PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE IN RELATION TO THE BERLIN SITUATION IN 1952

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP62-00865R000200140001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: November 11, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 7, 1998
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 8, 1952
• Content Type: REPORT

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SECURITY INFORMATION
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OCT 29 l9S25X1A8a
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PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFAU,j; IN ILLATION
TO THE BEHLIN SITUATION IN 1952
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Date Completed: 8 August 1952
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191,1611,
SECVITYINFORATION
CONTENTS
,
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE IN RELATION
TO THE BERLIN SITUATZON IN 1952
I. The Problem
II. Scope and Limitation
II/,., Summary
IV. Discussion
I Reference to Points (a) and (b) of the Request
Basic Contradiction of Soviet Policy in GermiA7
Ao In General.
B. In Berlin
2. Psychological Vulnerabilities of Soviet Policy in Germany
A. In General
Bo In Berlin
30 Implications for Psychological Warfare in the Bypatsing
of West Berlin .
A. Railways
Bo Canals
C. Local Transit
D. Travel between Sectors
E, Telephone... Telegraph
F. Sewage
I_!!!n.grMill.talSa11121.2E1110.1tEga
46 The Morale of West Berlin
V. Motes
VIc Appendim
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smear*.
I. The Problem
I
.4
Requeet was. made by PY/Intelli?genceeControl No. 28, June 16 1952
concerning the following points:
(a) 'The FY aime and implications which steew from phyeical
acts of bypassing Berlin. Such intelligence on physical factors
Le therefore needed in order that we may respond tee.coUnteract?
or forestall, the dieeernible'aims of the other side.'"
(b) "The FY vulnerabilities exposed in the other side in
their encircleMent of Berlin, Which vulnerabilities may have .
been produced among their own people" by certain acts suchas
digging of canals across private property, conscription Of labor?
use of child and momarelabor? of .East German Militarytormation
deprivation of utilitiesi,and.of work e travel permits, etce.
(a) "How effective will the Berlin 'encirclement be in
Causing West Berliners to mentally capitulate to the Soviet
eyeteen
Scope and Lirdtat_ions
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Material used: .11.1411.01, CIA Library material, CIA Cables euid
OCI Reports? ORR information, current newspaper clipping service,:
files of East and West German newspapers and magazines, Unclassified
literature on the Berlin airlift of 1948/49 and on Berlin,p economic
conditions?
Sutmam
The chief vulnerability of Soviet policy in Germany telewit from
the inherent contradiction Of two objectives: (1) the subjugation
of Eastern Germany to the interests of the Kremlin by Making it a .
fully integrated satellite; (2) the utilizatisn of Eastern Germany
as a base for attracting all Germany into the Soviet orbit by appealing
to national and neutralist 1eanings6 While Soviet eats reflect the
pursuit of the first aim, Soviet propaganda tries to conceal and
becloud the true intentions The tack of our propaganda is, therefore,
to unmask Soviet duplicity, particularly by alleging the parallel facts
in other eubjusated areas. :The measures taken by the Soviets in Berlin
lend themselves, in many ways to such an exposure,.
The prognosis for the morale of West Berlin is favorable, since
the same reasons which operated during the 1948/49 blockade are still
Valid, as long as Berlin feels itself sustained by the West6
, eibiNINONei
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1. Basic Contradiciorg of Soviet!Poliox_in Gertrav:
A. In Gsnerak
? _ _
?
. .
The psychological imPlications of the Berlin sitnation
have tp be visualimed in relation to the general ,trend of SoViet
policy in Germany. . ?
. ,
. _ . . . .
Soviet policy in Germany Seems to purnue two aiOn.l.
. . , .
. (1) Complete satellimation, SovistimetiCt, amleconomic
ana military integration of the GDR along the line of the other
,
'Teeples
,
(2) The mare impartant aim of uming the GDR am a base
CO7 attracting all Germany into the Soviet Obit. The achievement of
th.'3,n goal would prohably decide the struggle -for Europe in favor of
USSR.
1
Both ga0415 are contradictory at the present stage since
they cannot be panned with fal-intensity at the same timevet'least
an long as the latter atm -- that of -winning over ill-GermtlY-- ham
to be pursued by psychological Means'.
. . .
