THE KHRUSHCHEV ATTACK ON STALIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP78-02771R000200180001-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 28, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 21, 1956
• Content Type: REPORT

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21 June 1956
The vehemence of Khrushchev's attack on Stalin before the 20th Con-
gress of the CPSU suggests that Khrushchev and his colleagues bear pro-
found psychological scars from their experience with the naked power
of a dictator. Having lived under a common terror., they wish to pre-
vent its recurrence by establishing a greater degree of collective
rule. But the history of totalitarianism shows that this tenuous bal-
ance of power at the top of the pyramid cannot be maintained and there
is no warrant in Soviet experience for the new leaders' success.
Lenin, whose "principles" they invoke., left no model for collec-
tive leadership. At the Ninth Party Congress he said "the Soviet
Socialist Democracy is in no way inconsistent with the rule and dic-
tatorship of one person." (Collected Works, Vol. XVII, p. 899 1923
edition). Lenin did sharerh s power annconsult his associates more
than Stalin did. But as time went on9 he progressively tightened the
machinery of control and repression--the Party apparatus, the secret
police., and a legal system which gave the state broad powers for the
practice of "Party democracy," especially after the Kronstadt revolt
of 1921. And the complaints from within the Party during Lenin's life-
time were similar., though milder, to those now directed against Stalin's
regime, Party democracy was eroding, the right to criticize was being
denied., the party was becoming estranged from the people.
Thus, when Khrushchev called for a return to collective leader-
ship, "democratic centralism.," constructive criticism, and attentive-
ness by Party leaders to the needs of lower echelons, he was referring
to a theoretical apparatus that has never functioned successfully for
any length of time. The present members of the Presidium are certain-
ly aware of this. They are consciously trying to keep the inevitable
power struggle within bounds., to substitute consultation and self-
criticism for terror. Thus., despite confessions of error., Molotov
and Malenkov are still on the-Presidium.,
But the Soviet leaders are experimenting with collective rule
in the full knowledge of past Soviet failure to achieve it. And
Khrushchev's speech is a reminder that the experiment is taking place
against a background of suspicion and a climate of guilt engendered
by the Stalin years and the Stalin crimes in which the present leaders,
without exception, were implicated. Although they share a common
compulsion to make "Leninist principles" operative, it is probable
that they will be unable to prevent a new polarization of power to a
single man. `Djilas., the brilliant theoretician so largely responsible
for Tito's correct estimate of developments in the Communist world$
has now predicted in a widely-syndicated article that Khrushchev will
make himself a dictator within three years.
00CROALNT NO.
NO CHAr CLASS.
L-1 DECLASS
-- CLASS;. CHANGED
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The possibility should not be excluded that the present leaders
were involved in Stalin's death. Khrushchev acknowledged in his speech
that Stalin evidently planned to finish off the older members of the
Politburo., and he pointedly remarked that had Stalin lived another few
months., "Comrades Molotov and Mikoyan probably would not have delivered
any speeches in this congress." Several learned and highly qualified
students of Soviet affairs interpret this as an indication that Molotov
and Mikoyan may have disagreed with steps taken by their colleagues
to end Stalin's rule., and that Khrushchev was taking pains to associate
them with his portrayal of Stalin as a monster., probably as insurance
against a subsequent revelation of the facts surrounding the dictator's
demise. Some of our reports suggest that this interpretation is cor-
rect. If verified., the plot against Stalin will in itself explain the
decision to denigrate him so brutally, and will also enhance the prob-
ability of a new outbreak of violence in the struggle for power.
Apart from the virulence of the attack on Stalin., the present
leaders had good reasons for departing from his policies.,, which they
evidently regarded as inadequate., harmful., and even dangerous. His
police and his purges had impaired Party morale- his personal rule had
frozen the bureaucracy into attitudes of rigid caution. A change was
needed to Impart efficiency and a modicum of initiative in the manage-
ment of political and economic affairs. The same rigidity and lack
of imagination afflicted the Party leadership outside the Soviet Union.
While ostensibly promulgating "Leninist principles.," Khrushchev and
his colleagues were evidently more interested in infusing new revo-
lutionary zeal into the hardened Party arteries.
Abroad., Stalin's policies were uniting the enemies of Communism
and alienating the neutral nations. Stalin's strategy took no ac-
count of the new situation posed by nuclear weapons and jet propul-
sion. Aware of the growing resistance to the thinly-masked aggres-
siveness of the Stalin era9_ the new leaders realized that military
force no longer could be employed openly in local conflicts without
risking general conflict. And they were not ready to risk general
war for purely offensive purposes until they had achieved a relative
nuclear potential greater than they now possess. For the time being.,
Khrushchev and his colleagues wished to play down the military weapons
at their disposal and to reassure the West of their peaceful purposes.
In breaking with Stalin, however., they have no intention of relax-
ing their efforts to improve their capabilities for eventual armed
conflict. Stalin's death gave them a convenient opportunity to put
on a "new look" and to identify the new regime with "peaceful coex-
istence." The break with Stalin therefore signals a more subtle
economic and political offensive to achieve the continuing Commu-
nist goal of world domination.
