit tout simplement la fin de tout
les Thorez, quilt seises( Russes,' Allemande,
Freneata Cu eutres. D'ailleurs, Khrouchtchev
seat exprlme ties clairement sur les lin-rites
entandeit vole respecter pour l'opere-
lion de destalinisation. Car en Nemesis to
.rra sent pas les Thorez qui rant deboulOnne
les statues de Stalk's, mats le people au
promoter rang duquel lea militants ?eyries's
du Parti Communists. Et Khrouchtchev ?
tire au canon dens le people. II faudralt
tout de memo s'en souvenir.
L'operation Khrouchtchev consiste I eau.
ver tout to qui pout Atre seuve du stall.
flame. En restant fIceS sur les positions du
stall-1'111mo integral, Khrouchtchev risquareit
d'Atre balaye par. to revoke de ceux qua
en U.R.S.S., rant eu un pere, on here, une
mere, une sceur, on cousin, un marl, on
ami assessIn6 par l'equipe Staline.Beris.
Ils tont des dizalnes de millions. Et sl
Khrouchtchev a decide de ve'rser des pen-
nons aux veuves et aux orphelins des vic-
times des e purges a, c'est parce qu'tl lot
failed Inter un peu de bourne sur les plaice.
J'al pu recuaillir le temoignage d'un
camerade qui te trouvalt- dens un camp
sovIettque au moment de la mort de Sic'
line. Dans co camp, oh 11 y avail 200.000
prisonnlers, la revolte eclata. Le signal en
avail rate donne par on vioux boichevik. un
, des premiers adherents du Patti de L6n1ne,
membre de 'opposition de gauche (trot.
skyste) et on dot rares rescapes de ta
? vieille garde a. II avail lance l'insurrec-
Von seulement apres avoir obtenu ? grace
I one lialsoh Mobile par des cheminots --
des renseignements parvehant de Moscou
lul laissent crolre qua la eituation Malt
mOre pour le declenchement de la Revo-
lution. (Les cherninots avalent reipporte un
tract IMPRIME appelant les ouvrlere I to
revolter pour en finir avec la clIcteture.)
? Bien entendu, l'analyse faite par ce victim
? revolutionnaire &ad fausse masque la Re-
volution n'a pas' eclate. Male ii y a eu des
troubles serieux en differents -polnts de
l'U.R.S.S.
Khrouchtchev est beaucoup mleux rensel-
gn6 qua nous sur ten evenements. ? II salt
fort bion, lul, pourquol 11 fallait a lather
du lest a. 11 West pas doeteux que se tao
Vows sort revelde Intelligente at gull a
meme acquis, de cotta fagots, une mistime
,popularite. Toutefois 11 n'a pas encore ga-
gne a partle. Les communlstes !Whims
expliquent que Khrouchtchev a 616 contralnt
d'agir ainsi sous .1a pression des leunes
du Patti. Ils ont certainement raison mare
II feet neuter que la pression venue des
masses out encore plus Inquietante pour lui.
Les runners d'etudianls qui ont epplaudi
an lourie poete revolutionnalre, lore de
l'anniversaire de la most de Malakowsky,
treulent la destalIntsatIon totale, Is ont
ovationne cc leen? poete qul denongait los
crimes &Riser/Ides commis on U.R.S.S.
appelatt I !utter contre le regime de
Khrouchtchev, pour un gouvernement demo.
cratique des ouvrlers at des paysans. lis
l'ont port6 en trlomphe. Dans l'hIstaire de
tovtes les Revolutions, on retrouve de belies
manifestations d'etudlants, annonciatrices de
la revolte ouvriere. On pout facllement ima-
giner que 'Khrouchtchev a fait comprendre
-1 taus les Thorez Ou vous m'alclez
dans la vole que l'al choisie an a destali-
resent a, ou nous serons bus balayes en-
semble e.
Aussi eleigne
du inarxisme
que Franco
Lorsque Nathalte Trotsky a dernande
rehabilitation du compagnen de Lenine,
elle s'adressalt on fait Cu people sov.6-
tique at non pas A Khrouchtchev. Elle vptl.
bait .demontrer precisereent rese Khroucht-
-thee, en refusant cette rJralemlitatlon. Malt
reste le col-apace de Sta.line. Co, ahroticht.
chev no pout pretendre avoir Ignore les
crimes de Staline, cc qui serail on eves
d'insbdcillitC pal n'est pas concevable. C'est
bottle la direction stallnienne qui est re:-
por.sehle de l'assassinat de Trotsky et des
millions de reveletionna des letes dans is
camps de conaentratton. Nathalie Trotsky a
precise rP.silleurs maelle considered l'ac-
tuel reeime sovietique a eussl elolgne du
marxisme at de la revolution proletarlenne
qua eeare de Franco en Espagne a. Et elle
a *tate s La torreur policiere at les r_a-
lomnIes de Staline n'etalent qua respect
politique d'une lutte I mon contre la rive.
Teflon, merles per Vensemble de la bureau.,
deities, On no pout donc attendre le niter.
blIssement de toute le verde qua de Vanden.
tIssernent de cotta bureaucratie par la clam
ouvrIere qu'elle a recluite I l'esclavage. Jo
n'espere den du partI russe nl de sets
Imitateurs foncierement enticommunistes.
Mute destalinisatIon s'averere un leurre, st
elle tee va pas lesqu'a la prise du pouv-olr
per le proletariat at to dissolution des Ins-
titutions pollcieres, politiques, militalres et
economIques, bases de la contrerevelutIon
qui a Rahn le capitalism, d'Etat stalinien,
Quand
Khrouchtchev
park pour
Debr?
D'allleurs, al Khrouchtehev ?rehabilitait
TrotSky, Imagine-t-on Thorez ouvrant les
range du P.C. pour y faire entree tous coos
clue trottkystes d'hter or, d'aulourd'hul, ou
almplement antistallnlens, Pont chimed
comma fossoyeur de la Revolution Socia-
list*? II *OM d'enonter cotta hypothese
pOur en souligner l'abaurdit6. Le probleme
est Identique erT U.R.S.S, I cotta difference
pres, toutefola, qua les trotskystes, la-bas,
ont etb assessines. Mats II y a dos marts
qul font encore plus peer que les vivantse
Khrouchtchev a des preoccupations d'IM
autra ordre; repetoes-le endlgiser To me-
contentement. Cela est el vral n'a pas
craInt, dens am discours prononce to 14
novembre I Tsellnograd, de se rkarer I
Debre (sans le. nommer II est veal). pour
repondre I un ouvrier mecentent. 11 s'agls-
salt d'un cenducteur de tracteur qui se p1;1.
Omit de l'Insuffisance des salaires. Et K a
repondu a Le niveau des salaires dolt
repondre I celut de la production at du
randement/le rendement de la rnn!n crceU.
ere dolt toulohrs dePasser Vanementation
des salaires. a. Debre at Khrouststahev, pla-
ces devant les memos revendications. am.