- Sovi4isation involves:, in great Meanure, theisolaticn
and seclusi n of the country and the -removal of parte-in strata of ,...'
society from their economic and so-dial-position. Howeverv'every itep
tomards final -separation of Eastern GerManY--fro4 the Western Zone and
itn fullintgration with the USSR is apt to antagonize many people
ih Western Germany and to .increase the tacit'resistanee within the GDR.
The striving for unity in Germany is so strong that it et be made
basic theme of all propaganda. -
Because of this contradiction? the process of ioviet1Mation
in the GDR lags far behind that in the other' satellites and.. is only
in the initial stage of.the typical politi$1? eocialt'and military ,
developftent. -
For the?sams reason? -Soviet propaganda conceals the intenp
tion of sealing off and integrating Haat Gerniany, and depicts the steps
toward full severance as mere apicedes in the fight for Getman unity,
a fight' allegedly necessitated by Western aggression.' It /so therefore?
Soviet nolicy to incite the West to reactionswhich can in turn be
denounced as- provocations.
Moreover, Soviet propaganda holds out the promise of a
retreat from the preeent.degree-ef sovietization if there should be a
neutralization or 4 united GerMany.
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Xn Perlin
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.As An .the over-all German popitioreacantradiction
prevails in the Berlin Situation. TWenomalout: Position or Berlin,
having its origin in an arrangement .based on the. idea of temporary
eondeminium, has been rendered permanent by Soviet pOlicy. As 44
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island within a closed Soviet state, Berlin is a.iouree of incessant
annoyance: an unwanted leak in Soviet information eederity, and 4..
point of.communication and interchange with the West, ' Berlin is the
economic and administrative center of the GDR and its'foreigrn-controlled
Western sector a serious obstacle in the way of full eoVietitation of
lectern Germany. In view of the impending armament, the steady stream
of defectors to the West Zone, especially Of youth.of militarr ago:).
will hardly be tolerablejNote l). The Over-all Soviet objective as
long as the West sector exinets, is, therefore, to loolate'the Wept'
Sector from its immediate 'hinterland", to dry it up, to encYct:it
likcna foreign body within a living organism, in order to reduce it
'wore and more to an artificial enclave Which will be abandon ea ac
meaningless in time, ? ?
. This cannot lee,toldlljamemalcLeLllegali,J Before
the war, the popuralon of both sectors was.to'a large extent econdmi-
.
cally dependent upon the function of Berlin as a 'capital *CO141
not only of all Germany, but of Central Europe as well,. For the
Berliner it was a "Weltstadt", an international emporium: not merety:
a venter of administration enthose'provinces which now form the GDR.
(Note 2) Berlin is a symbol of German unity and with the exception of
the clique ruling the East Zen, every one of itacitizens:weeld
uttnrly resent final separation from We tern Germagr, :
.
As a matter of fact, the Initiative for separation lay
with the SovietmeWho are reeponaible for the blockade, the severance .
of the city administration and its utilities, as accomplished in 1949,
(liate 3), the division of the industry, and the restriction Of inter-,-
zone communication to and from*work. It requireli angreat measure of. '
persuasion to publicize these acts as epieodes in the fight for unity
.(Notem4): and to blaMe the other side for hepeesitating such acts, a
line of prepagandamot very likely to impress Berliners who had been
-eaposed to similar reasoning at the time of Goebbels?
2 Vulnerabilitios of Soviet Poliy in Gera
A. in General
(1) Our propaganda should denounce the insincerity
Of Soviet unity propaganda, stressing the consistent trend of full
economic and military subjugation 'to the interests of the USSR as a new
avow
leg el I 114TfTIV Twa," mien
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gmenetiat.
saricumerpoilmimemenr
form of colonialism practiced againit Western populations. It
should point Out the typical pattern of the sovietisation procedure'
followed in the other satellite 'elates.