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In weighing the consequences throughout the Communist and the
free world of the decision to renounce Stalin., one should not over-
look the elementary significance of Khrushchev's speech, The present
leader of world Communism acknowledged that twenty years of terror and
disaster had taken place under Communist rule. To be sure., Khrushchev
said nothing of the forced labor camps., the horrors of agricultural
collectivization., the sacrifices wrung from peasants and workers to
pay for the development of heavy industry., the total repression of
freedom for the masses. The grievances he enumerated against Stalin
were Party grievances. Even so9 it was addaamaging admission which
not only will repel non-Communists but will impair the morale of Com-
munists everywhere, After all,, the violation of theoretical. Party
norms for a generation cannot be dismissed as a temporary aberration,
Apparently the Kremlin rulers calculated that this damage could
be repaired and Party discipline maintained. They surely estimated
that the risks were outweighed by the gains to be anticipated from
their dramatic break with the past, The risks and the anticipated
gains will be briefly considered here as they relate to the CPSU9 the
satellite Parties., and the international Communist movement.
First, it may be noted that the Soviet leaders had no intention
of relaxing their dictatorship of the Party,, nor the Party's complete
supremacy in all aspects of Soviet life. Khru.shchev's invitation
to criticism did not extend. to remarks directed against decisions of
the Party leadership. Already the leadership and its official organs
have excoriated the "rotten elements whos, under the guise of attacks
on the cult of personality, have questioned Party authority. Shepilov.,
delivering the main address at the Lenin anniversary celebration of
22 April reminded his audience that collective leadership does not
mean "administration by production meetings., schoola9 ary9 and so
forth." The selection of the 20th Congress for delivery of the cli-
mactic attack on Stalin was itself a demonstration of the fact that
changes in the Party line will be handed down from the top as before,
In the portion of Kh ushchev's speech available to us there
is no reference to the satellites, The post-Stalin strategy., however
appears to call for some show of independence on the part of the
satellite parties and governments, calculated to improve their pros-
pects for expanding commercial and cultural relations with the West.,
and also to strengthen their appeal to elements of the population who
have been demanding priority for national as opposed to Soviet interests.
Khrushchev's speech, however., has caused profound embarrassment
to the Party leaders in the satellites. For these leaders served
Stalin and are identified with his policies- and they cannot., like
Khrushchev9 absolve themselves by pleading helplessness before Stalin's
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tyranny,, since this would constitute an acknowledgement that they have.
never in fact been independent of the Kremlin's dictates. To add to
their difficulties, Khrushchev?s violent indictment of the Communist
regime which the satellite Parties had faithfully served has touched
off a wave of cynicism among important intellectual and idealistic
elements of those Parties. The result has been embarrassment, con-
fusion and factionalism, the rehabilitation of leaders purged during
the Stalin regime, demands upon the present leaders for self-criticism,
and'in some cases their replacement by new leaders.
Moscow must have anticipated some such reaction. But the demands
for revision certainly have exceeded anything that either the Kremlin
or the Party hierarchies had expected. Our reports show that ferment
in the satellites has been greatly increased by the unexpected publi-
cation of Khrushchev5s secret speech. The Kremlin had counted on a
process of "education49 to feed the new line gradually to the gepeople& s
democracies." The sudden revelation of specific details of the
Stalin era has provided a shock which the satellite Parties have been
unable to absorb without lose of discipline.
Party leaders in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary were unpre-
pared for the open displays of discontent exhibited in recent weeks
by writers, students and Party functionaries. The entire apparatus
of Communist control stood by in temporary paralysis while students
in Czechoslovakia publicly demanded that their regime hall down the
Soviet flag and hired airplanes to spread their words throughout the
state. Local Czech Party leaders have openly criticized the Czech
Communist hierarchy.
Reaction to the denigration of Stalin has been even more violent
in Poland, where it brought into the open rising discontent among
Party members and intellectuals. A number of influential functionaries,
including a majority of the central Party Active, have pressed for
democratization of the Party, an increase in individual political
security, a real rise in the standard of living and a more independ-
ent socialist course for Poland.
one to great lengths to persuade th
ime has
h
g
reg
The Polis
people that it is divorcing itself from the excesses of Stalinism
and launching a new era of legality and reasonableness. A number
of high officials associated with Stalinism have been dismissed.
Along with Radkiewicz, minister of state farms, the, regime announced
on April 20 that the prosecutor general, the minister of justice and
the military prosecutor were dismissed. The ministers of culture
and foreign affairs and finally Deputy Premier Berman, a politburo
member and formerly one of the ruling triumvirate in Poland, were
removed. Party leaders imprisoned during the Stalin era have been
released, and many of them rehabilitated.
Hungarian Party members have been inspired to similar dissidence
by the Soviet de-glorification of Stalin. A central committee meeting
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shortly after the 20th Congress reportedly took place in an atmos-
phere of recrimination against first secretary Rakosi. High-level
factionalism has continued, Rakosius posthumous rehabilitation of
Laszlo Rajk,A former foreign minister purged and executed as a TTitoist
in 194,9., has stimulated rather than quelled opposition elements.