*lent les memos, arguments pour y re-
pondre. Main en U.R..F.S. la question pos6e
par be tractoriete a on caractere revolution-
sabre- et la reponse do K est on aveu
nique des positions rdictionnalres de he
bureaucratie qul s'aligne sur le C,N.P.F.
Parml les autres problemes qui- se pa-
sent on U.R.S.S. II faut fluter le prollfe.
radon des scandales, Le dernier en dirt*
merits 'd'atre rappele , des chefs d'entre-
prise ant escroque 150 MILLIARDS de francs
en vendant du tulle pour des rideashr de
fenetres. it y a eu 54 arrestations de per-
. sonnages appurtenant torts I Pepperell diri.
geant de la societe sovietique. Si l'on corn-
prend Wen, chacun de cos personnages
Fail un benefice de Pereira de deux mile
ilards de francs. Et Us s'achetaient des all-
ies A la cempagne et cies automobiles.
a Volga bleues , a (le grand luxe sovid.
tique). On no fait pas mieux en regime
capitaliste.
Main n'est-co pas le be signe de la pour-
rlture d'un regime? Et be fameux Pleat
sovietique, comment fonctionne-t-11 dont 7
Comment des escrocs peuvent-ils betle a clan,
destInernent a one usIne terur appertenent,
et una usine prospare pulsque rapportant
150 milliards de BENEFICES, sans que les
plenificateurs sun apergoivent.
SI to Pare. UBU presided aux destines-3
de la planification ?sovietique II n'er, trait
pas autrement.
In magnifique, de l'histotre, en effet,
c'est qua sl l'escroquarte, a pu reussir,
c'est parce qua les escrocs ant put decanter
satisfaction I on besoln (des rideaux do
fenetres ii que to bureaucretie, elle, ev't
negligee
Matheureusement, les enemas n'ont pea
trouve le moyen de suppleer aux detail-
lances de la bureaucratle dans to domaina,
allmentalre ; s'ils pouvalent fahriquer de
Ta vianda, du beurre, mix sucre, lis seraleet
tenement populaires que les voles du pot/-
vets leer seralent toutes grandes euvertes.
Mats cc West pas to genre de st destali.
nisatIon s quo nous souhaitons. La neve,
cent cella qui a dte reclarnee par les etc-
clients de Moscou et par le trectoriste de
Ian teograd.
Marcel BRIAND
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LA NATION SOCIALISTE
DEctimarzE 1961
ETTE'ioisei, lea choses 'Wont pas tralne ;
.les fleqrs- de Chou ,En Lai etaient it peine
fames quo .deja, le eadavre -de. Staline etait
. &menage vers on endroit .discret; loin de l'ado,
ration des tattles. Alors qu'eu 1956, .et scion
.Phumeur des dirigeants ou in pression des masses, ?
on avait timideutent deboulonne une statue par
.ci,-rchaptise une avenue par la, ii s'es-t produit,
depuis la fin du XXIfe Congres, une veritable ?
frenesie d'emulation socialiste pour effacer de
tons les Heim publics le. souvenir- de Staline
Stalingrad, ni les rues de nos municipalites corn-
munistes, n'ont trouve grace (levant l'ardeur tar.
? dive des contempteurs du ? crate de In pereon-
nalite ?. ? -
' La tache &sit .cependant lourde, au point
qu'un de nos ?confreres de in presse parisienne:
malicieusement? propose, pour . simplifier les
choses et epargner tout cc travail aux: conimu-
nisies, de retirer ii Staline le surnom S'etait
ehoisi, et de no plus desormais le designer qu'avee
son patronyme d'origine Stabile n'aurait ainsi
jamais existe, mais simplement urn sinistre erimi- .
Ind du nom de Djougaehvilli. La comedic de de-
stalinisation a laquelle .s'adonnent in plupart des
partis eommunistes du monde entier no:medic
pas tnieux que cette boutade. En concentrant
tention du public sur des episodes burlesques 01.1
aneedotiqUes, les dirigeants eommimistes se livrent,
mutes proportions gardees, au /Dente exereice quo
ees pinardiers pen serupuleux qui, par des substi'-'.
tutions d'etiqucttes, s'efforcent de presenter de,
piqrtettes SOUS tin join' plus favorable
mais le yin Ike s'ameliore pas pour .autant.
, .
2,IA 5
tri
.C.41
,
1
? Les erreurs, les fai.-21457 CrittleS ile Stnlitle a,
.emotne on (lit aujourd'hui, no Si Oat pas corrigj:s,
ou pnnis- par intense laiwnr de voirie
eommunale anquel nous assiskoH depois un umis.
lisne seront pas davantar,e cxpliques par cote
'oda ssab le den on cia ion dtf dO 1Ipe rson.
qui n'a et,S au fond, lonigre !,les dimensions
...a.ligeantes et son - earaca:re pit toresque, qu'un
4,SOCet $000ndnire de!in reidittS sovictique. Los
merites des ? grands hommes ? sont celeb-res dans
d'autres pays quo ceux de l'univers marxiste-leni-
niste, mais qui, en France, songerait a expliquer
les erreurs de la politique. gaulliste par l'exis-
tence d'innombraldes avenues du General De
Gaulle Ce qu'il y avait de choquant dans
latrie staliniertne, c'etait sans (Joule son carac-
fere demesure et.indecent, mais c!etait aussi qu'elle
s'appliquait a un homme dont les- qualites
poll-
tiques ne pouvaient faire oublier les incalculables
forfaits. Et ces forfaits etaient perpetres, non pas.
en raison du eulte de In personnalite, mais grace
aux possibilites offerten par on systeme totalitaire
qui etouffe toutes les discussions sinceres, musele
on aneantit, scion le ens, les oppositions, et im--
pose comme unique verite, cello elaboree par un
Parti aux structures apparemment democratiques,
mais dont in centralisation . integrale aboutit a
concentrer clans les mains d'une poignee de diri-
geants, on parfois d'un seul, tons les pouvoirs,
sans aucun element compensateur.
Dans on monde oil n'existe aucune des libertes
fondamentales (parole, reunion, promo, associa-
tion), sinon sur le papier, ?it l'Administration
.peut interner on deporter a an guise, oil tont
accuse est incapable de se faire assister conve-
nablement devant une, justice domestiquee, oit la
police cst tonic puissante, oil les, ge.neurs devien-
neat des: traitres et les tiedes des saboteurs corn-
pliees de l'imperialisme, le champ est Mire. pour
les ? erreurs, les fautes el les crimes des
geants ?.
LAJI
NAL' EISCI
ji:A.Arer
1/tjdiV5S/2;"
Lf
.i?.