(2) Propaganda uhoOld turn to the groups of popula-
tion, hitherto spared in the pit, as farmers, middle class people, ?
and religions groups, showing What :fate is in stere for them, in
case of full sovietization as practiced in the USSR and the satellites,'
(3) It should pdintlo the past acts of rape and
plunder, the ever-lasting drain of reparations fran current prodUc-
tic% the forced resettlmeht of specialists, the exploitation of
war prisoners's, and the Order-644dsse frontier. 0 proof that 'Soviet
IM?
licY in guided by exclusive Soviet !twat; fhterestao
(4) It Should denounce the GOR Five Year Plan as .
devised to meet Soviet Bussianintereate, peintinz, cut the economic
wastefulness, from thelitandpoint.of German unity in building' up
the East Zone industry. (Note 5)
(5) It Should show the discrepancybetween Soviet
words and deeds and the purpose behind apparent concessions and
the: advocacy of neutralism in the struggle for domination of all.
Gamakr.
(6) It Should contrast the unity propaganda with
the actual effort to transform the German interzonal border into
an international boundary with all thq Ireceeserieee Soviet border
fortificationassuch as dead zones, watch towers search lights,
blood hounds, etc. .
Bo In Berlin
(1) Our propaganda should harp on the fact that
all actions of separation were initiated by the Soviets, and that
the policy of harrasement and chicaneries is designed to create
an atmosphere conducive to further separation.
(2) That the Soviet polinY in feat nios at
reducing Berlin to the provincial capital of the Bast Zone.
(3) That the polisy of bypassing West Berlin is
not only a nuisance but a costly waste from the point of view of
German unity,"
millOINOM11.10.4144111.1
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4W*T11-71WV Varreajwasm
(4) That the establishment'of two separate town
administrations is.?likewise economic waste. ?
That the hurried construction of railways)
-8-Dahn-lines) and canals results in low quality work.
. (6) that Berlin at preaent still iats a Orefor
ential treatment in comparison with other iron-curtain
arvas because of its?eAyosure to the *5st and ihat prefer-
ential.treatment of border diStricte is an old Communist
device (see Note 6).
t'lleMPPImiglIPPOIPIONION
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aSPOPRIOMPLICIONFOrlfP.
3. Iedeeations for Peyeteejoeical Warfare in the Dv-feassing
of Ost Berlin
A. Railroads
Building of peripheral rail lines around Berlin
was otarted chiefly for military reasons ae early a6:1900: The
German railroad net had to bar* Ad demeans of speedy transportation
Of troops from East to West. This policy-waa centinued during *meld
War XX. Th Soviets took over where the Neeis had, left off, The
outer half circle around Berlin was completed in July 1951 by fill-
ing in the aiming section Karow-Oranieltemand rebuilding the
section BieeenhoreteKarow* WhiCh the Russians, had dismehtled in
1945* both to the Northeast, (State WOG* 134 Deep #2931 Oct. 17*
1951). Since the existing outer freighting cut through three milee
(5 km.) of the U. S. teeter* a Parallel line of 15 miles (24 km.)
wa built to the doeth of Berlin between Grosebeeren and Scanefeld.
The latter required the erection of 29 bridges and
the laying of 79 miles (126 km) Of rails which were taken from
other lines. The' work would have required two years under regular
procedure* butegs completed in eight months. There were 4500 persons,,
among them activist groups* put to work* 40% women* ? working in three
shifts* day and night, After finishing an July ]LQ, '195l a breakdown
occurr. which was repaired by September 15* 1951 4HIG0G* &Se Deep.
#293* Oct. 17, 3.951).
As far at the paeeengezetraffic is-ad:learned* the
? existing 'terminal etatione of the several cOrerginirlines will be
replaced by a central station -.Friedrich-Strae e eAm the East.
-sector.
Fe eh lo ical vulnerabilities: The conetruction
of new lines is not d ctated,by requirements of traffic* but by
strategic considerations. The wastefulness and senselessness of
allmthe efforts in hastening the construction of the Grossbeeren-
Schonefeld parallel stretch is obvious.
B. panels
? Barge traffic: ha' one of the foundations of
the economic positien ef-Baain.eThe Construction of canals dates
'back to the 18th century; The main E1bee0der canal cuts through the,
West Sector and is liable to interruption as a Western countermeadure
agal at closing the canals connecting Wept Berlin With West Germany. ?
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WNW in?
It was decided on Apri1,190 1951 by East German
authorities (allegedly on Soviet order) to build a new canal,
which would mainly follow the route of the existing Paretz-
Niederneuendorf Canal, measuring 2/.5 mi (36 kin) in length, and
bypassing entirely the West Sectoi: to the West and North.