Nor has kosiOs self-critical speech of 18 May appeased his opponents,
Following the first wave of reaction within the satellites to
the Kremlings attack on Stalin, the Communist leaders have moved to
reassert Party discipline, It is evident that Moscow must play a de-
cisive role., both in establishing the line between "democratic central-
ism" and "rightist deviations c? and in settling factional struggles.
Su.slov has already been dispatched to Hungary to resolve the dispute
over Rakosils leadership, Ultimately Moscow must also settle the
question of leadership in Poland., where opposing groups have appeareds
the two principal factions forming around Party First Secretary Ochab.,
who wishes to stop the process of liberalization by any means, and
Premier Cyrankiewicz., who evidently is encouraging open discussion
and criticism. And it is by no means certain that Moscowg s decision
will be accepted without a struggles since criticism of Khrushchev
and the Soviet Union is prevalent in the Polish Communist Party.
Beyond the immediate confusion and dissidence created in the
satellites by the downgrading of Stalin lies the continuing problem
of restoring monolithic leadership from the Kremlin, All, his words
about "Leninist principles99 will not conceal Khrushchev?a heavy hand
when it reappears upon the Party apparatus e The subsequent disillu.-
siorunent may cause serious repercussions within the Communist world,
And any tremors emanating from the continued power struggle in the
Kremlin would atilt further shake the foundations of the satellite
Parties
In the nations outside the Soviet orbits the new line is an im-
mediate source of embarrassment to Communist leaders., most of whom
are wail-known devotees of Stalin. The leadership in Western Europe
and the United States have evidenced genuine shook and confusion.
This appears to be a price the Soviets are willing to pay for the
privilege of claiming the respectability which the image of Stalin
had denied to the Party, The Communists may be expected to assign
all their past betrayal, of popular and democratic causes to Staling s
personal er?r?ors,
Communists in the West may also be expected to engage in a
variety of superficial moves to dispel the impression that they are
tools of Moscow. Togliatti has already published his manifesto urg-
ing the Italian Comm'uriist Party to work out its own way of life and
asserting that the Soviet Union is not the only model for the con-
struction of socialist society, He has further advertised his inn-
dependence by criticizing the Soviet leaders for not sufficiently
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emphasizing Sta1invs good works. The French Communist leadership
has followed with a similar, although weaker and more hesitant, show
of independence.
To some e :tent these national, Party leaders are voicing the real
indignation of the rank-and-file at Khrr.shchev4 s d is elosurres s, and their
own displeasure at the fact that these disclosures came from the cap-
italist press rather than the Party. As in the satellites, intelli-
gence reports indicate that publication of the speech threw off the
Kremlin timetable for gradual "education" of the local Parties on the
realities of the post-6talin era. The Khru.shr hev bombshell has ex-
acerbated factionalism in the national Parties.
The new drive to create popular fronts in the Western democracies
may provide the Communist leadership with a useful outlet for inner
Party tensions. It is significant that Togliatti, while criticizing
the Soviet leaders., called for a 94new drive of the Socialist society
in every direction on a wide, healthy, democratic base." In Italy,
in France and in the other West :rir. na loins, the imne ..ate goal of
the Comnurnists is to convince Socialists, youth, labor and intellec-
tuals that they may safely work with a pt cif i ed Communist movement
to promote liberal reforim and progressive causes.
This Commara st appeal may meet with some acceptance among leftist
elements, especially if nominal. shifts of leadership and other 11de-
Stalinnization" moves are made by the Party. Much depends upon how
well the liberals understand the real aims of the Khrushchev regime.
For if they believe that ,a new order has really emerged in the Kremlin,
they may not be alarmxed by the prospect of increased Communist influ-
ence in their o n governments.
At the 20th Party Congress, and on numerous subsequent occasions,
it has been made abundantly clear that the Soviet leaders are not
prepared to accept left-virng collaboration on any tees short of
complete Commnist domination. Nikoyan in his major speech serTed
notice that "progressive ideas can exist only in the Communist Party.9l
Khrushchev, in a public speech at the Congress, said that once the
Comm~mis-,-led working class had captured a parliamentary majority,
legislative bodies could then be transformed into "genuine instruments
of the peoples g w i1' ' neanning, obviously, tools of the Party dicta-
torship.
That basic Stalin concepts for seizing control have undergone
no fundamental change is further demonstrated by refeaenaes at the
Congress and subsequently to "the peaceful transition to socialism."
The Estonian delegate to the Congress, Ivan Kebins, pointed to the
past decade in the Baltic: nations as p-roof that it is possible,
under certain conditions., for power to become peacefully transferred
to the working people for the implementation of radical social reforms,"
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Czechoslovakia was similarly cited by Mikoyan as a nation where the
transition to socialism had been accomplished by 4tpeaceful41 means.
Although Party functioning demands that doctrine and tactics be
spelled out for the membership in this way,, both the Kremlin and the
local Party leadership will skillfully mask these stated objectives
in appealing to the non-Communist left.
The Communist threat to the Western democracies will remain
critical until such time as the continued Soviet objective of world
domination is widely recognized by Western liberals., or until a new
disillusion is promoted by still another ugly demonstration of the
rottenness at the core of the Communist system.
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