C'est pourquoi ii- est parfaitement hypocrite
&accuser Staline d'avoir tratti le leminisme, d'avoir
denature fes caseignements de Linine, etc.
est :vrai Ito moment de .sa vie Lenine a
e!gprim6 sue In hrtatalip"; de Sta.
line, Ss:1 temojcament eill,riciettx. et son mangoo
do patkn,..-, loyauttS ci 00 correetion ?, il est
aussi. v4.ridititte one &est grace A T,":.eine, et de
Hon vivant-, (ruo; Stabile a (1.6 tl?i,mu ecraaire
?Ge.o."?o-.!.1 (h) et pea a ? accomulti entre
ses un oouvoir dLuesore- )..). Les uroc47:d47.9.
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in du temps -de &Clarke, out abouti
_
-sedulernevit do-.in boting:eolsie tsariate;
muds aussi .'des non-boicheviks et Cu premier lieu
oke, soelanx:deumerates menebevika. ent servi plus
nava, an regime stalinien pour 67dludacr les com-
naaniste,s empecheurs de tourner en rend ou :red-
cam's. Pit quo do so lamenter sur 105 violations
do, a legalite soeialiste D par Stalin?, ii serait
).shts exact do coaatater qu'il en a utilise A fond
'4-:utes des ressoureeS. Et semble 'quo, depuiS
venue nu pouvoir d Khreueliteltex, on no
deport? plus, on no torture plus, on n'a.ssassine
plus en 'Union Sovietique, Hen no protive quo
ania no soft plus possible, car l'armature du
rime reste intincte ; sous To regale de Napo-.
leon III, rempire liJn.ral .succ? a l'empire auto-
ritaire, MICIS c'etait toujours
'One veritable destalinisation remettrait en cause
les bases memos du syslearte sovietique, et in poli-
tique qu'id a suivie, it l'interieur commp A Vox-
terieur, de,puis sa creation. Ceux qui fluent les
executants de in politique stalinienne nous preei-
seront-ils un jour si, par exemplo, le pacte ger-
ratano-sovietique demeure mm? succes du peuple
sovietique tout enticr avec a an tete- le ,glorieux
? ou s'il n'est plus qu'un forfait do
Stalinn,auquel, pour faire bonne'mesure, on asso-
eicra l'antiparti..Molotov ? - ? '
Es STA I MIENS
-
Ats
MgrISTM, AVMIjLiiVer I /VP; EVE
Et surtout tine veritable destalinisation contrain-
drait au. silence eeux qui s'en font maintenant
les apetresa Car a la difference -de Gomulka, ou
? memo .de Kadar, qui, en 1956, pouvaient se pre.-
valoir, sinon d'une grande lucidite politique, tout
au moms des persecutions dont us avaient souf-
?fort du fait' du stalinismo, les destalinisateurs, en .: .
Union Sovietique' et en France, cherchent A role- d-
pier' dans l'oubli leur comportment y a
quelques annees. Or, sans .staliniens, et memo
avec Staline, ii n'y aurait pas eu de Stalinism?,
et dans le genre stalinien .forcene, on no trouve
pas mieux quo ?Khronchtchey ou. Thorez., pour
no retenir qiIe ces deux exemples.triatement
Le Plus adroit des deux', cat evidemtnent
Khrouchtehev qui, ,des' 1956, acomprit le -parti
quil pourrait tirer, pour In conquete du pouvoir
. supreme, de la transformation de Lou sou maitre
Staline en repou.ssoir des horreurs de quarante ans
de dictature. Et, du memo coup, cc spectaculaire
retournement aiderait it rejeter 'dans l'ombre Pat-
titude particulierement repugnante de. Khroucht-
alley pendant l'ere stalinienne. Car lorsqu'on re.
monte aux sources, il apparait quo jusqu'a la mort
do Staline toute la carefere politique de Khroueltt-
chey.s'est faite A la favour des exees du stalinismo,
quo (Ample epuration, chaque purge a &?our
1tsi l'occasion de gravir un echelon supplementaire-
laa8 In hierarchic sovietique, on sans quo cot
aaanceznent nit ete acquis par dos prodigas de
basatulse et de lacbete. Les coif:nu-tea de cc -journal
oc suffiraient pas A reproduire les innond,rables
-propos et it relater les agissements
? K. ?, dent la prolixite et l'activite
loam: sent hien commnuen. iais quelques illustras
tinas -Ineritent cependant &etre tournies it cc qni
-tient (rare (lit.
?. ,
? ? '4 V., ? r".!'
?
aoAt 1936, en nannent do la limn': in!
Zinoviev, do Icrres cluaatmics, .
Khrouelitchev ecrivait dans los ? Itve,stia
Quiconque se rejouit des ?s?tteces realises -dans
notre pays -et des .victeires remportees par ? metres
parti dirige pan lea grand Staline, me trouvera
qu'utt C111 mot digne le chinnyinercenturea fas-
eiste.s dir gang trotskysteninosdeveue. Co Mot,
? c'est la mart par execution. Quo le chef dc cc gang,
alfie do In Gestapo allemande. : Trotsky, soit
abstat do cc proces, 1/1 furOur du peuple, In son-
lance de metrenibunal l'atteindront toutefois
"ta'ireporte ? Et Trotsky .fut assas,sineam
cnne, en .1940, par un agent de la G.P.U.. ; 'quant
Kamenev et Zinoviev, ils ,avaient ete abattus
des la fin du ? proces D. ?
: ? Le memo .Khrouchtehey, six jours avant l'exe-
? cation de Toukhatchevski et- de sea ? complices ?,
? burlait A la mort dans ces termes : ? Quo ces trai- .
, ? trea., .1cs Tonkltatcheyski et autres Gamarnik, sa-
- chent quo nous lea .dem..asquerons et aneantirons,
? que nous les reduirons jusqu'au dernier en pous-
aiere quo mans laisserons se disperser par le vent
, din quo in mOincire trace neareate plus de ces.
....renegats et _de ces traitres it in patrie ?socialiste.
LEU
. ? ? - ?
cook .01+ t91/ tj E. ?
,
? ? . .
. ? ? II
- 4CAIT 14 ? '? .
_
?
? AujOurd'hni, Khrouchtehev- rend Staline soul
coupabie de ces massacres, il pane de rehabilfter
ces a traitres et ces renegats et d'edifier un
monument A leur memoire t. ?? .