The official motivations for its construction was
to speed up traffic between the Elbe and the Oder.
Yet, according to West German experts, no time will
actually be saved. West German observers maintain that one of the
purposes of the construction of the canal was the concealment 'from
the Berlin population of the true amount of bulk reparation goods
shipped to the UO3R by canal transport.
Althibugh the Paretz-Niederneuendorf Canal follows
mainly the course of an old canal used at present for drainage
purposes and of the river Brieselang0 10 mi (16 km) of its 22.5 ml
(36 km) required enlargement and deepening (proposed width c. 10 ft .0
depth c. 10 ft.), and the construction of 12.5 mi (20 km) of embank-
ments, several locks, bridges, and underpasses? as well as pumping
stations and dams to a old flooding of the adjacent area. .The work
commenced in May 1951, encountered "unforeseen" difficulties, such
as high water, frozen ground, drifting sand, lack of spare parts
of the dredges, and difficulties in transportation. In August-
September 1951, the Work was placed under immediate Russian control
(Neuo Zeitung, September 240 1951)9 with a Russian as chief director
who worked with three interpreters. The censtruction which would
require three years under regular conditions was performed with
unreasonable speed, the original deadline being May 150 1952. The
canal was officially opened on June 28, 19520 but nettling of the
ground at the Schonewald lock prevented its being put in operation
(OGI 64439 J47280 190). ?A time lag of several months between
the opening date and the actual use is expected by local observers,
Part of the work was done by private contractors, part by the East
German Chief Directorate of Navigation.
Labor conditions were under criticism by East and
West German papers. Women and tannage workers were employed. The
East press reported proudly that 2,000 pairs of shoes, and a large
quantity of work clothing and sporting goods had been distributed
among the working force (State HICOG #790? March 26, 1952).
Except from certain
labor difficulties, no reports on the use of forced labor, youth
organizations or paramilitary formations, or the expropriation of
land in connection with the construction, could be traced. The
hardships mentioled above are probably overshadowed now by the
pressure of recruiting for the uranium mines, the imminent "Service
for Germany" (Washiggton Post July 298 1952), the general resentment
against the speed-up practices (Hennecke workers), the piecework
system with ever-increasing norm requirements, etc.
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The construction of the Paretz-Niedernetortdog:. -
Canal is not economically juetified.f It is doubtful:11-gm fe
will save trahsportation time, and it is essentially of strategic
and political character. the hast i construction resulted in
defective work.
C. Local Transit.
25X1A2g
A new S-Bahn line from Oranienbur
being surveyed to bypass the Western Sector
1952). The Reichebahn is committed to complete the work within six
month ' - - . r ii-, LJ!uIv 25X1A2g
Ps cholo ical vulnerabilitiest, the separation of
the local transit results in a 3 owdown and cOmPlication of the
'irate% and is a waste *foram and work.
O. Travel betweesa Sectors
The traffic between sectors Lavin general ehreitiiiiod.
Yet there is pressure on West ,Sector workers employed in the at
Sector to move to the East Sector, and t cotplets closing is feared
(Christian Science Mem. July 10, 1952).
. The ban on visiting real property of West Berliners
situated in the East Zone is particularly ruthless because it hits'
--4hiefly holders of small vegetable garden plots and week end houses,
who are mainly workmen and retired people. Undoubtedly, deeply
resented in both sectors is the ban on visiting cemeteries by
mourners and the inspection of coffins at the sector border.
Applications for visiting garden plots must be submitted two to
three weeks in advance (Telegram, June 29, 3.952)0
.2_11421cedulnerabilities: All these chicaneries
originate exclusively with the GDR authorities and are likely to be
increased with the Zaat'German rearmament. It is characteristic
that they are directed mainly against workers, the unemployed, and
the old aged. -
Z.
Cables connecting the West Sector with Western Germany
cross the Zest Zone, while the Zest Sector is likewise serviced by
cables cutting through the West Sector. During the blockade the
cable of the West Sector were not interrupted by the Soviets, since
.sichassolionmerrm
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the U. S. commandant threatened retaliation; At present traffic
from Seat Berlin is routed through the Saet Zone. Since May 27, 1952
long dis4p 41s from the East Zeno have been routed through
Leipzig
25X1A2g
. _EnahapAUALplgerakillUese .Slowdown of comment
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cations and waste.