? La Menne moisson,de citations accablantes pour-
, raft etre rassemblee sur 'la devotion sincere .ou
feinte, quo Khrouchtchey portait &line. Deux
echantillons d'une ganame extraordinairement
riche donneront? une idee? du 'talent de ? K. ? en
? ce ?clomaina. Ainsi cc telegramme qu'il fit envoyer
? en. 1930 par des femmes de Kiev A Staline : a Les
, yeux ,de nos 'enfants se rallument de joie lorsqu'ils
disent : Stalin?, vous Cies notre fierte, vous etes
.notre. espoir d'aujourd'Imi,.vous etes encore .da-
vantage' noire :ayenir radieux. ? Ou encore' cet
invraiseinblable diseours prononce on 1950 it Poe-
.? ea'sion du 70e anniyersairc de Staline, sun le theme,
? de, a Pamitie, stalinienne des peuples gage de
Pinvincibilite d,e notic panic n, cu fourmillent
dei flatteries ecceurantes cOmme celles-ci :a Tons
les peuples de l'Union sovietique, toute l'huma-
? .nite progressive ,celehrent cette date cher? du
70e 'anniyersaire'de 'Joseph Vissarionoviteli Sta.,
line, notre guide genial et metre educateur. Des
millions d'hommes adrcssent leurs pills profoncls
sentiments d'amour et de devouement au canna-
rade Staline... Lo ? camorade Stannic, chef genial
et educateur de notre Partin'. Le nom du cain,a-
rade Staline est lo drapeau de touter les victoires
? du peuple? sovietique... Aussi cst-ee avec le plus
vii sentiment d'affection et d'amour filial quo les
pennies do notre pays appellent le grand Staline,
leur ?peso, leur grand chef et edunateur giset i al.?
Glo ire. an pere aime, it l'eclueateur eelaire, an
? chef genial du Parti, du penple sovietinue nt des
? travailleurs du :monde entier, am canutrade Sta-
line.
? Etc., etc...
Ceei montre assez quo le maitre de In Itussic
3961 'Ida anoint titre it s'exiger on redresseur de
teats, en v,,.rtgeur des vietinaes qu'il ii contribite it
,,ivoyer a la mort.r. ?
ijp,51
?eeHT qid e Inissvit complaiNAnnuelit.
t]l;r:crIc Uti do ,;x lt-te.;.11evr.:c sia?.ion do Penn-
m6x4e- encore_ ceito quolifiegaion, ii
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voutu; aniorcer? le visage snit' winirmArit cii
15C), ear an dotite in situation n'etailt pas Ires
c'est-a-dire spell n'etait pas evident que
jis tendanee qui Pentporterait en U.R.S.S. remit
colic do Krouchteliev. Mai, apres in XXII?
Congres,II s'cst plie docilement aux nouvelles
instruCtions, et in voila aussi ? destalinisatenr ?
que Isle-semi le demande.?Le demi-tour tnanque
inutefois de legerete,- et les raisons &tutees aux
iIitauts out quelque chose d'assez piteux, Et
quand Maurice Thorez essaie de se tirer de .ce.
'nes assurement ("Meat cii insinuant qu'apres
tout, s'il y a en des erreurs, des fautes ou des
crimes, e'est en Union sovietique .qu'elles ont en
lien, /dors qu'en France, in democratic interieure,
la direction. collective out toujours eta' en hon.
inur anP.C.F., on 'a peine a croire quo c'etait in
menie homme qui se laissait encenser sans pudeur
longueur d'annee. Qui no c souvient des anni.
versaires de Maurice Thom's:, avec les gros titres
en premiere page de a L'ITuniltnite ??et In tableau
d'honneur .des rneillcures cellules, cellos qui of-
fraient les plus beaux cadeaux ? Est-cc un
? 'pant sovietique qui s'ecriait a,Nous. saluons, In
?creur plein d'amour et de confiancee le guide- et
? l'educateur des communistes du monde ender,
l'arehitecte du communisme, in champion., do in
paix, de l'independanee et de Ia'souverainete des
peuples; le 'eartrarade. Staline, Cdoire
. tour., et an ? guide des communistes'. de, tons les
pays, a l'ami?et au here des?travailleurs du mon-
de entier,'It notre cher.. et grand camarade Stall-
ne 5). Le style ferait -croire a un quelconque_
Khrouchtchev, mais ens platitudes sont extraiteg.
du ? saint an XIXe Congres du P.C. (b) ?, adios- -
se .par Maurice 'Thorez en 1952, devant Staline
en chair et en' os... On lions croira sans peine ii.
nous aUtirmons tenir en .reserve une abondante.
litterature de en genre. Mats a ens Messieurs qui .
feignent aujoiad'hui,. la douleur on 'Indignation
? devant l'i'dole gulls viennent de hriser, apreS
l'avoir. fabriqueee -on comprend que beaucoup de,
'militants .communistes aient envie de dire ;
? Pas ca, et pas 1v-0ns.! ?.
antisovietiques tout cc qui pouvait se dire on se
publier on clesaccord avec in liene- (Middle, its
se croient plonges en plein cam:ben-0e : celui qu
etait genial devient eriminel, les bons deviennent
des mechants, les .? traitres ? sont rebabilites, bref
'c'est le monde It l'envers. us no peuvent plaider
'Ignorance, si cc n'est cello tra ils out decide de
demeurer, car il fallait etre sOurd et aveugle en
France, on diablement reclaim, pour refuses do
se rendre It quelques evidences. Mais us souligne.
? tont true leur stalinisme a Mix, communistes fran.
cane emit totalements clesinteresse, puisqu'a la
difference de buns camaracleS sovietiques, ifs vis
vaieni, sons un re.gime qui ye .montrait anomie
bienveillance narticuliere i ceux qui se precia.
minima staliniens : nairs sans doute (et ynerite
credules?a l'exces), mais purs...
Ii n'est 'pas question de S'apitOyer sum lour '
deconvenue presente, car l'esprit de fidelite an
'Patti ne saurait excuser ?Pabsence de tout sens
, critique,. Ie fanatisme borne, et patfois la calotn-
nie facile contrc des camarades plus avises, qui
no pouvant plus y tenir, etouffant sous le men-
songe et la betise, quittaient le P.C.F. Mats ii
.faut constater qu'une masse important? de mein.
bres du P.C.F. et de communistes sans apparte-
? mince est profondement ebrardee, quo certains
mem?, so senteni franchement malheureux, un
pen perdus, ne sachant plus oti us en sont, De
totu cOtes pleuVent sur eux Ins sareasmes et les,
moqueries, et si in ridicule no tue 'plus, cc West
pas pour autant une situation bien' agreable.
IINE CHANCE
POUR LE 541 CIALISINE
?
convient-il",que" les socialistes, en cette eircons-
,;, lance, alignent leur Compartement sur eelui des
milieux reactionnaires, dont la?campagne antista.
purement negative, vise a degoilter les
travailleurs communistes de toute espece d'action
on de conviction politique ? fly a mieux a faire.
? Depuis longtemps, les ? socialistes deplorent la
? sterilisation. par le. P.C.F. d'une partie importan-
te de la force politique. que representent les tra.
vailleurs, et en premier lieu, les ouvriers. iran-
cais longtemps, nous. enrageens de veir
ces communistes, qui souvent ne sont que des so-
cialistes qui sIgnorent, consnerer leur energie Cl,
bum sincerite, It Itt . defense (Pune cause dont us
s'obstinent a in pas apercevoir qu'elle, est le
contraire, en fast, tic leurs aspirations.
Eh hien, le moment est vent] oil les socialistes
? out des chances plus grandes de faire admettre in
justesse de leurs -convictions par ce,s communis
tes, naguere d'eux, maintenant desempae
-res : us se readmit comptc que burrs .dirigeants
ont mend- sur pas mal de eboses, -l'Union sovieti-
que, Staline, les experiences atomiques, :etc...
mais qui, Hilton 1.6s, socialistes, lour demontrera
? qu'ils out ete trompes de la turrie facon stir lc
Parti socialiste ? Cela, a .de rams exceptions pres,
Us ne decouvriront pas tout seuls, et cc n'est
pas la lecture de la grande pres,se ou reeeute dts
la radio et de la television qui le leur apprendra,
Ce West pas non plus la pratique de l'unite frac-
-' lion, on pire, des actions communes entre (ergs-
- ? nisations conanumistes et socialistes, puisque pour
le P.C.F. toute action commune, theme ebaueltee,
si faible suit-elle, est claironneo comme Uri Sue-
cm Cu P.C.F.
Non. Ce travail d'eclaireissement, de reconver-
sion, ne se fora quo par des eontacts personnels,
d online i it om me, qui no laisse rant dans Porn-
bre IMCIATIC des raisons pour lesqeselles les soda-
Mites Sc ttenuent. fermement sum lours positions et
rejettent sans equivoque le sovietisine.
Ii faltdra montre.r a cm camarades qu'ils tie
sont pas enfermes dans lc faux ditemme : rester,
memo avec rms. es'sestion Immense, an P.C.F.,
on tout Licher. Ii raudra les aides It se depetrer
de lour bourbier idi.,?ologhpue sont pets a
Futter encore pour uu socialisme libre et (Ian?.
-cratique, alors leur place est fill Parti soeialiste.
Francois VERON.
Les reactions sont cependant,. hien differentes
scion qu'elles out pour theatre les pays commit.:
nistes on les autres ..En Union Sovietique et dans
les .dernocraties populaires, le stalinisme etait in
doctrine officielle, le pouvoir. Si -un nombre non .
negligeable de communistes? etaient, sincerenient
tlevoues a Staline et imputaient n cc qui.,n'allart
pas ? aux echelons -intermediaires, Staline etant
.repute genial et ,infaillible, d'autres etaient .ita-
liniens pour 's.auver leur peau ou faire une belle
earriere. Quant It la masse de la 'population, elle
subissait en silence, ecrasee par la' terreur poli-
eiere et une' propagande.omnipresente, sans inoyens
ito s'informer on de s'exprimer librement. Il est
done vraisemblable qu'une destalinisation, memo
caricaturale:"sera accueillie avec favour par les
peuples sovietises, qui espereront que ce n'est
qu'un debut, et qu'une fois la machine lancee, elle
no s'arretera plus ? : pour ceux qui out vecu "'op-
pression 'stalinienne dans in vie de A-Otis les jours,
qui 'en out souffert personneIlement, physique.
silent parfois, le regime actuel represents) quand
meme et indiscutablement, un -progres.
?-;:y410;:i 'tz. ? ik
VSTE
lI'ufe TON
s
14.fais quelle desillusion pour les communistes
francais (Ceux de in base, hien Sax, car il y a
ngtemps quo les (Iirigeants.savent a spiel s en
tenir). Eux qui se soul toujours cramponnes It cc
quo leur affirmait le, Parti, et qui rangeaient sys.
. tematiquement dans le yuagasin des ealomnies
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"KHRUSI-ICHEV WILL "'VT REHABILITATE TROTSKY"
/ry Marcel Brian& La Nation. Socialiste (The, Socialist Nation),
Paris, No. 50, DeceMe7-1961, page 7/ Translation
Little by little, Khrushchev is confirming all of Leon Trotsky's
accusations against Stalin. And it is important that Khrushchev is always
careful not even to mention the name of the founder of the Red Array. Of
all Stalin's crimes he ignores the most ignoble. But can he ignore it?
Obviously not.
This merits reflection.
The Limits of De-Stalinization
It would be stupid to underestimate the effort Khrushchev has made in
the field of de-Stalinization. What he has accomplished -- the little that he
has accomplished -- in rehabilitating several revolutionaries Who were
victims of the Stalin regime has hardly been pleasing to the men installed
by Stalin whom Khrushchev has retained. We know eornething about this
in France inasmuch as Thorez is still in the post given him by Stalin himself.
A certain de-Stalinization of the Party machine has taken place in the
USSR. It could not be otherwise because it was a matter of life or death for
Khrushchev and his friends. Thus Beria, the principle creature of Stalin
(wh,:: was not even a Communist Party member it, Ithrushchev's revelations
are to be believed, but who became the chief of the inquisition) was "physi-
cally liquidated, "as were several -others. But other creatures of Stalin
remain at the head of all Communist Parties, in the peoples' democracies
and elsewhere.
Ever since Khrushchev made his first accusaticns against Stalin all the
Thorezes of the machine have wrapped themselves in hostile silence. And
since the last CPSU Congress Stalin's men are de-Stalinizing. That is to say,
they take down some statues of the genius Chief and change some street names.
But what have they changed in the functioning of the Communist Parties?
Nothing.
Therefore it seems that Khrushchev has not chosen to clean house
completely by purging the hangman's accomplices in the machine, but rather
to persuade the latter to help him in his task. And they apparently have
consented. In these conditions one wonders what the limits are to the
de-Stalinization undertaken by Khrushchev. These limits ?are imposed by the
need to keep the present apparatus in place at all costs. Not only the
apparatus but even Stalinist methods, by slightly reforming and "humanizing"
them. According to "K's" revelations, it has been decided in the ,USSR that
the minority in the Political Bureau (the rdeviationists") will no longer be
assassinated. Only a fool would not recognize this as progress. But, need
revolutionaries felicitate Khrushchev for it? Assuredly not.
Had. we lived a century earlier, w-uld we have applauded Napoleon III
when he led the country from the Authoritarian Empire towards the Liberal
Empire? ? We obviously would have been with the Republicans who redoubled
their attacks to bring the Empire down.
Why Khrushchev De -Stalinize s
If Napoleon III "liberalized" the Empire, it was because he was forced
to. His throne was tottering and he felt concessions alone could save it.
Obviously, he did not appeal to Republicans for this "liberalization" but to
Bonapartists. It was a matter of cloSing the road to the Republic. Khrushchev
is not asking help from revolutionaries to "de-Stalinize" but from Stalinites
because it is a matter of closing the road to the Revolution. The rehabilitation
of Trotsky would quite simply mean the end of all the Thorezes, be they .
Russian, German, French, or whatever. Khrushchev spoke quite clearly
about the limits he expected to see respected'in the de-Stalinization operation.
In Hungary it was not the Thorezes who toppled the statues of Stalin but the
people, among whose leading ranks were Militant workers of the communist
party. And Khrushchev fired cannon among the people. It is, after all,
important to remember this.