F. &ME!
Cutting off the West Sector froM the sewage disposal
plants which are situated in the Sast Sector and Last Zone Would
involve a sanitary hazard to the entire population of the town and
ale? deprive the East Zeno of the proceeds from the sale of methane
gas produced by the clarification plants. Obiervere, therefore,
doubt that the East will deny West Berlin the use of the sewage
disposal plants 25X1A2g.
4. TheAcg:42_0_r__i qne West a tipi
In a recent Department of State estimate, the following
conclusion was reached:
"So long as living standards can be met in West Berlin, the
population of the three Western sectors of the city? will remain impervious
to Soviet and/or GDR threats, harassment and blockade. There appears to
be no method by which West Berlin may be brought under Soviet control
save by the use of force, so long as these standards can be maintained
(3tate? DRW? June 9, 1952, Intelligence Estimate #40). 25X1 A2g
Another report is
less optimistic: "Separation from the West in a complete or partial
blockade would probably result in a gradual drop of morale as time went
by." This estimate was based on the consideration that the blockade of
1948/49 was much dramatised," and a replay of the same theme would fall
pretty flat," and that deprivations would hit more at present because
the standard of living is much higher than three years ago.
But most observers are convinced that West Berliners would
brave another blockade as long as they were sutficiently supported by
the West Zone and the Western powers.
The initial stockpiles are now considerably higher (during
the blockade, they amounted to food or one month, coal for 45 days; now
the average is for six months, and another airlift is considered technically
feasible.
moSErLiP!'"
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ka.:Juui1J.J.J. J.kir UliMATIUN
The main liability.is unemPloyment in the West sector,
which would be largely increased by lack er raw Materials. A counter
blockade would be less efficient owing to,the bypassing countermeasures
and because asendlingthas-become:more dithoult. A large part of the
population are dependent in their living :standards on utilization of
the margin between West and East currencies. on Western unemployment.
pay in "hard" Western marks, they can often bey as much in the iastern
sector as their working Eastern Colleagues.(Manchester Guardian, Weekly?
July 10, 1952).
Yet, as to the morale of the West Berliner% 'whose endurance
and resourcefulness was decisive for the success of the airlift, the
same reasons obviously prevail now as they did three years ago. For
one thing, after the humiliating defeat in World War 1I0 Berlin has
felt again the taste of a major politital victory, It was not merely
fla victory over the Russian and Germah Communiets? but a victory within
the German camp, by which the role of Berlin as the future German
capital has been re-establiehed. After 1945, many people in Germany
had felt that the center of new Germany should be removed from the
Prussian Berlin to the West. Chancellor Adenauer was accused by his
opponents of having shared that view.
Whatever may be said for another German city.as the capital
of Germany from the point of view of German civilization, the issue was
decided in favor of Berlin. After 1950, Chancellor Adenauer expredsedly
spoke of Berlin as Germaayns future capital and the recent "Convention
on Relation, Between the Three Powers and the Federal German Re ublic"
affirms in its Annex A, the status of Berlin as the future capital.
Furthermoko? several actions by the Unitea States and the German Federal
Republic served to improve the economic situation of West Berlin. These
actions include &RP, tax and freight rate privileges, federal aid and
guarantees, and the encouragement of investments in West Berlin.
Although precisely these subsidizing measures show the
unsound economic'position of isolated West Berlin, they stress the role
of Berlin as the symbol of German unity. ?
After the experience of the exclusive Soviet domination
immediately following 1945 with the period of plundering, rape, and
wholesale dismantling, after the falsified fusion of the 4061 Democratic
and Communist parties, and after the great hardships of the blockade,
West Berlin stands firmly behind its forceful mayor, Dr. Reuter. There
was in all elections a much smaller Communist vote than before Hitler.
The proximity of the East Zone, which permits no 'illusion about Soviet
conditions, and the sense of fighting for its existence as a city of
world importancehave produced an aggressive fighting spirit which finds
its expression in organizations like that of the Free German Jurists,
and in the violent reaction against the kidnapping of Dr. W. Linse.