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Operation Khrushchev consists in saving all that can be saved of
Stalinism. By remaining immobile on positions Qf complete Stalinism,
Khrushchev would risk being swept away by the revolt of those in the USSR
who had a father, a brother, a mother, a sister, a cousin, or a friend
assassinated by the Stalin-Beria team. They number in the tens of millions.
And, if Khrushchev decided to pay pensions to the widows and orphans of the
victims of the "purges," it is because he had to put a little bairn on the wounds.
I have been able to acquire the testimony of a comrade who was in a
Soviet ca.mp4at the time of Stalin's death. Revolt broke out in this camp of
ZOO, 00.0 prisoners. The signal for it was given by an old Bolshevik, one of
Vie first members of Lenin's party, a member of the left opposition
(Trotskyite) and one of the few survivors of the "old guard." He started the
insurrection only after having obtained inforrnation from Moscow -- as a
result of liaison established by the railroad workers -- entitling him to
believe that the situation was ripe for the unleashing of the Revolution. (The
railroad workers had brought back with them a printed tract calling upon the
workers to revolt and put an end to the dictatorship.) The interpretation made
by this old revolutionary. was; obviously, false because the Revolution did not
break out. But there were serious troubles in different parts of the USSR.
Khrushchev is much better informed on these events than we are. He
knows well enough himself why it was necessary to "give in.'" There is no
doubt that his tactic was intelligent and that in this way he has even acquired
a certain popularity. Nevertheless, he has not yet won the game. Italian
communists explain. that Khrushchev was forced to act this way because of
pressure from the young people in the party. They are certainly right, but
it must be added that pressure coming from the people is even more disturbing
for him.
The thousands of students who applauded the young revolutionary poet at
the time of the anniversary of the death of Mayakovskiy want total de-Stalini-
zation. They gave an ovation to this young poet who denounced the anti-
Semitic crimes in the USSR and called for a struggle against the regime of
Ithrushchev and for a democratic government of workers and peasants. They
carried him off in triumph. In the history of all revolutions, there are found
such student demonstrations, announcing the workers'a*.evolt. It can easily
be imagined that Khrushchev made all the Thorezes understand, "Either you
help me in the Way I have chosen by "de-Stalinizing, " or you will all be swept
away together."
As Removed from Marxism as Franco
When Nathalie Trotsky sought the rehabilitation of Lenin's companion,
she addressed herself to the Soviet people and not to Khrushchev. She
wanted to demonstrate precisely that TV refusing this rehabilitation, Khrushchev
remained an accomplice of Stalin. Khrushchev cannot pretend to have been un-
aware of Stalin's crimes for this would be an avowal of unbelievable imbecility.
It is the entire Stalinite leadership which is responsible for the assassination
of Trotsky and million.s of revolutionaries thrown in concentration camps.
Nathalie Trotsky further pointed out that she considered the present Soviet
regime "as far removed from Marxism arid the proletarian revolution as that
of Franco in Spain." And she added, "The police terror and Stalin' 6 calumnies
were only the political aspect of a struggle. to the death against the revolution
led by the ensemble of the bureaucracy. One can no more expect the
re-establishment of the entire truth than the annihilation of this bureaucracy
by the working class it has reduced to slavery. I hope for nothing from the
Russian party nor from its basically anti-communist imitators. All
de-Stalinization will be confirmed as a delusion. if it does not reach the point
of the proletariat's seizure of the government and the dissolution of police,
political, military and economic institutions, bases of the counter-revoltition
established by i:he capitalism of the Stalinite state, "
When Khrushchev Speaks for Debre
Furthermore, if Khrushchev were to rehabilitate Trotsky, can one
imagine Thorez opening the ranks of the communist party to the Trotskyites
of yesterday or today, or simply anti-Stalinites who denounced him as the
gravedigger of the Socialist Revolution?' It is enough to state this hypothesis
to point out the absurdity of this idea. The problem is the same in the USSR
except for this small difference, that the Trotskyites there have been assassi-
nated. But, there are some dead who are more frightening than the living.
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21:hrushchev has preoccupations of a different order, let us repeat it:
to stem the discontent. This is so true that in a speech he gave the
14 November at Tselinograd he was not afraid to refer to Debre (without
naming him, it is true) to answer a dissatisfied worker. It was a matter
of a tractor driver who complained of the inadequacies of wages. And K
replied, "The salary level should correspond with the level of production
and return, The workers' production e7aould always exceed the level of
salaries. " Debre and Ithrushchev employ the same arguments in response
to the same claims. But in the USSI1 the question posed by the tractor
driver was of a revolutionary character, and K's reply was a cynical avowal
of he reactionary positions taken by the bureaucracy which is aliegned with
t'kee C. INT, -P. F.
Among the other problems arising in the USSR, one must note the
eoultiplication of scandels. The latest one is worth mention: some factory
ooa,nagers stole 150 billion francs /Fresurnably old francs, equivalent to
U.S. $3 billion/ by selling tulle fol.; window curtains. And 54 peirsons
were arrested.," all belbning to the management of this Soviet society. If
one correctly understands the case, each of these personages made a
profit on the order Of 2 billion francs. They bought country estates and
"Volga blue" automobiles (Soviet luxury models). You can't do better in
a capitalist regime.
But isn't this the sign of rotteness in a regime? Then, there is the
famous Soviet Irian, and how does that function? How can swindlers
"clandestinely" build a factory belonging to themselves and an enterprise
presperous enough to yield 150 billion in profits without the state planners
knowing about it?
If Father UBU presided over the destinies of Soviet planning it would
not have been otherwise.
The wonderful part of the story is that the swindle succeeded because
the swindlers satisfied a need (for window curtains)) that bureaucracy had
negle cted.
Unfortunately, swindlers have not found a way to make up for bureaucracy'e
failings in food supply; if they could manufacture treat, butter and sugar they
would be so popular that access to power would be wide open to them.
But it is not this kind of de-Stalinization that we desire. Ours is the
kind, sought by the students in Moscow and the tractor drive of Tselinograd.
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13:',10KEN IDOI.,S AND OPENED EYES"
My Francois Veron, La Nation Socialiste (The Socialist Nation),
Paris, No. 150,''DeceriTEeFT9-61,-TaTe7i7":17 Translation
This time things did not drag: Chou En-lairs flowers had scarcely
faded before Stalin's body was moved to a discreet spot far from the
adoration of the crowds. While in 1956, depending upon the humor of
leaders or the pressure-of the masses, there was a timid displacement
of a statue here or a rebaptism of a street there, since the end of the
22i-.d Congress a veritable frenzy of socialist emulation has taken place
for erasing all souvenirs of Stalin from all public places: neither Stalingrad,
nor the streets of our communist municipalities have found grace before the
delayed ardor of the haters of the "cult of personality."
The task was nevertheless great, to such a point that one of our
colleagues of the Parisian press maliciously proposed to simplify things
and save all, the communists this work by removing the surname Stalin
had chosen and no longer designating him except with his original patronym:
Stalin would thus never have existed, only a. sinister criminal by the name of
Dzhugashvili. The de-Stalinization comedy to which the majority of the
communist parties of the entire world devote themselves is worth no more
than this sally. By concentrating public attention on burlesque or anecdotal
episodes, communist leaders give themselves over to the same exercise as
unscrupulous vintners who by substituting labels try to present miserable
wines in a more favorable light: but the wine is not improved because of this.
Errors, Faults and Crimes
? '!Stalin's errors, faults and crimes" as they are called today, will not
be corrected, effaced or punished by this intense labor of communal sewers
we have witnessed for a month. They will be no more explained by this
tireless denunciation of the cult of personality which was, after all, in spite
of its distressing size and picturesque character, only a secondary aspect of
Soviet reality. The merits of "great men" are celebrated in countries other
than those of the Marxist-Leninist universe; but who in France would think
of explaining the errors of the Gaullist policy by the existence of innumerable
avenues called General de Gaulle? What was shocking in the Stalin idolatry
was without doubt its excessive and indecent character, but it was also that
it applied to a man whose political qualities could not cause the forgetting of
incalculable crimes. And these crimes were perpetrated not because of the
personality cult but because of the possibilities presezited by a totalitarian
system that smothered all aincere discussi.:ns and either muzzled or
destroyed opposition, according to the case, and imposed as unique truth that
formulated by a party of apparently democratic structure but whose complete
centralization succeeded in concentrating all powers in the hands of a handful
of leaders, or sometimes just one, without any compensating element.
In a world where none of the basic freedoms exist (Word, meeting, press
and association), if only on paper, where the administration can intern or
deport as it wishes, where each accused is incapable of suitably appearing
before a tamed justice, where the police is all-powerful and where trouble-
makers become traitors and lukewarrns become imperialism's accomplice
saboteurs, the field is open for "errors, faults and crimes of the leaders. "
Stalin, Faithful Disciple of Lenin
This is why it is completely hypocritical to accuse Stalin of having
betrayed Leninism, of having perverted the teachings of Lenin, etc. If it
is true that at one point in his life Lenin expressed his worries about Stalin's
brutality, "his capricious temperament and his lack of patience, loyalty and
correctness, " it is also true that it was because of Lenin and during his life-
time that Stalin was designated Secretary General of the communist party and
that he "accumulated excessive power in his hands." The procedures that at
the time of Lenin attained the annihilation not only of the Czarist bourgeoisie
but also of the non-Bolsheviks and primarily the social-democratic Mensheviks
served later during the Stalin regime to eliminate the standpat or reticent
comniunists. Eather than lamenting Stalin's violations of "socialist legality, "
it would be more exact to state that he made complete use of all their resources.
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(r-ont. )
And, if it should seem that since Khrushchev came to power there is no more
deportation, no more torture and no more assassination in the Soviet Union,
there is nothing to prove that this is no longer possible; the armature of the
regime remains intact. Under the reign of Napoleon III, the liberal empire
succeeded the authoritarian empire, but it was still the Empire.
A veritable de-Stalination would raise questions about the very bases of
the Soviet system and the policy it has followed internally as well as externally
since its creation. Will those who were the executors of the Stalin policy tell
us one day if, for example, the Russo-German pact is still a "success of the
entire Soviet people with the glorious CPSU at its head" or if it is no more
than a crime of Stalin to which one will associate the anti-party Molotov for
good measure?
Stalinites Against Stalin
And a veritable de-Stalinization will particularly constrain to silence
those who are now the apostles of it, because in contrast to Gomulka, or even
Kadar who could in 1956 take pride in themselves, if not for a great political
lucidity, at least for the persecutions they lad suffered as a result of Stalinism,
the de-Stalinizers in the Soviet Union and in France are trying to relegate to
oblivion their own behavior of a few years ago. Even with Stalin, there would
not have been any Stalinism, without Stalinites, and among the wild kind of
Stalinite, one can find none.better than Khrushchev or Thorez, to take only
these two sadly illustrious examples.
The more adroit of the two is obviously Khrushchev, who as early as
1956 understood the advantage he could win in the conquest for supreme power
by the transformation of his late master, Stalin, as a repository of the horrors
of 40 years of dictatorship. And, by the same stroke this spectacular turn
would help to over-shadow the particularly repugnant attitude of Khrushchev
during the Stalin era. Because, if one goes back to the beginning, it would
seem that until Stalin's death the entire political career of Khrushchev was
built on the basis of excesses of Stalinism, that each purge gave him the
opportunity to climb an additional rung in the Soviet hierarchy, not without
this advancement's being achieved through prodigies of villany and cowardice.
This newspaper's columns would not suffice to reprint the innumerable
examples and to relate "K's" ultra-Stalinite operations whose verbosity and
meddling activity are well. known. But it is nevertheless worthwhile to rite
a few illustrations of what has just been said.
Fascist Mercenary Dogs
At the time of the liquidation of Ka.menev, Zinoviev and their comrades,
Khrushchev wrote in Izvestia of 23 August 1936, "Whoever rejoices in the
victories won by our party led by the great Stalin will find but one word worthy
of the fascist mercenary dogs of the Trotsky - Zinoviev gang. This word is
death by execution. Even if Trotsky, the head of this gang allied to the
German Gestapo, is absent from the trial, the fury of the people aud the
sentence of our court will reach him, no matter where." And Trotsky was
assassinated in Mexico in 1940 by an agent of the GPU; Kamenev and Zinoviev
were killed at the end of the "trial."
Six days before the execution of Tukhachevskiy and his "accomplices,"
the same Khrushchev screamed death in these terms, "Let these traitors,
the Tukhachevskiys and other Garnarniks, know that we will unmask and
destroy them, that we will reduce them to dust so the wind may scatter them
and not the smallest trace will remain of these renegades and traitors to the
socialist fatherland, "
... They Will Have Their Monument
Today, Khrushchev makes Stalin alone guilty of these massacres. He
talks of rehabilitating these "traitors and renegades" and of building a
monument to their memory!
The same harvest of oppressive citations could be gathered on the
subject of the devotion, sincere or feigned, Khrushchev bore Stalin. Two
samples from an extraordinarily rich range will give an Wee. of "K's" talent
in this field. Such was the telegram he had the women of Kiev send Stalin in
1938, "Our children's eyes light up with joy when they say, 'Stalin, you are
our pride, you are .? ? %Ink" ? ?