Thera is at present no place where the intellectual and political
struggle against Communism is carried on with like vigor,
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1/,; Notes
1. Rerugees from the East Zone are fleeing to West Berlin
at the rate of 10000 a dey0 five timis the daily average of last
Spring 25X1A2g
2. The textile industry located in one sector depends on the
other for processing and finishing (Howley, Frank L.0 Berlin Command,
p. 253).
3. Half of the population of Berlin used to live by eervices
,in th fields or government, finance, tourism, etc. (Oetteld1Pv*ip
Geo......mt.-ideelBerlin-rar, p. 87).
>
4o is clear to every man that at Getman authorities were
forced to this step because of sabotage and diversioniat activities
of organizetionwin West Germany." An official East German 'comment
on the occaeion of new travel restrictions, Opted in Mancheoter
Guardian; Juli 23,1952.
5. The Ferro-Combinate inFlm__40L.Altp.L...sme is eupposed to get
its iron from Swed;n0 ita coal from Poland. The Ferto-Ubrk
Busckenberet will make coke out of lignite. "Almoat a -quarter of,
a billion marks is spent for installations which would have no
jUstifieetion in a united Germany. (Publication of the Investigation
? Committee of Free German Lawyers, "Audder Zone des Unrechts",
'-ea:ShmmeInuoMefA46323e4041-147-1952i5771 0"
6. The rations in East Berlin are higher than in the reAaining
Eaet Zone.
7. Details on the Pereta-Niwderneuemderfanal.in the East
German journel !Der Verkehe or Oete 17, 1951? in an aitias by
Dipl. Inge Ot.) Klaus, a translation of Which ieeUeluded-in State
Hicog EE Deip. 293; of October 27a 1952. ' ? '
?? 8. It is not permitted in the East Zone to leave a hems for
more than 24 hours without telling the police, according to a law
issued at the end of July 1952 (New York Times), Jay 300 1952).
9. Compare the memoirs of Brig. Gene, Frank L. Howley, Commandant
of the U. S. Sector during the blockade (at present Chanceller of
New York University): "Never in history had the Germans known their
minds so cl arly, never had they stood so firm against one occupying
power. It would be rair to Bey that, In the three Western Sectors;
the people were not so !math Wand their officiale aa behind the
Western powers that eustained them (Berlin Command, N. I, 19500 1:1, 257)."
?Also, Lowell Bennett, Berlin Bastion Frankfort, 1951, p. 75: There
Was "no serious crace in the morale" during the blockade.
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.VI. APPePdbi
MOM
SiTINIPTTV TAWADIAmrtn
1. The Office of Current Intelligence has made tte following
observations regarding the psychological vulnerabilities of the
Communist position in Berlin:
a0 lon&-standing vulnerabilities of Commun!.sts in East
Germany (e.g., to the Charges of violation of pst-waragrenments
by the Russians, of complete Soviet domination, of &est Gerain
subjugation to Soviet economic needsvetc., et.) are not open
to fuller exploitation than heretofore, the Russians oitansibly
move toward the satellization of gest Germany. (The rape of
Berlin by Russian 'soldiers? Soviet kidnippinqs, and the sasure
of German property by the Russians Probably:Ail; exciteu
more anger on the part of Berliners than more recent ovinti;)
. .
b. .the weaknesses of the Communist position in Berlin are
part of the general vulnerability of theil. position An all of
Germany and should be exploited As such; '
c, the rapidity with whidh apparent changes are now being
made offers a particularly fortuitous time to exploit an
atmosphere of uncertainty. '
, 2. It As the. conviction of OCI, based an intelligence luforma-
tion at hand of current develepments in Reit Germany, that The
following general gubjects'effer the greatest opportunities for
psychological exploitation.in the nearfuture:
a. East German rearmament: (1) 0 Rast German ,"national
army" cannot be accamp1ia7Cathout &ascription and general
military service for East German youth'. (2) The likelihood of
conscription. and compulsory military service has been made
necessary by the failure to win Voluntary recruits .in sufficient
numbers. (3) Registration is the first .step toward conscription,
or,? toward a system of neap7compu3,sory fulfillment ,of "voluntary"
quotas of recruits. (4) The ;officer Corps of the new national '
army will be made up of the ex-Nazi and Wehrmacht wit.tary .
figures?.now being tie obviously doilrted..(5) .An 'Sae. German
national am will be German Only in name: an gaet German.Ar
will produce an gaet German 110kossoveky, whose primr.ry interests..
will Joie Soviet cannon-fodder. (6). The cost of East German
rearmament will be borne by Rest Germans - arms will be squeezed'
from the economy at the expense of consumption, .reconstruction,
en4 Ream0a tAlmOmmto. ?