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T
our hope today, even more, you arc our radiant future. " Cr, a.gain, this
unbelievable speech given in 1950.at the time of Stalin's 70th birthday on the
theme of "The People's Friendship for Stalin, Symbol of the Invincibility of -
Our Country," in which there swarmed such nauseating flattery as, "All the
people of the Soviet Union, and all progressive mankind celebrate this
precious date of the 70th birthday of Joseph Vissarionbvitch Stalin, our guiding
genius and teacher.. Millions of men send their deepest feelings of love and
devotion to comrade Stalin... Comrade Stalin; our party's genius vbilefoand
teacher... Comrade Stalin's name is the flag of all the =victories of the Soviet
people...So it is that with the greatest feeling of affection and filial love the
people of our country call the great Stalin their. father, their great chief, and
genial teacher.. Glory to the beloved father, to the enlightened teacher, to the
genial chief of the party, of the Soviet people and the workers of the entire
world, to comrade Stalin." Etc. ,
This is enough to show that the 1961 master of Russia is not entitled to
build himself up as the redresser of wrongs and the avenger of those victims
he helped to send to their death.
iequst Thorez Be De-Stalinized?
As for the man who complacently allowed himself to be attributed the
title of "France's Best Stalinite, " and who still deserves this title, he did
not want to take the curve imposed in 1956, doubtlessly because the situation
was not very clear; that is to say, it was not apparent that the tendency that
Would win in the USSR would be Khrushchev's. But, after the 22nd Congress,
he docilely complied with the new instructions, and now here he is as good
a "de-Stalinizer" as Moscow cculd wish. The about-face lacks nimbleness
and the reasons given the militants are pitiful. And, when Maurice Thorez
tries to extricate himSelf from this assuredly delicate step by insinuating that
after all, if there were errors, faults or crimes, they took 'place in the
Soviet Union, while in France, internal democracy and collective leadership
have always been honored in the French communist party, one has a hard
time believing that this is the same man who without modesty let himself be
flattered year in and year out. Who does not remember Maurice Thorez's
birtlidays, with the big headlines on the first page of l'Hurnanite and the
honor roll of the best cells, those offering the finest gilts. Was it a Soviet
leader who cried, "With the heart full of love and confidence, we greet the
guide and educator for communists of the entire world, architect of communism,
champion of peace, independence and the sovereignty of the peoples. comrade
Gliary to the teacher and guide of communists of all countries, to the
friend and brother of the workers of the entire world, and to our dear, great
eomrade Stalin." The style would make one think of some Khrushchev, but
these platitudes are extracts from the "Greeting to the 19th Congress of the
Comrnunitet Party(b)" addressed by Maurice Thorez in 1952 to Stalin in the
flesh and blood... There will be no difficulty in believing us when we say we
have an abundant literature of this kind in reserve. But, it is readily under-
stood that militant communists want to say to these gentlemen who today feign
grief or indignation for the idol they have just shattered after having created
it, "Not this from you!"
Some Comfort...
Reactions are, however, quite different depending upon whether their
theater is communist countries or others. In the Soviet Union and the People's
Democracies, Stalinism was the official doctrine, the government. If a
significant number of Communists were sincerely devoted to Stalin and ascribed
"whatever was not right" to intermediate ranks, since Stalin had the reputation
of being a genius and infallible, others were Stalinites to save their hides or to
build a successful career. The mass of the population, crushed by police
terror and an omnipresent pri.paganda, without means of informing itself or
freely oxpressing itself, submitted in silence. It is, thus, probable that a
de-Stalinization, even in caricature will be greeted with favor by Soviet :people
who will hope that it. is not just a beginning and that once the machine is in
motion, it will not stop again: for those who lived through the Stalin oppression
in everyday life and who suffered personally from it, sometimes physically,
the present regime even so represents an indiscutable progress.
Consternation
But what disillusion for French communists! (Those at the base, to be
sure, because for a long time the leaders knew what to reckon with.) Those
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who clung desperately to what the party tsld them, and v4,,,,o syTtematically
arrayed everything that could be said or published in disagreement with the
official line in a storehouse of anti-Soviet calumnies believe themselves in
the midst of a nightmare: the man who was a genius becomes a criminal,
the good become the bad, and "traitors" are rehabilitated, in short, the
world is upside down. They cannot plead ignorance, unless that is what
they had decided to remain, because one would have to be deaf and blind in
France, or devilishly sectarian, to refuse to accept the evidence. But
they will point out that their own Stalinism, that of French communists, was
totally disinterested., because in contrast with their Soviet comrades, they
lived under a regime that showed no particular benevolence to those claiming
to be Stalinites: naive beyond doubt (and even excessively credulous), but
nure...
There ia no question ,of taking pity on their present discomfort because,
the spirit of fidelity to the party could not possibly excuse the absence of
all critical sense, stubborn fanatasisrn, and sometimes easy calumny - against
better informed comrades who, ,no longer able to stand it, smothering
beneath lies and stupidity, left the French communist party. But, it must
be pointed out that an important group of members of the French communist
party and communists without membership is deeply disturbed, that some of
them even feel frankly unhappy, a little lost, not knowing any more where
they ire. From all sides rsarcasm and mockery, rain upon them, and if
ridicule no longer kills, it still does not mean that this is a pleasant situation.
Chance For Socialism
Is it, appropriate in this circumstance for socialists to match their
behavior ;with that of reactionary groups whose purely negative anti-Stalin
campaign is aimed at arousing the aversion of communist werkers for all
kind a of action or political conviction? We have better things to do.. For
a long time socialists- have deplored the French communist party's sterili-
zation of an important part of the political force represented by workers, .
French -worker's to begin with. For a long time we have been enraged by the
:.ti.ght. of these cornrhunists who often are no more than socialists unaware of,
each other devote their energy and their sincerity to the -defense of a cause
they refuse to see is, in effect, contrary to their aspirations.
.And .so ,? the moment has come when socialists have a greater chance
to.have.the wisdom of their convictions admitted by these communists,
formerly so ,sure- Of themselves, now disabled: they realize that their leaders
have lied about quite a few things, the Soviet Union, Stalin, atomic experi-
n-.tents, etc, but who,. if not the socialists, will show them that they have
been deceived in the same way about the socialist party? With very few
exceptions they 'willaot find this out all by themselves, and it is not by
reading important newspapers, and listening to the radio or the television
that they will find out. Nor is it the practice of unity of action, or worse,
common action between communist and socialist organizations since for the
French cornnaunist party all common action, even meager, no matter how
weak it may be, is trumpeted as a success of the French communist party.
No. This work of enlightenment and reconversion will only take place
through personal contacts, man to man, that will leave in no way obscured
the reasons for tvhich socialists firmly maintain their prositions and
unequivocally reject Sovietism.
It will be necessary to show these comrades they are not bound up in a
false dilemma: to remain, even with a shameful resignation /Translator: .
printing bad; this is only a guess7, in the French communist party, or to
give everything up. They musebe helped to disentangle themselves from
.their id.eological quagmire: if they are ready once again to, struggle for a
free and democratic socialism, then their place is in the socialist party.
4
Approved For Release 2000/08/27 : CIA-RDP78-03061A000100050010-6