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Sanitized - Approved For Release ? CIA-RDP62-00865R000200140001-6
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b. East German isolation: (1) The Sovietization of Sapt
Germany is raising new obstacles* the reunifiCatien of Germany.
(2) .Sast German reaction to the iinitialling of the contractual
and SDC agreevients it, in its vikence significant of. an East
German desire to excuse an intention to accept the permanently
divided status of Germany and to carry out the communization
. of that part of Germany under Soviet domination. (3) The
desire of the East German government to erect barriere against
the West is significant of the. desires of the East German's in
contrast with:the West to close rather than to leave -Open the..
lines of communication between East and West. (4) The speed
with Which East German leaders are proceeding with the isolation
of their country is significant of their feara a their own
'personal demises in the event a free unification of Germany
. should come about. (5) Isolation is a sign'ef fear, and the
knowledge that East German policies can be Carried out only in
isolation from its criticism and observation of the West.
(6) Zest German isolation cannot be accomplished without
disrupting the lives of all East Germans: the evaddation of
border restents; the prohibition of interzonal travel; the
expropriation of land; the disruption of all contacts between
East and West,
t. East German communization: (1) Sat German "democrati-
zation" willbe.Sr) The reorganization of the
government is the admission of political and econcimicfailures
on the part of the East German government. (3) "Reorganization"
is another name for "communization": . the abolition of tradi-
tional administrative organs, the formation of doordinating
committees, the creation of inner cabinets is designed to
monopolise political power by the SSD. (4) East German re-
organization is preparing the exit for bourgeois .political
activity: the Pankow government cannot elate *Ads approval
while preparing the arrest of no&-Communist "leadere on trurarcd-
up charges Of espionage. (5) "Reorganization" Will penetrate.
throughout Seat German life:: the Bast Zone church will be'
tolerated
,tolerated only se long AS it serves Communist purpote6,-ane
:recent attacks upon Protestants and Catholice alike pOtnt tJ
the trend. (6) "Reorganization" means collectivization: in
agriculture,, in industry, and in labor, with all the con,equenees
for East German citizens in loss Of freedom, dieruptionof
established social patterns, and deteriorating living Ecandards.
, .
d. East German Sovietization: (l) East German leaders, to
retain 01171WSIEIGWETTO subscribe to Soviet foreign
policy including subscription to the Oder-Reissc dioiaion0
afGadit
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afieirffint
4141~1IMOIMOVITATEI
(2) The Russians have not offre4 to leave East Germany and
will wi not make such an offer: . .he symbol of Satellization is
the acceptance of Soviet controls, remote Or otherwise, in,.
perpetuity. (3) An East GermarreSoviet Contractual arrange-
ment, if it is ever offered, would centinUe Soviet domination
in a different form. (4) Symbolic Of Sovietization is the
enlistment of East Germany in a phony 'peace campaign while
proclaiming rearmament - a phenomenon typical of the Soviet
Orbit. (5) "Soviet models" means the abandonment of tradi-
tional German perms - a century of traditienal Gerimea legal
codes will noto'Se junked for the lawlessnesof the kidnapper
and the rule of the Alice state.
. Lei
e.ee.......a._._...mntee.EastGezl: -Atter seven year:: of intensive
activity, the Russians 4ed their East German puppet leaders
-
have been compelled to admit failure in every OM of their
major objectives: they have failed to achieve'Conieenist domi-
,Alation,ot all of Germany; they have failed to drive the West
from Western Berlin; they have failed to prevent the re-entry
of a free Germany into the.family.of Free Western Nations.
They will now fail to foreclOie the Possibility of, 4 re-
united but free 411-German nation.
aSagigamliampaibtawep
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